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From: Wojciech Purczynski (cliphisec.pl)
Date: Tue Mar 26 2002 - 07:40:20 CST

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    Hash: SHA1

    Name: Linux kernel
    Version: up to 2.2.20 and 2.4.18
    Homepage: http://www.kernel.org/
    Author: Wojciech Purczynski <cliphisec.pl>
    Date: March 26, 2002


    In case of excessively long path names d_path kernel internal function
    returns truncated trailing components of a path name instead of an error
    value. As this function is called by getcwd(2) system call and
    do_proc_readlink() function, false information may be returned to
    user-space processes.


    Linux is a clone of the operating system Unix, written from scratch by
    Linus Torvalds with assistance from a loosely-knit team of hackers across
    the Net. It aims towards POSIX and Single UNIX Specification compliance.


    d_path kernel function resolves a string of absolute path name of a dentry
    passed as an argument to the function.

    The path is a concatenation of subsequent path components starting from
    trailing path component. The concatenated path name is stored into a
    fixed-length buffer of PAGE_SIZE bytes.

    If a dentry points to a path that exceeds PAGE_SIZE - 1 characters length,
    leading path components are not written to the buffer and function returns
    truncated path without an error value.

    Because getcwd(2) system call uses d_path() function, it may return
    invalid path to the user-space process. However, if a returned path is
    longer than user-space buffer a correct error value is returned.

    readlink(2) system call called on proc filesystem uses do_proc_readlink()
    function which is also vulnerable to d_path() bug.


    Privileged process may be tricked to think it is inside of arbitrary
    directory. Other scenarios are possible if readlink() is used on files on
    proc filesystem (like "/proc/self/exe").

    PS: Please CC to securityisec.pl as I may not be subscribed to the list.

    - --
    Wojciech Purczynski
    iSEC Security Research

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