FYI, for those not on bugtraq.

         ---Mike

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>Date: Sat, 4 Jan 2003 19:37:03 -0800
>To: bugtraqsecurityfocus.com
>Subject: OPENSSH REMOTE ROOT COMPROMISE ALL VERSIONS
>From: mmhshushmail.com
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>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>*********** OPENSSH REMOTE ROOT COMPROMISE ALL VERSIONS ***********
>
>MICKEY MOUSE HACKING SQUADRON ADVISORY #2
>
>DISCLAIMER
>- ----------
>
>The nation's zeroth private security intelligence firm, Mickey Mouse
>Hacking Squadron uniquely addresses the challenges faced by both public-
>and private-sector organizations in protecting critical information
>assets.
>
>Our intelligence is timely, delivered 24 x 7, 365 (*) days per year;
>relevant, fully customizable, and actionable intelligence is only
>valuable if it makes a difference.
>
>(*) in the case of a leap year, we of course provide a 24 x 7, 366 days
>premier service.
>
>TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
>- --------------------
>
>The following advisory is based on the excellent advisory published by
>Global InterSec LLC *six months ago*:
>
>http://www.globalintersec.com/adv/openssh-2002062801.txt
>
>After more than six months of intensive underground research, our ISO
>31337 certified security department evidenced that the bug (an integer
>overflow, resulting in a heap overflow) described in the aforementioned
>advisory still exists in OpenSSH 3.5p1 and 3.4p1, and remains trivially
>exploitable. All existing PAM enabled versions of OpenSSH (3.5p1, 3.4p1
>and below) are therefore affected.
>
>Due to various advisories posted to various fora by unnamed security
>companies, this bug was supposed to be nonexistent or nonexploitable.
>Fortunately, Global InterSec LLC shed some light on the whole affair and
>revealed the malignant nature of the oversight to the world.
>
>Their results were applied to the latest OpenSSH versions by privately
>trained Mickey Mouse Hacking Squadron security specialists and revealed
>that the exploitation techniques developed by Global InterSec LLC are
>still applicable to the newest OpenSSH.
>
>PROOF OF CONCEPT
>- ----------------
>
>The following proof of concept is reproducing Global InterSec LLC
>findings, enhanced with the patented research performed by Mickey Mouse
>Hacking Squadron against OpenSSH 3.5p1.
>
>First of all, the OpenSSH 3.5p1 server has to be built (with PAM support
>enabled):
>
>$ tar xzf openssh-3.5p1.tar.gz
>$ cd openssh-3.5p1
>$ configure --with-pam
>[...]
>$ make sshd
>[...]
>
>Before the SSH server is actually executed, the sshd_config file should
>be modified in order to enable PAM ("PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt yes").
>
># sshd
>
>In order to reveal the nature of the OpenSSH vulnerability, the next
>step is to connect to the SSH server:
>
>$ ssh werewolf.research.mmhs.com
>Password:
>
>Thanks to the "Password:" prompt, it is clear that PAM is actually
>enabled (otherwise, the prompt would have been "userhost's password:").
>This unique fingerprinting technique was investigated by Mickey Mouse
>Hacking Squadron, and is already present in the latest version of the
>Mickey Mouse Hacking Squadron award winning network vulnerability
>assessment tool.
>
>After the previous command was executed, the freshly spawned sshd
>process has to be examined with a debugger, in order to set the correct
>breakpoints within the input_userauth_info_response_pam() function of
>OpenSSH, as demonstrated in the Global InterSec LLC advisory:
>
># gdb sshd 6552
>(gdb) disassemble input_userauth_info_response_pam
>[...]
>0x80531bc <input_userauth_info_response_pam+192>: push %esi
>0x80531bd <input_userauth_info_response_pam+193>:
> call 0x807306c <xfree>
>[...]
>(gdb) break *0x80531bd
>Breakpoint 1 at 0x80531bd: file auth2-pam.c, line 158.
>(gdb) continue
>Continuing.
>
>Now that the buggy call to xfree() can be intercepted, the SSH client
>should trigger the integer overlow and the resulting heap overflow:
>
>$ ssh werewolf.research.mmhs.com
>Password: <type a thousand 'A' characters here and hit enter>
>
>After that, the xfree() breakpoint is reached, and the next call to
>free() should therefore be intercepted in order to comply with the
>technique developed by Global InterSec LLC:
>
>Breakpoint 1, 0x080531bd in input_userauth_info_response_pam (type=61,
> seqnr=7, ctxt=0x809c050) at auth2-pam.c:158
>158 xfree(resp);
>(gdb) disassemble xfree
>[...]
>0x807308e <xfree+34>: call 0x804ba14 <free>
>[...]
>(gdb) break *0x807308e
>Breakpoint 2 at 0x807308e: file xmalloc.c, line 55.
>(gdb) continue
>Continuing.
>
>Breakpoint 2, 0x0807308e in xfree (ptr=0x809dfb8) at xmalloc.c:55
>55 free(ptr);
>(gdb) x /10x 0x809dfb8
>0x809dfb8: 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
>0x809dfc8: 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
>0x809dfd8: 0x41414141 0x41414141
>
> >From here on, as demonstrated by Global InterSec LLC, exploitation
>becomes trivial. For more information on exploiting calls to free() see
>the excellent Phrack article "Once upon a free()" [2].
>
>WORK AROUND
>- -----------
>
>As mentioned in http://www.openssh.com/txt/preauth.adv, and as
>demonstrated by noir in http://www.phrack.org/phrack/60/p60-0x06.txt,
>"you can prevent privilege escalation if you enable
>UsePrivilegeSeparation in sshd_config."
>
>Love,
>
>- --
>Mickey Mouse Hacking Squadron
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>
>
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Mike Tancsa, tel +1 519 651 3400
Sentex Communications, mikesentex.net
Providing Internet since 1994 www.sentex.net
Cambridge, Ontario Canada www.sentex.net/mike

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