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From: Adrian Filipi-Martin (adrian+freebsd-security_at_ubergeeks.com)
Date: Mon Sep 09 2002 - 09:27:19 CDT

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    On Sun, 8 Sep 2002, Benjamin Krueger wrote:

    > Think carefully about exactly what kind of privileges your clients get. A
    > friend asked me recently if his users could escalate privileges if they have a
    > normal user account on the main server, and root inside the jail. After some
    > thinking we outlined a situation in which the user creates a suid binary to
    > escalate any user to root inside the jail, and then runs it as a normal user
    > outside the jail. Instant root.

            We stumbled accross this situation a year or so ago as we converted
    our development environments to be jails on the developer workstations.

            A reasonable solution is to block access to the jailed filesystems
    from non-jailed accounts. Just do the following:

            install -m u=rwx,go= -d /usr/fence
            install -d /usr/fence/jail

            Then use the fenced off directory as your jail root. We are
    successfully running desktops with multiple developer jails in this sort of
    configuration and things work great. This exclued anyone but root from
    using suid binaries from a jail, and well, root's already root.

            Adrian

    --
    [ adrianubergeeks.com ]
    

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