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Subject: Re: IDS: intruder clues
From: Philippe Bourgeois (Philippe.Bourgeois
cnes.fr)Date: Tue Apr 25 2000 - 05:06:35 CDT
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Some more details about investigating a compromised Unix platform.
I fully agree with "flynngn
jmu.edu" overall process, but I
want to give you further details.
1.first of all, make a raw image of the disks before you
erase "volatile" traces (such as file time stamps) using a
"dd" command.
A "tar" copy of some important files (logs and configuration
files) could be usefull (easier to read back than a "dd"
image).
2.double-check "/etc/passwd" to find unknown accounts (created
by the intuder). If you are lucky you will find a login
added by the hacker. Search that login in "sulog" and "wtmp"
to establish a time frame for the hacker activity.
3.could be interesting to run a port scanner (such as
Nmap) to search for unknown open ports (e.g. back-doors
or sniffer). Compare scan result with "netstat" to know if
a rootkit has been installed (hiding some network services).
4.install a sane copy of the binaries and the librairies you
will use to investigate the compromised system.
NB: That doesn't protect you against corrupted kernels
(such as a result of a malicious loadable kernel module)
5.search for regular files in "/dev" (could be rootkit configs
files), strange directory names (e.g. "..." or ".. ")
6.Review the log files. The overall process here is to discard
all the lines that are looking as regular to finally spots the
strange entries.
7.If you can establish a time frame
( [intrusion-time, incident-detection] ), reviewing
access/modification time is very usefull to track hacker
activity.
8.If you dont have Tripwire running on that system, you
can use "md5" to check system binaries. For that you
need a sane copy of your system on an other platform
(could be a restore of a backup of the intruded system).
Build the MD5 signatures for binaries on that other
platform and compare the result with the MD5 signatures
of the intruded system.
Philippe Bourgeois
==================================================================================
flynngn
jmu.edu wrote:
>
> [...]
>
> In rough order of effectiveness:
>
> 1. File fingerprints from previously stored tripwire or RPM comparisons.
> 2. Careful examination of critical configuration files
> (inetd.conf, inittab, rc, crontab, profiles, auditing, tcpwrappers, other
> access controls, etc.)
> 3. Network access logs.
> 4. External system logs.
>
> Everything below this point is iffy on a compromised system. Anything,
> including
> the tools you use to inspect the system may be compromised. Its best to mount
> the disk read-only on a known good "inspection system".
>
> 5. Onboard logs
> 6. File modification times.
> 7. Unexpected files and directories.
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jmu.edu: "Re: IDS: intruder clues"
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jmu.edu: "Re: IDS: intruder clues"
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