OSEC

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From: Pavel Machek (pavelUCW.CZ)
Date: Sun Feb 18 2001 - 11:13:43 CST

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    Hi!

    > > 1) {
    > > 2) static time_t last_kill_time = 0;
    > > 3) if (time(NULL) - last_kill_time > 60 && getppid() != 1)
    > > 4) {
    > > 5) last_kill_time = time(NULL);
    > > 6) kill(SIGALRM, getppid());
    > > 7) }
    > > 8) fatal("Bad result from rsa_private_decrypt");
    > > 9) }

    This looks more like ugly workaround than proper fix to me. If
    attacker can do 400*60 requests per second, he can still decrypt
    private key.

    Solution would be to reconfig after number of _attempts_, not
    time. Plus, it is still racy, as it uses kill().

    What about attacker doing 400*3600 requests before kill actually
    reaches the parent?

                                                                     Pavel

    --
    I'm pavelucw.cz. "In my country we have almost anarchy and I don't care."
    Panos Katsaloulis describing me w.r.t. patents at discusslinmodems.org