OSEC

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From: Jeremy C. Reed (reedreedmedia.net)
Date: Fri Jun 15 2001 - 15:36:36 CDT

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    I didn't see any news about the Guninski OpenBSD security advisory related
    to NetBSD.

    "A race condition exists in the kernel execve(2) implementation that
    opens a small window of vulnerability for a non-privileged us er to
    ptrace(2) attach to a suid/sgid process." (From OpenBSD's errata.)

    "By forking a few process it is possible to attach to +s pid with ptrace.
    The process seems to be in a strange state when it is attached.
    Contrary to the man info PT_DETACH allows specifying an address to which
    execution is continued." (From Guninski.)

    It appears the NetBSD kern_exec code is slightly different -- using
    lockmgr() -- than OpenBSDs.

    And from trying the http://www.guninski.com/vvopenbsd.c exploit, I don't
    see anything happening (no root) on my NetBSD 1.5.1_ALPHA (i386) system
    (other than when I ran it a few times, my load went to 25+, but system was
    still usable even though slow). I did notice that the rxvt windows I was
    in exited a few times after saying exit.

    Can anyone confirm if this problem exists in NetBSD?

    The exploit uses su -- is this exploit doable for users not in the wheel
    group?

       Jeremy C. Reed
       http://www.reedmedia.net/