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OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project
http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org
openpkg-securityopenpkg.org openpkgopenpkg.org
OpenPKG-SA-2002.006 04-Jul-2002
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Package: bind
Vulnerability: buffer overflow vulnerability
OpenPKG Specific: no

Affected Releases: OpenPKG 1.0
Affected Packages: <= bind-8.2.5-1.0.0
Corrected Packages: >= bind-8.2.6-1.0.1
Dependent Packages: -

Description:
  According to CERT Advisory CA-2002-19 [5] a buffer overflow
  vulnerability exists in multiple implementations of DNS resolver
  libraries. Applications that utilize vulnerable DNS resolver libraries
  may be affected.
  
  For the OpenPKG bind package this means that the included utilities
  dig, host, nslookup and nsupdate are affected. Please note that the
  named server itself is not affected.

  A remote attacker who is able to send malicious DNS responses could
  potentially exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code or
  cause a denial of service on a vulnerable system. Note that a
  possible attack would be performed by a DNS response, thus bypassing
  any firewall.

  For more details and background information see the corresponding
  NetBSD Security Advisory 2002-006 [6].

  The Internet Software Consortium (ISC) Berkeley Internet Name Domain
  (BIND) Vulnerabilities Summary table [7] shows that for the 8.2.x
  track of BIND the DNS resolver library (libbind) issue is fixed in
  8.2.6.

  Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm -q
  bind". If you have the "bind" package installed and its version is
  affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it
  (see Solution).

Solution:
  Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
  [4], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [3] or a mirror location,
  verify its integrity [1], build a corresponding binary RPM from it and
  update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary RPM [2]. For
  the latest OpenPKG 1.0 release, perform the following operations to
  permanently fix the security problem (for other releases adjust
  accordingly).

  $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
  ftp> bin
  ftp> cd release/1.0/UPD
  ftp> get bind-8.2.6-1.0.1.src.rpm
  ftp> bye
  $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --checksig bind-8.2.6-1.0.1.src.rpm
  $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild bind-8.2.6-1.0.1.src.rpm
  $ su -
  # <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/bind-8.2.6-1.0.1.*.rpm
  # <prefix>/etc/rc bind stop start
________________________________________________________________________

References:
  [1] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
  [2] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
  [3] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.0/UPD/
  [4] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.0/UPD/bind-8.2.6-1.0.1.src.rpm
  [5] http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-19.html
  [6] ftp://ftp.netbsd.org/pub/NetBSD/security/advisories/NetBSD-SA2002-006.txt.asc
  [7] http://www.isc.org/products/BIND/bind-security.html
________________________________________________________________________

For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with
the OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkgopenpkg.org>" (ID 63C4CB9F)
of the OpenPKG project which you can find under the official URL
http://www.openpkg.org/openpkg.pgp or on http://keyserver.pgp.com/. To
check the integrity of this advisory, verify its digital signature by
using GnuPG (http://www.gnupg.org/). For instance, pipe this message to
the command "gpg --verify --keyserver keyserver.pgp.com".
________________________________________________________________________

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