OSEC

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From: Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team (psirtcisco.com)
Date: Tue Feb 27 2001 - 03:00:00 CST

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    Due to technical difficulties, the cust-security-announcecisco.com
    mailing list did not receive the attached security advisory at the time
    it was originally mailed. We have taken steps to make sure it doesn't
    happen again.

    Since the time of the original announcement, the advisory has been
    updated. Please be sure to see the on-line version of this advisory at
    http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/ios-snmp-ilmi-vuln-pub.shtml for
    the very latest information.

    Note that the status of this advisory is still "interim", which means we
    do expect to update the notice soon. Updates are usually NOT sent to
    the mailing lists, so we encourage you to check the URL mentioned above
    to find out the latest information.

    Please contact us if you have any comments or questions.

            Product Security Incident Response Team, psirtcisco.com

    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

     Cisco Security Advisory:

     Cisco IOS Software SNMP Read-Write ILMI Community String Vulnerability
                                          
      Revision 1.0: INTERIM
      
      For Public Release 2001 February 27 04:00 US/Eastern (UTC+0500)
         _______________________________________________________________
       
    Summary

       Cisco IOS software releases based on versions 11.x and 12.0 contain
       a defect that allows a limited number of SNMP objects to be viewed
       and modified without authorization using a undocumented ILMI
       community string. Some of the modifiable objects are confined to the
       MIB-II system group, such as "sysContact", "sysLocation", and
       "sysName", that do not affect the device's normal operation but that
       may cause confusion if modified unexpectedly. The remaining objects
       are contained in the LAN-EMULATION-CLIENT and PNNI MIBs, and
       modification of those objects may affect ATM configuration. An
       affected device might be vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack if
       it is not protected against unauthorized use of the ILMI community
       string.
       
       The vulnerability is only present in certain combinations of IOS
       releases on Cisco routers and switches. ILMI is a necessary
       component for ATM, and the vulnerability is present in every IOS
       release that contains the supporting software for ATM and ILMI
       without regard to the actual presence of an ATM interface or the
       physical ability of the device to support an ATM connection.
       
       To remove this vulnerability, Cisco is offering free software
       upgrades for all affected platforms. The defect is documented in
       DDTS record CSCdp11863.
       
       In lieu of a software upgrade, a workaround can be applied to
       certain IOS releases by disabling the ILMI community or "*ilmi" view
       and applying an access list to prevent unauthorized access to SNMP.
       Any affected system, regardless of software release, may be
       protected by filtering SNMP traffic at a network perimeter or on
       individual devices.
       
       This notice will be posted at
       http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/ios-snmp-ilmi-vuln-pub.shtml.
       
    Affected Products

       The vulnerability is present only in certain releases of Cisco IOS
       Software versions 11.x and 12.0 for router and switch products that
       include support for Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) networking and
       Interim Local Management Interface (ILMI), and it is present without
       regard to any physical capability for supporting an ATM interface.
       
       Cisco IOS Software versions based on 10.3 and earlier do not contain
       the vulnerability. The defect was introduced in 11.0(0.2). All Cisco
       IOS software releases of 12.1 and later have been repaired and are
       not vulnerable to the defect described in this advisory.
       
       To determine the software running on a Cisco product, log in to the
       device and issue the command "show version" to display the system
       banner. Cisco IOS software will identify itself as "Internetwork
       Operating System Software" or simply "IOS (tm)". The image name will
       be displayed between parentheses, usually on the next line of
       output, followed by "Version" and the IOS release name. Other Cisco
       devices will not have the "show version" command or will give
       different output.
       
       The following example identifies a Cisco product running IOS release
       12.0(3) with an installed image name of C2500-IS-L:

           Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software IOS (tm)
           2500 Software (C2500-IS-L), Version 12.0(3), RELEASE SOFTWARE
           
       The device is not vulnerable to the defect described in this
       advisory since the model 2500 router is specifically excluded in the
       list of unaffected products shown below.
       
       Cisco devices that may be running an affected IOS software release
       include, but are not limited to:

         * Cisco 1400 and 1700 series.

         * Cisco 2600 (except that c2600-c-mz, c2600-d-mz, c2600-i-mz,
           c2600-io3-mz, and c2600-ix-mz images are not vulnerable).

         * Catalyst 2900 ATM, 2900XL, and 2948g series.

         * Cisco 3620 (except that c3620-d-mz, c3620-i-mz, c3620-io3-mz,
           and c3620-ix-mz images are not vulnerable).

         * Cisco 3640 (except that c3640-d-mz, c3640-i-mz, c3640-io3-mz,
           and c3640-ix-mz images are not vulnerable).

         * Cisco 3660 (except that c3660-d-mz, c3660-i-mz, and c3660-ix-mz
           images are not vulnerable).

         * Cisco MC3810 (except that mc3810-i-mz, mc3810-is-mz,
           mc3810-is56i-mz, and mc3810-js-mz images are not vulnerable).

         * Catalyst 4232, 4840g, 5000 RSFC series switches.

         * Cisco 4500, 4700, and 5800 DSC series.

         * Cisco 6200, 6400 NRP, and 6400 NSP series.

         * Catalyst MSM (c6msm), 6000 Hybrid Mode (c6msfc), and 6000 Native
           Mode (c6sup).

         * Cisco RSM, 7000, 7010, 7100, 7200, ubr7200, and 7500 series.

         * Catalyst 8510CSR, 8510MSR, 8540CSR, and 8540MSR series.

         * Cisco 10000 ESR and 12000 GSR series.

         * LS1010 and Cisco 6260-NI2.

         * DistributedDirector (except that igs-w3 images are not
           vulnerable).
           
       Cisco products that are not affected by this vulnerability either
       because they have no support for ATM and ILMI, or because they do
       not run IOS include, but are not limited to:

         * Catalyst ATM blade (runs possibly affected code, but an SNMP
           connection to the blade is not possible).

         * Cisco 800 and 805 series.

         * Cisco Universal Broadband Routers ubr900 and ubr920.

         * Cisco 1003, 1004, and 1005 series.

         * Cisco 1600, 2500, 2800, 4000 series.

         * Cisco 2500 Fixed Frad.

         * Cisco 3800 (not to be confused with MC3810).

         * Cisco 5100, 5200, and 5300 series access servers.

         * Catalyst 6000 Supervisor Module.

         * Cisco PIX Firewall.

         * Aironet and Cisco/Aironet wireless products.

         * CS11000, Cache Engine, LocalDirector, and network scaling
           products (except that the Distributed Director might be
           affected).

         * VPN products such as Altiga concentrators.

         * Host-based network management or access management products.

         * Cisco IP Telephony and telephony management software (except
           those that are hosted on a vulnerable IOS platform).

         * Voice gateways and convergence platforms (except those that are
           hosted on a vulnerable IOS platform).

         * Optical switch products such as the ONS 15000 series.
           
    Details

       ILMI (Interim Local Management Interface) is an independent industry
       standard used for configuration of ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode)
       interfaces. The standard specifies the use of mechanisms and formats
       previously defined by SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol).
       Although it is based on SNMP, ILMI communication actually occurs
       using a transport other than IP (Internet Protocol) that traverses
       only the physical ATM link. ILMI is essential to functions such as
       ATM auto-discovery and LANE (LAN Emulation).
       
       SNMP "objects" are variables that are organized into a MIB
       (Management Information Base). The MIB has a tree structure and
       contains both operational (read-only) data as well as configuration
       (read-write) options. By specifying a community string of "ILMI" in
       an SNMP request, access can be obtained to read the objects in three
       specific parts of the overall management tree structure on any
       device affected by this vulnerability: the MIB-II system group, the
       LAN-EMULATION-CLIENT MIB, and the PNNI (Private Network-to-Network
       Interface) MIB. A subset of objects in each part can be modified
       using the same "ILMI" community string.
       
       The MIB-II system group contains basic information about the device
       itself. The number of objects that can be modified is limited.
       Examples include:

         * system.sysContact: The contact information for the person or
           organization responsible for managing the device.

         * system.sysLocation: A description of the physical location where
           the device is installed or operating.

         * system.sysName: The hostname of the device, how it identifies
           itself at the console prompt. (This might not be the same name
           by which the device is known to other hosts on the network.)
           
       Most of the objects in the system MIB are read-only and cannot be
       changed via SNMP, such as the time elapsed since the previous
       restart and textual descriptions of the device's hardware and
       software.
       
       Numerous objects can be viewed in the LAN-EMULATION-CLIENT MIB and
       PNNI MIB, and modification of some of the read-write objects can
       have an affect on ATM operation of the device. The objects in the
       LAN-EMULATION-CLIENT MIB can only be viewed or modified if LANE has
       already been configured on the device.
       
       Access to SNMP in Cisco IOS software can be limited by applying
       access control lists (ACLs), by modifying or removing the SNMP view,
       by removing the community string from the running configuration, or
       by disabling the SNMP service. Any SNMP query that does not meet the
       criteria for access is promptly discarded when such protective
       measures are in place. If a query does meet the criteria for access,
       then a response is formulated and sent.
       
       It is possible to configure the device so that the ILMI community
       string is unavailable in all IOS 11.1 and higher releases. The
       particular method selected to accomplish this depends on the
       specific IOS release and configuration.
       
       This defect is documented as CSCdp11863. The vulnerability is
       repaired by imposing a test such that an SNMP request using the
       "ILMI" community string will only be recognized if it has been
       transported by ILMI.
       
       ATM functionality was added in various 10.x releases of Cisco IOS
       software. However, the function containing the defect was introduced
       when support for ILMI and other ATM features was added in IOS
       release 11.0(0.2). Therefore, all prior releases are not vulnerable.
       
    Impact

       If SNMP requests can be received by an affected device, then certain
       MIB objects can be viewed without proper authorization, causing a
       violation of confidentiality.
       
       A subset of the readable MIB objects can be modified without
       authorization to cause a failure of integrity. For example, the
       hostname can be modified so as to confuse network adminstrators, or
       the contact and location information could be changed with a goal of
       disrupting operations or embarassing whoever is responsible for the
       device.
       
       Objects in the LAN-EMULATION-CLIENT and PNNI MIBs can be viewed and
       modified, thus resulting in changes to the operation of ATM
       functions. If ATM is in use on the device, this may result in a
       failure of availability.
       
       Any affected device that is not otherwise protected against the
       receipt of SNMP packets is vulnerable to a denial-of-service (DoS)
       attack by flooding the SNMP port with read or write requests.
       
    Software Versions and Fixes

       The following table summarizes the known affected Cisco IOS software
       releases and the earliest estimated dates of availability for fixed
       releases. All dates are tentative and subject to change.
       
       Each row of the table describes a release train and the platforms or
       products for which it is intended. If a given release train is
       vulnerable, then the earliest possible releases that contain the fix
       and the anticipated date of availability for each are listed in the
       "Rebuild", "Interim", and "Maintenance" columns. If a device is
       running an earlier release that is known to be vulnerable, it should
       be upgraded to at least the indicated version.
       
       When selecting a release, keep in mind the following definitions:
       
       Maintenance
              Most heavily tested and highly recommended release of any
              label in a given row of the table.
              
       Rebuild
              Constructed from the previous maintenance or major release in
              the same train, it contains the fix for a specific defect.
              Although it receives less testing, it contains only the
              minimal changes necessary to effect the repair.
              
       Interim
              Built at regular intervals between maintenance releases and
              receive less testing. Interims should be selected only if
              there is no other suitable release that addresses the
              vulnerability. Interim releases are usually not available for
              customer download via CCO without prior arrangement.
              
       In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
       devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
       hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
       properly by the new release. If the information is not clear,
       contact the Cisco TAC for assistance as shown in the following
       section.
       
       More information on IOS release names and abbreviations is available
       at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html.
                                   
     +===========================================================================+
     | Train | Description of | Availability of Fixed Releases* |
     | | Image or Platform | |
     +===========================================================================+
     | 10.3-based Releases and | | | |
     | Earlier | Rebuild | Interim** | Maintenance |
     +===========================================================================+
     | 10.3 and | | |
     | earlier |All |Not affected |
     +===========================================================================+
     | 11.0-based Releases | Rebuild | Interim** | Maintenance |
     +===========================================================================+
     | | |11.0(22a) | | |
     | 11.0 |Major GD release | | | |
     | |for all platforms |2001-Mar-05 | | |
     +===========================================================================+
     | 11.1-based Releases | Rebuild | Interim** | Maintenance |
     +===========================================================================+
     | | |11.1(24a) | | |
     | 11.1 |Major release for | | | |
     | |all platforms |2001-Mar-05 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |ED release for | | |12.1(7) |
     | 11.1AA |access servers: | | | |
     | |1600, 3200, and | | | |
     | |5200 series. | | |2001-Feb-26 |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Platform-specific |11.1(36)CA1 | | |
     | 11.1CA |support for 7500, | | | |
     | |7200, 7000, and RSP|2001-Mar-02 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |ISP train: added | | | |
     | |support for FIB, |11.1(36)CC1 | | |
     | 11.1CC |CEF, and NetFlow on| | | |
     | |7500, 7200, 7000, |2001-Mar-02 | | |
     | |and RSP | | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Added support for |12.0(11)ST2 | | |
     | 11.1CT |Tag Switching on | | | |
     | |7500, 7200, 7000, | | | |
     | |and RSP |2001-Feb-26 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | | |11.1(28)IA1 | | |
     | 11.1IA |DistributedDirector| | | |
     | |only |2001-Feb-26 | | |
     +===========================================================================+
     | 11.2-based Releases | Rebuild | Interim** | Maintenance |
     +===========================================================================+
     | | |11.2(25a) | | |
     | 11.2 |Major release, | | | |
     | |general deployment |2001-Mar-05 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Platform-specific | | | |
     | |support for IBM | | |12.1(7) |
     | 11.2BC |networking, CIP, | | | |
     | |and TN3270 on 7500,| | |2001-Feb-26 |
     | |7000, and RSP | | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Early deployment |12.0(15)S1 | | |
     | 11.2GS |release to support | | | |
     | |12000 GSR |2001-Feb-20 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | | |11.2(25a)P | | |
     | 11.2P |New platform | | | |
     | |support |2001-Mar-05 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | | | | |12.1WC |
     | 11.2SA |Catalyst 2900XL | | | |
     | |switch only | | |2001-Apr-12 |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | | | | |12.0(10)W5(18c)|
     | 11.2WA3 |LS1010 ATM switch | | | |
     | | | | |Available |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | | |11.2(25a)P | | |
     |11.2(4)XA |Initial release for| | | |
     | |the 1600 and 3600 |2001-Mar-05 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Initial release for| | | |
     | |the 5300 and |11.2(9)XA1 | | |
     |11.2(9)XA |digital modem | | | |
     | |support for the |Unscheduled | | |
     | |3600 | | | |
     +===========================================================================+
     | 11.3-based Releases | Rebuild | Interim** | Maintenance |
     +===========================================================================+
     | | |11.3(11b) | | |
     | 11.3 |Major release for | | | |
     | |all platforms |2001-Mar-05 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |ED for dial | | | |
     | |platforms and |11.3(11a)AA | | |
     | 11.3AA |access servers: | | | |
     | |5800, 5200, 5300, |2001-Mar-05 | | |
     | |7200 | | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Early deployment |12.1(5)DA1 | | |
     | 11.3DA |train for ISP DSLAM| | | |
     | |6200 platform |2001-Feb-28 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Early deployment | | | |
     | |train for |12.1(4)DB1 | | |
     | |ISP/Telco/PTT xDSL | | | |
     | 11.3DB |broadband | | | |
     | |concentrator | | | |
     | |platform, (NRP) for|2001-Feb-26 | | |
     | |6400 | | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Short-lived ED | |
     | 11.3HA |release for ISR |Not Vulnerable |
     | |3300 (SONET/SDH | |
     | |router) | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | | |11.3(1)MA8 | | |
     | 11.3MA |MC3810 | | | |
     | |functionality only |Unscheduled | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Voice over IP, |12.1(7) | | |
     | 11.3NA |media convergence, | | | |
     | |various platforms |2001-Mar-05 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Early deployment |11.3(11b)T1 | | |
     | 11.3T |major release, | | | |
     | |feature-rich for | | | |
     | |early adopters |2001-Mar-05 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Multilayer | | | |
     | |Switching and | | |12.0(14)W5(20) |
     | |Multiprotocol over | | | |
     | 11.3WA4 |ATM functionality | | | |
     | |for Catalyst 5000 | | | |
     | |RSM, 4500, 4700, | | |2001-Feb-28 |
     | |7200, 7500, LS1010 | | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | | |11.3(11b)T1 | | |
     |11.3(2)XA |Introduction of | | | |
     | |ubr7246 and 2600 |2001-Mar-05 | | |
     +===========================================================================+
     | 12.0-based Releases | Rebuild | Interim** | Maintenance |
     +===========================================================================+
     | |General deployment | |12.0(7.1) |12.0(16) |
     | 12.0 |release for all | | | |
     | |platforms | |Available |2001-Feb-20 |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | | | |12.0(7.1)T | |
     | 12.0DA |xDSL support: 6100,| | | |
     | |6200 | |Available | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |ISP/Telco/PTT xDSL |12.1(4)DB1 | | |
     | 12.0DB |broadband | | | |
     | |concentrator | | | |
     | |platforms |2001-Feb-26 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | | |12.1(4)DC2 | | |
     | 12.0DC |6400 Access | | | |
     | |Concentrator |2001-Feb-26 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | | |12.0(15)S1 | | |
     | 12.0S |Core/ISP support: | | | |
     | |GSR, RSP, c7200 |2001-Feb-20 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | | |12.0(15)SC1 | | |
     | 12.0SC |Cable/broadband | | | |
     | |ISP: ubr7200 |2001-Feb-26 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | | |12.0(14)SL1 | | |
     | 12.0SL |10000 ESR: c10k | | | |
     | | |2001-Feb-26 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |General deployment |12.0(11)ST2 | | |
     | 12.0ST |release for all | | | |
     | |platforms |2001-Feb-26 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | | |12.1(5c)E8 | | |
     | 12.0SX |Early Deployment | | | |
     | |(ED) |2001-Feb-26 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Early | | | |
     | |Deployment(ED): | | |12.1(7) |
     | 12.0T |VPN, Distributed | | | |
     | |Director, various | | |2001-Feb-26 |
     | |platforms | | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |cat8510c, cat8540c,| | | |
     | |ls1010, cat8510m, | |12.0(10)W5(18c)|12.0(14)W5(20) |
     | |cat8540m, c5atm, | | | |
     | |c5atm, c3620, | | | |
     | |c3640, c4500, | | | |
     | 12.0W5 |c5rsfc, c5rsm, | |Available |2001-Feb-28 |
     | |c7200, rsp, | | | |
     | |cat2948g, cat4232 | | | |
     | +-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | | | |12.0(10)W5(18d)|12.0(14)W5(20) |
     | |c6msm | | | |
     | | | |Available |2001-Feb-28 |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |General deployment | | |12.0(13)WT6(1) |
     | 12.0WT |release for all | | | |
     | |platforms | | |2001-Feb-20 |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Early Deployment | | |12.1(7) |
     | 12.0XA |(ED): limited | | | |
     | |platforms | | |2001-Feb-26 |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | | | | |12.1(7) |
     | 12.0XB |Short-lived early | | | |
     | |deployment release | | |2001-Feb-26 |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Early Deployment | | |12.1(7) |
     | 12.0XC |(ED): limited | | | |
     | |platforms | | |2001-Feb-26 |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Early Deployment | | |12.1(7) |
     | 12.0XD |(ED): limited | | | |
     | |platforms | | |2001-Feb-26 |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Early Deployment |12.1(5c)E8 | | |
     | 12.0XE |(ED): limited | | | |
     | |platforms |2001-Feb-26 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Early Deployment | | |12.1(7) |
     | 12.0XF |(ED): limited | | | |
     | |platforms | | |2001-Feb-26 |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Early Deployment | | |12.1(7) |
     | 12.0XG |(ED): limited | | | |
     | |platforms | | |2001-Feb-26 |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Early Deployment |12.0(4)XH5 | | |
     | 12.0XH |(ED): limited | | | |
     | |platforms |2001-Mar-05 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Early Deployment | | |12.1(7) |
     | 12.0XI |(ED): limited | | | |
     | |platforms | | |2001-Feb-26 |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Early Deployment | | |12.1(7) |
     | 12.0XJ |(ED): limited | | | |
     | |platforms | | |2001-Feb-26 |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Early Deployment |12.0(7)XK4 | | |
     | 12.0XK |(ED): limited | | | |
     | |platforms |Unscheduled | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Early Deployment |12.0(4)XH5 | | |
     | 12.0XL |(ED): limited | | | |
     | |platforms |2001-Mar-05 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | | | | |12.1(7) |
     | 12.0XM |Short-lived early | | | |
     | |deployment release | | |2001-Feb-26 |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Early Deployment | | | |
     | 12.0XN |(ED): limited | | | |
     | |platforms | | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Early Deployment | | |12.1WC |
     | 12.0XP |(ED): limited | | | |
     | |platforms | | |2001-Apr-12 |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | | | | |12.1(7) |
     | 12.0XQ |Short-lived early | | | |
     | |deployment release | | |2001-Feb-26 |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | | |12.1(5)T5 | | |
     | 12.0XR |Short-lived early | | | |
     | |deployment release |2001-Mar-05 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | | |12.1(5c)E8 | | |
     | 12.0XS |Short-lived early | | | |
     | |deployment release |2001-Feb-26 | | |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | |Early Deployment | | |12.1WC |
     | 12.0XU |(ED): limited | | | |
     | |platforms | | |2001-Apr-12 |
     +----------+-------------------+------------+---------------+---------------+
     | | |12.1(5)T5 | | |
     | 12.0XV |Short-lived early | | | |
     | |deployment release |2001-Mar-05 | | |
     +===========================================================================+
     |12.1-based and Later Releases | Rebuild | Interim** | Maintenance |
     +===========================================================================+
     | All 12.1 | | |
     | Releases |Various platforms |Not Vulnerable |
     +===========================================================================+
     | Notes |
     +===========================================================================+
     | * All dates are estimated and Subject to change. |
     | |
     |** Interim releases are subjected to less rigorous testing than regular |
     | maintenance releases, and may have serious bugs. |
     +===========================================================================+
                                                                                 
    Obtaining Fixed Software

       Cisco is offering free software upgrades to remedy this
       vulnerability for all affected customers. Customers with service
       contracts may upgrade to any software release. Customers without
       contracts may upgrade only within a single row of the table above,
       except that any available fixed software release will be provided to
       any customer who can use it and for whom the standard fixed software
       release is not yet available. Customers may install only the feature
       sets they have purchased.
       
       Note that not all fixed software may be available as of the release
       date of this notice.
       
       Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through
       their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that
       upgrades should be obtained via Cisco's Software Center at
       http://www.cisco.com/.
       
       Customers without contracts or warranty should get their upgrades by
       contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) as shown
       below:
         * (800) 553-2447 (toll-free in North America)
         * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
         * e-mail: taccisco.com
           
       See http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for
       additional TAC contact information, including instructions and
       e-mail addresses for use in various languages.
       
       Give the URL of this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a
       free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be
       requested through the TAC. Please do not contact either
       "psirtcisco.com" or "security-alertcisco.com" for software
       upgrades; faster results will be obtained by contacting the TAC
       directly.
       
    Workarounds

       Several workarounds are available based on customer needs,
       equipment, and software features. The usefulness and practicality of
       each workaround depends on the IOS release running on the device and
       many variables in the customer's environment. Customers are urged to
       consider each of the following alternatives carefully before
       deploying. These workarounds are only needed if it is not possible
       to upgrade to an unaffected release of IOS software.

        A. Default workaround for use with releases for which no other
           workarounds are effective:

             1. Applying access lists to all the interfaces of the
                vulnerable device blocking SNMP from all hosts but those
                authorized to manage the devices.

             2. Blocking SNMP access at the edge of the network to prevent
                undesirable SNMP traffic from entering the network
                containing the vulnerable device.

           Access lists should be deployed with careful consideration of
           the possible effects on network operation and performance. Also
           note that authentication based on an IP source address is weak,
           so the preceding method will not protect against certain types
           of attacks in which the IP source address has been spoofed.
           Further information can be found in the Cisco document
           "Improving Security on Cisco Routers", available at
           http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/21.html

        B. For affected releases based on IOS 11.1:

             1. Remove the view so that the ILMI community cannot be
                reached:

                    no snmp-server view *ilmi

             2. This configuration will not survive a system reload. The
                command must be re-entered after every restart of the
                system.

        C. For affected releases of IOS 11.2 through 11.3(8) NOT REQUIRING
           ATM:

           In this affected range of releases, the ILMI community string
           can be modified or deleted. However, the changes will not
           persist through a reboot of the device. These instructions must
           be re-applied following every system reload of the affected
           device:

             1. Expose the undocumented ILMI community string so it can be
                modified:

                    snmp-server community ILMI RW

                The preceding command may cause an error that can be safely
                ignored.

             2. Disable read-write capability for the same community:

                    no snmp-server community ILMI RW

                If an error is displayed, then this workaround cannot be
                applied to the device. Use the default workarounds
                presented in the first item above.

             3. Since this configuration will not survive a system reload,
                the command must be re-entered after every restart of the
                system.

           If the command in item 2 above did not generate an error and ATM
           is not needed on this device, then this workaround is complete.

        D. For affected releases of IOS 11.2 through 11.3(8) THAT REQUIRE
           ATM:

           This workaround will allow ILMI to continue to function for ATM
           while constraining who may reconfigure the device by way of the
           ILMI community string:

             1. Create a simple ACL to deny access using the following
                command. If "66" is already in use, choose a different
                two-digit number:

                    access-list 66 deny any

             2. Apply it generally to the ILMI community to restrict its
                view:

                    snmp community ILMI view *ilmi RW 66

                An error will be reported if the *ilmi view doesn't exist.
                If that occurs, then use the following command to
                explicitly restrict the ILMI view:

                    snmp community ILMI RW 66

                If the preceding command produces persistent errors, then
                this workaround cannot be applied to this device. Use the
                default workarounds presented in the first item above.

        E. For affected releases of IOS 11.3(9) through 12.0(2)T NOT
           REQUIRING ATM:

           All versions of IOS in this range will accept this workaround,
           and the change will remain in place after a system reload.

             1. Expose the undocumented ILMI community string so it can be
                modified:

                    snmp-server community ILMI RW

                The preceding command may cause an error that can be safely
                ignored.

             2. Disable read-write capability for the same community:

                    no snmp-server community ILMI RW

                If an error is displayed, then this workaround cannot be
                applied to the device. Stop this procedure and use the
                default workarounds presented in the first item above.

        F. For affected releases of IOS 11.3(9) through 12.0(2)T THAT
           REQUIRE ATM:

           This workaround will allow ILMI to continue to function for ATM
           while constraining who may reconfigure the device by way of the
           ILMI community string:

             1. Create a simple ACL to deny access using the following
                command. If "66" is already in use, choose a different
                two-digit number:

                    access-list 66 deny any

             2. Apply it generally to the ILMI community to restrict its
                view:

                    snmp community ILMI view *ilmi RW 66

                An error will be reported if the *ilmi view doesn't exist.
                If that occurs, then use the following command to
                explicitly restrict the ILMI view:

                  snmp community ILMI RW 66

                If the preceding command produces persistent errors, then
                this workaround cannot be applied to this device. Use the
                default workaround presented in the first item above.

        G. For affected releases of IOS 12.0(3)T and later:
           These releases of IOS include support for Simple Network
           Management Protocol version 3 (SNMPv3), which is required for
           this workaround.

             1. Confirm the presence of SNMPv3 support by asking the
                console CLI (command-line interpreter) for assistance with
                options to complete the snmp-server command. Enter config
                mode, enter the command shown below, and note the expected
                response:

                  snmp-server user test test ?

                  remote Specify a remote SNMP entity to which the user belongs
                  v1 user using the v1 security model
                  v2c user using the v2c security model
                  v3 user using the v3 security model

                If the preceding command did not produce the expected
                results, then SNMPv3 is not supported in the release and
                this workaround cannot be applied. Stop this procedure and
                consider applying the default workaround presented above in
                the first item.

                Otherwise, if the device responded as expected, continue
                with the following explanation and instructions.

           In these IOS releases (12.0(3)T and later), ILMI packets are
           processed by the SNMP engine in the same manner as ordinary IP
           SNMP packets. An access control list or a view applied to the
           ILMI community string will be processed whether the transport is
           ILMI or IP. However, the only types of access control lists that
           can be applied to a community string are via IP access-list
           statements, which when applied, block ALL non-IP packets,
           including ILMI packets. Modifying or deleting the *ilmi view
           will also affect the packets transported by ILMI, so workarounds
           that change the view are equally ineffective at permitting ILMI
           while denying SNMP. In this range of releases, it is not
           possible to apply a workaround that denies IP SNMP packets that
           does not also deny ILMI SNMP packets.

        H. For affected releases of IOS 12.0(3)T and later NOT REQUIRING
           ATM:

             1. Expose the undocumented ILMI community string so it can be
                modified:

                  snmp-server community ILMI RW

                The preceding command may cause an error that can be safely
                ignored.

             2. Disable read-write capability for the same community:

                  no snmp-server community ILMI RW

                If an error is displayed, then this workaround cannot be
                applied to the device. Stop this procedure and consider
                using the default workaround.

        I. For affected releases of IOS 12.0(3)T and later THAT REQUIRE
           ATM:

           NOTE: This section also applies to 12.0-based ATM switch
           software such as for the LS1010 and the 8500 series.

           The only effective workaround for systems in this category is
           the default workaround:

             1. Applying access lists to all the interfaces of the
                vulnerable device blocking SNMP from all hosts but those
                authorized to manage the devices.

             2. Blocking SNMP access at the edge of the network to prevent
                undesirable SNMP traffic from entering the network
                containing the vulnerable device.

           Access lists should be deployed with careful consideration of
           the possible effects on network operation and performance. Also
           note that authentication based on an IP source address is weak,
           so the preceding method will not protect against certain types
           of attacks in which the IP source address has been spoofed.
           In this range of releases it is not possible to block IP SNMP
           packets while permitting ILMI SNMP packets. The alternative
           workarounds presented previously will almost certainly cause a
           failure of ATM ILMI communications resulting in a loss of ATM
           connectivity, either immediately upon configuration, or
           unexpectedly at some later time. Either use the default
           workaround or upgrade to fixed software.
           
    Exploitation and Public Announcements

       This vulnerability is known to the engineering staff of several
       Cisco customers. Cisco considers it known to the public prior to the
       publication of this notice.
       
       Cisco is aware of one recent incident involving the unauthorized
       modification of a router that appears to have resulted from this
       vulnerability. However, it may have been the unintended side-effect
       of a test of the vulnerability.
       
       Cisco is not aware of any available tools specifically designed to
       make use of this vulnerability. However, various off-the-shelf
       network management programs could easily be used to test for this
       vulnerability and to exploit it. Certain widely-available programs
       known to the cracker community could be modified by any reasonably
       competent programmer to automate the abuse of this vulnerability.
       
       Cisco is not aware of any general public discussion of this
       vulnerability other than the exceptions previously noted.
       
    Status of This Notice: INTERIM

       This is an interim security advisory. Cisco anticipates issuing
       updated versions of this notice at irregular intervals as there are
       material changes in the facts, and will continue to update this
       notice as necessary. The reader is warned that this notice may
       contain inaccurate or incomplete information. Although Cisco cannot
       guarantee the accuracy of all statements in this notice, all of the
       facts have been checked to the best of our ability. Cisco
       anticipates issuing monthly updates of this notice until it reaches
       FINAL status.
       
       A standalone copy or paraphrase of the text of this security
       advisory that omits the distribution URL in the following section is
       an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain
       factual errors.
       
    Distribution

       This notice will be posted at
       http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/ios-snmp-ilmi-vuln-pub.shtml .
       
       In addition to Worldwide Web posting, a text version of this notice
       will be clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and will be posted
       to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients:

         * cust-security-announcecisco.com

         * bugtraqsecurityfocus.com

         * firewallslists.gnac.com

         * first-teamsfirst.org (including CERT/CC)

         * ciscospot.colorado.edu

         * cisco-nsppuck.nether.net

         * comp.dcom.sys.cisco

         * Various internal Cisco mailing lists
           
       Future updates of this notice, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
       Worldwide Web server, but may or may not be actively announced on
       mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are
       encouraged to check the URL given above for any updates.
       
    Revision History
      
       Revision 1.0 2001-Feb-27 First interim public version
       
    Cisco Product Security Incident Procedures

       Instructions for reporting product security vulnerabilities in Cisco
       products, obtaining assistance with customer security incidents, and
       registering to receive security information from Cisco can be found
       at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/sec_incident_response.shtml
       , including instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco
       Security Advisories.
         _______________________________________________________________
       
       Copyright 2001 by Cisco Systems, Inc. This notice may be
       redistributed freely after the release date given at the top of the
       text, provided that redistributed copies are complete and
       unmodified, and include all date and version information.
         _______________________________________________________________

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