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Re: Excellent host SYN-attack fix for BSD hosts
Granville Moore (granville_moore
il.us.swissbank.com)Mon, 14 Oct 1996 13:31:47 +0100
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"Charles M. Hannum" <mycroftmit.edu> writes: > Avi Freedman <freedman
netaxs.com> writes: > > > > > No state is kept locally; when a SYN is received, an ISS is generated that > > contains a few bits for reference into a table of MSS values; window size > > and any initial data is discarded; and the rest of the ISS is the MD5 > > output > > of a 32-byte secret and all of the interesting header info. > This doesn't seem to deal with window scaling, which is a big lose on > high-bandwidth networks. It also breaks TCP's algorithm for > recognizing stale data. I don't understand why window scaling would be a problem, since the window size isn't included in the MD5, but I believe that the stale data issue can be addressed by using a "rolling secret". By changing the 32-byte secret, say every minute, retaining the old secret for one minute, and checking incoming packets against both, you can be sure that if a packets check out OK against either, then the original SYN must have been processed within the last 2 minutes. Each ACK sent is good for at least one minute (even if the secret changes immediately after it's generated). If the variation in the timeout (1-2 minutes) isn't acceptable, it can be reduced by changing the secret more often, and retaining more old versions on a rolling basis (e.g. changing every 10 seconds, retaining 6 old copies would give a timeout of between 60 and 70 seconds). By checking against old versions in an "intelligent" order (decreasing order of hit-frequency would seem good), it should be possible to minimise the overhead of multiple MD5 calculations. Regards, Granville ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Granville Moore granville.moore
swissbank.com Perot Systems at SBC Warburg, London Nothing in this message represents the views of SBC Warburg or Perot Systems -----------------------------------------------------------------------
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