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From: Jakob Lell (jakobjakoblell.com)
Date: Mon Nov 19 2012 - 07:20:31 CST
CVE-2012-4366: Insecure default WPA2 passphrase in multiple Belkin
Belkin ships many wireless routers with an encrypted wireless network
configured by default. The network name (ESSID) and the (seemingly
random) password is printed on a label at the bottom of the device.
II. Description of vulnerability
Having a preconfigured randomly generated WPA2-PSK passphrase for
wireless routers is basically a good idea since a vendor-generated
passphrase can be much more secure than most user-generated passwords.
However, in the case of Belkin the default password is calculated solely
based on the mac address of the device. Since the mac address is
broadcasted with the beacon frames sent out by the device, a wireless
attacker can calculate the default passphrase and then connect to the
Each of the eight characters of the default passphrase are created by
substituting a corresponding hex-digit of the wan mac address using a
static substitution table. Since the wan mac address is the wlan mac
address + one or two (depending on the model), a wireless attacker can
easily guess the wan mac address of the device and thus calculate the
default WPA2 passphrase.
Moreover, the default WPA2-PSK passphrase solely consists of 8
hexadecimal digits, which means that the entropy is limited to only 32
bits (or 33 bits since some models use uppercase hex digits). After
sniffing one successful association of a client to the wireless network,
an attacker can carry out an offline brute-force attack to crack the
password. The program oclhashcat-plus can try 131,000 passwords per
second on one high end GPU (AMD Radeon hd7970) . Doing a full search
of the 32-bit key space takes about 9 hours at this rate.
An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to calculate the WPA2-PSK
passphrase of a wireless network. This allows sniffing and decrypting
all wireless traffic in a purely passive attack given that the attacker
has also sniffed the association.
The attacker may also connect to the wireless network, which may allow
further exploitation of unprotected systems in the local network. An
attacker may furthermore use the wireless network to access the internet
from the owner's network. The network owner may then be held responsible
for any illegal activities perpetrated by the unauthorized users.
IV. Affected devices
Belkin Surf N150 Model F7D1301v1
The official Belkin support page  contains pictures of the label of
several other WiFi devices, which show that the following devices are
vulnerable as well:
Belkin N900 Model F9K1104v1
Belkin N450 Model F9K1105V2
The following device uses a variation of the algorithm and the password
consists of uppercase hex digits. When using our algorithm with the wlan
mac of the device, the first 5 digits of the password are calculated
correctly. It is likely that the algorithm differs only in the tables used.
Belkin N300 Model F7D2301v1
It is likely that other Belkin devices are affected as well.
Unfortunately, Belkin has not yet cooperated with us to fix the
vulnerability and/or confirm a list of other affected devices. If you
own a Belkin wireless router and want to know whether it is vulnerable
as well, you should change the passphrase and then send me the relevant
data (model number, wan/wlan mac address and original, default WPA2
Users of potentially affected wireless routers should change the
wireless passphrase to something more secure.
6.1.2012: Vendor contacted
29.10.2012: Another contact attempt, still no response
19.11.2012: Public disclosure
Advisory location: http://www.jakoblell.com/blog/?p=15