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From: Roy Hills (Roy.Hillsnta-monitor.com)
Date: Mon Apr 15 2002 - 09:11:58 CDT

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    Raptor Firewall FTP Bounce vulnerability


    The Raptor Firewall can make an FTP server behind it vulnerable to the
    FTP bounce vulnerability even if the FTP server used is not susceptible to
    this issue.


    While performing a penetration test for a customer, we discovered that
    their FTP server
    was vulnerable to the well-known FTP Bounce attack from the
    Internet. However, subsequent
    conversation with the customer showed that the FTP server itself (a recent
    version of
    wu-ftp) was not vulnerable to the FTP bounce attack.

    It appears that the Raptor Firewall's FTP proxy was somehow making the FTP
    server vulnerable
    to the FTP bounce vulnerability even though the FTP server itself was
    immune to this problem.

    The Firewall vendor (Symantec) have been informed of this issue.


    Firewall: Raptor 6.5.3i on Sun Solaris 7
    FTP Server: wu-ftpd on internal network with anonymous access
    Config: Using built-in Raptor FTP proxy for inbound FTP access from Internet


    We verified and analysed the vulnerability using the following setup:

    1. "attacker" - A Linux system on the Internet that connects to the FTP
    server and
          exploits the vulnerability
    2. "victim" - A second Linux system on the Internet that is the target of
    the bounce attack
    3. "server" - The FTP server. External address, internal
    4. "Firewall" - The Raptor Firewall

    We verified the FTP bounce vulnerability from the Internet and used the
    "tcpdump" packet
    sniffer on the Internet "attacker", the Internet "victim" (target of the
    ftpbounce test) and the
    FTP server to determine what was going on.

    It turns out that the Raptor Firewall re-writes the inbound FTP "PORT"
    command and
    changes the IP address to be the Hacker's IP rather than the Victim's, and
    the port number
    to be another ephemeral port. This means that the FTP server cannot detect
    the FTP
    bounce attack because it sees the correct IP address (the one of the hacker
    rather than
    the victim) and an ephemeral port. However, when the FTP Server makes the
    connection to this IP address and port, the Firewall re-writes the IP
    address and port in
    the packet to be the IP address and port of the victim which was originally
    specified by
    the Hacker.

    Thus, the Raptor Firewall prevents the FTP Server from detecting the FTP
    bounce attack, and
    permits the attack to take place. Because the FTP Server will always see
    the "correct" IP
    address and port in the PORT command, it cannot determine that an FTP
    bounce attack is
    being carried out and will accept the command.

    Further information:

    Further information, including annotated "tcpdump" packet traces are
    available at:


    Roy Hills

    Technical Director
    NTA Monitor Ltd

    Roy Hills                                    Tel:   +44 1634 721855
    NTA Monitor Ltd                              FAX:   +44 1634 721844
    14 Ashford House, Beaufort Court,
    Medway City Estate,                          Email: Roy.Hillsnta-monitor.com
    Rochester, Kent ME2 4FA, UK                  WWW:   http://www.nta-monitor.com/