OSEC

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Subject: Xato Advisory: FrontPage DOS Device DoS
From: sozni (sozniXATO.NET)
Date: Wed Aug 23 2000 - 10:18:28 CDT


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                     Xato Network Security, Inc.
                            www.xato.net

                     Security Advisory XATO-082000-01
                           August 17, 2000

        FRONTPAGE SERVER EXTENSIONS SHTML.EXE DENIAL OF SERVICE

                         --DOS Device DoS--

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Systems Affected
================
FrontPage Server Extensions 1.1 for Windows 9.x, windows NT4, and Windows
2000

Overview
========
The FrontPage Server Extensions are vulnerable to a remote denial of service
attack that will disable all FrontPage operations on a web site. By
requesting
a URL that includes a DOS device name, the server extensions will hang
and will not service any further requests. To re-enable the server
extensions
requires restarting IIS or rebooting the server.

There is also a secondary problem with certain DOS device names that reveal
the
server's physical path.

Details
=======
To exploit this vulnerability, you must request a URL through the shtml.exe
component of the FrontPage Server Extensions. The URL you request must
include
a DOS device name followed with the .htm extension.

The following DOS devices will lock up the server extensions:
http://www.example.com/_vti_bin/shtml.exe/com1.htm (if the server has a
com1)
http://www.example.com/_vti_bin/shtml.exe/prn.htm
http://www.example.com/_vti_bin/shtml.exe/aux.htm

Note also that the following URL's will also have the same effect:
http://www.example.com/_vti_bin/shtml.exe/prn.anything.here.htm
http://www.example.com/_vti_bin/shtml.exe/com1.asp
http://www.example.com/_vti_bin/shtml.exe/com1.

However, the following URL's will NOT have any affect on the server:
http://www.example.com/_vti_bin/shtml.exe/prn
http://www.example.com/_vti_bin/shtml.exe/com1
http://www.example.com/_vti_bin/shtml.exe/aux

Also note that the device names MAILSLOT, PIPE, and UNC do not have the
denial
of service effect. However, they do have an interesting side-effect that
they
do return the physical path to the server.

If you send the request:
http://www.example.com/_vti_bin/shtml.exe/pipe.htm

You will receive the following error:
Cannot open "C:\InetPub\wwwroot\pipe.htm": no such file or folder.

Finally, using the device name NUL (as you would expect) returns a blank
page.

Impact
======
When one of the above URL's are sent to the server, all FrontPage operations
become disabled for that web site. If the web server hosts multiple web
sites,
only the one that received the request will become disabled.

By disabling the FrontPage Server Extensions, you block all web authoring,
web administration, WebFolders, InterDev, and WebBot operations. The server
will otherwise function normally until the IIS Service is restarted.

Note that there is another related issue when using the vti_rpc
list_documents
method that includes a reference to a DoS device. However, since one would
need authoring permissions to issue that command, it is not much of a
threat.

So how is this all important to you? Lets go over some scenarios:

SCENARIO 1: The Everlasting Hack

Suppose that Company X has a web site hosted at a large web hosting service
that allows their customers to author their sites using FrontPage. And
suppose
that as a further security precaution, that hosting service has shut off
telnet
and FTP access, forcing users to author with the FrontPage client. One day
the
CEO and the web designer get into an argument and the CEO fires the web
designer.

As a going away present, the web designer posts on the company home page
some
pictures of the CEO drunk at a company party. He then sends the site a FP
DoS
and packs up his personal belongings.

Needless to say, the CEO begins to get calls about his web site and quickly
opens his FrontPage client to undo the web designer's changes. To his
demise,
he is unable to connect to the site so he calls the tech support at the
hosting
service. The technician says that permissions seems ok and the FrontPage
extensions are working properly on all the other sites. He suggests to the
CEO
that the problem may be with his FrontPage client. The CEO panics as he
reinstalls FrontPage on his own computer and after a day of calls back and
forth,
he finally convinces one of the technicians to completely take down the
company
site until the problem is fixed. Finally, someone reads the Xato advisory
and
sees the problem and that they must completely restart the IIS server to get
the
FrontPage extensions working again.

SCENARIO 2: Bad Sales Day

Several months have passed and the CEO of Company X has learned that his
former
web designer had stolen company secrets and sold them to a competitor,
Company Y. Company Y is now ready to come out with a product using all of
Company X's ideas. The CEO of Company X is irate but instead of spending
years
in litigation, he decides to get some revenge. He notices that Company Y
uses
the FrontPage Form Bot to take product orders online. He waits until the
release date of Company Y's new product and sends the FrontPage DoS,
disabling
the order form.

By mid-morning, Company Y notices that there have been no sales at all for
their
new product. They check their web site and it seems to be up and running.
They
even browse to the order form page which also comes up properly. They spend
half the day trying to figure out why they are not getting any orders when
they
finally get an e-mail complaining that their order form gets an error when
you
click on the submit button. After a couple more hours of debugging, they
finally reboot the server, having lost nearly a whole day of sales.

SCENARIO 3: Killing the Client

But the CEO of Company X isn't finished with them yet. He keeps checking
for
the url www.company-y.com/_vti_pvt/service.lck. Once that file appears, he
knows that someone has the web site open for authoring in the FrontPage
client.
Once he sees that file, he once again sends the FP DoS. Meanwhile, the web
designer is working hard on some new designs for the web site. He has
several
pages open that he is working on and after things look just right he goes to
save his work. He clicks on save and sits there. After a minute or so
waiting,
he clicks on save again. Something is obviously wrong so he switches to a
web
browser to see if the site is up. Sure enough, it is up and running. But
now
when he switches back to FrontPage, the screen won't refresh. Eventually he
has
to use CTRL+ALT+DEL to stop FrontPage and loses all his work. Dismayed, he
starts up again and now he can't even connect to the server. Time for
another
reboot.

Solution
========
Microsoft has addressed these issues in the 1.2 version of the FrontPage
server
extensions available at:
http://msdn.microsoft.com/workshop/languages/fp/2000/winfpse.asp

Commentary
==========
Microsoft was informed of this issue on July 5, 2000. Once acknowledged,
they
asked me to not release any advisory until they had could fix the problem.
They indicated that they would include the fix in the 1.2 version of the
server extensions. Version 1.2 was released on August 15, 2000.

I was quite displeased that the release of the 1.2 extensions was rather
uneventful. There was no security bulletin, it did not show up on the
FrontPage downloads site, it could not be found at the main downloads
page at microsoft.com. There were also not any accompanying knowledge
base articles. There were five security issues addressed in the
release and yet none of them were explained and there was no mention
at www.microsoft.com/security that there were security issues that have
been addressed with this release. In other words, there are probably
hundreds of thousands of servers completely vulnerable to this DoS.

I thought it was bad enough that Microsoft sat on a known issue for so long,
yet when they finally did fix the issue it was with no notice to the
security community. It was almost as if they were hoping to sneak the
issue by without all the bad press.

And finally, speaking for myself and the others who had informed Microsoft
of security issues in FPSE 1.2, it would be nice to have been given some
credit for the issues we discovered and worked with Microsoft to resolve.
We do not do this all for credit, but we are doing this on company time
and our companies should be given proper credit for the resources freely
given to help Microsoft test and secure their software. Our companies
are paying for us to test someone else's software and credit is the
least they deserve.

Acknowledgements
================
Author: sozni (soznixato.net)
Thanks to: Royce, tgooat, xentury, Mark Burnett, Don Staheli, Aaron Shumway

This document is located at:
http://www.xato.net/reference/xato-082000-01.htm
http://www.xato.net/reference/xato-082000-01.txt

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THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS ADVISORY IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT
WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. XATO NETWORK SECURITY, INC. DISCLAIMS ALL
WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

COPYRIGHT (c) 2000 XATO NETWORK SECURITY, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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Keywords:
FrontPage Server Extensions, Microsoft, Denial of Service, DoS,
Device Names, SHTML

Five Totally Unrelated Words:
Angst, Lagoon, Newt, Trample, Chimichanga