From: Martin Vuagnoux (dailydavevuagnoux.com)
Date: Mon Oct 20 2008 - 09:56:18 CDT

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Thierry Zoller a écrit :
> Dear Martin,
>
> Very interesting, could you elaborate on your experiences, with a
> running laptop (lcd/tft turned on) ? Is the attack still feasiable to
> a 100% ? What influences does the emissions from the PC or Screen have
> and do they make the attack "impossible" ?
>
>
>
Hi Thierry,

We removed power supply and LCD monitor because there are already known
attacks which use them. In the paper we show how they can be used to
improve the eavesdropping rang. If you look at the video, you see three
LCD displays in the room, with 3 computers (I don't count the laptop).
They were all running and emitting electromagnetic waves, but the
frequency range used by keyboards is preserved. It's generally not a
problem. Printers may create bigger interferences when they are printing.

In the paper, we show that we can even distinguish multiple keyboards
(sharing the same model) in a computer room (our student computer which
PC's with LCD and CRT monitors).

We spend a lot of time to have a practical attack, which can be really
used. These videos show the worst case for us: 802.11n base stations and
something like 60 computers on the same floor with a computer cluster
and printers just 2 room away. However, I cannot garantee that these
attacks are 100% reliable. We tried to do our best to have more than
just a proof of concept which works in an anechoidal room. I can say
that it took a *lot* of time to go from the anechoidal room to a real one.

Martin
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