From: Etaoin Shrdlu (shrdludeaddrop.org)
Date: Wed May 24 2006 - 09:53:49 CDT

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Martin Johns wrote:

> On 5/24/06, Steve Wilson <S.Wilsoneris.qinetiq.com> wrote:
>
>> A large government organisation with no egress firewalling policy? No
>> restrictive and monitored outbound proxies? What sort of a perimeter is
>> that[1]?

> I do not think monitored outbound proxies are a feasible concept to
> prevent the leakage of classified material. As long as http traffic is
> allowed, there are about 100000000 hidden channels which could be used
> to encode the material.

Please, please, please, folks; unless you've worked in the classified
area (which is where I've spent my entire professional life), try not to
guess at these things. Truly classified documents are not *on* the
Internet. They have multiple classified networks with only sneakernet
between them, and while there have indeed been "spillages" of classified
material, this has usually been the result of some fool or other
mentioning something in email or in a document that makes the result
classified (and the destruction and wiping of perfectly good disk drives
due to inadvertent release of such minor details is *huge*, and very
time consuming).

Sure, most of the gov and mil internet facing networks are a lot more
lax than they should be, but the classified stuff (even the stuff
classified at a mere Confidential level) is not there. Not. Look up
things like siprnet.

Coffee. Need more coffee...

--
Shrdlu

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