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From: Robert Watson (rwatsonFreeBSD.ORG)
Date: Sun Jan 07 2001 - 10:21:16 CST

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    On Sun, 7 Jan 2001, **1st Vamp** wrote:

    > To: Wes Peters <wessoftweyr.com>
    > Date: 07/01/2001, 12:45:09
    > Subject: Re: Antisniffer measures (digest of posts)
    >
    > Technically any SSL enabled telnet client wouldn't be that different from
    > using a normal telnet client through an SSL tunnel, such as stunnel,
    > although some bugs have been found in recent ports, and this is technically
    > no more secure than plain old SSH.

    I'm not sure I follow your argument -- if the SSL telnet properly
    evaluates X.509 certificates, and has preconfigured, trusted roots, then
    an SSL telnet does offer something that SSH does not have: the ability to
    connect to a new host without a manual keying procedure. Given that the
    weakness currently widely touted as existing in SSH is really a failure to
    provide an automatic keying procedure (and users not knowing how to deal
    with that), it seems to be the case that in that regard, it really *is*
    more secure than plain old SSH. Now, at least some of the SSL clients out
    there actually don't do this: for example, last time I looked at pine-SSL
    (a while ago), it performed no certificate checking, meaning it was quite
    subject to a man-in-the-middle attack, and unlike most versions of SSH,
    would not display any warning indicating the potential for one. However, a
    properly written and configured SSL client should not do this.

    Robert N M Watson FreeBSD Core Team, TrustedBSD Project
    robertfledge.watson.org NAI Labs, Safeport Network Services

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