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Subject: Re: The problem with SSH2
From: Carl Ellison (cme
acm.org)Date: Wed Dec 27 2000 - 21:11:05 CST
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At 05:35 PM 12/27/00 -0500, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote:
>Well, openssh prints the following:
>
>

























































>
WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED!
>

























































>IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!
>Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!
>It is also possible that the DSA host key has just been changed.
>Please contact your system administrator.
>Add correct host key in /home/tytso/.ssh/known_hosts2 to get rid of this
>message. Password authentication is disabled to avoid trojan horses.
>Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid trojan horses.
>
>
>If after reading this, the user doesn't get an the idea, that user is an
>idiot.
That's possible. However, if a good mechanism with a well designed human
interface isn't provided for communicating and verifying the hash of the
public key, the "contact your system administrator" command does little
good. So, the sysadmin says that the key was changed. That doesn't mean
that there's no MITM.
The warning message should print out the hash of the public key actually
received and the user should be told to get the sysadmin to read that hash
back to him before accepting the key as valid.
The keygen utility should print that hash. There should also be a utility
to print the hash after key generation, in case the sysadmin forgot to write
down the hash when the key was generated.
- Carl
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|Carl M. Ellison cme
acm.org http://world.std.com/~cme |
| PGP: 08FF BA05 599B 49D2 23C6 6FFD 36BA D342 |
+--Officer, officer, arrest that man. He's whistling a dirty song.-+
- Next message: Steve Reid: "Re: The problem with SSH2"
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- In reply to: Theodore Y. Ts'o: "Re: The problem with SSH2"
- Next in thread: Markus Friedl: "Re: The problem with SSH2"
- Next in thread: Steve Reid: "Re: The problem with SSH2"
- Reply: Carl Ellison: "Re: The problem with SSH2"
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- Reply: Mike Brodhead: "Re: The problem with SSH2"
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