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From: CERT Advisory (cert-advisorycert.org)
Date: Mon Nov 05 2001 - 13:32:20 CST

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    CERT Advisory CA-2001-30 Multiple Vulnerabilities in lpd

       Original release date: November 05, 2001
       Last revised: --
       Source: CERT/CC

       A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.

    Systems Affected

         * BSDi BSD/OS Version 4.1 and earlier
         * Debian GNU/Linux 2.1 and 2.1r4
         * FreeBSD All released versions FreeBSD 4.x, 3.x, FreeBSD
           4.3-STABLE, 3.5.1-STABLE prior to the correction date
         * Hewlett-Packard HP9000 Series 700/800 running HP-UX releases
           10.01, 10.10, 10.20, 11.00, and 11.11
         * IBM AIX Versions 4.3 and AIX 5.1
         * Mandrake Linux Versions 6.0, 6.1, 7.0, 7.1
         * NetBSD 1.5.2 and earlier
         * OpenBSD Version 2.9 and earlier
         * Red Hat Linux 6.0 all architectures
         * SCO OpenServer Version 5.0.6a and earlier
         * SGI IRIX 6.5-6.5.13
         * Sun Solaris 8 and earlier
         * SuSE Linux Versions 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 7.0, 7.1, 7.2

    Overview

       There are multiple vulnerabilities in several implementations of the
       line printer daemon (lpd). The line printer daemon enables various
       clients to share printers over a network. Review your configuration to
       be sure you have applied all relevant patches. We also encourage you
       to restrict access to the lpd service to only authorized users.

    I. Description

       There are multiple vulnerabilities in several implementations of the
       line printer daemon (lpd), affecting several systems. Some of these
       problems have been publicly disclosed previously. However, we believe
       many system and network administrators may have overlooked one or more
       of these vulnerabilities. We are issuing this document primarily to
       encourage system and network administators to check their systems for
       exposure to each of these vulnerabilities, even if they have addressed
       some lpd vulnerabilities recently.

       Most of these vulnerabilities are buffer overflows allowing a remote
       intruder to gain root access to the lpd server. For the latest and
       most detailed information about the known vulnerabilities, please see
       the vulnerability notes linked to below.

     VU#274043 - BSD line printer daemon buffer overflow in displayq()

       There is a buffer overflow in several implementations of in.lpd, a BSD
       line printer daemon. An intruder can send a specially crafted print
       job to the target and then request a display of the print queue to
       trigger the buffer overflow. The intruder may be able use this
       overflow to execute arbitrary commands on the system with superuser
       privileges.

       The line printer daemon must be enabled and configured properly in
       order for an intruder to exploit this vulnerability. This is, however,
       trivial as the line printer daemon is commonly enabled to provide
       printing functionality. In order to exploit the buffer overflow, the
       intruder must launch his attack from a system that is listed in the
       "/etc/hosts.equiv" or "/etc/hosts.lpd" file of the target system.

     VU#388183 - IBM AIX line printer daemon buffer overflow in
                     kill_print()

       A buffer overflow exists in the kill_print() function of the line
       printer daemon (lpd) on AIX systems. An intruder could exploit this
       vulnerability to obtain root privileges or cause a denial of service
       (DoS). The intruder would need to be listed in the victim's
       /etc/hosts.lpd or /etc/hosts.equiv file, however, to exploit this
       vulnerability.

     VU#722143 - IBM AIX line printer daemon buffer overflow in
                     send_status()

       A buffer overflow exists in the send_status() function of the line
       printer daemon (lpd) on AIX systems. An intruder could exploit this
       vulnerability to obtain root privileges or cause a denial of service
       (DoS). The intruder would need to be listed in the victim's
       /etc/hosts.lpd or /etc/hosts.equiv file, however, to exploit this
       vulnerability.

     VU#466239 - IBM AIX line printer daemon buffer overflow in chk_fhost()

       A buffer overflow exists in the chk_fhost() function of the line
       printer daemon (lpd) on AIX systems. An intruder could exploit this
       vulnerability to obtain root privileges or cause a denial of service
       (DoS). The intruder would need control of the DNS server to exploit
       this vulnerability.

     VU#39001 - line printer daemon allows options to be passed to sendmail

       There exists a vulnerability in the line printer daemon that permits
       an intruder to send options to sendmail. These options could be used
       to specify another configuration file allowing an intruder to gain
       root access.

     VU#30308 - line printer daemon hostname authentication bypassed with
                  spoofed DNS

       A vulnerability exists in the line printer daemon (lpd) shipped with
       the printer package for several systems. The authentication method was
       not thorough enough. If a remote user was able to control their own
       DNS so that their IP address resolved to the hostname of the print
       server, access would be granted when it should not be.

     VU#966075 - Hewlett-Packard HP-UX line printer daemon buffer overflow

       A buffer overflow exists in HP-UX's line printer daemon (rlpdaemon)
       that may allow an intruder to execute arbitrary code with superuser
       privilege on the target system. The rlpdaemon is installed by default
       and is active even if it is not being used. An intruder does not need
       any prior knowledge, or privileges on the target system, in order to
       exploit this vulnerability.

    II. Impact

       All of these vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely. In most cases,
       they allow an intruder to execute arbitrary code with the privileges
       of the lpd server. In some cases, an intruder must have access to a
       machine listed in /etc/hosts.equiv or /etc/hosts.lpd, and in some
       cases, an intruder must be able to control a nameserver.

       One vulnerability (VU#39001) allows you to specify options to sendmail
       that can be used to execute arbitrary commands. Ordinarily, this
       vulnerability is only exploitable from machines that are authorized to
       use the lpd server. However, in conjunction with another vulnerability
       (VU#30308), permitting intruders to gain access to the lpd service,
       this vulnerability can be used by intruders not normally authorized to
       use the lpd service.

       For specific information about the impacts of each of these
       vulnerabilities, please consult the CERT Vulnerability Notes Database
       (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls).

    III. Solution

    Apply a patch from your vendor

       Appendix A contains information provided by vendors for this advisory.
       As vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we will update this
       section and note the changes in our revision history. If a particular
       vendor is not listed below, we have not received their comments.
       Please contact your vendor directly.

       This table represents the status of each vendor with regard to each
       vulnerability. Please be aware that vendors produce multiple products;
       if they are listed in this table, not all products may be affected. If
       a vendor is not listed in the table below, then their status should be
       considered unknown. For specific information about the status of each
       of these vulnerabilities, please consult the CERT Vulnerability Notes
       Database (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls).

    + = Affected
    - - = Not Affected
    ? = Unknown
       
    VU# -> |274043 |388183 |722143 |466239 |39001 |30308 |966075
    Vendors ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
    Apple | - | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | -
    BSDI | + | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | ?
    Caldera | - | - | - | - | - | - | -
    Cray | ? | - | - | - | - | ? | -
    Debian | ? | ? | ? | ? | + | + | ?
    Engarde | - | - | - | - | - | - | -
    FreeBSD | + | - | - | - | - | - | -
    Fujitsu | - | - | - | - | - | - | -
    HP | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | +
    IBM | - | + | + | + | - | + | -
    Mandrake| ? | ? | ? | ? | + | ? | ?
    NetBSD | + | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | ?
    OpenBSD | + | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | ?
    Red Hat | ? | ? | ? | ? | + | + | ?
    SCO | + | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | ?
    SGI | + | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | ?
    SuSE | + | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | ?
    Sun | - | - | - | - | + | - | -

    Restrict access to the lpd service

       As a general practice, we recommend disabling all services that are
       not explicitly required. You may wish to disable the line printer
       daemon if there is not a patch available from your vendor.

       If you cannot disable the service, you can limit your exposure to
       these vulnerabilities by using a router or firewall to restrict access
       to port 515/TCP (printer). Note that this does not protect you against
       attackers from within your network.

    Appendix A. - Vendor Information

       This appendix contains information provided by vendors for this
       advisory. As vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we will
       update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a
       particular vendor is not listed below, we have not received their
       comments.

    Apple Computer, Inc.

       Mac OS X does not have the line printer daemon vulnerability issues
       described in these advisories.

    Berkeley Software Design, Inc. (BSDI)

       Some (older) versions are affected. The current (BSD/OS 4.2) release
       is not vulnerable. Systems are only vulnerable to attack from hosts
       which are allowed via the /etc/hosts.lpd file (which is empty as
       shipped).
       BSD/OS 4.1 is the only vulnerable version which is still officially
       supported by Wind River Systems. A patch (M410-044) is available in
       the normal locations, ftp://ftp.bsdi.com/bsdi/patches or via our web
       site at http://www.bsdi.com/support

    Compaq

       Compaq has not been able to reproduce the problems identified in this
       advisory for TRU64 UNIX. We will continue testing and address the LPD
       issues if a problem is discovered and provide patches as necessary.

    Cray

       Cray, Inc. has been unable to prove an lpd vulnerability. However, it
       was deemed that a buffer overflow may be possible and so did tighten
       up the code. See Cray SPR 721101 for more details.

    Debian

       http://www.debian.org/security/2000/20000109

    FreeBSD, Inc.

     ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-01%3A58.lpd.asc

    Hewlett-Packard Company

       Hewlett-Packard has released
       HPSBUX0108-163 Sec. Vulnerability in rlpdaemon
       Bulletin and patches available from http://itrc.hp.com
       Details to access http://itrc.hp.com are include at the last half of
       any HP Bulletin.

    IBM Corporation

     http://www-1.ibm.com/services/continuity/recover1.nsf/4699c03b46f2d4f68525678c006d45ae/85256a3400529a8685256ac7005cf00a/$FILE/oar391.txt

    Mandrake Software

       http://www.linux-mandrake.com/en/updates/2000/MDKSA-2000-054.php3

    NetBSD

       If lpd has been enabled, this issue affects NetBSD versions 1.5.2 and
       prior releases, and NetBSD-current prior to August 30, 2001. lpd is
       disabled by default in NetBSD installations.
       
       Detailed information will be released subsequent to the publication of
       this CERT advisory.
       
       An up-to-date PGP signed copy of the release will be maintained at

       ftp://ftp.netbsd.org/pub/NetBSD/security/advisories/NetBSD-SA2001-018.txt.asc
       
       Information about NetBSD and NetBSD security can be found at
       http://www.NetBSD.ORG and http://www.NetBSD.ORG/Security/.

    OpenBSD

       http://www.openbsd.org/errata29.html#lpd

    RedHat Inc.

       http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA2000002-01.6.0.html

    Santa Cruz Operation, Inc. (SCO)

       ftp://stage.caldera.com/pub/security/openserver/CSSA-2001-SCO.20/

    SGI

       ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/advisories/20011003-01-P

    SuSE

     http://lists2.suse.com/archive/suse-security-announce/2001-Oct/0000.html
         _________________________________________________________________

       The CERT Coordination Center thanks Internet Security Systems and IBM
       for the information provided in their advisories.
         _________________________________________________________________

       Feedback on this document can be directed to the author,
       Jason A. Rafail
         _________________________________________________________________

       References
         * http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/274043
         * http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/388183
         * http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/722143
         * http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/466239
         * http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/39001
         * http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/30308
         * http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/966075
         * http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls
       ______________________________________________________________________

       This document is available from:
       http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-30.html
       ______________________________________________________________________

    CERT/CC Contact Information

       Email: certcert.org
              Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
              Fax: +1 412-268-6989
              Postal address:
              CERT Coordination Center
              Software Engineering Institute
              Carnegie Mellon University
              Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
              U.S.A.

       CERT/CC personnel answer the hotline 08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) /
       EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies
       during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.

    Using encryption

       We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email.
       Our public PGP key is available from

       http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key

       If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more
       information.

    Getting security information

       CERT publications and other security information are available from
       our web site

       http://www.cert.org/

       To subscribe to the CERT mailing list for advisories and bulletins,
       send email to majordomocert.org. Please include in the body of your
       message

       subscribe cert-advisory

       * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S.
       Patent and Trademark Office.
       ______________________________________________________________________

       NO WARRANTY
       Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
       Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie
       Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or
       implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of
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       Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information

       Copyright 2001 Carnegie Mellon University.

       Revision History
    November 05, 2001: Initial release

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