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Subject: Re: Another facet of Kerberos insecurity
From: Simon Wilkinson (sxw
dcs.ed.ac.uk)Date: Thu May 18 2000 - 15:38:05 CDT
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> malicious remote site (or compromised big site) could use insecurities in
> the Kerberos protocol to compromise clients connecting with these
> "kerberized" binaries?
Do you mean insecurities in the protocol, or insecurities in the MIT
implementation of the protocol? I took from your last post that the
MIT implementation was the one that you were referring to, and that
the krb-kth / heimdal implementation was OK. If you really believe
that there are insecurities _in the protocol_ then we're looking at
a much bigger can of worms.
Cheers,
Simon.
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