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Subject: RE: [suse-security] SuSE: traceroute
From: bolo
lupa.deDate: Mon Oct 02 2000 - 05:52:59 CDT
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Hi,
according to bugtraq post from Chris Evans (chris
ferret.lmh.ox.ac.uk) from
Sep. 29th traceroute version 1.4a5 seems to be vulnerable; Chris Evans wrote:
"VERSIONS AFFECTED
=================
(Where LBNL = Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory)
Affected: LBNL 1.4a5
Safe: LBNL 1.4a7
Safe: RedHat7.0 traceroute (1.4a5 + a patch)
[...]
First, some background reading, namely Solar Designer's excellent
discussion on the generic exploitation of heap overflows;
http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/71598
The discussion shows nicely how heap mismanagement is fatal. However,
overflowing a malloc()'ed buffer is not the only bad thing you can do to
the heap. In the case of traceroute, there was a reliable way of making
traceroute call free() on a pointer that was not obtained with malloc().
This flaw in traceroute (if your version is vulnerable) is tickled like
this:
traceroute -g 1 -g 1 (I think it didn't need a hostname)
Segmentation fault
Looking at the code, there is a file "savestr.c", which contains a
function savestr(). This savestr() function is essentially a
strdup() function, but with the difference that an attempt is made to cut
down on the number of malloc() calls. This is accomplished by malloc()'ing
a large block and handing out pointers _inside_ this block as savestr() is
repeatedly called."
The traceroute version we use on several of our boxes running SuSE 6.0 -> 6.2
(1.4a5) segfaults by issuing the traceroute command line mentioned above. Is
this (SuSE-)traceroute version really unsusceptible of being exploited with
some piece of evil code? Why?
Boris
---On 01-Oct-00 Roman Drahtmueller wrote: > Hi, > > SuSE ships a different implementation of traceroute in the distributions. > It is not susceptible to the attacks as mentioned by other Linux vendors. > > Regards, > Roman Drahtmüller. > -- > - - >| Roman Drahtmüller <draht
suse.de> "Caution: Cape does not | > SuSE GmbH - Security enable user to fly." >| Nürnberg, Germany (Batman Costume warning label) | [...]
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