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From: CERT Advisory (cert-advisorycert.org)
Date: Fri Oct 05 2001 - 13:54:03 CDT

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    CERT Advisory CA-2001-27 Format String Vulnerability in CDE ToolTalk

       Original release date: October 5, 2001
       Last revised: Thu Oct 5 14:17:55 EDT 2001
       Source: CERT/CC

       A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.

    Systems Affected

         * Systems running CDE ToolTalk

    Overview

       There is a remotely exploitable format string vulnerability in the CDE
       ToolTalk RPC database service. This vulnerability could be used to
       crash the service or execute arbitrary code, potentially allowing an
       intruder to gain root access. This vulnerability is documented in
       VU#595507.

    I. Description

       The Common Desktop Environment (CDE) is an integrated graphical user
       interface that runs on Unix and Linux operating systems. CDE ToolTalk
       is a message brokering system that provides an architecture for
       applications to communicate with each other across hosts and
       platforms. The ToolTalk RPC database server, rpc.ttdbserverd, manages
       communication between ToolTalk applications. For more information
       about CDE, see

              http://www.opengroup.org/cde/
              http://www.opengroup.org/desktop/faq/

       There is a remotely exploitable format string vulnerability in the CDE
       ToolTalk RPC database server. While handling an error condition, a
       syslog(3) function call is made without providing a format string
       specifier argument. Since rpc.ttdbserverd does not perform adequate
       input validation or provide the format string specifier argument, a
       crafted RPC request containing format string specifiers will be
       interpreted by the vulnerable syslog(3) function call. Such a request
       can be designed to overwrite specific locations in memory, thus
       executing code with the privileges of rpc.ttdbserverd, typically root.

       The vulnerability was discovered by Internet Security Systems (ISS)
       X-Force. For more information, see

              http://xforce.iss.net/alerts/advise98.php

       This vulnerability has been assigned the identifier CAN-2001-00717 by
       the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) group:

              http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2001-0717

       Many common UNIX systems ship with CDE ToolTalk installed and enabled
       by default. The rpcinfo command may help determine if a system is
       running the ToolTalk RPC database service:

              $ rpcinfo -p hostname

       The program number for the ToolTalk RPC database service is 100083.
       References to this number in the output from rpcinfo or in /etc/rpc
       may indicate that the ToolTalk RPC database service is running. Any
       system that does not run the ToolTalk RPC database service is not
       vulnerable to this problem.

    II. Impact

       An attacker can execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the
       rpc.ttdbserverd process, typically root.

    III. Solution

    Apply a patch

       Appendix A contains information from vendors who have provided
       information for this advisory. We will update the appendix as we
       receive more information. If a vendor's name does not appear, then the
       CERT/CC did not hear from that vendor. Please contact your vendor
       directly.

    Block access to vulnerable service

       Until patches are available and can be applied, you may wish to block
       access to the RPC portmapper service and the ToolTalk RPC service from
       untrusted networks such as the internet. Using a firewall or other
       packet-filtering technology, block the ports used by the RPC
       portmapper and ToolTalk RPC services. The RPC portmapper service
       typically runs on ports 111/tcp and 111/udp. The ToolTalk RPC service
       may be configured to use port 692/tcp or another port as indicated in
       output from the rpcinfo command. Keep in mind that blocking ports at a
       network perimeter does not protect the vulnerable service from the
       internal network. It is important to understand your network
       configuration and service requirements before deciding what changes
       are appropriate.

    Appendix A. - Vendor Information

       This appendix contains information provided by vendors for this
       advisory. When vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we
       update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a
       particular vendor is not listed below, we have not received their
       comments.

    Caldera, Inc.

       Caldera UnixWare and Open Linux are vulnerable, and a fix is
       forthcoming.

    Compaq Computer Corporation

       Compaq Computer Corporation
       ============================
       Software Security Response Team
       
       Severity: low
       
       ToolTalk RPC Server Format String Vulnerability
       
       This potential security vulnerability has not been
       reproduced for any release of Compaq Tru64 Unix.
       However with the information available, we are providing
       a patch that will further reduce any potential
       vulnerability.
       
       A patch has been made available for all supported
       versions of Tru64/ DIGITAL UNIX V4.0f, V4.0g, V5.0a,
       V5.1, and V5.1a.
       
       *This solution will be included in a future distributed release of
       Compaq's Tru64/ DIGITAL UNIX.
       
       This patch may be obtained from the following URL address:
       
       http://www.support.compaq.com/patches/
       
       Select BROWSE PATCH TREE and choose the version directory
       required.
       
       The patch names are:
       
           DUV40F17-C0056200-11703-ER-*.tar
           T64V40G17-C0007000-11704-ER-*.tar
           T64V50A17-C0015500-11705-ER-*.tar
           T64V5117-C0065200-11706-ER-*.tar
           T64V51Assb-C0000800-11707-ER-*.tar
       
       Note: Te asterisk in the filename indicates the remainder of the
       tarfile name may change depending on the applicable date.
       
       This patch can be installed on:
       
       V4.0f, V4.0g all patch kits
       V5.0a, V5.1, and V5.1a all patch kits

    Cray Inc.

       UNICOS and UNICOS/mk are not vulnerable to [this] advisory. For
       further inform ation see Cray SPR 721061. Cray SPRs are available
       to licensed Cray customers.

    Hewlett-Packard Company

       Patches are now available from HP. See HPSBUX0110-168 for details.

    IBM Corporation

       IBM AIX 5.1 and 4.3 are vulnerable. IBM has released an emergency
       fix (efix) w hich contains patched binaries for both AIX 5.1 and
       AIX 4.3 as well as an advis ory:
        
           ftp://aix.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security/tooltalk_efix.tar.Z
       
       
       IBM is working on APARs which will not be available until late
       October or Novem ber of 2001.
       
           AIX 4.3: Pending assignment
           AIX 5.1: APAR #IY23846

    The Open Group

       The Open Group maintains source code for the Common Desktop
       Environment (CDE). Source licensees of The Open Group's CDE product
       can contact desktopopengroup.org for advice and a source patch that
       address this issue.

    SGI

       SGI acknowledges the CDE vulnerabilities reported by CERT and is
       currently investigating. No further information is available at this
       time. For the protection of all our customers, SGI does not disclose,
       discuss or confirm vulnerabilities until a full investigation has
       occurred and any necessary patch(es) or release streams are available
       for all vulnerable and supported IRIX operating systems. Until SGI has
       more definitive information to provide, customers are encouraged to
       assume all security vulnerabilities as exploitable and take
       appropriate steps according to local site security policies and
       requirements. As further information becomes available, additional
       advisories will be issued via the normal SGI security information
       distribution methods including the wiretap mailing list.

          http://www.sgi.com/support/security/

    Sun

       Sun has reproduced the vulnerability and is testing a fix. The Sun
       patches will be made available at the following location:

           http://sunsolve.sun.com/securitypatch/

    Xi Graphics

       Xi Graphics is investigating this report and will provide more
       information when it is available.

    Appendix B. - References

        1. http://www.opengroup.org/cde/
        2. http://www.opengroup.org/desktop/faq/
        3. http://xforce.iss.net/alerts/advise98.php
        4. http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/595507
        5. http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1998-11.html
         _________________________________________________________________
         _________________________________________________________________

       The CERT Coordination Center thanks Internet Security Systems (ISS)
       X-Force, who published an advisory on this issue. We would also like
       to thank The Open Group for technical assistance.
         _________________________________________________________________

       Authors: Art Manion and Shawn V. Hernan
       ______________________________________________________________________

       This document is available from:
       http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-27.html
       ______________________________________________________________________

    CERT/CC Contact Information

       Email: certcert.org
              Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
              Fax: +1 412-268-6989
              Postal address:
              CERT Coordination Center
              Software Engineering Institute
              Carnegie Mellon University
              Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
              U.S.A.

       CERT/CC personnel answer the hotline 08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) /
       EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies
       during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.

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       Patent and Trademark Office.
       ______________________________________________________________________

       NO WARRANTY
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       Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie
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       Copyright 2001 Carnegie Mellon University.

       Revision History

       October 5, 2001: initial release

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