Aleph1 wrote:
> A flaw in the standard not on the stack. RFC 1122 "Requirements for
> Internet
> Hosts -- Communication Layers" covers this issue although without
> pointing
> out its security consequences.

In the case that a host is not routing, it is abundantly clear that the
strong model is the only correct one. Similarly, I would argue that in
the case that a host is routing, the weak model is clearly correct. In
more complex cases, one should use packet filtering to enforce
requirements. You'll note that RFC 1122 is completely silent on the
difference between routing and non-routing hosts, which makes it so
broken it seems almost irrelevant on this issue.

But the really important point in our advisory which is independent of
these considerations is that packets can be delivered to localhost, err,
remotely.

RFC 1122 is actually somewhat flawed in this respect, too, in that it
makes it a requirement that 127/8 packets should not appear on the
network, without specifying the behaviour of hosts upon receipt of such
an illegal packet (which by the default "be liberal in what you receive"
rule should handle them gracefully, rather than sensibly discarding
them).

But the bottom line is this: regardless of RFCs, it is clear how the
systems should be expected to behave, and if they don't behave that way,
they are broken. If the RFCs also make it "legal" for them to be broken,
then they, in turn, are also broken. So, yes, RFC 1122 "covers" this
issue, but so hopelessly it is hardly worth considering. I have to
wonder what the authors were thinking of!

Cheers,

Ben.

--
http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html
"There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he
doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff
ApacheCon 2001! http://ApacheCon.com/

• Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]