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From: 3APA3A (3APA3ASECURITY.NNOV.RU)
Date: Tue Jan 15 2008 - 17:19:02 CST
Well, I cant' say it's all fake... It's all junk.
FD> OpenSSL 0.9.7j
FD> openssl-0.9.7j/fips-1.0/aes/fips_aesavs.c 973: User supplied data
FD> copied into fixed length buffer on the stack with no length
Buffer overflow in non-suid test application (not compiled by default).
FD> SSH 188.8.131.52
FD> ssh-184.108.40.206/lib/zlib/contrib/minizip/minizip.c 187: User supplied
FD> data copied into fixed length buffer on the stack with no length
Identical to CVE-2007-1657 and is probably fixed in the same time. Local
overflow in non-suid application (minizip). Do not affect SSH. Only this
one can be considered as low risk vulnerability.
FD> Apache 1.3.37
FD> src/regex/split.c 164: User supplied data copied into fixed length
FD> buffer on the stack with no length verification.
Local buffer overflow in non-suid test application, which is not
compiled by default. Not security.
FD> Samba 3.0.25b
FD> samba-3.0.25b/source/popt/poptparse.c 27: Integer overflow in size_t
FD> which is later used in heap allocation. Buffer then copied into this
FD> memory resulting in heap overflow.
This one is fake.
size_t nb = (argc + 1) * sizeof(*argv);
nb += strlen(argv[i]) + 1;
dst = malloc(nb);
nb <= memory already allocated for argc and argv < size of address space
nb < size of address space
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