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From: Pete Chown (Pete.Chownskygate.co.uk)
Date: Tue Jun 12 2001 - 04:39:44 CDT

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    Nicko van Someren:

    > You could strengthen against the use of hardware by using a system
    > that needed more memory and used functions such as multiply
    > operations which are expensive in hardware but which CPU designers
    > spend a lot of effort upon.

    I agree. The point must be to inflate the gate count and prevent
    parallelisation. The second part of this isn't too hard, but the
    first is more difficult. It seems to me that there are two choices.

    The first is to make the hash function itself very complicated, so it
    takes a fair amount of memory to express it in software. This puts
    hardware implementations at a disadvantage because gates are likely to
    be in shorter supply than program memory.

    The second possibility is to make the computation generate a large
    number of intermediate data. One possibility might be a brute force
    attack on a cipher which is iterated twice.

    First you choose a work factor n. Then you select two random keys k1
    and k2, of size n bits. You then encrypt a nonce under first k1 and
    then k2.

    As we know, this construction gives a total strength of n+1 bits, not
    2n, because of the meet in the middle attack. However, the meet in
    the middle attack generates a lot of intermediate results. This could
    mean that the complexity in an FPGA would be O(2n) while the
    complexity on a general purpose computer would be O(n+1). Of course
    the constant of proportionality would favour the FPGA.

    You could make this even worse for the hardware people by using a
    cipher like RC4. RC4 would be a real pain to implement in hardware.

    Eric Johansson:

    > On the point about stolen stamps, I was planning on defeating that
    > by making hashcash be a client to client protocol and the only thing
    > intervening machines might do is validate that the stamp is present.

    A general purpose end to end protocol would be quite beneficial I
    think. There are lots of things you could usefully ask the recipient
    of mail, such as preferred formats (plain text, HTML, Word document,
    virus...).

    -- 
    Pete