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From: McCammon, Keith (Keith.McCammon
eadvancemed.com)Date: Wed Aug 01 2001 - 13:33:50 CDT
Dave,
This is a great idea. Funny thing is that just about any responsible
network engineer already does this with a firewall or access list:
INBOUND
access-list 112 permit tcp any gt 1023 host X.X.X.X eq 80
access-list 112 permit tcp any gt 1023 host X.X.X.X eq 443
OUTBOUND
access-list 113 permit tcp host X.X.X.X eq 80 any established
access-list 113 permit tcp host X.X.X.X eq 443 any established
The problem we have, you see, is that there seems to be a *ridiculous* lack
of responsible network/systems/security engineers, as evidenced by this
silly-a** worm.
Cheers!
Keith
>-----Original Message-----
>From: dave.goldsmith
intelsat.com [mailto:dave.goldsmith
intelsat.com]
>Sent: Wednesday, August 01, 2001 1:48 PM
>To: incidents
securityfocus.com
>Subject: Possible method to prevent spread of CodeRed and other similar
>wo rms
>
>
>I mailed this earlier today but got a message that the
>incidents mailbox was
>disabled so I am resending it.
>
>Obviously firewalls, screening routers and whatever other
>tools people use
>to guard their networks are configured to allow INCOMING
>connections from
>the Internet to be initiated to their public web servers. The
>web server
>then responds and while the session exists, two way traffic is
>exchanged.
>
>Is there normally any reason for a web server to initiate OUTBOUND
>connections to the Internet? If not, why not block such
>outbound packets?
>The primary reason that I can think of for a web server to
>initiate Internet
>traffic is if a system administrator is upgrading software and
>trying to
>retrieve software patches from the Internet. Usually, you could access
>those files from a local network server or transfer the files
>via flopy/CD
>or other media.
>
>If an IIS (or any other) web server were to become infected
>with a worm that
>then tried to spread, that system would be blocked from
>sending out viral
>traffic.
>
>Flaws, glaring omissions, or a good idea?
>
>Dave Goldsmith
>
>
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