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Subject: Corel Linux 1.0 local root compromise
From: suidSUID.KG
Date: Fri Feb 25 2000 - 00:28:36 CST

suidsuid.kg - Corel xconf utils local root (among others) vulnerability.

Advisory Author: suidsuid.kg
Software: Corel Linux 1.0 xconf utilities
URL: http://linux.corel.com
Version: Version 1.0
Platforms: Corel Linux only.


        Local users can take advantage of lack of input validation and
        the lack of privilege dropping to gain root access, or perform
        a denial of service attack on Corel Linux systems.


        There are multiple vulnerabilities. I know I have missed some
        here. For example, I saw some /tmp files being used with the
        return value of time(NULL) as an attempt at selecting a unique
        filename. I haven't written these up here however.

        (1) Appending garbage XF86Config data to any file on the system

            /sbin/buildxconf does no input validation and is setuid root.
            Invoking it with the -f argument, a user can specify a filename
            to output to. Example /etc/shadow.

        (2) Replacing the first line of any existing file with garbage.

            As above, no input validation. When invoked with the -x
            command buildxconf replaces the first line of the specified
            file with the path/filename of an X server. An effective
            denial of service against /etc/passwd root account.

        (3) Create root owned world writable files anywhere on the file system.

            Again, buildxconf does no input validation or directory
            permission checks. specifying -x or -f on a non existent
            filename creates that file mode 0666. Set your umask to 0.

        (4) Executing arbitrary commands with euid root.

            A touch different. /sbin/setxconf allows users to test X configs
            with the -T switch. This process eventually invokes xinit with
            euid root. A quick look at the xinit man page will tell you
            that xinit looks at ~/.xserverrc and will execute things in there
            while starting.

In the interests of keeping this post short I have left the rest of this
advisory off. If your interested in exploit/workaround information visit: