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Re: [Dailydave] Does Fuzzing really work?

From: Peter Winter-Smith (peterngssoftware.com)
Date: Mon Sep 25 2006 - 15:21:26 CDT


Hi Aviram,

I can't speak for Dave, but I felt that his note "There are no new MSRPC
bugs. You should give up looking for them"
(http://seclists.org/dailydave/2006/q3/0160.html) was probably given more in
the context of the MSRPC fuzzer that he had published (and/or provided with
CANVAS/SILICA), and knowing what I do of Dave I suspect was more of a
joke/challenge than a definitive statement ;-)

The research looks very interesting however, in those figures that you gave
to what degree do you take account for subsets of data that you are testing
(fields within a given portion within a given protocol, and the format of
the data that they can accept), etc, and the valid common interesting bad
values which can typically be used in such circumstances (i.e data which
conforms but has often been known to cause problems - strings of specific
lengths, given sets of integer values which often cause problems, etc)?

Just interested what makes up the numbers! :-)

-Peter

----- Original Message -----
From: "Aviram Jenik" <avirambeyondsecurity.com>
To: <dailydavelists.immunitysec.com>
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 8:35 PM
Subject: [Dailydave] Does Fuzzing really work?

> There's a lot of talk lately on whether fuzzing can actually be used to
> find
> vulnerabilities - and more importantly, reliably rule out the existence of
> unknown vulnerabilities.
>
> Since most of this talk revolves around Dave's note "There are no new
> MSRPC bugs. You should give up looking for them" I thought this was the
> right
> forum to answer this question.
> The question was whether RPC fuzzing can really rule out vulnerabilities,
> and
> our experience shows it can (at least, as much as you can rule out
> anything
> in IT security).
>
> Let me throw some numbers at you(*). The FTP protocol has 310 "scenarios"
> of
> valid FTP sessions. If you try to overflow each time a different part of
> the
> command in every scenario you get a little over 12M attack combinations.
> If
> you use some of our nifty beSTORM 2.0 optimizations you get to 70,679
> attack
> vectors. Even with the lamest FTP server allowing just 5 simultaneous
> connections and taking a full second to process each session it would take
> only 4 hours to fully test the protocol.
>
> FTP is too simple you say? With more complex protocols like SIP you have
>>15,000 scenarios and something like 40,680,459 attack vectors after
> optimizations. Sounds scary at first, but a SIP server capable of handling
> 500 requests per second would take only 22 hours to test, which means you
> can
> leave it running when you go home for the weekend and come back for the
> results. If you don't feel like waiting 22 hours, put it on 5 machines and
> have an answer by 4 hours. If you don't feel like waiting 4 hours... well
> you
> get the point.
>
> HTTP is probably as complex as they come, but most servers can handle
> >100,000
> requests per second in a closed environment and a fast local network.
> Suddenly trying all HTTP combinations is not as hard as it seems.
>
> And so on, and so on.
>
> My point is to those people who mock fuzzers - you either tried the wrong
> kind, or you tried them a long time ago. I'm not saying that buffer
> overflows
> are suddenly obsolete (don't delete that ZERT bookmark just yet!). But
> nowadays there is no reason for an FTP server to come out with buffer
> overflows; there's just no excuse.
>
>
>
> (*) Don't believe the numbers? Check the URL below and see for yourself.
>
> --
> Regards,
> Aviram Jenik
> Beyond Security
> (703) 286-7725 x504
>
> http://www.BeyondSecurity.com
> http://www.SecuriTeam.com
>
> Looking for Unknown Vulnerabilities?
> http://beyondsecurity.com/beSTORM
> _______________________________________________
> Dailydave mailing list
> Dailydavelists.immunitysec.com
> http://lists.immunitysec.com/mailman/listinfo/dailydave
>

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