OSEC

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From: Tim.Newshamguardent.com
Date: Tue Mar 13 2001 - 16:39:30 CST

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    -----Original Message-----
    From: Tim Newsham
    Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2001 5:34 PM
    To: kmlgecko.nas.nasa.gov
    Subject: FW: clip from netbsd mailing list

    Hi, I'm not on the mailing list, I received a copy of this indirectly.
     
    NetBSD is not vulnerable to attacks I outlined, as far as my analysis
    of your stack was able to tell (from -current sources)
     
    The parameter used for RFC1948 need not be randomly generated
    at boot time. I was actually wondering if this violates the intent.
    Shouldnt
    ISN values exist in the same space across reboots? I'm not sure.
    Anyway, the TCP secret could be generated once and stored in the
    filesystem. If they are generated at boot time, it could be done using
    entropy stored in the filesystem from previous boots. To accomplish
    this, the TCP secret would have to be set from userland, requiring an
    ioctl or something similar. Previous entropy could be read from
    data stored during the previous incarnation, and mixed with whatever
    entropy can be gathered from the newly running system and passed
    into the kernel early during the system startup (prior to bringing up
    any interfaces).
     
     
    -----Original Message-----
    From: Jerry Brady
    Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2001 5:24 PM
    To: Tim Newsham
    Subject: clip from netbsd mailing list

    <!--StartFragment-->From
    tech-security-owner-tech-security-archive=mail-archive.netbsd.orgNetBSD.ORG
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    To: perrypiermont.com
    cc: Luke Mewburn <lukemconnect.com.au>, tech-securityNetBSD.ORG
    Subject: Re: NFS file handles are guessable.
    In-reply-to: Your message of "Fri, 07 Mar 1997 11:58:14 EST."
                 <199703071658.LAA09575jekyll.piermont.com>
    Date: Fri, 07 Mar 1997 09:26:53 -0800
    From: "Kevin M. Lahey" <kmlnas.nasa.gov>
    Sender: tech-security-ownerNetBSD.ORG
    Precedence: list
    Delivered-To: tech-securityNetBSD.ORG

    In message <199703071658.LAA09575jekyll.piermont.com>"Perry E. Metzger"
    writes
    >What we really desperately need is a /dev/random...

    Absolutely. I was looking at the changes necessary to generate a more
    random ISS for TCP connections (RFC1948). It was relatively easy to
    add the code to generate the ISS, but generating a random enough
    seed value looked really tough. It seemed especially ugly because
    the seed was required pretty early on in the boot process, before
    there was a chance to sample alot of OS events to get some randomness.

    Any ideas or plans to add /dev/random? It sure would make things
    easier.

    Kevin

    Jerry Brady
    VP, Research & Development
    W: 212.937.2183 F: 212.937.2183 M: 646.279.7328
    75 Third Avenue, Waltham, MA, 02451
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