Neohapsis is currently accepting applications for employment. For more information, please visit our website www.neohapsis.com or email hr@neohapsis.com
From: Peter Gründl (peter.grundlDEFCOM.COM)
Date: Tue Mar 20 2001 - 05:12:33 CST

  • Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]

                      Defcom Labs Advisory def-2001-12

      Hursley Software Laboratories Consumer Transaction Framework DoS

    Author: Peter Gründl <peter.grundldefcom.com>
    Release Date: 2001-03-20
    ------------------------=[Brief Description]=-------------------------
    The HSLCTF HTTP object contains a flaw that could allow a malicious
    attacker to crash the web object and interconnected objects (eg. SMTP)

    ------------------------=[Affected Systems]=--------------------------
    - HSLCTF 1.0 for AIX

    ----------------------=[Detailed Description]=------------------------
    A never-ending HTTP request will crash the HTTP service, and can also
    bring down the internal mail system. The request looks like this:

    GET / HTTP/1.0\r\nhost:www.foo.org\r\nreferrer: aaaaaaa..aaaaaaaaaaaa

    This means a script that will continue to fire in "a"'s in the socket,
    until it exhausts the server.

    This vulnerability is closely coupled with def-2001-11, as the method
    of triggering the crash in HSLCTF is the same is the one in
    Websweeper: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/2465

    The following workaround example has been supplied by IBM Hursley
    Software Laboratories, see "Vendor Response":

    import com.ibm.CTF.Adapters.*;
    import java.io.*;

    public class LimitHttpTcpipAdapter extends CTFTcpipHttpAdapter
      protected String ReadLine( ) throws Exception
        int intChar;
        int i = 0;
        StringBuffer Result = new StringBuffer( 1024 );
        /* read Header from input stream */
        while ( true ) /* repeat until "newline"*/
          intChar = Stream_in.read(); /* read a character */
          switch ( intChar ) /* what character */
          case -1: /* ... no character */
            i = i + 1; /* error count */
            if ( i > 3 ) /* more than threshold ? */
              throw new EOFException(); /* ... yes, EOF */
              else /* ... no */
              Thread.sleep( 10 ); /* wait a bit */
          case 10: /* line feed */
              BytesRead = BytesRead + Result.length();
            /* data received so far */
            return( Result.toString() ); /* all done */
          case 13: /* carridge return */
              BytesRead = BytesRead + 1; /* data received so far */
          default: /* real data */
              i = 0; /* timeout count reset */
            Result.append( (char) intChar ); /* append to string */
              if ( Result.length( ) > 1024 )
                throw new IOException( "missing cr-lf delimiter" );
          } /* switch */
          } /* while */

    -------------------------=[Vendor Response]=--------------------------
    This issue was brought to the vendor's attention on the 9th of
    November, 2000 and a workaround was received by the vendor on the 20th
    of March 2001. The Danish Vendor replied (translated to English):

    "Support on the CTF toolkit stopped at the end of 2000, but customers
    can protect themselves against http header overflow, see workaround
    from IBM hursley"

    Hursley Software Laboratories replied:

    "The customer can put in what ever extra checks or controls they wish.
    In the following example I have shown how a check can be made for
    header records not exceeding 1024 characters in length by creating a
    descendent of the CTFTcpipHttpAdapter this descendent adapter would
    then be used in place of the CTFTcpipHttpAdapter in the start up
    information for the webserver i.e.

    In the web server ini file (or equivalent AddAdapter statement in the
    server start up code)

    Only the customer will know what limits they want to impose and what
    they want to do if the limits are exceeded, since it depends on the
    sending application, any additional information proxy's or firewalls
     may add etc..."

                This release was brought to you by Defcom Labs

                  labsdefcom.com www.defcom.com