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From: Frederick Bruckman (fredb_at_immanent.net)
Date: Wed Oct 23 2002 - 12:10:54 CDT

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    On Wed, 23 Oct 2002, Todd Vierling wrote:

    > On Wed, 23 Oct 2002, Alistair Crooks wrote:
    >
    > : And I will jump in and say that it is really pax's problem. This is
    > : because (a) a lot of the distfiles that we use in pkgsrc come with
    > : symbolic links with ".." in them,
    >
    > Symbolic links whose *content* contains "../" are not the same thing as file
    > entries in a tar file whose *filename* contains "../".
    >
    > The former should be unconditionally allowed by pax, as the default is to
    > unlink before creating; there's no risk of overwriting files outside the
    > destination tree, even if a created symlink points outside the destination
    > tree.

    You know, that makes sense. So what's all the hoopla about? Can
    someone who's privy to the pax/tar maintainer's discussion refute that?

    It also occurs to me that there are no security implications to
    creating archives with symlinks. Calling that a security hole is on
    the same level as claiming that the very existence of "tcpdump" is a
    security breach.

    > The latter should be unconditionally disallowed by pax, as it's beyond bad
    > form and is already warned about by GNU tar.

    Frederick