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Subject: Re: chroot() and capabilities
From: David Lang (david.langdigitalinsight.com)
Date: Fri Aug 11 2000 - 13:56:39 CDT

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one question about your approach.

in a standard chroot there are seperate copies of the binaries which means
that if someone gets into the sandbox and corrupts it it only affects taht
sandbox. in your scheme it sounds like they would corrupt other parts of
the system that use the same binary.

am I missing something here?

David Lang

 On Thu, 10 Aug 2000, Crispin Cowan
wrote:

> Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2000 13:20:32 -0700
> From: Crispin Cowan <crispinwirex.com>
> To: Chris Evans <chrisferret.lmh.ox.ac.uk>
> Cc: David A. Wagner <dawcs.berkeley.edu>, security-auditferret.lmh.ox.ac.uk
> Subject: Re: chroot() and capabilities
>
> Chris Evans wrote:
>
> > On 9 Aug 2000, David A. Wagner wrote:
> >
> > > (The tool is called Janus, and some out-of-date information can be found
> > > at http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/janus/.)
> >
> > Ah, Janus. I read about that a while ago. IIRC, it's about syscall
> > filtering.
> >
> > I think this is _very_ _very_ needed. I had no idea it was still in active
> > development, I was pondering the design of a "syscall firewall" recently
> > in fact.
> >
> > I'll explain why I believe some Janus-like facility is needed. Recently,
> > there has been increasing use of chroot() usage in daemons, e.g. statd,
> > telnetd (me), portmapper (Olaf) etc.
>
> We're working on something like that called SubDomain
> http://immunix.org/subdomain.html
>
> It's kind of like a flexible chroot on steriods. The major difference is
> that where chroot confines a program "by value" (need to copy everything it
> needs into the jail) SubDomain confines programs "by reference" (everything
> the program wants to touch is explicitly specified, along with RWX access
> modes). The idea is to make it feasible to wrap nearly everything that runs
> on a server in a SubDomain profile.
>
> Crispin
>
> --
> Crispin Cowan, Chief Scientist, WireX Communications, Inc. http://wirex.com
> Free Hardened Linux Distribution: http://immunix.org
>
>
>

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