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From: Greg A. Woods (woodsweird.com)
Date: Fri Jul 13 2001 - 17:50:11 CDT

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    [ On Saturday, July 14, 2001 at 07:02:54 (+1000), matthew green wrote: ]
    > Subject: re: i386 IO access and chroot()
    >
    > With == 2 it is difficult.
    >
    > this case is much more interesting. i don't believe's possible.

    If I'm not mistaken there are already some papers suggesting methods...

    Indeed many of the existing methods I've seen documented are blocked by
    preventing all new mounts when securelevel>=2.....

    However I don't think mknod(2) is disabled at securelevel>=2 yet, and it
    probably should be, though you can work around that by putting the
    chroot jail on a filesystem mounted with 'nodev' (and maybe 'nosuid'
    too!).

    I think there could still be holes in lesser used facilities like /proc,
    so leaving it mounted in view of the chroot area may be a mistake...

    Various device drivers may have issues, so if there are any device nodes
    visible in the chroot area.... ('nodev' and/or no mknod()....)

    If there are any more buffer-overflow style vulnerabilities in the
    kernel then that's another potential avenue of escape.....

    I don't know if anyone's explored the possibilities of (ab)using
    networking services from within the chroot jail yet either....

    -- 
    							Greg A. Woods
    

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