Neohapsis is currently accepting applications for employment. For more information, please visit our website www.neohapsis.com or email firstname.lastname@example.org
Subject: SCO OpenServer SNMPD vulnerability
From: NAI Labs (seclabsNAI.COM)
Date: Mon Feb 07 2000 - 22:34:29 CST
- Next message: Ari Gordon-Schlosberg: "Re: recent 'cross site scripting' CERT advisory"
- Previous message: Dylan Griffiths: "Re: Evil Cookies."
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Network Associates, Inc.
February 7, 2000
SNMPD default writable community string
The default configuration of SCO OpenServer 5.0.5 allows local users
read/write access to SNMPD via a default writable community string.
This configuration has been verified on SCO OpenServer 5.0.5 and may
be present in earlier versions.
SNMP(S.imple N.etwork M.anagement P.rotocol) is a protocol suite
used to manage information obtained from network entities such as
hosts, routers, switches, hubs, etc. A management station collects
the information from these various network entities via SNMP variable
querys. Information events called traps can also be sent from
entities to managment stations notifying the station of critical
changes such as changes to interface status, packet collisions, etc.
These domains of SNMP managment stations and entities are grouped
togather in what are called communities. The community name (called
the community string) is used as the authentication method used for
information retrieval/traps. There are 2 types of community strings
read(public), and write(private). A read community has privilages
to retrieve variables from SNMP entities and a write community has
privilages to read as well as write to entity variables.
The problem lies in that the default installation of SCO OpenServer
5.0.5 has snmpd enabled with a default write(private) community string.
SCO has released a security bulletin for this vulnerability, which can
be found at: http://www.sco.com/security.
SNMPD, run on startup by SCO OpenServer 5.0.5, is configured by
default with a writable(private) community string. This allows any
local user full administrator access to the SNMPD facility. The potential
abuses of this privelege include the ability to modify hostname,
network interface state, IP forwarding and routing, state of network
sockets (including the ability to terminate active TCP sessions and
listening sockets) and the ARP cache. An attacker also has full read
access to all SNMP facilities.
The community string definitions can be found in /etc/snmpd.comm
Remove/modify these strings and restart snmpd. Alternatively, if your
site does not use SNMP, kill snmpd and remove it from system startup
Discovery and documentation of this vulnerability was conducted by
Shawn Bracken <shawn_brackennai.com> at the security labs of Network
ABOUT THE NETWORK ASSOCIATES SECURITY LABS
The Security Labs at Network Associates hosts some of the most
important research in computer security today. With over 30 security
advisories published in the last 2 years, the Network Associates
security auditing teams have been responsible for the discovery of
many of the Internet's most serious security flaws. This advisory
represents our ongoing commitment to provide critical information to
the security community.
For more information about the Security Labs at Network
Associates, see our website at http://www.nai.com or contact us
NETWORK ASSOCIATES SECURITY LABS PGP KEY
- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: PGP 5.5.5