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From: Matthew Pemble (mpemble@ISINTEGRATION.COM)
Date: Mon Mar 05 2001 - 14:40:03 CST
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As I read the paper, what we are talking about is a conventional
One-Time-Pad solution, with an interesting key distribution method.
As has already been stated, the basic encryption technology is not
new (1917 according to Schneier App Crypto Section 1.5) and is
provably secure even given unlimited computational power (let's not
think about practical difficulties). However, we are not all
currently using this old, provably secure technology: we are using
DES, AES or even Public Key systems - why? Key exchange. OTP
systems use one bit of key for every bit of data, therefore you have
a huge distribution problem. Rabin is using open (broadcast)
transmission, relying on the high data rate to make trying every key
set impractical.
Note the last: trivial (mathematically), not even difficult, but just
hard engineering. In the event of infinite storage, to remember the
key sequence, any particular message will be decodable - assume they
have more power than you and that time is not of essence.
There is, however, a more interesting theoretical problem: how do the
sender and the receiver agree on the starting point of the key? Due
to the data rate, you can't even use GPS (best timing available to
most of us) to lock you clocks together and, anyway, you still have
to agree a starting time. You could say something like "take the key
starting after the first block A54FD17C after 12:01:00.0000000" but
that is then, in practice, a key which you have to transmit securely.
Anyone with that "key" can do the decryption.
Therefore, although your actual encryption is secure, you have to use
another method to ensure secure key exchange. That is your weakest
link, therefore this is no solution. If you want to play similar
games, write a random bit stream onto a DVD-RAM, make one copy and
post it (DataPost in the UK, Fed-Ex or UPS outside) that to your
correspondent. That way you each have a very lengthy OTP key, and
unless your horrid organisation of choice can interfere with the
mail, it is more secure than broadcast.
Matthew Pemble, Principal Consultant, IS Integration,
Preston Technology Management Centre, Marsh Lane, PRESTON,
Lancashire, PR1 8UD
Tel: +44 (0)1324 820690 Fax: +44 (0)1324 826034
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- -----Original Message-----
From: CISSP Study Mailing List
[mailto:CISSPSTUDY@SECURITYFOCUS.COM]On
Behalf Of Robert G. Ferrell
Sent: 27 February 2001 17:23
To: CISSPSTUDY@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
Subject: Re: This should start up a discussion....
>The whole article looks to me more of using science fiction movies
>slang.
Imagine the potential for man-in-the-middle attacks, or the error
correction
algorithm necessary to keep two random bit streams synchronized.
How do you verify data integrity? I don't think CRCs would suffice
here.
;-)
Cheers,
RGF
Robert G. Ferrell, CISSP
Information Systems Security Officer
National Business Center
U. S. Dept. of the Interior
Robert_G_Ferrell@nbc.gov
========================================
Who goeth without humor goeth unarmed.
========================================
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