From: Peter Gutmann (pgut001cs.auckland.ac.nz)
Date: Fri Aug 08 2008 - 12:49:42 CDT

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Eric Rescorla <ekrnetworkresonance.com> writes:

>It's easy to compute all the public keys that will be generated
>by the broken PRNG. The clients could embed that list and refuse
>to accept any certificate containing one of them. So, this
>is distinct from CRLs in that it doesn't require knowing
>which servers have which cert...

You'd also end up with a rather large list for the client to carry around,
which would be especially problematic for lightweight clients. You'd need to
represent it as something like a Bloom filter to avoid this (given that most
users will just click OK on invalid certs, the small false positive rate
shouldn't have much effect either :-).

Peter.

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