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From: Michael Richardson (mcrsandelman.ottawa.on.ca)
Date: Sat Jul 14 2001 - 22:36:28 CDT

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    >>>>> "Greg" == Greg A Woods <woodsweird.com> writes:
        Greg> [ On Saturday, July 14, 2001 at 21:19:49 (-0400), Michael
        Greg> Richardson wrote: ]
    >> Subject: Re: i386 IO access and chroot()
    >>
    >> 4. bind < 1024 5. network operations, period

        Greg> I don't yet fully understand the implications, but I'm very leary
        Greg> about allowing non-root users to do anything like this under any
        Greg> circumstances.

      I want to restrict *root* in a *jail* from binding less than 1024.

        Greg> Take for example SSH. If you get right down to the brass tacks,
        Greg> SSH requires you to trust the OS and hardware at each end of the
        Greg> connection (which of course implies that you can trust them to have

      Sure.

        Greg> done the authentication, but that's a separate issue). As I
        Greg> understand the Unix security model in combination with the SSH
        Greg> protocol this means that SSH must run as root on both ends and the
        Greg> initial use of a TCP port less than 1024 is key to the web of trust

      No.

      SSH can emulate "rhost" <1024 stuff if you insist. That is not the default.
      You can permit RhostRSA to use RSA to authenticate hosts. That depends upon
    access to /etc/ssh_host_key, which is why ssh client is often setuid. This
    also is often not the default. (although setuid ssh has been the default in
    the past).
      Most use of ssh does not require any of this.

        Greg> By adding some kind of access control mechanism that allows
        Greg> non-root users to do "trusted" network operations you are
        Greg> shouldering responsibilities onto non-root users and I'm not so
        Greg> sure you should be.

      My goal is further restricting even root.

    ] ON HUMILITY: to err is human. To moo, bovine. | firewalls [
    ] Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works, Ottawa, ON |net architect[
    ] mcrsandelman.ottawa.on.ca http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ |device driver[
    ] panic("Just another NetBSD/notebook using, kernel hacking, security guy"); [