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From: Frederick Bruckman (fredb_at_immanent.net)
Date: Sun Oct 27 2002 - 18:25:44 CST

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    On Sun, 27 Oct 2002, Greg A. Woods wrote:

    > [ On Saturday, October 26, 2002 at 11:17:32 (-0400), Todd Vierling wrote: ]
    > > Subject: Re: tar ignores filenames that contain `..'
    > >
    > > 2. For each entry being extracted, warn and skip file if any intervening
    > > path component is a symlink in the filesystem. (This catches both extant
    > > symlinks *and* those created by pax.)
    >
    > Hmmm.... I _think_ that's a good idea. However if I'm not mistaken
    > implementing it in a truly secure (race-free) way in conjunction with
    > 'tar -p' (or 'pax -p [oe]', or 'cpio -i' as root (without -R should it
    > be implemented)), at least when the directory was not created fresh from
    > the archive and even then unless setting of directory permissions is
    > held until the end, without additional kernel support will require some
    > extra work...

    Considering that the *threat* is of a malicious archive being
    downloaded from the internet, what chance is there to exploit a race
    condition while the archive is being extracted?

    Frederick