OSEC

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Subject: Re: Solaris patchadd(1) (3) symlink vulnerabilty
From: Juergen P. Meier (jpmCLASS.DE)
Date: Wed Dec 20 2000 - 03:30:22 CST

Solaris /usr/sbin/patchadd is a /bin/ksh script.
The problem lies in the vulnerability of ksh.

However: Sun Microsystems does recommend to only install
patches at single-user mode (runlevel S). So no other
possibly malicious user can exploit this ksh behaviour.

at least after the ebay desaster we should have all learned
this lesson... ;)

Always do init S before applying solaris patches. (especially
if you do kernel or devicedriver patches, check your readme's).

Again: if you follow the Vendors recommendations, you are
not vulnerable.

cheers,

Juergen

On Tue, Dec 19, 2000 at 07:00:20PM +1100, Paul Szabo wrote:
> Jonathan Fortin <jfortinREVELEX.COM> wrote:
>
> > When patchadd is executed, It creates a temporary file called
> > "/tmp/sh<pidofpatchadd>.1" , "/tmp/sh<pidofpatchadd>.2 ,
> > "/tmp/sh<pidofpatchadd>.3 and assigns them mode 666 ...
>
> I guess that patchadd is a "sh" script using the "<<" construct, this
> being an instance of the bug I reported recently:
>
> milan.maths.usyd.edu.au">http://www.securityfocus.com/templates/archive.pike?list=1&msg=200011230225.NAA19716milan.maths.usyd.edu.au
>
> This is essentially the same as the tcsh bug fixed recently in other OSs.
>
> Paul Szabo - pszmaths.usyd.edu.au http://www.maths.usyd.edu.au:8000/u/psz/
> School of Mathematics and Statistics University of Sydney 2006 Australia 

--
Juergen P. Meier                        email: jpmclass.de