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From: Microsoft (0_37890_0F0B756C-5457-6C40-B1BF-B4CDDD1694B1_US_at_Newsletters.Microsoft.com)
Date: Thu Oct 03 2002 - 00:06:18 CDT

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    - ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    Title: Unchecked Buffer in Windows Help Facility Could
                Enable Code Execution (Q323255)
    Date: 02 October 2002
    Software: Microsoft Windows 98
                Microsoft Windows 98 Second Edition
                Microsoft Windows Millennium Edition
                Microsoft Windows NT 4.0
                Microsoft Windows NT 4.0, Terminal Server Edition
                Microsoft Windows 2000
                Microsoft Windows XP
    Impact: Attacker could gain control over user's system
    Max Risk: Critical
    Bulletin: MS02-055

    Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletin at:
    http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-055.asp.
    - ----------------------------------------------------------------------

    Issue:
    ======
    The HTML Help facility in Windows includes an ActiveX control that
    provides much of its functionality. One of the functions exposed via
    the control contains an unchecked buffer, which could be exploited by
    a web page hosted on an attacker's site or sent to a user as an HTML
    mail. An attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability would
    be able to run code in the security context of the user, thereby
    gaining the same privileges as the user on the system.

    A second vulnerability exists because of flaws associated with the
    handling of compiled HTML Help (.chm) files that contain shortcuts.
    Because shortcuts allow HTML Help files to take any desired action on
    the system, only trusted HTML Help files should be allowed to use
    them. Two flaws allow this restriction to be bypassed. First, the
    HTML Help facility incorrectly determines the Security Zone in the
    case where a web page or HTML mail delivers a .chm file to the
    Temporary Internet Files folder and subsequently opens it. Instead of
    handling the .chm file in the correct zone - the one associated with
    the web page or HTML mail that delivered it - the HTML Help facility
    incorrectly handles it in the Local Computer Zone, thereby
    considering it trusted and allowing it to use shortcuts. This error
    is compounded by the fact that the HTML Help facility doesn't
    consider what folder the content resides in. Were it to do so, it
    could recover from the first flaw, as content within the Temporary
    Internet Folder is clearly not trusted, regardless of the Security
    Zone it renders in.

    The attack scenario for this vulnerability would be complex, and
    involves using an HTML mail to deliver a .chm file that contains a
    shortcut, then making use of the flaws to open it and allow the
    shortcut to execute. The shortcut would be able to perform any action
    the user had privileges to perform on the system.

    Before deploying the patch, customers should familiarize themselves
    with the caveats discussed in the FAQ and in the Caveats section
    below.

    Mitigating Factors:
    ====================
    Buffer Overrun in HTML Help ActiveX Control:
     - The HTML mail-based attack vector could not be exploited on
       systems where Outlook 98 or Outlook 2000 were used in conjunction
       with the Outlook Email Security Update, or Outlook Express 6 or
       Outlook 2002 were used in their default configurations.
     - The vulnerability would convey only the user's privileges on
       the system. Users whose accounts are configured to have few
       privileges on the system would be at less risk than ones who
       operate with administrative privileges.

    Code Execution via Compiled HTML Help File:
     - The vulnerability could only be exploited if the attacker
       were able to determine the exact location of the Temporary
       Internet Files folder. By design, this should not be possible, and
       Microsoft is unaware of any means for doing so which has not
       already been patched.
     - The vulnerability would convey only the user's privileges on
       the system. Users whose accounts are configured to have few
       privileges on the system would be at less risk than ones who
       operate with administrative privileges.

    Risk Rating:
    ============
     - Internet systems: Moderate
     - Intranet systems: Moderate
     - Client systems: Critical

    Patch Availability:
    ===================
     - A patch is available to fix this vulnerability. Please read the
       Security Bulletin at
       http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms02-055.asp
       for information on obtaining this patch.

    Acknowledgment:
    ===============
     - David Litchfield of Next Generation Security Software Ltd.
       (http://www.nextgenss.com/)and Thor Larholm, Security Researcher,
       PivX Solutions, LLC (http://www.pivx.com) for reporting the
       Buffer Overrun in HTML Help ActiveX Control.

    - ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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