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From: Treece, Dennis (ISS Atlanta) (DTreeceiss.net)
Date: Wed Sep 19 2001 - 14:38:41 CDT

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    Copyright 2001 Internet Security Systems (trademark) THE POWER TO
    PROTECT

    INTERNET THREAT & SOLUTIONS UPDATE for September 19th - 21st, 2001
    ISS X-Force Special Operations Group

    - --------------------------------------
    CURRENT THREAT ASSESSMENT & THREAT FORECAST
    - --------------------------------------

    AlertCon 3 Today, September 19th, 2001
    AlertCon 3 Projected for September 20th - 21st, 2001

    *************

    - - We are holding at AlertCon 3 and projecting this out an additional
    two days. AlertCon 3 means there is a focused or specific threat and
    some action is required.

    - - The NIMDA worm continues to plague the Internet. The port stats
    below show how NIMDA's propagation via port 80 dominated our alarms
    yesterday.

    - - NIMDA affects Windows 95, 98, ME, 2000, and NT 4.0. It spreads
    itself via Outlook, using the addresses of the people in your inbox.
    It also spreads itself via file shares and if it finds none it will
    create them. It spreads itself via the web, scanning for such things
    as the back door deposited in infected machines by Code Red II.

    - - NIMDA deposits itself in a multitude of files with a variety of
    extensions (e.g. .exe, .htm, .doc). The executable is in a README.EXE
    file.

    - - The X-Force <http://xforce.iss.net/> R&D team has published a
    technical advisory that you should consult for the detailed write-up.
    Keep checking their site for updated security solutions relative to
    this worm.

    - ---------------------------------------
    SOLUTIONS
    - ---------------------------------------

    - - NIMDA is pervasive and destructive. Today, make sure key data is
    identified and then backed up in a separate place.

    - - Patch your Win 2K and NT machines from these links:
    - -- Win 2K
    <http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/downloads/critical/q300972/defaul
    t.asp?FinishURL=%2Fdownloads%2Frelease%2Easp%3FReleaseID%3D30800%26redi
    rect%3Dno>
    - -- Win NT
    <http://www.microsoft.com/ntserver/nts/downloads/critical/q300972/defau
    lt.asp?FinishURL=%2Fdownloads%2Frelease%2Easp%3FReleaseID%3D30833%26red
    irect%3Dno>

    - - Visit the Microsoft site
    http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/technet/secu
    rity/topics/Nimda.asp and follow their suggestions regarding NIMDA.
    Advise your users to avoid opening any e-mail attachment they are
    unsure of with a .exe, .txt, or .vbs extension.

    - - Anti-virus solutions are available. Visit your vendor's site and
    update immediately.

    - - Blocking tftp outbound will keep your machines from being infected
    from other networks via either the e-mail method or the Code Blue
    vulnerabilities.

    - - Cause a prompt to appear before running Java script when surfing the
    web. Unless you are sure of the integrity of the site you are visiting
    it is wise to avoid running Java unless absolutely necessary. A .eml
    file is what you want to watch for in these situations.

    - - Check your firewalls to ensure net bios traffic is not passing
    through them. This prevents share points from being accessed from
    outside your local network. Any networks using file sharing between
    geographical areas should be doing it via VPN.

    - - NIMDA Removal, Protection. Bugtraq has some suggestions, as do
    others in this business. The safest way to do this may be to minimize
    risk by taking the above steps and wait for your anti-virus vendor to
    field a removal solution. Because this worm insinuates itself into so
    many different files its safe removal is a tricky proposition.
    Suggested Reading:

    http://it.is.rice.edu/~rickr/safe/
    http://www.slipstick.com/outlook/antivirus.htm

    - -------------------------------------
    Attack Signatures - global IDS, midnight - midnight, previous day, %
    of total
    - -------------------------------------

    Suspicious Activity 44.70%
    Protocol Decode 27.14%
    Unauth Access Attempts 14.43%
    Denial Of Service 12.61%
    Pre-Attack Probe 01.13%
    Back Doors 00.00%

    - -------------------------------------
    Top Ten Destination Ports - global IDS, midnight - midnight, previous
    day, % of top ten (port assignments found at
    <http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers>
    - -------------------------------------

    80 (http) 97.52%
    25 (smtp) 01.28%
    21 (ftp) 00.62%
    443 (https) 00.17%
    139 (net bios) 00.16%
    53 (dns) 00.08%
    143 (imap) 00.06%
    2560 (labrat) 00.05%
    2065 (data link switch read) 00.04%
    12754 (unassigned) 00.04%

    - ---------------------------------------
    NOTE, DISCLAIMER AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE
    - ---------------------------------------

    NOTE: Our web site with this information in more attractive format and

    graphics is available to the public at no cost at
    <http://www.iss.net/> under "Global Internet Threat Intelligence
    Service". Screen
    captures (Control/PrtSc) of the site's pages dropped into PowerPoint
    can be an effective way to communicate various aspects of the Internet
    threat, e.g. the graph depicting "AlertCon Trends".

    We provide this information on Internet threat metrics, viruses,
    vulnerabilities, patches, and breaking news, in the spirit of PDD 63,
    to help security professionals wage the war against Internet threats
    more effectively. Information in this update derived primarily from
    global, real time, 24 x 7 IDS feeds, ISS X-Force R&D Team research,
    and professional liaison. Other sources as noted. AlertCon 1 reflects
    the global, malicious, determined, 24 x 7 attacks experienced by all
    networks. AlertCon 2 means increased vigilance/action recommended due
    to a specific threat or concern. AlertCon 3 means increased attacks
    against specific targets or vulnerabilities on a scale that is
    unusually high, action required. AlertCon 4 reflects an Internet
    emergency for a target or group of targets whose business continuity
    may depend on some sort of immediate, decisive action. All summaries
    cover 24 hours the previous workday, GMT. Monday summaries may cover
    some weekend activity.

    Copyright 2001 Internet Security Systems, Inc. Permission is granted
    for the redistribution of the Internet Threat Update electronically.
    It is not to be sold or edited in any way without express consent of
    ISS. Refer comments or questions to dtreeceiss.net
    <mailto:dtreeceiss.net>. Disclaimer: This information is subject to
    change without notice. Use of this information constitutes acceptance
    for use in an "as is" condition. There are no warranties with regard
    to this information. In no event shall the author be liable for any
    damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use or
    spread of this information. Any use of this information is at the
    user's own risk. No other use authorized. FOIA Exemption 4.

    Dennis
    Dennis Treece
    Director,
    Global MSS Special Operations Group
    Internet Security Systems (ISS)
    6303 Barfield Road
    Atlanta, Georgia 30328
    404-236-4065
    Cell 404-667-9345
    Fax 404-236-2626

    Internet Security Systems -- The Power to Protect

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