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From: InfoSec News (isn_at_c4i.org)
Date: Tue Jan 28 2003 - 12:42:03 CST

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    http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,3959,848302,00.asp

    By Dennis Fisher
    January 27, 2003

    As corporate IT departments go about the business of cleaning up their
    networks, there are strong indications that the SQL Slammer worm that
    brought down portions of the Internet over the weekend is based on the
    work of an obscure Chinese cracking group.

    Signatures within the worm's source code indicate that a group known
    as the Honker Union of China - also known as the Hacker Union of
    China - may be responsible for writing the code, according to security
    experts who have analyzed the code. However, experts caution that
    although they are certain of the code's origins, someone else may have
    actually loosed the worm on the Internet.

    "We're 100 percent certain this was based on the CNHonker code," said
    Chris Rouland, director of the X-Force research team at Internet
    Security Systems Inc., in Atlanta. "But that doesn't mean they
    released it."

    Although the Honker Union has not yet claimed responsibility for the
    worm, it has posted on its Web site in the past several versions of an
    exploit for the vulnerability used by Slammer. The group has been
    quite active in pro-Chinese and anti-American hacking activity in the
    past and was involved in a U.S.-Chinese cyber-skirmish that erupted in
    early 2001.

    The worm did most of its damage in Asia, particularly South Korea,
    which was effectively taken off the Internet for several hours
    Saturday. And some experts have pointed out that the Slammer worm was
    released on the anniversary of a major offensive in the Korean War
    that began pushing back Communist Chinese forces that had penetrated
    South Korea.

    Despite the possible political motivations behind the worm's release,
    White House security officials downplayed the idea that this was an
    act of terrorism.

    "We'd rather characterize terrorism as something that physically kills
    people," said Marcus Sachs, director of communications infrastructure
    protection in the Office of Cyberspace Security in Washington. "There
    was no lasting damage done to the infrastrucutre. We'd like to see the
    term cyber-terror dropped."

    The worm, known variously as Slammer and Sapphire, hit the Internet
    around 12:30 a.m. Eastern on Saturday and began spreading quickly.
    Within the first hour, it had infected more than 50,000 machines,
    Rouland said. It continued to spread throughout the day Saturday and
    has now found its way into more than 200,000 machines, experts say.
    Its infection rate was much faster than the Code Red worm of 2001,
    even though there are far fewer SQL servers on the Internet than there
    are Web servers running the Microsoft Corp. IIS software that Code Red
    attacked.

    But, while Code Red continued to spread for several days, Slammer was
    contained relatively quickly. The shorter life-cycle is due to several
    factors, but much of it has to do with quick reactions from ISPs and
    large network operators who all agreed to block traffic on port 1434,
    which is the port Slammer uses to infect machines. This kind of
    wholesale filtering is virtually unheard of and would not have been
    possible with Code Red. Also, government agencies reacted much more
    quickly to Slammer than they did to previous attacks, thanks mainly to
    experience and help from private-sector security firms.

    "There was quite a bit of activity going on here," said Sachs. "We
    first saw it, I think at the [National Communications System] at about
    1 a.m., and by 3 a.m. or 4 a.m. everyone who needed to know was out of
    bed and notified."

    Others agreed that the cooperation among the various ISACs, government
    agencies and private firms was key to the worm's containment.

    "I was the first one to call the [National Infrastrucutre Protection
    Center] and that was at about 3:45 a.m., and we had a pretty good
    handle on the analysis by then," said Pete Allor, director of
    operations for the Information Technology Information Sharing and
    Access Center and manager of the threat intelligence service at ISS.
    "We had the packet captures early, and the analysis was pretty
    straightforward. We talked to the Financial Services ISAC, [and]
    worked closely with the telecom folks, all of them."

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