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From: Casper Dik (Casper.DikSun.COM)
Date: Wed Aug 01 2001 - 03:37:06 CDT

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    >On 21 Jul 2001, Dale Southard wrote:
    >
    >> Sshd should probably be constraining its match to the length of the
    >> crypt() output rather than the length of the password file entry. [I
    >> say ``probably'' here because some systems (AIX) seem to produce null
    >> password file hashes when `passwd` is given a null password. If that
    >> behavior is due to the underlying crypt() function, then the
    >> ``probably'' suggestion I just made yields remote root on those
    >> systems.]
    >
    >What's wrong with just using `strcmp' (i.e. no constraint at all)? After
    >all, what you want to know is just whether the two strings are identical,
    >period. And unless crypt() and /etc/shadow are both broken, it will stop
    >at the right place. I realize it goes against the reflexive "only strn*
    >functions are safe" idea, but that shouldn't substitute for thinking...

    It does look a knee-jerk str* is bad, use strn* type of code change.

    strcmp() is *never* dangerous. strncmp() is really only useful
    for prefix checking and should not be introduced as part of "security fixes".

    Casper