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From: Heath Satterfield (hsatterfield@Enspherics.com)
Date: Fri Oct 05 2001 - 07:50:57 CDT

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    I really hate getting 50 responses to the same question, but will go ahead
    with this anyway.

    The layered architecture is becoming an ever more common practice in both
    government and industry deployments, therefore, I think it is very important
    to realize the benefits, and drawbacks.

    The layered approach to firewall architecture does NOT provide redundancy
    nor does it eliminate a single point of failure.

    Two (2) firewalls are used with One (1) Internet presence, with the
    architecture
    looking like so:
       INTERNET - FW - DMZ - FW - LAN
    Note: to add redundancy, and eliminate the single point of failure, you
    would
    need dual FW's with internet connection, connected to a switch/hub in the
    DMZ.

    Like others have already stated, the benefits are:
    1. Network is divided into logical "Zones", where each Zone must traverse a
    FW to get to another zone.

    2. Less cumbersome rule sets. Internet can only communicate with DMZ,
    which
    would contain hosts such as, web servers, external SMTP, Citrix, Portals,
    etc.

    3. In turn, DMZ communicates with internal LAN for data sources.

    4. If two different FW products are used, the thought is that if the FW
    with
    Internet presence is hacked, no valuable information is available. The
    second
    firewall must be hacked as well to get to the "good stuff". However, this
    can
    add a bit of admin overhead, as it may require someone.

    Another twist on this architecture is when you have other "Untrusted"
    entities
    that share your Internet connection (many county governments are structured
    this
    way). The problem being that you have no control over their backend
    connections
    (modems on desktops, DSL line, etc). With the previous architecture, you
    can add
    in these entities at your own comfort level, with a DMZ interface on either
    the
    external or internal FW.

    Hope this helps someone....

    -----Original Message-----
    From: Paul D. Shaffer [mailto:paulshaf@earthlink.net]
    Sent: Thursday, October 04, 2001 6:05 PM
    To: Rob Collins
    Cc: CISSPSTUDY@securityfocus.com
    Subject: RE: "design the firewall system" practice from the CERT
    Security Improvement Modules

    Rob, the benefit is in the keyword "layered." By adding a second firewall
    layer, an admin gains flexibility, redundancy and more granular control over
    the traffic passing through the system. Single point of failure is
    mitigated, and additional options for placing and managing, for example,
    intrusion detection devices is gained.

    As we are all probably well aware, there will always be a tradeoff in added
    complexity and administrative overhead whenever additional devices or
    systems are added to a network. The decision to employ a more complex,
    "layered" protection scheme would be based on various factors including
    traffic loads on the various segments, applications hosted at different
    points on the network and their commensurate security requirements, etc.
    Hope this helps...

    Paul

    -----Original Message-----
    From: Rob Collins [mailto:robtompc@yahoo.com]
    Sent: Thursday, October 04, 2001 4:52 PM
    To: Arlen Fletcher; CISSPSTUDY@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
    Subject: RE: "design the firewall system" practice from the CERT
    Security Improvement Modules

    Just to be clear, the two different architectures are:
    Basic firewall with DMZ network architecture;
       INTERNET
          |
    LAN---o---DMZ
    Dual firewall with DMZ network architecture;
       INTERNET
          |
          o
          |___DMZ
          |
          o
          |
         LAN

    In both architectures, traffic from any one segment to
    another must first pass a firewall. The difference,
    so far as I see, is entirely in the shape of the rules
    the firewall(s) use.

    Maybe I'm not understanding 'layering'. What benefit
    does putting the second firewall in provide? I see
    complications (like an extra firewall), but no benefit
    in making traffic destined for the intranet traverse
    the DMZ.

    --- Arlen Fletcher <Arlen.Fletcher@farm-credit.com>
    wrote:
    > It's a layered defense.

    =====
    --r
    "Experience is that marvelous thing that enables you to recognize a mistake
    when you make it again." -- F. P. Jones

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