OSEC

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From: Brook Powers (bugtraq_at_tech-serve.com)
Date: Mon Sep 23 2002 - 21:13:41 CDT

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                                Techserve, Inc.
                            www.tech-serve.com

                              Security Advisory

    Advisory Name: HP Procurve 4000M Stacked Switch HTTP Reset Vulnerability
    Release Date: 09/23/2002
    Platform: HP Procurve 4000M Switch (J4121A)
    Application: Firmware revision C.09.13 (Current)
    Severity: Multiple reset requests may deny use of stacked switch entirely
    Authors: Brook Powers (bugtraqtech-serve.com), Tony Kapela
    (tonywi.engr.wisc.edu)
    Vendor Status: Vendor Notified August 28th, 2002
    CVE Candidate: Pending
    Reference: www.tech-serve.com/research/advisories/2002/a092302-1.txt

    Overview:
    =======

    The HP Procurve 4000M is a extremely common, managed switch, which provides
    low-cost and scalable ethernet switching. It is ideal for medium-to-large
    businesses that desire a flexible platform for 10, 100, and gigabit
    interfaces. In the 4000M's base configuration, the switch ships with five
    of ten 'slots' populated with cards that contain 8 fast ethernet copper ports.

    Under many circumstances, several 4000M chassis will be in operation at a
    single site, or otherwise interconnected. Also common, would be a situation
    where several switches are interconnected via 'trunked ports' for link
    aggregation, or for VLAN extension to remote wiring closets.

    In these examples, the administrator can enact specific features of the
    4000M which allow any (or all) of the switches to be viewed through a
    single administrative interface, anywhere on the internet, via a web
    browser. We refer to the switches within this administrative group as a
    'stack.'

    There exists at least one vulnerability in this interface that allows an
    attacker to reset a switch when it is a member of a 'stack' of switches via
    a HTTP URL. This allows the attacker to arbitrarily and repeatedly deny
    access to all switched ports of the stack member.

    Detailed Description:
    ===============

    The firmware handling the URL "http:// ADDRESS>/sw2/cgi/device_reset?"
    allows the "device_reset?" command to be executed on member switches
    without first checking to see if the source of the command is
    authenticated. The IP address is the address that the administrator has
    assigned to the designated "commander" switch for the stack. The "2"
    denotes the stack member number (i.e. "sw2") or the second switch in the
    stack.

    Exploitation of this vulnerability and the resulting reset requests may
    deny use of stacked switch entirely as the switch is repeatedly rebooted.

    Neither the stacking features nor remote IP access features are enabled by
    default. The administrator has the option of effectively disabling IP
    support (see 'Recommendation' below) and may then administer the switch via
    the device's rs-232 serial port.

    At this time we are unaware of any other cgi's that do not verify submitted
    commands against authorized users, however we believe it reasonable to
    assume others may exist. It is also likely that other switches, which
    utilize similar firmware, such as the 8000M, are also at risk.

    Vendor Response:
    ==============

    This issue was reported to Hewlett Packard by on August 28, 2002. On
    September 11, 2002 posting of this vulnerability was delayed at HP's request.

    On 9/20/2002 HP asked that we include the following statement;

    "Hewlett-Packard Company has released Security Bulletin number
    HPSBUX0209-219 which recommends the following solution: Upgrade the switch
    firmare [sic] to revision C.09.16 or newer, and be sure that a "manager
    password" is being used. HPSBUX0209-219 may be found in the "Security
    Bulletin archives" on <
    http://itrc.hp.com>."

    As of this post the patched firmware and security bulletin have not yet
    been posted.

    Our Recommendation:
    =================

    Disable stacking features of all switches. If stacking features must be
    enabled, prevent or restrict IP level access to the device by assigning
    0.0.0.0 or private IP ranges.

    If IP-level access must be available, then it is highly recommended that IP
    access lists (where available) on the switches be utilized. Additionally,
    placing the Switch's IP address(s) in a subnet apart from those in use by
    other systems attached to the switch is ideal. It would be best to disable
    both telnet and HTTP access.

    For more info, see:
    ==============

    (Reserved for HP advisory notice URL)

    Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Information:
    ===========================================

    The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
    following names to these issues. These are candidates for inclusion in the
    CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes names for security
    problems.

    CAN-2002-(Pending)

    Copyright 2002 Techserve, Inc. All rights reserved.