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From: Greg A. Woods (woodsweird.com)
Date: Sat Jul 14 2001 - 21:28:37 CDT

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    [ On Saturday, July 14, 2001 at 21:19:49 (-0400), Michael Richardson wrote: ]
    > Subject: Re: i386 IO access and chroot()
    >
    > 4. bind < 1024
    > 5. network operations, period

    I don't yet fully understand the implications, but I'm very leary about
    allowing non-root users to do anything like this under any
    circumstances.

    Take for example SSH. If you get right down to the brass tacks, SSH
    requires you to trust the OS and hardware at each end of the connection
    (which of course implies that you can trust them to have done the
    authentication, but that's a separate issue). As I understand the Unix
    security model in combination with the SSH protocol this means that SSH
    must run as root on both ends and the initial use of a TCP port less
    than 1024 is key to the web of trust built up as SSH establishes the
    authenticity of the hosts and users at each end. I.e. part of the
    protocol assumes that only _the_ trusted superuser on the remote system
    could have bound the socket to the port it did.

    By adding some kind of access control mechanism that allows non-root
    users to do "trusted" network operations you are shouldering
    responsibilities onto non-root users and I'm not so sure you should be.

    -- 
    							Greg A. Woods
    

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