OSEC

Neohapsis is currently accepting applications for employment. For more information, please visit our website www.neohapsis.com or email hr@neohapsis.com
 
From: Jay D. Dyson (jdysontreachery.net)
Date: Tue Jun 11 2002 - 19:07:18 CDT

  • Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]

    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
    Hash: SHA1

    On Tue, 11 Jun 2002, Sweth Chandramouli wrote:

    > > Here's what I'm seeing -- anyone have any information on this variant?
    > > /msadc/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:\\*.cif/s/b
    > > /a.asp/..%c1%1c../..%c1%1c../winnt/repair/sam
    > > /a.asp/..%c1%9c../..%c1%9c../winnt/repair/sam
    > >
    > > This is definitely not Nimda, although it attempts to exploit the same
    > > directory traversal vulnerability in IIS as Nimda
    >
    > Perhaps this should be thrown over to the incidents list?

            I concur. Incidents folks, here's a summary of the present
    discussion from the Log Analysis list.

            1. Tina Bird requested a list of Nimda variant attack strings
                    (which I provided). Upon review, she determined that the
                    style of attacks she was seeing (enumerated at the top of
                    this message) were not among the known Nimda variants.

            2. Michael Katz made the observation that the directory
                    traversal technique is the same as Nimda, though the
                    attacks don't appear as a Nimda variant. Mr. Katz
                    further suggested that the attacks may have been manually
                    executed.

            3. Sweth Chandramouli commented on the '.cif' request thus:
                    "This is the one that scares me; it's attempting to run a
                    recursive directory search on your C drive to find your
                    Internet Explorer component information file--the file
                    that, for example, Windows Update uses to determine what
                    patches you have installed. Presumably, if that request
                    succeeded, it would then download the CIF to find out what
                    version of IE you have, etc., and try only those exploits
                    of relevance."

            4. Both Sweth and myself noted that the traversal to /winnt/
                    repair/sam had some large ramifications if the file access
                    attempt wasn't hung up with some sort of Microsoft access
                    sharing violation. (The attacker would basically have a
                    load of goodies to feed l0phtcrack.)

            Anyone else seeing this pop up in their logs? Any honeypots
    collecting data of this sort? It's a new one on me.

    - -Jay

      ( ( _______
      )) )) .--"There's always time for a good cup of coffee"--. >====<--.
    C|~~|C|~~| (>------ Jay D. Dyson -- jdysontreachery.net ------<) | = |-'
     `--' `--' `-- I'll be diplomatic...when I run out of ammo. --' `------'

    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
    Version: GnuPG v1.0.7 (TreacherOS)
    Comment: See http://www.treachery.net/~jdyson/ for current keys.

    iD8DBQE9BpC5GI2IHblM+8ERAukTAJ4yysPYcDmnBzSkMvMA8+w+PaoGtACfetJk
    hE4GalTiNp/d0VcmfOhyUqE=
    =oCYX
    -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This list is provided by the SecurityFocus ARIS analyzer service.
    For more information on this free incident handling, management
    and tracking system please see: http://aris.securityfocus.com